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SUMMARY 
Historically South African law has been dominated by Western law. Indigenous law and 
the jural postulates which underpin that law are insufficiently accommodated in the 
South African legal order. The Western component of the official legal system is 
regarded as institutionally and politically superior and is as such perceived to be the 
dominant system. In contrast indigenous law is regarded as a servient system. The 
monopolistic control of the legal order by the Western section of the population 
resulted in the creation of a legal order primarily suited to its own needs. 
The fact that few of the values of indigenous law are reflected in the official legal 
system and the fact that there is a measure of conflict and tension between the 
fundamental precepts of indigenous law and those of Western law, gave rise to a crisis 
of legitimacy of the official legal system in South Africa. This in turn lead to the 
emergence of unofficial alternative structures for the administration of justice. 
Indigenous law should receive full recognition and enjoy the same status as Western 
law. To accomplish this, legislative measures which entrench a distorted indigenous 
law, limit the application of indigenous law, or affect its status in the South African legal 
order, should be revoked. 
Even in a multicultural society such as that of South Africa, there is a common nucleus 
of core values that are shared by the whole society. But different cultures have 
different conceptions of these basic values and their role in legal, political and social 
ordering. The Bill of Rights should give due recognition to the postulates which 
underscore both Western and indigenous law. This should be done by providing that 
the values the Bill entrenches, must be interpreted in their proper cultural perspective 
where circumstances so demand. But this will be possible only if the level of 
knowledge of indigenous law and its fundamental precepts is drastically improved. 
Key terms: indigenous law; indigenous courts; people's courts; community courts; 
people's justice; colonial law; pre-colonial indigenous law; jural postulates; legal 
pluralism; legitimacy; Interim Constitution; Bill of Rights; value-systems. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1 Terminology 
2 Nature of the Problem 
3 Method of Presentation 
1 TERMINOLOGY 
Various terms are used to denote the legal systems applicable in South Africa. In this 
thesis the following terms are of importance: "official law", "unofficial law", "State law", 
"Western law", "official indigenous law", "unofficial indigenous law", "pre-colonial 
indigenous law" and "living or'people's law". The South African legal order comprises 
official law and unofficial law. The most important components of official law assessed 
in this investigation are State law and official indigenous law. State law is regarded as 
law which emanates from, and is supported or authorised by the highest political 
authority in the country. On th~t_QflELhand,__StaJa.law _ _refers to the South African 
----- •-··-~-n•>-~-·-··-.----·~-----~-·--A~---------------
com_r!}_~m la~L!_t:l_?.!J~ ... B9Ql?.11:~utch law as influenced by English law and adapted and 
•-"-~- ·- • ~ -~"-"'"""""'~~~-,,_ __ ,,,~"__,.,..~"~'=cc-··--~,~,,..,..,_..~~,~·------~~--•--' 
develope,d through jljcjicial decisiot'ls and legislation. On the other hand it refers to 
indig_~~gus law i[IC()!POrated i.otolegi~l~tiori, or pronounced in judicial decisions. The 
former component of State law is referred to as "Western law", the latter as "official 
indigenous law". Official indigenous law further includes indigenous law which is 
indirectly recognised and supported by the State, but which has not_ yet been 
incorporated into State law through judicial decision or legislation. 
Also various terms are used to denote the i~nous legal syst!ms currently 
applicable in Africa. Although there are various such systems applicable in South 
Africa, they reveal sufficient similarity with regard to structure, technique and ideology 
to be regarded as a single family of law - hence "indigenous law" and not "indigenous 
laws". The term which is most commonly used is "customary law". However, this term 
equates species with genus, because indigenous African law is partly customary and 
partly statutory in origin. The term "traditional law" is not acceptable because it does 
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not do justice to the dynamic nature of indigenous law. "African law" has become a 
generic term for law of the African continent. It comprises indigenous law or those 
remnants of it which are still applied, those laws of religious and cognate origins which 
are recognised by African States, laws and judicial institutions introduced by colonial 
powers and the laws and decrees of independent African States. "Autochthonous law" 
or "indigenous law" seems to be more appropriate terms to use. In Roget's Thesaurus 
"indigenous" and "autochthonous" are classified under "inhabitant-native" and under 
"intrinsically-intrinsic". According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary these terms mean 
"produced naturally in a region: belonging naturally" and "sprung from the land itself". 
"Autochthonous law" is not commonly used and therefore "indigenous law", a simpler 
and more popular term, is preferred to denote the indigenous law of Southern Africa. 
The unofficial (or living) law of importance in this thesis, is "people's law", "indigenous 
law" and "pre-colonial indigenous law". People's law is generated by the community 
through unofficial dispute-resolution institutions. This law displays many similarities with 
indigenous law and is to an extent consonant with indigenous jural postulates. 
Pre-colonial law is the purest form of indigenous law which has not yet been adapted 
or distorted. It is not officially recognised as a system, but is to an extent applied by 
unofficial indigenous institutions in the rural areas, and also unofficially by 
State-recognised institutions such as the Chiefs' Courts. Generally indigenous law 
refers to pre-colonial law which has been adapted in accordance with its underlying 
postulates. It is natural that official indigenous law, unofficial indigenous law and 
pre-colonial indigenous law are to a large extent similar, but it should be borne in mind 
that there are also fundamental differences. 
2 NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
Indigenous law and the jural postulates which underpin that law are insufficiently 
accommodated in the South African legal order. The Western law is regarded as 
institutionally and politically superior and is as such perceived to be the dominant 
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system whilst indigenous law is regarded as a servient system. Over the years, the 
interaction between Western and indigenous law has been directed by this perceived 
superiority and dominance of the Western component of the law. The fact that few of 
the values of indigenous law are reflected in the official legal system and the fact that 
there is a measure of conflict and tension between the fundamental precepts of 
indigenous law and western law, gave rise to the cultural legitimacy crisis of the official 
legal system in South Africa. 
Throughg_l}JJbahistor¥-,ot~tt+.Atrica!here..hadJ::>~en very little reciprocal influence 
'. ,, ··- -~·, _______ ,,_..,,_, ' , . ,, "' ''"""' '"''" .,..,~,,,,,"",.~-·>-·•---""'"~---- .. -.-.......,....... .,.._. 
between the indig~!lQl,,J.~ g1Jc::l_YV~~!~Tn~$:L~J~rn§.9Ll.~~--!~?tt are applied in this country. . 
·--~-~-------- --~-·m~---~•R ' '' ~,.,.~ .... ,_,,_., ..... ,._.,,....,,_,._,_,,.,."'<..,.__,_...,...,.,...,_.~.,., .. .-....,,_,.,.,..__~ ... ...-· 
Indigenous law was mostly ignored or distorted by th~ courts. cmd .!he l~~i.slature. The 
superiority of the Western law still directs the practical relationship between the two 
systems of law, even today after the implementation of a new interim Constitution. 
The dominance of Western law dates back to the time when Roman-Dutch law was 
superimposed upon the indigenous legal systems of Southern Africa. Although it is 
generally believed that Roman-Dutch law was transplanted in the Cape (because it is 
erroneously assumed that there existed no sophisticated legal system in this country 
at that time), there was originally not a transplantation. There was also no reception, 1 
because there was no desire by the local people, nor any degree of consciousness 
and voluntariness on their part to receive foreign law. 2 
Although legal effect is given to certain institutions of other communities (such as 
Hindu and Muslim populations), 3 indigenous law is the law that was originally 
applicable in this country and the only legal system other than the Western system 
which is, albeit to a limited extent, officially recognised. The fact that a multiplicity of 
The only reception that took place in South Africa was the reception of English law into the 
existing Roman-Dutch law which started with the first occupation of the Cape by the British. 
2 Van Niekerk "Indigenous Law" 34. 
3 Hindu and Islamic family law are not officially recognised: see Hacq Nadvi 13-24. 
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legal systems exist and are observed, gives rise to legal pluralism in South Africa. 
Legal pluralism has been variedly interpreted. In a narrow sense it presupposes that 
various legal systems, which are officially recognised, apply in a territory. The 
relationship between the systems of law, is based on equality. 4 In a wide sense it is 
the observation of various official and unofficial laws in a territory. 
True legal pluralism in the narrow sense of the word does not exist in South Africa 
because the Western law is regarded as the dominant system whilst indigenous law 
is seen as the servient system. This perception flows from an ethos of legal positivism 
which has directed jurisprudence in South Africa for many years. Within a positivistic 
framework, law is monist and consists of those norms that are created and sanctioned 
by official State organs in accordance with a basic rule of recognition or a grundnorm. 
The possible co-existence of a variety of unofficial legal systems is denied and 
unofficial laws are regarded as culturally inferior. 
In a wider sense, legal pluralism should be regarded as a factual situation which exists 
in a social field in which various legal systems are observed; a situation which is not 
dependent on State recognition of the various legal systems. Official recognition of 
certain legal systems and non-recognition of others have no effect on the factual 
existence of legal pluralism; each simply determines the status of the legal systems 
which are officially and unofficially observed in a territory. Legal pluralism is a result of 
cultural pluralism. Whereas official legal pluralism exists where the State recognises a 
variety of legal systems, real or "deep" legal pluralism comprises the observance of 
various legal systems in a legal order - some of which are officially recognised and 
others which are unofficially applied although not officially recognised. s But whether 
one regards it as true pluralism or official pluralism, in this country the Western 
component of the official law is still regarded to be dominant and superior. 
4 In this sense it would perhaps be better to speak of legal dualism, seeing that there are only two 
systems which are officially recognised. 
5 Prinsloo "Regspluralisme· 696; Reyntjens "Future" 5-7. 
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This thesis involves a historical and comparative analysis of the interaction between 
indigenous and Western law. 
In Part I the historical facts which lead to a situation of deep legal pluralism are 
investigated in order to establish first which systems of law are observed in this 
country, and secondly, to establish why the interaction between these laws is 
characterised by the dominance of the Western law. The reason for this dominance 
is perceived to lie in the supposed superiority of the Western culture in South Africa. 
This perception is but a reflection of a broader cultural chauvinism prevalent in the 
Western world in general. The exaggerated belief in the hegemony of Western culture 
is evinced by the fact that the Western world indisputably accepts that Europe is the 
cradle of civilisation. 
The reasons for the assumption that African history commenced no earlier than the 
colonial period and the concomitant denial of pre-colonial African history are 
investigated in this thesis. The lack of interest in pre-colonial and preliterate law in 
Africa is discussed and reference is made to methods to establish preliterate history 
and law through oral traditions. Attention is focused on the different approaches to 
research in indigenous law and to the viability of explaining preliterate cultural concepts 
in a Western language. 
The basic principles of pre-colonial indigenous law, regarded as the purest form of that 
law, is explained by analogy with known Western legal concepts. This is done to 
enable a feasible comparison between the two systems and to render the explanation 
intelligible to the reader unfamiliar with indigenous law. Pre-colonial law is discussed 
to establish the extent to which it has been influenced by the interaction with Western 
law and specifically by the dominant position of Western law, as well as the extent to 
which it has digressed from its underlying postulates. 
The role of the State (through legislation) and of the State courts (through the judicial 
application of indigenous law and in resolving internal conflict of laws situations) in the 
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development of official and unofficial indigenous law is appraised. The appearance of 
people's law and institutions are seen as a natural consequence of the legitimacy crisis 
of the official law. The development of official, Western and indigenous law and 
unofficial law is traced through the walk of history. The course of the interaction 
between these laws is followed from the colonial period to 1994. The new political 
dispensation which commenced in April 1994, in theory removed the political reasons 
for the dominance of Western law and for the legitimacy crisis. This period is treated 
in Part II because the changed circumstances are believed to have paved the way for 
a fundamental change in the relationship between the applicable legal systems in 
South Africa and in prevailing attitudes towards the status of indigenous law. 
In Part II the emphasis is on a comparison of the jural postulates which underlie 
Western and indigenous law respectively. A comparative-jurisprudential study is 
undertaken of the jural postulates upon which the legal systems under investigation 
rest. First a theoretical explanation is provided of the way in which the different laws 
which developed over an extended period and which are observed in this country, fit 
into the larger scheme of the South African legal order. The reasons are investigated 
why the historical dominance of the official law and Western jurisprudence gave rise 
to a legitimacy crisis in the legal order. Because legitimacy is viewed within the 
framework of a fundamental value consensus of the greater section of the community, 
this part of the thesis concentrates on the value systems which underlie the applicable 
laws. These values are reflected in the jural postulates or basic axioms which form the 
starting point for legal reasoning in the different systems of law. Attention is also 
focused on the legal traditions upon which these postulates are founded. The 
invariable characteristics of the legal systems, the result of the legal traditions in which 
they are founded, are explained. Here again the purest form of indigenous law, 
unadulterated by external influences, namely pre-colonial law, is employed to extract 
the underlying postulates. But this does not imply that indigenous law is static. 
Indigenous legal norms have changed in line with its underlying postulates, but they 
have at the same time also been distorted through judicial application, legislation, 
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insufficient knowledge of personnel who apply it, and even by traditional leaders who 
saw their power dwindling and sought to regain it by distorting the indigenous law. 
Finally, the relevance of the interim Constitution is discussed, and specifically the Bill 
of Rights, in the practical application of indigenous law. Here some examples of official 
and pre-colonial indigenous law are taken to illustrate the conflict which exists between 
Western and indigenous values. The legitimacy of the official legal system is again 
appraised in light of the new political dispensation and proposals are made regarding 
the status of indigenous law, internal conflicts management and possible solutions to 
the conflicts between the values and legal postulates that underlie the various legal 
systems. 
3 APPROACH AND METHOD OF PRESENTATION 
The method of research employed for this study to some extent accords with the 
"quantitative" research approach of the human sciences. This approach comprises a 
scientific study and analysis of existing literature to reach reasoned conclusions. 6 
The literature consulted for present purposes, includes legal text books and articles, 
legislation, anthropological writings, published and unpublished criminological and legal 
field-research reports, and, to a limited extent, judicial decisions. 
For a number of reasons only very limited attention is paid to judicial decisions on 
' indigenous law. The objective of this thesis is not to compare Western and indigenous 
legal norms as they are applied in the courts, but to assess the influence of the 
interaction between these systems on their respective development. On the one hand 
it has to be established to what extent this interaction has been causing the indigenous 
law to fall out of step with its underlying jural postulates and on the other hand it has 
to be established how it affected the legitimacy of the official legal system. 
6 See, eg, Church Marriage 3. 
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For this purpose, the focus is on the jural postulates which underlie the law and not 
on the actual legal norms. To determine what these postulates are, the purest possible 
form of indigenous law, namely pre-colonial law, is employed and this makes it 
necessary to rely on anthropological and legal-anthropological material. Judicial 
decisions often reflect a distorted form of indigenous law and are therefore an 
unreliable source when the true underlying postulates are to be ascertained. 
Because legitimacy is reflected in a value consensus of the majority of the community, 
jural values of the two legal systems must be compared to establish to what extent 
there is a disparity between them. Jural values are expressed in jural postulates. 
Although it is impossible to give a comprehensive list of the jural postulates which 
underscore the Western and indigenous law, some examples from both legal systems 
are compared to establish the extent to which they differ, overlap or are reconcilable. 
For this purpose too, only limited use can be made of judicial decisions. 
Published material on living or people's law is limited and it is for various reasons 
difficult to do field research in the metropolitan areas. All possible information 
concerning alternative dispute-resolution institutions, including unpublished reports and 
conference proceedings, are therefore used to research this phenomenon. 
There are different approaches to the study and analysis of preliterate laws and 
institutions. In this thesis pre-colonial law is explained by analogy with Western 
dogmatic devices. This is necessary because a comparative analysis of indigenous law 
and Western law is undertaken, with a view to law reform. It is further necessary 
because official indigenous law has been adapted to incorporate some Western 
concepts, for example individual ownership. However, the true nature of indigenous 
law is always borne in mind and the postulates underlying indigenous law form the 
basis of the framework within which indigenous law is explained. 
Statements of indigenous legal norms are in the historic present. Where necessary 
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reference is made to changes in that law. However, the emphasis is on the underlying 
postulates and it is not always necessary to trace all possible distortions or adaptions 
which have taken place. These are referred to, where necessary, to illustrate why 
official indigenous law is sometimes in conflict with its jural postulates and how it can 
be reformed to reconcile it with these postulates, often, in the process removing the 
source of conflict with Western law. 
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PART I 
HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL PLURALISM 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
CHAPTER I 
PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA - SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS1 
Introduction 
2 History and Oral Traditions in Pre-colonial Africa 
3 Legal Systems and Oral Traditions 
4 Summary 
1 INTRODUCTION 
For many years, Western culture has been dominated by a spirit of cultural chauvinism 
which denied Africa a place in world history, in the origin of civilisation, and in world 
thought. All merited cultural attributes claimed by Africa have been ascribed to 
European or Asian influence. Because of its pre-literate nature, Africa has even been 
denied a history and a law of its own. In this spirit, East and West are found to be 
characterised by progressive civilisation and Africa by primitive barbarism. 
It is often taken for granted that the cradle of the civilised world lies in Europe. When 
Charles Darwin reflected that our forefathers may have originated from the African 
continent, the Victorian world was shocked. When the oldest hominid fossil, between 
one and three million years old, was discovered in 1924 in the Northern Cape in South 
What follows has been gleaned from various sources, amongst others the following: Saunders 
11-19, Keita 59-66, Oleta 79-80, Olivier & Fage 13-30, Rowe 170-173, Curtin 5-9 14-35 39-42 
63-66, Temu & Swai 22-23, Nothling 6-9 12-15 36-39 49-54, Paden & Soja 69-80, Spaulding & 
Kapteijns 1-7, Olivier & Atmore 15 23-25, Omer-Cooper 1-16 26-30, Temu & Swai 23. 
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Africa and identified by Raymond Dart as a link in the line of man's ancestry, this was 
not accepted as such by the world at large. Although many questions today still 
remain unanswered, Africa's role in the origin of mankind has been verified by 
archaeological discoveries and sound scientific research. Studies in the pre-history of 
Africa have established the fact that the continent was never far behind in the 
development of the human race and that it had in fact been in the lead in the 
palaeolithic or Old Stone Age. It has been established that between 90 000 and one 
million years ago Africans started using fire; that between 27 000 and 25 000 years 
ago rock paintings were made in Namibia; that the San2 hunter-gatherers, whose 
descendants still live in the Kalahari, and who are by some regarded as the ancestors 
of the Khoikhoi, were widely dispersed over Southern Africa at least 14 000 years ago; 
that agriculture, as opposed to hunting and gathering was first practised South of the 
Sahara between 7000 and 4000 years ago; that the iron-age man emerged in 
Northern-Africa 3000 years ago; that communities practising metal work and pottery 
settled South of the Sahara 2500 years ago; and that the San who turned to stock 
farming 2300 years ago became known as the Khoikhoi. 
This attitude of cultural chauvinism3 makes it equally difficult for the Western world to 
accept that Africa may have had some influence on European cultures and world 
thought. Thus, even those who acknowledge Egypt as the cradle of Greek 
philosophical thought, often regard it as part of Eastern civilisation and thus classify 
it together with Turkish, Chinese, Indian and Japanese cultures. However, 
cultural-historical research has revealed that Egypt, which was strongly influenced by 
Ethiopian culture, indeed falls within the matrix of African culture and thought. Egypt 
and Ethiopia are considered to be the most important African cultures of antiquity. 
There is evidence that Egyptian ancestry may be traced back to the Somalians and 
2 Because there is no generally accepted alternative, the word ·san• is commonly used by 
academics. However, the San them~ves regard the term as derogatory: see Vorster -rowery" 
70. 
3 A phrase coined by Curtin 5. See generally Curtin 2-9. 
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the Masais, who currently inhabit Tanzania and Kenya, 4 and archaeological finds have 
revealed that Ethiopia may have been populated by the San in prehistoric times. 
The historical link between Africa and Europe is further evidenced by the fact that the 
inhabitants of Crete, considered to be the origin of the hellenistic culture, originally 
came from Africa - from Western Ethiopia. They roamed the Sahara until, in 2500 BC 
they were driven by drought to the regions surrounding the Mediterranean Sea. Crete 
had strong trade links with Egypt and flourished as a trading centre until it was 
overpowered by the semi-barbarous Greeks. 
On a smaller scale but in the same chauvinistic vein, the advent of Europeans on 
South African soil is described as the starting point of that country's history. Only 
recently have scholars begun paying attention to the existence of an established 
civilisation South of the Sahara before the colonial invasion of the region. Whilst the 
colonial period should not be regarded as the starting point of African history, it should 
nevertheless be kept in mind that it introduced a new age of change and development 
to Africa. As a rule, the South African legal system is today considered to be rooted 
in Europe; Western law is considered to be the common law of this country. The 
reality of various legal systems which have grown and developed for many centuries 
prior to the infiltration of Europeans has been ignored to the extent that those legal 
systems are presently only regarded as secondary legal systems. As will be explained 
below, not even a new constitutional dispensation has effected any change in the 
superiority and dominance of the Western component of the official law. 
4 According to Nothling 23-24 Egyptian ancestry also had elements of European stock. 
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2 HISTORY AND ORAL TRADITIONS5 IN PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA6 
Until the 1950's pre-colonial1 history in Africa was a much neglected topic in historical 
research. Three reasons may be advanced why historians chose not to research the 
unwritten history of Africa. First, history was considered to be the study of human 
change and achievement and Africa was perceived to present only a "monotonous 
spectacle of arrested development ... the only discernible movement .. . [being] the 
pointless gyrations of generations of savages". a In the same vein Africans were 
perceived to have an inability to grasp historical perspective which leads to an 
alteration of the tradition when it is spontaneously handed down from generation to 
generation. Secondly, some .historians adopted the approach that because of the 
fallibility of human memory, history can only concern itself with written documents, 
which therefore makes it impossible to research the African oral sources of history.9 
5 Vansina (yansina Methodology 19-20, Vansina History xi-xii 3) describes oral traditions as 
unwritten, verbal accounts (spoken or sung) of the past. Oral traditions are documents of the 
present because they are told in the present, but they are expressions of the past because ihey 
embody messages of the past". They are oral messages which are used as historical sources 
and they are based on previous oral messages which are at least one generation old. Miller 2 
defines it as •a narrative describing, or purporting to describe, eras before the time of the person 
who relates it". 
6 The following sources have been consulted in this regard: Rowe 1~-170, Curtin 5-20, 
Langworthy 1-7, Nothling 16-18 89 96-99, Vansina Methodology 1-18. 
7 Strictly speaking "pre-colonial" denotes the era before the so-called "scramble for Africa" by 
European powers. In South Africa this would roughly refer to the period preceding the first 
English annexation of the Cape in 1795. It is this period of colonisation which brought Africa into 
real and permanent contact with the West and it is in this period that the most serious inroads 
into traditional indigenous cultures were made. However, in a broader sense pre-colonial could 
also refer to the period before indigenous communities came into contact with Westerners. In 
the South African context the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck at the Cape in 1652, or the first 
contact with earlier traders and missionaries who brought indigenous communities into contact 
with Christianity and a new type of economy could mark the end of the pre-colonial period. 
However, this influence was limited and of a selective nature and for purposes of this thesis 
"pre-colonial" will thus refer to the period preceding the first English annexation of the Cape. See 
Curtin 20-24, Prah 2-3. · 
8 Rowe 155. 
9 Some researchers are of the opinion that pre-literate people had exceptional powers of memory 
which were used to transmit and continue their culture and traditions. See Vansina Methodology 
4-5. 
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Thirdly, and stemming from the second reason, there was uncertainty about the 
methodology of processing oral information to reconstruct the history of pre-literate 
communities and the concomitant possibility of distortion of historical facts. 
The teaching of history within an African framework, with the emphasis on oral 
traditions, originated and was mainly concentrated in tropical Africa. Countries in Africa 
South of the Zambezi regarded European history as their heritage and those in Africa 
North of the Sahara, regarded Muslim history as their legacy. From the 1950's 
onwards African history formed part of the syllabuses of the Universities of Ibadan, 
Ghana and the School for Oriental and African Studies in London. Vansina, the first 
author of a comprehensive theoretical work on oral traditions and methodology in 
history and a leading historian on pre-colonial central African history, started his career 
in the Congo. Together with universities in Senegal and Upper Volta, the Congo 
became the centre for the teaching of pre-colonial African history in Francophonic 
Africa. 10 
Indigenous African people are characteristically a pre-literate people, that is, people 
without writing. Oral traditions thus form the main source of information on their past. 
However, it should be remembered that other historical sources, especially the ancient 
sources of literate communities, were often also based on oral traditions. In Africa oral 
traditions of indigenous communities are still practised and have not yet been taken 
over by the written word. Further, the fact that oral traditions have been reduced to 
writing in some instances has not supplanted them. Objections against the study and 
teaching of pre-literate African history were overcome by a critical interdisciplinary 
approach. Whilst the limitations of the information thus transmitted are today readily 
1 O See Van Niekerk & Vorster (eds) Field Research in Indigenous Law for a recent survey of the 
methodology of evaluating oral traditions in the legal research of pre-literate communities. Of 
special interest is Prinsloo's comprehensive analysis of existing anthropological and legal 
material on this topic. It is noteworthy that the methodology employed in generel historical 
research as expounded by Vansina, displays many similarities to the methods and techniques 
of legal and also of anthropological research. It emphasises the fact the study of all aspects of 
preliterate cultures should be approached holistically, although the emphasis may vary in the 
different disciplines. 
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accepted, written documentation as well as ethnographical, archaeological, 
palaeontological and linguistic materials are employed to reconstruct and corroborate 
oral information on unwritten history. 11 Any distortions which may have occurred 
through the very method of transmitting oral history are usually detectable and may 
be accurately pinpointed by comparing various versions of the same events; a method 
which is also successfully applied to establish the accuracy of written documents. 
Thus archaeological and ethnological studies have established scientifically the 
development in political and military organisation, techniques of social control, and the 
development of a copper and iron industry in pre-colonial Africa South of the Sahara. 
Critical analyses of various oral accounts have been used to substantiate information 
and to reconstruct the most likely version of historical events, much in the same way 
as written records were utilised to obtain a true account of European historical events. 
Today source material about this era in the history of Africa abounds and few people 
question the value of oral evidence as historical source material. 
Bantuspeakers presently occupy the greatest part of Africa South of the Sahara. The 
San, who are regarded as the original inhabitants of the Southern African region, 
occupy only a small part of the South-Western corner of Africa. Linguistic research has 
disclosed that the Bantuspeakers originated in North-East Nigeria and the Cameroon, 
and from there migrated southwards and eastwards over a period of 2000 years. The 
collective name "Bantu" is derived from their original primeval and ancient language, 
Ur-bantu or proto-Bantu. It is uncertain when exactly this migration commenced, 12 but 
it seems that their first contact with the San of Northern Botswana took place some 
11 Vansina Methodology 17 is of the opinion that the very nature of oral traditions makes it possible 
to establish its reliability without necessarily always having reference to other disciplines. 
12 There Is some evidence that the Bantuspeakers have established themselves South of the 
equator before the end of the Stone Age: see Oliver & Fage 32- 34, Curtin 31-35, Sachs Justice 
95. 
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2300 years ago 13 and that they established themselves as iron-using farmers South 
of the Limpopo, in the Transvaal and Natal, at least 1750 years ago (and not, as is 
sometimes believed and propagated, in the mid-seventeenth century, at the same time 
the Dutch arrived at the Cape). Dominant cultural features such as matrilineal descent, 
anthropomorphic art, secret societies, and cults involving spirit possession indicate 
cultural ties between the Bantuspeakers and the West African Negroes which 
transcend any apparent cultural differences such as language, or physical differences 
which are the result of their migration and contact with groups like the San. 1" 
The pre-literate tradition of the Bantuspeakers resulted from their geographical isolation 
at a critical stage in the development of the written word. 15 When these people 
migrated South from Nigeria and the Cameroon, they were cut off from the Sudan 
civilisations where, by the end of the tenth century, the technique of writing became 
known. This isolation was enhanced by problems of transportation in the tropical 
forests and difficulties with coastal shipping. Before the development of technically 
more advanced ships and navigation skills in the fifteenth century, weather patterns 
on the West coast of Africa prevented Africans South of the Sahara from travelling 
northward and Europeans from travelling southward. On the East coast, in contrast, 
shipping conditions were ideal and Indian-Ocean trade was well developed by the end 
of the tenth century. However, contact between the coast and the interior was 
hampered by the risk of disease. Not only did yellow fever and malaria endanger the 
lives of the traders, but the tropical tsetse fly decimated the draft animals. Human 
porters had to be employed and the expansion of trade was slow. This isolation also 
had the effect that Islam and Christianity became established in these areas only after 
the eighteenth century. 
13 This encounter introduced the concept of stockfarming to the San of Botswana and had a 
revolutionary influence on their prevailing economic and social life. Saunders 12 is of the opinion 
that these San were the ancestors of the Khoikhoi, whilst Wilson & Thompson 41-47 hold that 
the origin of the Khoikhoispeakers is unknown. 
14 See generally Olivier & Fage 30-34, Curtin 38-39, Saunders 62. 
15 Curtin 35-38; Nohthling 304-305. 
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3 LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ORAL TRADITIONS 
Research into the development of the unwritten legal systems in Africa poses problems 
similar to those encountered in other historical research. In pre-literate societies oral 
tradition continues to exist at the heart of the environment from which it arose 18 and 
remains an important source of the unwritten laws. Only recently have scholars begun 
reducing indigenous laws to writing. Vansina 11 indicates that researchers into the 
history of pre-literate cultures should be acquainted with the language and social 
anthropology of the culture under examination. It is not surprising then that many of 
the scholars concerned with the restatement of pre-colonial indigenous law were 
trained anthropologists as well as lawyers and often had a thorough knowledge of the 
vernacular of the people being researched. 18 
It has been established, with recourse to oral traditions and interdisciplinary research, 
that law as a method of resolving disputes was indeed known in the pre-colonial 
period. 19 The methods of preserving oral information20 and the close relationship 
between law and religion in pre-colonial African societies have ensured that we have 
a fairly clear picture of the nature of indigenous laws in their pre-colonial phase. 
16 Vansina Methodology 2. 
17 See Vansina Methodology 45-46 75 111-113 139-140 for a discussion and analysis of the nature 
of oral traditions; the technique of understanding them; the methods of establishing distortions 
and evaluating accuracy of oral traditions; and the relative weight to be attached to them. 
18 For instance Myburgh, Schapera, Breutz, Lestrade and Van Warmelo. 
19 Young 473-480. 
20 See Rowe 160, Curtin 14-20, Langworthy 1-7 on the preservation of oral information by non-
literate communities through songs, legends and epic poems, which are memorised verbally and 
transmitted from one generation to the next; or through more concrete ways such as the 
burying of gold nuggets in clay pots to mark important events. They also discuss the criteria for 
the evaluation of such oral evidence transmitted from one generation to the next. Oral evidence 
is regarded as a living source of traditional indigenous cultures. In fact, Allott Language 29 
compares legal proverbs in indigenous law with judicial pronouncements of the House of Lords: 
authoritative, yet often obscure! 
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Curtin21 is of the opinion that pre-colonial Africa had developed sophisticated legal 
systems and forms of social control which made the coercive power of a State 
unnecessary. These indigenous forms of social control were underpinned by kinship 
ties and the extended family. 
Indigenous law in Africa is today still typified as primitive law and displays features 
similar to those of other laws in the primitive phases of their development. The fact that 
change in the substance of indigenous law has been slow is mainly due to the 
isolation of the Bantuspeakers. However, this does not mean that these legal systems 
should be characterised as static, and neither are they inferior or in any way backward 
compared to developed Western legal systems. On the contrary, a different picture 
altogether is indicated by the mere fact that these systems have survived with relatively 
little change and contain elements which may assist in the development and reform 
of Western legal systems. 
In a broad perspective the factors which brought about change in indigenous cultures 
also gave rise to the development of increasingly more complex societies and social 
organisation in Africa. Spaulding and Kapteijns22 point out that change in Africa is 
closely connected to the demands of material needs. Change prompted greater social 
differentiation within societies. The period of the hunter-gatherers (in Southern Africa 
the San) was characterised by very little social differentiation.23 Group solidarity was 
strong and the concept of chief or courts foreign in some of the San communities.24 
21 Curtin 37-38. 
22 Spaulding & Kapteijns 1-6. 
23 It should be borne in mind that hunter-gatherers presently still occupy parts of Southern Africa, 
notably the arid parts of Botswana, Namibia and Angola. Some of these communities have 
managed to preserve their ancient way of life remarkably well and are thus considered 
invaluable sources for anthropological and other research. See Wilson & Thompson 41-54 on 
the social structure of the hunter-gatherers in Southern Africa. 
24 In other San communities there was a measure of centralisation, and political and social 
structures similar to those found amongst the Bantuspeakers. 
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The group as a whole settled disputes which were feared by the group. 25 A so-called 
custodian controlled vegetable and water distribution and protected the fire. His 
position was hereditary. 
With the decline in natural resources, a period of food production was introduced. 
Communities increased in size and could no longer be socially organised in the same 
and simplistic way as earlier. A new type of community, comprising subgroups or 
lineages, and based on unilineal descent, came to the fore. Increasing social 
differentiation occurred between males and females, the elder and the young, and the 
creation of a lineage elite, secured by hereditary titles, became pronounced. 26 The 
change from food gathering t~ food production, 21 which occurred in Africa South of 
the Sahara around the beginning of the Christian era, involved other cultural changes 
too. This period was also the iron age28 and the exploitation of minerals brought 
about political and economic change. 29 Trade developed and expanded and so did 
wealthy settlements and chiefdoms. 
Islam and Christianity30 also made inroads into traditional cultures, as did contact with 
European explorers. The first contact with Christianity in sub-Saharan Africa came in 
the fifteenth century when Christian priests escorted Portuguese navigators to Africa. 
In the kingdoms of Benin and Congo many indigenes were converted to Christianity. 
This conversion was seemingly superficial and when the Europeans withdrew from 
25 Vorster "Spanning en Konflik" 1-2 points out that conflict and tension were dealt with in different 
ways by the community. Disputes were resolved and tensions released by talking or arguing, 
by fighting without weapons and even by fighting with weapons. 
26 See generally Wilson & Thompson 55-74 on the social organisation and economic structure of 
the herders and cultivators of Southern Africa, notably the Khoikhoi, Nguni Tsonga and Venda. 
27 See Spaulding & Kapteijns 3; see also Nothling 99-1 oo on food production in sub-equatorial 
Africa. 
28 See Nothling 100-104 on metal working in Southern Africa. 
29 See Wilson & Thompson 142- 153 179-182 on the Sotho's skill as craftsmen and the influence 
of their metal craftmanship on trade and the economy in general. 
30 Fabian 381-399, Paden & Soja vol II 193-200. 
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these territories the inhabitants reverted to their traditional beliefs and practices. In the 
eighteenth century freed slaves from the New World who were repatriated to Sierra 
Leone and Liberia, spread the gospel also in the Gambia, Gold Coast and Nigeria. The 
European Christian mission-movement started in the nineteenth century and in this 
period conversion to Christianity took place on a more solid and substantial basis. 
Literacy, vocational training and medicine were the three major fields of activity 
practiced by the missionaries. However, the missionaries' intolerance of indigenous 
religious practices, customs and beliefs gave rise to an independent church in Africa. 
The local churches which broke away from the mission churches may be divided into 
the "Ethiopian" churches and the Zionist movements. The former retained their 
European orientation after they had broken away and the only difference is that now 
they have an independent leadership of their own. The latter accommodated 
indigenous forms of worship and broke away from the mission-church orientation. 
Although magic is strongly opposed,31 polygyny is allowed. Today Christianity 
remains a minority religion in Africa. 
In contrast lslam32 gained more ground in Africa because of its basic tolerance of 
indigenous customs and beliefs. In fact, Islam in Africa has a specific African character 
which distinguishes it from its Asian counterpart. The adoption of Islam in Africa was 
usually accompanied by the acceptance of an Islamic legal system. There are four 
schools within the Islamic legal tradition, and the system most commonly adopted in 
Africa is known as Maliki. This legal system is considered to be the most traditional 
Islamic legal system and is tolerant of indigenous custom and institutions. It is 
estimated that approximately a quarter of the African States have a Muslim majority or 
that one in three Africans is Muslim. This is not surprising in view of the Islamic 
heritage of the Northern part of the African continent. The line of Islamic influence can 
be drawn from the West to East coast above the tropical rainforest belt. Certain parts 
31 The Zionist movement's alternative to traditional magic eg, is their holy water and strong 
prayers. 
32 See generally Abu-Lughod 545-567, Padan & Soja 81-84 201-203, Nothling 105 139 148 149 on 
the impact of Islam on Africa. 
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of sub-Saharan Africa were also influenced by Islam through religious-military methods. 
Although there are sections of central and mostly Southern Africa which have 
experienced only a minimal Islamic influence, Islam is generally regarded as an 
indigenous religious system in the African continent as a whole. 
Cultural change is significant in the development of a legal system which, itself, is also 
an aspect of a community's culture. African culture is characterised by the fact that it 
is accommodating; change is not experienced as substitutionary.33 Indigenous legal 
systems in Africa have been responsive to change by integrating change without 
displacing the existing legal structure, technique and ideology. Therefore, although 
certain changes have taken place by adopting new rules to accommodate changing 
conditions, the nature of indigenous law has remained largely unchanged. An example 
of this accommodating nature of indigenous culture is the fact that although the 
Christian religious system has been accepted, indigenous customs and beliefs are still 
adhered to. Indigenous ideas and principles have also not been replaced by Islamic 
doctrine and the Islamic religious system is accepted merely as an additional system 
of belief. Feyerabend34 describes the same feature in ancient Greece as a " ... 
tolerance in religious matters which later generations found morally and theoretically 
unacceptable and which even today is regarded as a manifestation of frivolous and 
simple minds". He explains further, that "[a]rchaic man is a religious eclectic, he does 
not object to foreign gods or myths, he adds them to the existing furniture of the world 
without any attempt at synthesis, or a removal of contradictions". The same feature of 
basic tolerance is also observable in Islam, which in Africa has a different African 
character. 
The period between the establishment of the first white settlement at the Cape in 1652 
and the first British occupation of the Cape in 1795 was marked by a systematic 
subjugation of the Khoikhoi and the San (Khoisan). In the smallpox plague of 1713 a 
33 This feature of indigenous law is discussed in more detail in Part 11.11.3.b.i(iii). 
34 Feyerabend 245. 
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large part of the Khoikhoi population was destroyed. 315 In 1739 the last armed 
resistance by the Khoisan took place in the South-Western Cape and in 17 40 the 
remainder of these landless and indigent people in the Western Cape became 
labourers. By 1795 the Khoikhoi had all but become extinct and the San had of 
necessity been driven to a small Western area of the country. 36 
The position of the Bantuspeakers was quite different. Although their encounters with 
the Westerners from 1652 onwards were also marked by conflict, their numbers 
prevented their destruction in the way the Khoisan were decimated. The first real 
influence on their culture and interference with the application of their laws and 
institutions began in the late eighteenth century when the British first occupied the 
Cape. Therefore, the discussion of the characteristic features of the pre-colonial 
indigenous laws will focus on the law of the Bantuspeakers as it applied prior to 1795. 
4 SUMMARY 
The utilisation of oral traditions has made it possible to study pre-literate history and 
law. In the next chapter the nature and principles of pre-colonial indigenous law will be 
discussed. Reference will be made to the different approaches to the applicability of 
oral traditions and their documentation in language intelligible to the Western reader. 
It should be borne in mind that in establishing the principles of indigenous law 
researchers had to interpret oral traditions. Although the methods of preserving oral 
traditions and the close relationship between law. and religion in pre-colonial African 
societies may ensure a fairly clear picture of that law, the fact that researchers have 
had to interpret these oral traditions, presents one with a measure of uncertainty 
regarding the true state of affairs in pre-colonial times. Therefore, it is only possible to 
35 Saunders 45. 
36 Saunders 39-41. 
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say that the principles discussed in the following chapter are as far as can be 
ascertained the true principles which ordered pre-colonial indigenous society. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Despite the variety of legal systems encountered in Africa South of the Sahara and 
despite the fact that they cannot be traced back to a common ancestor, 1 traditional 
indigenous legal systems constitute a legal family, similar in structure, technique and 
ideology. 2 These systems developed to meet the demands of the ancient and primitive 
societies inhabiting the area and were adapted to their needs over many centuries. 
Being based on common values, they were accepted as legitimate. They have been 
described as bodies of immemorial rules which emanated from uninterruptedly 
followed practices and which were crowned with morals and religion. 3 
M'Baye 140. 
2 See below Part 11.111.2. Pre-colonial African law must be distinguished from the law which evolved 
in modem-day Africa, law influenced and sometimes distorted by Western influence, and law in 
a constant state of flux due to continual political changes taking place on the continent. Kodwo 
Mensah-Brown 16 noted that there is "no legal system in contemporary Africa that is uniquely 
African". He divides contemporary African legal systems into "clusters of inherited or adopted 
legal cultures" and ascribes their basic similarities to "shared territorial legal systems of the 
predecessor colonial states". In cases where there were no colonial power, the African legal 
system is classified with reference to the Western model it has adopted. 
3 See M'Baye 140. 
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In this chapter an overview is given of pre-colonial indigenous law. The nature and 
principles of this law can be discussed only once it has been established that legal 
systems did indeed exist in pre-colonial and primitive times. For this reason it is 
necessary to explain certain opposing views about the status of indigenous normative 
systems of social ordering as legal systems. Closely connected to this problem is the 
question of how to approach research into such normative systems of behavioural 
control. It is usually difficult to separate the method of research, the philosophical 
approach to law in general and indigenous law in particular, and even the language 
used to record one's findings. 4 What is sure, though, is that oral traditions have an 
important role to play in research of this nature. 
2 RESEARCH AND PRE-COLONIAL LAW 
The conflict usually lies between the behavioural approach and the rule-centred 
approach to the study and explanation of primitive or indigenous legal systems. 
The first approach focuses on the process of social ordering and dispute resolution 
to establish the norms which regulate pre-literate societies. In order to avoid 
ethnocentrism, a conception of law, wide enough to encompass a society's own views 
on its mechanisms of social ordering, is adopted, thus side-stepping the problem of 
finding a Western-style definition of law which could encompass indigenous law. Law 
is regarded as facts, not rules, and is determined through the study of so-called 
trouble-cases. Indigenous law and custom are thus viewed not as a coherent, 
consistent and rational set of rules which is deductively employed to determine the 
outcome of a dispute. It is regarded rather as a reserve of knowledge which everyone 
is expected to know. It is not the exclusive domain of certain experts in the community, 
but common property of all the members of the community. 
4 Harris 224-229; Genn 138-143; Uoyd 790-797; Bennett Sourcebook 8-17; Young 474-480; Hund 
"Roles of Theory" 208-214. 
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Adherents of this approach are usually also committed to the doctrine of legal 
realism. 5 They focus on the facts of legal experience rather than rules; they 
concentrate on the study of court cases. This rule-scepticism in the context of legal 
anthropology may be described as an attempt to show that law is but a guess at what 
the courts may do in a particular case, and that legal rules do not exist.6 However, the 
intention of the proponents of this approach is probably not to negate rules 
completely, but to indicate that in addition to technical legal analysis, dispute 
settlement could reveal important information on how the law works and how it could 
be improved. 1 Indigenous law may also be studied through personal observation of 
the daily life of small-scale communities. a In both the study of trouble-cases and the 
study of the daily life of communities accepted types of oral tradition are used to 
reconstruct pre-literate cultural information.9 
Researchers who follow this approach usually regard indigenous communities as so 
unique that no aspect of their culture, including their law, can be explained in terms 
of Western concepts and principles. 1° For example, the Dutch Adat Law School, in 
their research into Indonesian adat law, attempted to observe indigenous Indonesian 
law through oriental eyes and refrained from employing any Western concepts and 
principles. 11 Feyerabend12 observes, by analogy with styles in painting and drawing, 
5 See eg Hund "New Legal Anthropology" 211-223. 
6 See Allott "Social Anthropology" 7; see generally Frank 679-682, Lloyd 659-661. Frank makes 
a distinction between rule-scepticism and fact-scepticism. According to him the rule-sceptics 
regard the formal legal rules which are enunciated in court decisions as the cause of legal 
uncertainty, because they are unreliable guides in the prediction of court decisions. The 
fact-sceptics regard the elusiveness of facts as the primary cause of legal uncertainty. 
7 Genn 112-119. 
8 Hund & Van der Merwe 39 42-46. 
9 See Vansina Methodology 141-164. 
10 Bohannan Tiv 4-6 8 120; Roberts 13. 
11 Prinsloo "Principles" 15-16. 
12 Feyerabend 230. 
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that" ... there are no 'neutral' objects which can be represented in any style, and which 
can be used as objective arbiters between radically different styles. The application to 
languages is obvious". And the application to law is obvious too. Thus, legal 
phenomena, or concepts, or principles are not universally applicable to, or in all legal 
cultures. Anthropological research should be conducted without reference to, and 
independent of the researcher's own cultural background. Only after all possible 
information on the group under study has been collected, will a comparison of the 
Western and indigenous systems of law be in order. The comparison would then 
indicate whether the anthropological information thus collected can be reproduced in 
Western terms or whether it has a logic of its own which cannot be found in any 
Western language. 13 But, although key concepts and principles should never be 
made clearer (with reference to Western concepts and ideas) than the collected 
material indicates, it may be useful or even necessary as a temporary aid for further 
research to clarify them in such a way. Familiar (Western) definitions and concepts 
should not be employed prematurely to explain or translate collected material. 14 
Instead, further study and collection of more material15 should be used to explain the 
material already collected. 
Criticism which is generally levelled against this trouble-case method of investigation 
is that it involves an extremely lengthy process of establishing what the law is, that is, 
one of studying how it works in practice, employing the vernacular and creating 
neologism. In Africa time is notoriously not on the side of the researcher. Some thirty 
years ago Allott16 warned that, although valuable, there was a major obstacle to the 
13 Feyerabend 230. 
14 "Premature" here indicates that such methodology is not completely ruled out but that it should 
be employed with caution. 
15 Feyerabend 250-252. 
16 Allott Language 30. 
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study of indigenous law through comprehensive analyses of court proceedings. 11 This 
obstacle was 
"the rapid disappearance, before our eyes, of the traditional systems that we have proposed to 
study. A generation ago there would not have been this difficulty; but today the traditional 
tribunals have vanished in many African countries. ... If we want to act, we must do so with 
extreme speed ... [O]ur precious raw material, the indigenous legal institutions, which we can 
neither preserve in situ nor rebuild elsewhere, is being overwhelmed by the onward rush of 
modernity. Before It sinks for ever beneath the tides of history, we must capture its figuration 
and Inner meaning. "18 
Moreover, in indigenous law there are many informal dispute-settling institutions such 
as family councils and regimental and age-group institutions which settle disputes out 
of court. Therefore, court decisions are too restricted a source to determine the true 
law of a community. The normative aspect of legal rules, which serve as guidance to 
human behaviour, should not be disregarded in a community that is by nature 
non-specialised and in which many informal institutions enforce legal rules. 
The second method, the so-called rule-centred approach, focuses on a framework of 
Western concepts and ideas in an explanation of indigenous law. The reason is that 
it is believed that research which is not accompanied by a comparative analysis in 
legal terms, understood by jurists generally (that is, in legal terms derived from a 
Western background), loses some of its value. 19 Factual information is obtained 
through the study, analysis and comparison of existing literature and rule directed 
17 A comprehensive study would include, amongst others, the complete recording of proceedings, 
the analysis of the legal background to disputes, arguments and issues involved and of the way 
they were handled by those concerned with the case, the analysis of the language in which the 
case was presented, and an isolation of proverbs and maxims. Such an endeavour would also 
require expert lawyers, linguists, sociologists, recording technicians, guides and informants. 
18 See also Allott "People as Law-makers" 4-5. 
19 See generally Allott Language; see also Allott "Social Anthropology" 16-18, Cotran 161. 
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interviews with experts on indigenous law. 20 Western legal dogmatic devices are then 
employed to explain the phenomena. Law is regarded as a cultural universal which, 
as a system of social control, may be compared to language. 21 In the same way as 
lingual phenomena, as cultural universals, may be jurisprudentially explained despite 
the vast differences between the various languages, jural phenomena may be 
explained by making use of universal jurisprudential ideas and concepts. 
Some researchers employ Western jurisprudential concepts and ideas to explain 
indigenous jural phenomena, but nevertheless adopt a trouble-case method of 
investigation and isolate law from other social norms by making use of institutional 
criteria. They define indigenous law in terms of institutionalised customary norms. For 
example, Pospisil,22 who believes that law manifests itself in a decision passed by a 
legal authority, is of the opinion that there is no qualitative difference between 
indigenous law and Western law because the most important attributes, functions and 
processes of law are present in both. His studies focus on law in process. 
Gluckman23 who also studies indigenous law as established in dispute resolution, 
concludes that the central concepts of law (such as right, duty, guilt, innocence, crime, 
delict, negligence and contract) are present in most legal systems although their 
attributes vary around the central idea. 
Prinsloo, 24 a member of the Centre for Indigenous Law at the University of South 
Africa, gives a useful explanation of the application of the rule-centred approach 
20 The use of informants is also an accepted method of applying oral traditions in the search for 
preliterate cultural information. See Vansina Methodology 22-31 190-194 on the role of 
informants in research into preliterate cultures; see also Prinsloo "Principles" 18-30. 
21 See Myburgh Papers 31-32. Allott Language 6-9 too compares law with language and regards 
both as forms of social expression or social behaviour which are moulded by society. He 
regards both as vehicles of communication and control which, in tum, mould the society in 
which they function. 
22 Pospisil Anthropology 341-342. 
23 Gluckman African Traditional Law 6-22. 
24 Prinsloo "Principles• 6 4-32. 
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employed by this centre in their study of indigenous law. He explains that 
·caJll field data, whether obtained through interviews or by observance, should be evaluated 
critically. For a critical evaluation the data is tested against the requirements of logic, the norms 
of juristic science in general and the norms of indigenous law in particular. The researcher's 
ability to identify consistent and conflicting information and his knowledge of indigenous law are 
important" (my emphasis). 
He is also of the opinion that whilst neologism25 has some merit in certain 
circumstances, "Western legal terms as such should not be rejected when [they] 
concern universal legal phenomena" (my emphasis).26 
The concepts of "requirements of logic", "norms of juristic science in general" and 
"universal legal phenomena" should be used with extreme care. To explain indigenous 
law by analogy with Western jurisprudential concepts and ideas may prove 
constructive in a comparative analysis of indigenous law and Western law with a view 
to law reform.21 This is specifically relevant in a situation of legal pluralism where both 
indigenous and Western law are observed. However, the true nature of indigenous law 
should always be kept in mind and the postulates underlying indigenous law should 
form the basis of the framework within which indigenous law is explained. Thus, the 
requirements of logic should be evaluated within an indigenous framework and one 
should guard against the imposition of a formal Western concept of logic as a 
universally applicable criterion for the critical evaluation of oral data. 28 
25 Neologism in this context refers to the use of new terms and concepts in analysing indigenous 
law. An indigenous approach is adopted to the study of indigenous law instead of fitting 
indigenous ·concepts into the familiar categories and terminology of Western jurisprudence·. 
Prinsloo •principles· 16. 
26 Prinsloo •principles· 16. 
27 Fuller 33 is of the opinion that in Western law there are analogues of almost all phenomena 
characterising indigenous law. 
28 Hesse xiii 38 39 too opposes what she terms the ·universability" of ·our [Western] conceptual 
frameworks·. She denies the possibility of accurately applying logic in science and sees logic 
only as an ideal to which no theory could ever perfectly attain. Moreover, although belief 
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In the eighteenth century Aristotelian logic was elevated to the only, and universally 
applicable, form of logic. But logic may refer either to the study of the structures 
inherent in a certain type of discourse or to the results of such a study. Therefore, the 
logic inherent in different types of discourse may differ from each other and from the 
familiar principles of formal logic. 29 Research results which seem logical in indigenous 
legal anthropological discourse may for instance seem quite illogical in Western legal 
discourse; or the study of the structures inherent in indigenous legal discourse may 
follow a system of logic which differs from that of a study of Western law.00 Moreover, 
there is a close link between rethoric31 and logic, and rhetoric is closely connected 
to the development of communities and their institutions. 32 Rethoric and logic should 
therefore not be perceived as ~niform, universally applicable concepts, but should be 
assessed in the cultural framework of the specific community under investigation. 
Legal oratory may be regarded as a bridge between law and fact and both law and 
fact fall within the realm of living speech, 33 which is generally understood to be a 
social creation and which depends for its validity on a society's common 
understanding. It is clear that language cannot be separated from its cultural context. 
This brings one back to the warning that preconceived ideas, definitions and concepts, 
which are understandable and clear to the Western researcher, should not be blindly 
and prematurely employed where anthropological research results seem unclear or 
systems, or languages, may show certain formal similarities in logical structure, the formal 
logical principles are not necessarily identical as far as content is concerned. 
29 See Feyerabend 252ff, Hesse xiii 33-39. Fuller 13 explains that it is the "internal· logic of a legal 
order which often makes it difficult to explain it to an outsider. 
30 One may take this a step further and apply the principle to the notorious repugnancy clause. 
What may be repugnant in one legal culture need not necessarily be perceived as repugnant 
in another. 
31 Grassi 18-21 describes rhetoric, ·or the speech that acts on the emotion•, as the speech which 
is the basis of rational thought. 
32 See Grassi 32 72-75; see also Mooney 80. 
33 See Mooney's interpretation of Vico on the tradition of rhetoric. Mooney 76 n. 
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incomplete in the light of allegedly uniform and universally applicably principles of 
logic.34 
It is furthermore questionable whether universal legal phenomena indeed exist. It 
should be borne in mind that although certain legal phenomena may be consistently 
applicable in Western systems of law, the possibility exists that they may not 
necessarily fit into an indigenous frame of reference or legal culture. Legal phenomena 
should be distinguished from facts of which legal systems take cognisance. Murder, 
or the killing of another individual, for instance, is a fact to which most35 legal systems 
attach certain consequences. But depending on the postulates underlying the legal 
system, the fact of killing would be perceived differently in different legal systems. The 
Oxford Dictionary describes "phenomenon", in the philosophical sense of the word, as 
"the object of a person's perception; what the senses or the mind notice". Thus, 
depending on a legal system's perception of the fact of killing, it may take cognisance 
of it and attach certain consequences to it, or it may not take cognisance of it at all 
because it is perceived differently in a different legal culture. Thus, a legal phenomenon 
entails the perception of facts, in a certain manner, within a legal culture. 
In the final analysis indigenous legal phenomena should not be forced into Western 
categories or distorted to adapt to the postulates underlying Western law. The nature 
of a society's law and culture should form the context of research into indigenous law. 
Prinsloo36 points out that in drawing up a memorandum, inappropriate material such 
as definitions, classifications and examples of Western law should be omitted. 
Research methods should be combined and not be mutually exclusive. They should 
supplement each other in a critical analysis in search of the truth. He also underlines 
34 Feyerabend 250-252. 
35 "Many" may be more correct in this context. One should move away from the Western paradigm 
which Is generally used as a frame of reference. It is possible that legal systems exist which 
have not been contemplated because they fall not only outside the Western legal tradition, but 
also outside famRiar legal traditions such as Eastern, religious, traditional or socialist 
36 Prinsloo "Principles" 16; see also 10-14 23. 
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the importance of a knowledge of related social and economic structures and cultural 
values in an understanding of a legal system and, in line with Vansina's view, of 
knowledge of the vernacular and anthropology. The School for Oriental and African 
Studies in London successfully restated the civil law of various African countries31 
within reasonably short periods of time by employing such a comprehensive method 
of research. 38 
Both the trouble-case method and the rule-centred approach primarily make use of 
oral traditions to establish the unwritten indigenous law. The real difference in 
approach lies in the methodology of their control and analysis of the material 
established through the use of oral traditions, and in their view of law in jurisprudence. 
Ideally one should adopt a combination of the rule-centred and behavioural 
approaches to the study of indigenous law. Both these approaches may be criticised 
if applied rigidly. Both may be employed fruitfully if utilised with caution. It is important 
to make a comparative study of the various research methods to develop a holistic 
view of the study of indigenous law. In addition to the methods referred to above, 
consistent anthropological methods and techniques should be employed to obtain 
information. Written material should also form part of the pool of information. As 
indicated, all these methods are to an extent dependent on the critical evaluation of 
certain oral traditions. The oral information should thus be carefully assessed and 
controlled to establish its reliability and accuracy. 
Strict adherents to the rule-centred approach to indigenous law often have a narrow, 
ethnocentric, Western view of law and procedure and misunderstand the 
non-specialised character of group-orientated indigenous cultures. The real danger of 
this approach lies in the fact that indigenous law does not easily fit into Western 
definitions of law and may thus be considered as custom and not law. Because of the 
37 The law of marriage and divorce, succession, property, agreements and civil wrongs of countries 
such as Kenya, Malawi, Ghana, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, West Cameroon and Botswana 
were restated. 
38 See Allott ·social Anthropology- 12-18. 
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close link between law, custom, religion and other social norms in indigenous cultures, 
anthropologists and jurists alike have often felt compelled to believe that these 
societies are lawless societies governed by the power of custom alone. The absence 
of physical coercion and authorised institutions to enforce norms, as well as the 
absence of the concept of state and formal legislators in a narrow Western sense, 
have been regarded as further indicators pointing to the absence of law in indigenous 
communities.38 Driberg40 very aptly remarks that "European observers have often 
doubted the existence of law in African societies, because generally the paraphernalia 
which we associate with law are absent". 
However, by employing Western concepts but always keeping the true nature of 
indigenous cultures in mind, certain features of indigenous law suggest that institutions 
analogous to those encountered in Western cultures may be identified and that 
indigenous law is distinguishable from mere recurrent customary behaviour.41 
Prescripts are not automatically adhered to by members of indigenous communities. 
Although peaceful co-existence and social order are not maintained through physical 
coercion in the Western sense of the word, there is an indication of some control. 
Indigenous law has been regarded as a program for living together, manifesting itself 
in norms which are visited by sanctions when breached. 42 Where in indigenous law 
reconciliatory measures fail, sanctions may be enforced by an order of a court or 
recourse may be had to extra-judicial sanctions such as self-help following personal 
injury or feud action. -43 Sanctions may take on various forms. Religious sanctions44 
39 See generally Allott ·social Anthropology 7-12. 
40 Driberg 166. 
41 See generally Myburgh Papers 1-12 50-54, Van Niekerk Comparative Study 13-16, Driberg 
162-173, Myburgh •Punishmenr 43-61, Myburgh ·crime" 5-6. 
42 Fuller 11. 
43 Sanction is here used in a broad sense, being an endorsement or confirmation by the 
community through its institutions. 
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are all pervasive in indigenous law and depend on the concept of the wholeness of the 
living and the dead ancestors. The fact that law is also supported by the ancestors, 
provides a very strong inducement to obey the law. This is evidenced by the fact that 
many offences are regarded as defilement45 of the community and that reparation is 
only complete when certain purifying rituals48 have been conducted. Ridicule and 
ostracism are legal sanctions unknown in Western law but very effective in indigenous 
law.47 This is not surprising, in the light of the importance of an individual's position 
as member of the community. 48 
Sanctions are not always disapprobatory, as is the case in criminal law which by its 
nature involves punishment. Approbatory or approving sanctions follow the nomination 
of a successor to the position of head of a household, or the rites of passage 
indicating transitions (such as birth, puberty adulthood, marriage) in the life cycle of 
individuals. It should nevertheless be noted that indigenous law is more willingly 
adhered to by members of the community than is the case with Western law. On the 
one hand this may be attributed to the close link between law and the metaphysical 
norms of morality and religion to which members readily adhere and the fact that 
protection and continuity of these norms are assigned to the elders of the community. 
On the other hand it could be attributed to the fact that customary law originates from 
within the community and is not imposed from the outside. 49 Indigenous law has an 
internal aspect, which is necessary for the preservation of group solidarity, and which 
44 Elias 60-75 stresses the fact that all sanctions in indigenous law are not of a religious nature and 
that there is in fact law enforcement in the Western sense of the word. 
45 In indigenous law "defilement• denotes both physical and spiritual pollution. 
46 Fu11er 6 points out that ritual and ceremonies in indigenous law are forms of communication. 
This interpretation should be seen in the light of the lack of abstraction in indigenous law and 
the preference for the concrete. 
47 "Ultimately the sanction for the enforcement of all laws is the consent of the people .. .": Elias 75. 
48 See below Part 11.11.3.b.ii(iij. 
49 M'Baye 148. 
36 Part 1.11.2 Pre-colonial Africa 
distinguishes it from mere habit. 50 This internal aspect of indigenous law refers to the 
fact that the rules are not only obeyed, but that they are consciously viewed as 
standards of behaviour by individual members of the community and that violation of 
those standards is met by some sanction. Thus, adherence to indigenous law is the 
result of a communal acceptance of the law as an integral part of the social 
organisation: it is obeyed because of the belief that it is in the interest of the 
community and that it is the only way in which the society can function properly. 51 
The notions of an abstract ruling figure such as a State in Western terminology and 
of a separation of governmental powers are foreign to indigenous law and are, as 
mentioned above, relied on as indicators that indigenous law should not be considered 
to be law. However, in indigenous law all functions of rule are assigned on behalf of 
the people to the ruler. Although indigenous court structures and institutions for the 
hearing and settling of disputes differ from the Western models, they have proved to 
be an effective means of maintaining order.52 Procedure is ultimately aimed at 
reconciliation and arbitration, but a clear distinction is drawn between legal norms 
which are accepted as binding, and social norms which are adhered to because they 
are highly regarded. Despite the absence of formal legislators, legislation also forms 
a source of indigenous law. Such legislation is usually unwritten and may take the form 
of decrees issued by the ruler, decrees by the ruler-in-council, institutional legislation 
applicable to exclusive groups such as secret societies, and legislation democratically 
passed in public assemblies. 53 
50 Uoyd 348-350 792. 
51 Driberg 166-167. 
52 So effective that they continued in existence despite Western influence and interference. In fact, 
there is presently a movement to adapt them to modem circumstances and utilise them in 
metropolitan areas. See Part l.IV.4.b.iii below. 
53 Indigenous public law is discussed in more detail below. 
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.. THE NATURE OF PRE-COLONIAL INDIGENOUS LAW 
Pre- ~olonial indigenous legal systems share certain characteristic features, some of 
which are still discernible despite the shroud of colonial influence. Although indigenous 
law has today to some extent through legislation, codification and restatement by 
Westerners been reduced to writing, it is essentially oral law and remains largely 
unwritten. It is preserved in the memories of people and orally handed down from one 
generation to the next. The fallibility of human memory makes it uncertain and difficult 
to ascertain. It was once remarked that each time an old man dies in Africa it is as 
though a library has burnt down. 54 
Indigenous law is inherently conservative and group-oriented in that members of the 
group share their rights and responsibilities in accordance with each individual's status 
within the group. But the group is not an independent self-contained unit. It comprises 
individuals who often re-act upon it and who may even sometimes change its 
character.55 Thus the law is aimed at the preservation of group solidarity. Collectivism 
in indigenous law, that is, the fact that rights and duties are shared, is often referred 
to as a lack of individualism in that law. This lack of individualism should be clearly 
distinguished from individualisation. Individualisation is an imQ9rtant feature of 
- . ----.....__.... ~ ~ 
indigenous law and concern for the individual takes a very high prior.ity in every day 
I' ------... ____.--......._ -
life. In this regard the following may be noted. In dispute resolution special care is 
-taken that substantive justice is done and that the individuals involved are reconciled. 
In criminal law it is the individual's mental health, consciousness and sobriety which 
determine his responsibility for his act. In the case of assault the victim is allowed to 
inflict upon the attacker an injury similar to the one he had suffered. Amongst the Zulu 
the culprit responsible for the injury of another in a kraal encounter, has to visit the 
injured party frequently and offer assistance in sympathy. 
54 M'Baye 150. For this very reason it is important to restate the traditional indigenous law, despite 
the obvious criticism which is usually leveled against such restatements. 
55 Elias 85. On the importance of the individual within the group; see generally Elias 76-95. 
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Because of the importance of agriculture in indigenous communities, indigenous law 
may further be described as peasant law in which land plays a central role. The 
concept of land in indigenous communities has been largely misunderstood in Western 
jurisprudence. Its position must be seen within the framework of communality. Thus, 
neither the land, nor the sky or the sea, can belong to an individual, because these 
are shelters of the ancestors and belong to the community as a whole. 58 The right to 
use land is usually linked to kinship structures and changes continually. Rights vest 
in the group as a whole. Land is not regarded as a marketable commercial 
commodity. It cannot be bought or sold and land rights are acquired through 
allocation by the ruler, exchange, loan, gift, cultivation or administrative action such as 
a reward from public resources. Boundaries are not clearly demarcated. Organisation 
and use of land is viewed in terms of social relationships. Space is thus genealogically 
mapped. This is so in the case of smaller local communities as well as larger tribes. 
Conflicts that occur usually pertain to grazing and water rights. Attachment to land is 
explained with reference to a magico-religious devotion to graves and shrines of 
deceased ancestors. 57 
4 DIVISIONS OF LAW 
In indigenous law, by analogy with Western jurisprudential concepts, it is possible to 
distinguish certain broad categories and divisions that also occur in Western law. 
Western dogmatic devices are here used as descriptive aids to illustrate that the legal 
systems encountered in Africa prior to colonisation had reached a seldom appreciated 
level of sophistication. The categories and divisions described below are not meant to 
be rigid pigeon holes into which indigenous law should be forced, and should 
furthermore not be regarded as an exhaustive list. Western devices are merely used 
to translate the indigenous systems in order to make them more understandable to 
56 M'Baye 149; see also Paden & Soja 39-40, Dalton 71-72. 
57 See generally Myburgh Papers 89-91, Seyfarth & Van Ransburg 62-63, M'Baye 149, Prinsloo 
·Exchange• 29-30, Van Blerk ·Loan· 69-72, Schapera Tswana 20-21, Schapera Handbook 
195-213; see also Part 11.11.3.b.i(ii). 
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the Western reader. Indeed, it should always be borne in mind that the categories in 
indigenous law do not necessarily correspond to those in Western law for the very 
reason that a people's legal system forms part of its culture and is inextricably linked 
to its social structure and arrangements. Thus, in the light of the non-specialised 
character of its culture, distinctions in indigenous law are often very subtle. Some of 
the more interesting divisions and principles, unadulterated by Western influence as 
far as can be ascertained, will be discussed. Statement of the rules is in the historic 
present, irrespective of whether or not these norms still exist. 
4.a Public Law 
In Western law a distinction is drawn between private law and public law. However it 
should be borne in mind that even in Western jurisprudence the basis for such a 
distinction remains a vexed problem and that the boundaries between private law and 
public law are gradually fading. 58 It is often assumed that public law does not exist in 
indigenous law. However, it is possible in indigenous law to isolate on the one hand 
rules pertaining to the individual as member of the group, and on the other hand rules 
pertaining to the community as a whole, to state structures, or to political organisation 
and the administration of justice. 
The issue of a division between public and private law in primitive societies is often 
reduced to one of a distinction between a crime and a civil wrong. Typically it is 
suggested that indigenous law does not differentiate between crimes59 that offend the 
58 A distinction between private and public law is also closely connected to the question of the 
horizontal application of the Interim Constitution: See Part ll.IV.2; see also Friedmann 377-382, 
Van Aswegen "Bill of Rights" 2. Critical Legal Studies commentators criticise efforts to draw a 
distinction between private and public law on two grounds: First the State is inextricably involved 
in what is supposed to be the realm of private law; and secondly, coercion and what they call 
"choicelessness" often characterise the private law sphere: see Kelman 102-109 232-233 253-
257. 
59 On indigenous criminal law, the following sources were consulted: Schapera Handbook 46-52, 
Prinsloo Publiekreg 170-236, Myburgh & Prinsloo Public law 73-135, Elias 110-144, Bohannan 
Tiv 116-146, Cotran & Rubin 101-200, Myburgh "Crime" 5-6, Myburgh "Satisfaction" 20-23, 
Myburgh "Punishment• 43-44, Myburgh "Assault" 81-83, Van Bierl< "Theft" 90-93, Van Niekerk 
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public as a whole and for which public redress is sought, and wrongs against 
individuals for which private redress is sought. This view is based on the notion that 
indigenous law is aimed at the maintenance and restoration of an equilibrium in the 
community through arbitration rather than punishment, or on the fact that indigenous 
procedure allows for the hearing of civil and criminal matters in the same set of 
proceedings. It is further based upon Maine's pronouncement that in primitive 
jurisprudence true criminal law did not exist but that primitive penal law was in fact the 
law of civil wrongs. 80 
Certain crimes in Western law, such as theft of private property, damaging private 
property, culpable homicide and assault are regarded as civil wrongs in some 
indigenous communities. Yet, the fact that individual crimes in Western and indigenous 
law do not correspond does not imply that indigenous criminal law does not exist. 
From the very earliest times it existed, if in an amorphous form, in the violation of 
taboos laid down by ancestral spirits, in witchcraft resulting in death, in incest and in 
persistent theft. These crimes concern not only the individual perpetrator or victim but 
the community as a whole and are believed to be automatically visited by the wrath 
of the spirits which finds expression in penalties such as infertility of the soil, drought, 
blindness, or similar detriment. These are sanctions in the form of retribution which 
emanate from the superhuman,81 and which reflect the close relationship between the 
living and deceased ancestors in indigenous culture. 
The purpose of the death penalty or ostracism is not necessarily to punish offenders, 
but to protect the community against the outrage of the ancestors. Acts such as 
treason, witchcraft, incest and adultery with royal wives are some of the earliest crimes 
acknowledged as such in indigenous communities. It is significant that incest and 
adultery with the royal wives are regarded as two of the most serious crimes in 
Comparative Study 24-29, Ogwurike 171, Leach 21-33, Read 39-44 51-52. 
60 Maine 379. 
61 Kelsen 58. 
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indigenous law,. whilst murder, which ranks very high on any Western list of crimes, 
has not always been regarded as a crime.82 Yet this is in line with the all 
encompassing position of kinship in indigenous culture and the preservation of group 
solidarity. Kelsen83 is of the opinion that the importance of socialisation and group 
solidarity lies in the increased protection it offers the individual. lncest84 and adultery 
with the royal wives threaten the whole fabric of the collectivity in which kinship roles 
are clearly defined and in which everyone is related by kinship ties. 85 
Although criminal and civil matters arising from the same facts are dealt with as a 
whole and tried in the same set of proceedings, in indigenous law the court 
distinguishes clearly between the fine and the damages awarded and frames the 
sentence to include both compensation and punishment. This is done, for instance, 
by allowing an assault victim to inflict upon the attacker an injury similar to the one he 
has suffered. The sentence for murder,66 which is either regarded as a crime or a civil 
wrong, serves as satisfaction61 for the particular group whose member has been killed 
and as satisfaction also for the community as a whole. 66 It seems that the talion 
principle applies in indigenous criminal law. Vengeance and retaliation are important 
agents of moral control and retribution is an all-pervading power in primitive 
societies. 69 
An offender's group is collectively responsible for a crime he has committed. The 
62 See Diamond Primitive Law 228. 
63 Kelsen 53-54. 
64 Incest covers a much wider range of relationships in indigenous law than It does in Western law. 
65 See Leach 31-32. 
66 The accused is put to death in a way similar to that in which the victim has been killed. 
67 Satisfaction is awarded for the worry, sorrow or fright caused by the death of the member of 
the group. 
68 This Is also the case in the law of delict. 
69 Kelsen 53 56. 
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group shares patrimonial liability, but cannot share corporal punishment. The family 
of a person convicted of witchcraft, or of violation of allegiance to the ruler, is executed 
with him because they are regarded as participants and therefore as public enemies. 
In the case of adultery, which is considered a crime, the adulterer may be killed 
summarily. The female participant in the adulterous liason, who is regarded as 
participant in the crime is sometimes killed as well and this is seen as action taken 
against the group who has given her in marriage,70 yet another example of group 
responsibility for criminal behaviour. Summary action taken against a criminal without 
trial is regarded as self-help to obtain public satisfaction for the outraged community 
and as such goes unpunished. 
Certain crimes are regarded as a defilement of the community and bear supernatural 
consequences. This defilement has to be cleansed by rites of purification. Where the 
commission of a crime has a defiling effect on the community, the fine (an animal)11 
is regarded as an animal of disgrace. It is slaughtered (to take the place of the 
offender) and eaten as a purificatory and conciliatory meal. The slaughter of the animal 
also serves to indicate that the fine has no connection with patrimonial restitution. 
Self-help to obtain public satisfaction for serious crimes is lawful. It may take the form 
of lawful feud action, for instance cattle looting as satisfaction for the abduction of a 
women, or the burning or amputation of a cattle thief's hand. In the case of incest the 
culprit is summarily killed for the polluting moral threat to the community and cleansing 
rites are performed at the place where the incest or the incestuous birth has taken 
place. 
Because the application of indigenous criminal law has been abolished or severely 
limited in many African countries today, .the restatements and descriptions of traditional 
indigenous criminal law are of enormous value. The works on indigenous criminal law 
70 Her group of origin retains limited guardianship (which is regarded as a patrimonial right) over 
her. 
71 In indigenous law animals are usually paid as a fine. 
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in fact preserve a rapidly disappearing branch of law.12 
Indigenous procedure and evidence13 present one of the branches of indigenous law 
which has been best preserved and which is today still widely practised in both 
unofficial and official indigenous courts in Africa. Since rights are shared by the agnatic 
group and responsibility is collective, civil disputes within the group, such as breach 
of discipline, crime or the violation of regimental or age-group rules, are settled by 
mediation or corrective action. Such disputes are not taken to court. The best known 
informal dispute resolution institutions are family councils and regimental courts. Family 
councils are concerned with all matters affecting the harmony within the family group. 
In civil procedure there is al~ays the possibility of informal settlement by a family 
council which plays an important role in informal procedures preceding any court 
hearing. The decision of a family council is not binding but may be taken into 
consideration by the court. The family council's goal is to reach a peaceful settlement 
out of court through conciliation. The council may in deserving circumstances even 
administer corporal punishment. Regimental courts are concerned with matters 
affecting regimental duties or initiation schools. 
Despite the fact that criminal and civil matters may be adjudicated upon simultaneously 
and despite that criminal and civil procedures are principally the .same, a clear 
distinction is drawn between punishment and compensation. In contrast to the highly 
technical character of Western law, indigenous procedure and evidence are relaxed 
72 Principal research on indigenous criminal law includes Malinowski Crime and Custom in Savage 
Society (1926), Driberg The African Conception of Law (1934), SchaperaA Handbook of Tswana 
Law and Custom (1938), Snell Nandi Customary Law (1954), Elias The Nature of African 
Customary Law (1956), Gluckman Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law (1969), 
Myburgh (ed) Criminal Law in Bophuthatswana (1980), Prinsloo lnheemse Publiekreg in Lebowa 
(1983), Prinsloo & Myburgh Indigenous Public Law in KwaNdebele (1985). These works 
generally reflect fairly accurately indigenous public law as a whole. 
73 See generally Schapera Handbook 279-300, Schapera Tswana 55-57, Bohannan Tiv 28-69, 
Cotran & Rubin 47-100, Myburgh Papers 70-76, 107-109, PrinslooPubliekreg 237-290, Myburgh 
& Prinsloo 111-143, Van Niekerk Comparative Study 40-43, Van Niekerk •procedure· 130-140, 
Van der Merwe •Procedures· 141-150, Elias 110-144, for a detaUed exposition of indigenous law 
of procedure and evidence. 
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and non-technical in nature and decisions are based on merit. 74 Procedure is 
inquisitorial and the presiding officer plays an active role in eliciting evidence.15 Legal 
representation is unknown and agnates, assisted by representatives of their jural 
community, assist members involved in court proceedings. Judicial precedent is not 
strictly followed but may be taken into account as guideline in difficult cases. 
Women are only present when involved in a case as complainants or witnesses. In 
such cases the venue of the court has to be moved away from the cattle kraal which 
usually adjoins the court. This is so because women's periodic ritual impurity is 
believed to have a detrimental effect on the cattle and consequently on the agnatic 
group. Criminal cases may be taken directly to the Chief's Court but it is customary 
and preferable that a case first be investigated by the court of the jural community, that 
is by the Court of the Headman. Appeals lie to a higher court. The presiding officer 
may himself refer a case to a higher court. Because trials are conducted orally and no 
official records are kept, the presiding official or his representative attends the appeal. 
In the interest of persons involved, trials are conducted and appeals heard speedily, 
lest important evidence of which there is no written record be forgotten. 
Indigenous law has a free system of evidence which emphasises cogency or the 
weight of evidence rather than the admissibility thereof. There are no rules regarding 
the admissibility and relevance of evidence. Hearsay and circumstantial evidence which 
are not corroborated are admissible but carry little weight. Evidence on character and 
previous convictions are admissible and due to the close-knit nature of the community, 
judicial notice is taken of certain facts without proof being required. Real or material 
evidence, such as physical appearance, tracks of stolen livestock and physical objects 
seized from a culprit, carry considerable probative weight. The importance attached 
74 It is interesting that when Socrates appeared before a people's court at the age of seventy, 
facing charges of being a speculative philosopher and evil-doer who meddled with things under 
the earth and in heaven, of corrupting the youth and of being an atheist, he introduced his 
defence by saying that truth and a just decision were more important than the use of formal 
procedure and technical skills: see Van der Westhuizen "Socrates" 31. 
75 This is also a feature of the Continental legal systems. 
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to tangible evidence is consonant with the lack of abstraction in non-specialised 
cultures. Extraordinary methods of obtaining proof, such as divining, ordeal and torture 
are sometimes employed. Certain presumptions are operative in indigenous law, such 
as the presumption that an initiation candidate is not fully blameworthy. Although there 
are some exceptions in the law of the Northern-Sotho, trials are generally not 
conducted under oath. Cross examination and questioning are regarded sufficient to 
establish the truth and the court comes to a conclusion by objectively evaluating 
evidence. 
Some authors are of the opinion that the standard of a reasonable man plays an 
important part in the standard of evidence.10 There are no rules regulating the burden 
and measure of proof, but it seems that proof on a balance of probabilities is regarded 
as sufficient. An accused is as a rule not asked to plead. Confessions and admissions 
carry much weight and admission of guilt may bring the case to an immediate end. A 
case is never officially closed. 
Allott's11 often quoted description of the character of indigenous law of procedure and 
evidence, captures its essence: 
"At the heart of African adjudication lies the notion of reconciliation or restoration of harmony. 
The job of the court or an arbitrator is less to find the facts, state the rules of law, and apply 
them to the facts than to set right a wrong in such a way as to restore harmony within the 
disturbed community. Harmony will not be restored unless the parties are satisfied that justice 
has been done. The complainant will accordingly want to see that the legal rules ... are applied 
by the court. But the party at fault must be brought to see how his behaviour has fallen short 
of the standard set for his particular role as involved in the dispute, and he must come to accept 
that the decision of the court is a fair one. On his side he wants an assurance that once he has 
admitted his error and made recompense for it he will be reintegrated into the community.• 
76 Gluckman "Order" 184-198; Prinsloo Publiekreg 280. 
77 Allott ·African Law" 145. 
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Indigenous public law is also manifested in the rules regulating government structures, 
the powers of organs performing legislative, executive and judicial functions, and in 
administrative rules regulating the exercise of executive powers and the relationship 
between the executive and the people. The fact that government functions are not 
performed by separate organs, 78 or that an abstract ruling figure such as the State 
cannot be identified, evidences the non-specialised nature of indigenous law, and not 
necessarily the absence of public law. 
The ruling family, represented by a chief or a king (the ruler, who is the genealogical 
highest ranking male of the ruling family), forms the nucleus of indigenous 
constitutional law. The position of this family is entrenched by rules ensuring the 
authority of its members. The position of ruler is hereditary. He stands outside the 
realm of private law. There is no separation of judicial, legislative or. executive 
functions, and the ruler is the highest legislative and executive authority as well as the 
supreme judicial official.79 Whilst legislation may only be passed at the highest level, 
administrative and judicial organs are encountered at all levels of government. The 
realm is divided into jural communities under headmen. The ruler reigns in consultation 
with his private council and the representative council. His private council consists of 
members of the ruling family, chosen on merit. The ruler's consultation with this 
council is highly confidential and takes place in private. It is consulted in all matters but 
in very unimportant matters, such as the dispatch of a messenger, it is merely 
informed of the instruction. In turn this council has to ensure that chiefly duties are 
exercised satisfactorily. The representative council consists of members of the private 
council and of the headmen of the jural communities who represent the people. A 
ruler's actions are only valid if exercised in-council. 
78 The ruler is chief legislator, executive officer and judge. 
79 With regard to indigenous constitutional law the following sources were consulted: Myburgh 
Papers 55-63 99, Prinsloo Publiekreg 25-79, Myburgh & Prinsloo 1-23. 
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Indigenous administrative la~ too revolves around the ruler. He is head of the tribal 
administration and responsible for its proper functioning. He is further responsible for 
the maintenance of public order and safety and may exercise the power to stop faction 
fights or other disturbances of the peace. He is responsible for the protection of 
private persons and property, as well as the tracing and prosecution of criminals. 
Execution of judgment is ensured by the ruler. He is in charge of the granting of 
membership of the chiefdom and has to grant permission to a family who intends to 
leave. Banishment orders may be granted only by the ruler. Other administrative 
functions include the consideration of petitions, the organisation of initiation schools, 
and control of land matters. He has to be notified of births deaths and marriages. 
Leadership of age regiments81 falls on the shoulders of the highest ranking son of the 
ruling family. The ruler acts in-council in all administrative matters. 
4.b Private Law 
Indigenous private law is today still widely practised in Africa. Family law and the law 
of succession are the two aspects of indigenous law which have the most far-reaching 
influence on the lives of black Africans and are, as a result, the best known. These 
branches of law have been extensively investigated and restated by both 
anthropologists and jurists and have been reformed to adapt to changing modern 
circumstances. These are also the fields of law which have been subject to most 
distortions. 
An important feature of the so-called pre-colonial private law is the fact that members 
of the group share their rights and duties. A person's share in rights and obligations 
depends on his status and this is determined by rank, gender, marital condition and 
80 See generally Myburgh Papers 63-67 99-100, Prinsloo Publiekreg 80-169, Myburgh & Prinsloo 
24-72 for a detailed exposition of indigenous administrative law. 
81 Boys of the same age group and initiation school form age-regiments. These regiments make 
up the army and may be conscripted to defend the chiefdom. They are also responsible for 
public services such as the cultivation of tribute fields and the building of dams. 
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physical maturity. Abstract concepts, such as that of juristic persons, are unknown in 
non-specialised indigenous legal systems. Because rights and duties are shared, 
concepts of dependents, support or maintenance and inheritance within a family group 
are unknown. Estates do not vest in individuals but in the group as a whole. 
Holleman82 describes the traditional indigenous conception of wealth and an estate 
as 
ihe capacity to maintain and reproduce one's own kin-group as an organic unit to safeguard 
its spiritual and material well-being by being able to propitiate the ancestral spirits. . . . [T] he 
estate is primarily regarded as the capacity of the kin-group to reproduce Itself, and ... wives and 
children - that is, their reproductive value - are regarded as natural 'assets' of the estate .... 
[S]ince the reproductive assets are by far the most important ... the Shona conception of estate 
is organic rather than economic in Western sense". 
Within this framework it is not difficult to comprehend that the law of succession entails 
succession to the position of head of a group in accordance with certain rules 
regarding descent, rank, male promigeniture, birth and the like. 
In terms of the Western theory of rights, three kinds of rights in indigenous law 
concern a group's estate and may thus be compared with patrimonial rights. These 
are rights in things (analogous to the real rights in Western law),83 rights to 
performance, and rights of guardianship. 
The law regulating contractual relations has been a much neglected field of study in 
indigenous law and it is only recently that comprehensive theoretical studies in the 
indigenous law of contract have appeared in legal literature. Contracts84 in indigenous 
82 Holleman 263. 
83 It appears that ownership is the only real right recognised in indigenous law. 
84 The following materials provided information on contracts in indigenous law: Myburgh Papers 
91-92 112-113, Prinsloo & Vorster "Elements of a Contract" 6-20, Prinsloo & Vorster "Parties" 
21-25, Whelpton /nheemse Kontraktereg 24-34, Schapera "Contract" 201-209, Elias 152-155, 
Gluckman "Ideas" 213-220. 
Part 1.11.4 Pre-colonial Africa 49 
law can be concluded only between different groups. Because of the lack of 
abstraction in these non-specialised legal cultures, it is only natural that the contracts 
of indigenous law resemble real contracts in Western law. The concept of a 
consensual contract and that of contractual liability flowing from a mere agreement are 
unknown. Contractual liability arises only after performance by one of the parties. 85 
In a recent study of the contract law of the Bakwena ba Mogopa of Hebron, 
Whelpton86 indicated that many features of pre-colonial indigenous law are still 
discernible today, namely the nature of the contract as a real contract, the informal 
way in which it is concluded, the fact that contracts are concluded in the presence of 
both parties, the absence of prescription and set off, and the fact that, as a rule, no 
provision is made in contracts for interest. 
Rights of guardianship are rights over persons. Guardianship may be classed as falling 
within the ambit of a group's patrimony.81 This may be explained as follows: 
guardianship entitles the group, amongst others, to an individual's earnings and 
services. In the case of a woman, services encompasses her labour and reproductive 
capacity. Children born to a woman fall under the plenary guardianship of her group 
who then has the right to their services and earnings. Marital guardianship or a limited 
right of authority over a daughter is transferred to the group of her husband and 
marriage goods are transferred to her group in consideration of the .marriage. 88 
Damages are awarded following the infringement of the right of guardianship over an 
individual. In the case of seduction and rape of an unmarried woman damages are 
85 Prinsloo & Vorster "Elements of a Contract" 10-11; Elias 152-155; Gluckman "Ideas" 218-219; 
Whelpton lnheemse Kontraktereg 27-31 248; for a contrary view see Schapera "Contract" 202. 
86 Whelpton lnheemse Kontraktereg 248; see also Prinsloo & Vorster "Elements" 10-11 20, Prinsloo 
"Exchange" 36 on the law of contract in the former Boputhatswana. 
87 See Myburgh Papers 23-28 11 O 111 112, Holleman 262-263. 
88 Church Marriage 36-37. Marriage goods should not be seen as a quid pro quo for the transfer 
of authority over the daughter, or for the daughter herself, but rather as performance in terms 
of a contract. This contract is comparable with a real contract in Western law. 
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awarded for the reduction of value which may be obtained by the group when giving 
the victim in marriage. In the case of adultery, rape or abduction of a married woman, 
damages are awarded for the dimunition of the value of the group's right of authority 
over the woman or for their deprivation of her services as worker and child bearer. 
Pregnancy and child birth following the perpetration of these delicts increase the 
amount of damages, because of the additional costs incurred. Also in the case of 
homicide damages are awarded for the infringement of the right of authority. 
Members of a group not only share patrimonial rights but also personality rights89 • 
Rights to physical integrity00 and honour do not fall within the estate of a group. This 
is illustrated by the fact that whatever is in self-help seized by the group, the 
personality right of which has been impinged upon, or is handed over to it, is usually 
destroyed. This is done to indicate that it has nothing to do with patrimonial gain. 
Where it is not destroyed, the satisfaction lies in the patrimonial comfort brought about 
by the animals that were handed over, and which now fall within the group's estate. 
Violation of honour is in addition always regarded as having a polluting effect on the 
group and therefore has to be neutralised by purification rituals. 
As explained above, the law of delict or civil wrongs, is closely connected to criminal 
law. It is today applied in a very restricted form. 01 In indigenous law, infringement of 
a right may establish delictual liability. Again, the concept of group rights and liability 
apply. Delictual liability incurred by a member is thus shared by the group. Because 
the head represents the members of the group, an erroneous inference is often drawn 
89 See generally Myburgh Papers 31-49114-115. Very little has been written on the indigenous law 
of personality. Myburgh's analysis of indigenous law of personality appears to be the first and 
most comprehensive exposition of this field of study. 
90 Bodily injury also encompass worry, sorrow fright and dismay. 
91 The following works were consulted on delict in indigenous law: Myburgh Papers 13-49, 
Schapera Handbook 46-52, Elias 110-144, Bohannan Tiv 116-146, Cotran & Rubin 101-200, 
Myburgh "Crime" 5-6, Myburgh "Satisfaction" 20-23, Myburgh "Punishment" 43-44, Myburgh 
"Assault" 81-83, Van Bl erk "Theft" 90-93, Van Niekerk Comparative Study 24-29, Ogwurike 171, 
Leach 21-33, Read 39-44 51-52. 
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that he is individually liable for delicts committed by a member of his group. The notion 
of the infringement of a right within a group is unknown in indigenous law. Such an 
infringement of a right is dealt with in criminal law, or as a violation of regimental or 
age-group rules. When, therefore a member's behaviour embarrasses his group, or 
causes them loss, his age-group or regiment punishes him. 
Relief is usually afforded in the form of damages and satisfaction and these two forms 
are clearly distinguished. A delict is often regarded as the infringement of a personality 
right, for which satisfaction is awarded, in addition to the infringement of a patrimonial 
right. Self-help and feud action are accepted means of obtaining satisfaction for the 
infringement of a right. Some actions are regarded as pollution of the group and are 
remedied by purificatory rituals. Murder, for instance, is regarded as a violation of the 
right of authority for which damages may be awarded, a violation of the group's right 
in their bodies, 92 as well as a violation of the honour of the group. Death is perceived 
to cause pollution, which affects their honour. Feud action sometimes takes on the 
form of blood vengeance and the killing of members of the culprit's group. Satisfaction 
is also obtained by means other than feud action. Thrashing or killing of a culprit 
caught red-handed, as well as vendetta against a person responsible for the death of 
a member killed by witchcraft, are familiar ways of obtaining satisfaction. Satisfaction 
may further be obtained through a court order. Where a court orders payment of an 
amount in excess of the value of a stolen thing, or in excess of damage to property, 
it includes both satisfaction and damages. The satisfaction being awarded in this case 
for the trouble caused. 93 In those cases where assault is regarded as a delict, the 
court orders satisfaction in the form of lashes or, in accordance with the principle of 
talion, permits the victim to inflict similar injuries on his attacker. Injury resulting from 
institutionalised action incurs neither criminal nor delictual liability in indigenous law. 
Examples of such actions are stick fighting and herd boys' fights; initiation; physical 
marking of an adulterer caught red-handed; torture and ordeal, which are regarded 
92 The death of the relative causes sorrow. 
93 Myburgh Papers 36. 
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as procedural institutions to elicit evidence; and cleansing ceremonies, resulting in 
physical injury or discomfort, to remove defilement . 
5 SUMMARY 
As far as can be determined, pre-colonial indigenous law is the purest possible form 
of indigenous law. It is the law which has not been adapted or distorted, through 
judicial application or legislation or even by some sections of the indigenous 
community. This law will be employed to extract the underlying jural postulates of 
indigenous law. It will be used as the yardstick to determine the extent to which 
indigenous law, distorted through its interaction with Western law, is consonant with 
indigenous jural postulates. This law will also be referred to to illustrate the invariable 
characteristics of indigenous law which are attributed to the legal tradition upon which 
it is founded. 





INDIGENOUS LAW IN COLONIAL1 SOUTH-AFRICA 
Introduction 
The Imposition of Western Law 
2.a The Cape Province 
2.b Natal 
2.c The Transvaal 
2.d The Orange Free State 
Summary 
"It is the defect of our administration of Native Law that we have tended constantly to be wiser 
than Nature, and to cut out points of Native Law not because they are contrary to the jus 
naturale but because they conflict with what Lord Coke called the 'artificial and acquired 
reasoning' of our own advanced legal systems. "2 
1 INTRODUCTION3 
Proceeding from the premise that at the time of colonisation there indeed existed 
indigenous legal systems and established modes of social ordering, it must now be 
determined to what extent the development of these indigenous laws and 
dispute-resolution institutions had been influenced by the imposed Western law. 
Furthermore, in order to grasp fully the position of indigenous law, and the relationship 
between that law and Western law in South Africa today, it is necessary to recognise 
See Part I. 1 .1 for a demarcation of the colonial period. 
2 Brookes 191. 
3 The following materials have been consulted with regard to the position of indigenous law in the 
colonial period: Olivier & Fage 162-173, Hosten 186-194, Brookes 1-35, Omer-Cooper 35-49, 
Olivier & Atmore 53-65. 
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the socio-political circumstances prevalent here when the first official policies regarding 
the administration of the indigenous populations and their institutions were formulated. 
Long before the first British annexation of Cape in 1795, Europeans had through 
missionaries and traders made some incursions on the traditional indigenous cultures 
of Southern Africa. When the Cape, established as trading post and refreshment 
station for the Dutch East-India Company, could no longer provide for the colonists' 
need for a market for the sale of their produce, some settlers started moving out of 
the area to the East. They became stock farmers, farming with cattle which they had 
traded from the Hottentots. These farmers, in their trek to the east, overpowered and 
dispersed the Hottentots and Bushmen. However, in the Bantuspeakers a stronger, 
more organised people was encountered and their conflict resulted in the so-called 
Kaffir Wars of the late eighteenth century. 
The Dutch East-India company had little interest in the Southern African interior, their 
main interest in this part of Africa being its strategic position. The company's judicial 
administration of the Cape during this period was primitive and not well-ordered. 4 The 
highest court, the Raad van Justitie which was established in 1685, as well as all the 
lower courts were initially staffed by laymen and almost until the end of the Batavian 
rule by inexperienced lawyers. It was only at the end of that rule that lawyers, trained 
at academic institutions in the Netherlands, were employed in these courts. It naturally 
follows that little attention was paid to the administration of justice in the interior. 
Because of the British policy that the laws of a conquered territory would remain in 
force until altered by the conqueror, the changeover from Dutch to English rule in 1795 
made little difference to the laws of the interior settlements or the indigenous 
populations. 5 
4 Hosten 188. 
5 Allott ·Aboriginal Rights• 92; see generally 90-93 on the effect of colonisation on indigenous laws 
of British colonies. 
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The period of British rule too was characterised by the same spirit of Western cultural 
chauvinism which had been experienced from the very first encounter between the 
indigenous populations and the Westerners in Southern Africa. 8 
The administrators of the various territories, to a greater or lesser extent, all aspired 
to civilise the indigenous population and to oust their barbarous laws and customs. 1 
Where indigenous law was recognised, it was subject to the strict application of a 
repugnancy Clause. The various policies towards these peoples and their cultural 
institutions were somewhat dependent on those in charge of what was then known as 
native administration. Thus, the policy of the Natal administration during Shepstone's 
office reflected his sympathetic attitude to the indigenous community. In fact, he was 
often criticised for an attitude of non-interference in the traditions of the indigenes and 
for his consistent refusal to civilise the indigenous tribes. a In contrast, the Cape 
administrators were known for their all encompassing drive to civilise the indigenous 
tribes. 
By the middle of the nineteenth century South Africa was divided into various 
6 See Curtin 5 on the concept of cultural chauvinism; see also Part 1.1 General Introduction, 
Roberts & Mann 18, Allott "Aboriginal Rights" 88 93. At 88 Allott points out that colonial 
expansion was legitimised by international law. The doctrine applied that "only States in the 
formal Western sense had international legal personality and participated in the benefits and 
burdens of international law .... Territories which lacked a formal system of government and law 
comparable to those prevailing in the 'States' could be treated as 'unoccupied' or owner1ess 
territory or 'terra nullius', and hence were open ... to acquisition by an outside 'State' despite 
the will of the inhabitants". Tso 225-226 describes this attitude of the colonisers in America thus: 
"The false assumption is that the dominant society operates from the vantage point of 
intellectual, moral and spiritual superiority. The truth is that the dominant society became 
dominant because of military strength and power.· 
7 Allott "Aboriginal Rights" 87 explains the colonial powers' dualistic purpose in their African 
expansion thus: "Humanitarian, altruistic and civilising purposes were also often put forward as 
justifications for such expansions and occupation .... For many of the colonisers who waged war 
on the indigenes before seizing their territories and exploiting their resources, these justifications 
were no more than a cynical cover for enrichment. But at the same time one must recognise 
the less self-regarding and genuine desire of many to bring civilisation and enlightnment, as they 
saw them, to the benighted.· 
8 Whether this policy flowed from an understanding and respect for the Zulu culture, based on 
real knowledge of their tradition, or whether it was for political reasons or personal ambition, 
remains speculation. 
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autonomous areas - two of which were British Colonies (Natal and the Cape), 
numerous indigenous kingdoms (the Zulu and Basuto being the largest) and two Boer 
Republics (Transvaal and the Orange Free State). The population at that stage 
consisted of about 300 000 Europeans and 2 to 3 million indigenes. The administrators 
of these territories all had different attitudes towards the administration of the local 
population, but the Inter-colonial Native Affairs Commission of 1903-1905 saw as 
ultimate goal for the administration of justice the improvement of indigenous law and 
its eventual assimilation into colonial law. 
2 THE IMPOSITION OF WESTERN LAW 
2.a The Cape Province9 
An official policy for the administration of the indigenous population of the Cape was 
first implemented around 1830. At that time the colonial secretary, Sir George Murray, 
instructed that whilst the indigenous population should not be allowed to retain 
ownership of the territory which was permanently occupied by the Colony, they should 
nevertheless not be expelled from the land of their birth by force. He saw it as 
necessary that they be removed ''from temptations which must attach to their close 
proximity to the borders of the Colony: and it would be not only sacrificing the ultimate 
hope of their civilisation, but the immediate welfare of an extensive district of the 
colony, to allow the Cafres to retain their present locations ... ". 10 
At first, the British government tried to shirk responsibility for the indigenous people. 
Thus, in 1833 a treaty system was introduced whereby direct rule of the indigenous 
population could be avoided and indigenous tribes could be controlled through treaties 
9 The following materials provided information in this regard: Cape Native Laws & Customs 
Commission (1883) 14-20, Cape Native Laws & Customs Commission (1881) xi-xii xiv-xix, 
Brookes 32-35 SO 87-118 182-186, Olivier lnheemse Reg 24-32, Bennett Application 40-43, Brand 
174-188, Matthews 225-241, Sachs Justice 62. 
1 O Brookes 13. 
Part 1.111.2 Colonial South Africa 57 
with their chiefs. 11 Through this system administration of the indigenes was left wholly 
in the hands of the chiefs who had to administer their tribes in accordance with 
indigenous law and custom. An example of such a treaty whereby direct rule of the 
local populace could be avoided, was Benjamin D'Urban's proclamation of the territory 
between the Kei and Keiskamma rivers qs British territory, 12 while at the same time 
expelling the indigenous tribes. This treaty was never fully implemented. 13 It was 
followed by another treaty in terms of which it was agreed that the chiefs and their 
people would become British subjects and would fall under the control of the Cape 
government, but that they would retain their laws and customs. 1• A treaty of 1836 
recognised the independence of the tribes living east of the Great Fish River, granting 
them the right to administer their own laws and customs. Other treaties were 
concluded with various other tribes until 1845. These treaties introduced total territorial 
segregation. 15 In 1840 and 1845 it was agreed that individuals converted to the 
Christian religion could be exempted from certain indigenous law practices if so 
desired.18 
During the period under discussion various territories were annexed to the Cape 
proper. After the so-called War of the Axe, all treaties were abolished and the territory 
between the Kei and Keiskamma rivers was annexed by the British. This province 
became known as British Kaffraria. The province was regarded as a reserve for the 
indigenous population and the High Commissioner as Paramount Chief. Although the 
11 The first such treaty was concluded between Sir Benjamin D'Urban and Andries Waterboer of 
the Griqua tribe on 11 December 1834. 
12 The Province of Queen Adelaide. 
13 One obvious reason for this was that the indigenous tribes refused to be expelled from the 
territory. 
14 Only certain of the more serious crimes were exduded from the jurisdiction of the chiefs. See 
Cape Native Laws & Customs Commission (1883) 15. 
15 Territorial segregation was also an important incentive for the Voortrekker's move away from the 
Eastern Cape. 
16 Cape Native Laws & Customs Commission (1883) 15. 
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inhabitants were allowed to administer their own indigenous laws and practice their 
customs, all their decisions and acts were subject to the revision of colonial officials. 
At a special meeting with the chiefs of the territory, their position as British subjects 
was explained to them. Besides the fact that they were from that time expected to 
obey the laws of England and to force their subjects to do so too, they were to 
"disbelieve in and cease to tolerate or practice witchcraft in any shape", to 
"acknowledge no chief but the Queen of England and her representative", and to 
"abolish the sin of buying wives". 11 The Cape policy towards the administration of the 
indigenous population was directed at their civilisation, and in this process Western 
laws and institutions were relied on. 
Although from the earliest times the Cape never sought to recognise indigenous laws, 
the administrators of British Kaffraria were as early as 1849 forced to recognise th~ 
principle of collective responsibility where stock theft was concerned. Furthermore, 
certain practices, such as the distribution of unmarried girls among the chief and his 
men, were made punishable. The application of Western law to the indigenous 
population proved to be so problematic that British Kaffraria remained under martial 
law (until 1859), thus ensuring that the magistrates had a free hand in resolving 
disputes in accordance with indigenous law while at the same time the Cape 
government steadfastly refused to recognise that system. In 1865 this territory became 
annexed to the Cape. Yet the magistrates of British Kaffraria, as well as the indigenous 
judicial officers, never stopped applying indigenous law, even after martial law was 
suspended and the territory made subject to colonial law. The Cape Native Succession 
Act of 1864 and the Kaffraria Native Succession Ordinance of 1864 were the first 
official instruments which recognised indigenous law.18 
The Native Laws and Customs Commission of 188319 found that in view of the fact 
17 Brookes 33. 
18 Cape Native Laws & Customs Commission (1881) xi-xii. 
19 Cape Native Laws & Customs Commission (1883) 18-20. 
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that indigenous law had been unofficially applied by magistrates and unofficial 
indigenous institutions alike, that law should be recognised as an uncodified system 
of common law. It further warned that because it was so interwoven with the 
indigenous culture the abolition of indigenous law would be both dangerous and futile. 
Moreover, it was found that such a step would refute the Colony's object of civilising 
the indigenous population through the gradual importation of Western laws and 
institutions into their community. Finally, it was suggested that a code and regulations 
of indigenous law be drafted which would leave the indigenous law which is not 
opposed to the universal principles of morality and humanity, and which would secure 
a uniform and equitable administration of justice in accordance with civilised 
practice. 20 The Commission found that owing to the fact that there was no certain and 
uniform system of indigenous criminal law, it would not be advisable to codify that part 
of the indigenous law. It was suggested rather that the colonial criminal law should be 
codified - at the same time remedying its defects and incorporating "some laws and 
principles of procedure dear to the natives".21 
However, the Cape government took no decision regarding the position of indigenous 
law and gave no effect to the Commission's recommendations. Magistrates still 
unofficially applied indigenous law as an uncodified system of common law in civil 
cases between blacks, whilst the Cape High Court refused to apply that law in the 
absence of statutory indication to that effect. 22 The position in the Cape province had 
far-reaching consequences for the indigenous community. This was especially felt in 
the sphere of family law. In Ngqobela v Sihe/e23 the presiding judge remarked that it 
was regrettable that although provision was made for the recognition of Muslim unions, 
traditional indigenous marriages were not regarded as proper marriages. It is ironic 
that indigenous-law unions are today, more than a century later and after the 
20 Cape Native Laws & Customs Commission (1883) 20. 
21 Cape Native Laws & Customs Commission (1883) 23. 
22 See Ngqobela v Sihele (1893) 1 o Juta 346. 
23 (1893) 10 Juta 346. 
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introduction of a new constitutional dispensation, still not regarded as being on a par 
with western marriages. 
When the Transkeian territories were annexed24 by the British (1877-1894), provision 
was made for existing laws to remain in force because the inhabitants of the territory 
were not sufficiently civilised to be subjected to the ordinary laws of the Colony. 25 
Provision was further made for the governor of the territory to determine a date at 
which the territory would become subject to colonial law. This happened in 1879, when 
the application of indigenous law was restricted to civil cases between blacks. Its 
application was further made subject to a repugnancy clause. 26 The implementation 
of the repugnancy clause obviously brought about changes to the traditional 
indigenous law. Certain indigenous institutions, such as levirate unions and initiation 
dances, were for example forbidden. 
It is interesting to note that those indigenous marriages that were registered, were 
accorded full recognition under the Transkei and Griqualand East Regulations 
pertaining to courts of law. The patrimonial consequences of such registered 
marriages were taken to be the same as those of Western marriages. The position of 
children from such marriages too was the same as that of children born of Western 
marriages. Divorce and related issues could only be decided by a Magistrate's Court. 
This Act also determined that colonial law would apply to cases of both testate and 
intestate succession. A penal code was drawn up by the Cape Native Laws and 
Customs Commission in 1883, and the principle of collective responsibility regarding 
stock theft was incorporated into this code. 21 
24 See the Transkeian Annexation Act 38 of 1877; see also Cape Native Laws & Customs 
Commission (1881) xviii. 
25 Cape Native Laws & Customs Commission (1881) xviii. 
26 In terms of Proclamations 110 and 112 of 1879; see also Cape Native Laws & Customs 
Commission (1881) xviii-xix. 
27 In Natal the principle of collective responsibility was generally recognised and not limited to 
stock theft. 
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With the annexation of Basutoland, 28 which had been in a continuous land struggle 
with the Orange Free State, it was determined that although the territory would 
become part of the Cape, it would remain for the time being under its own indigenous 
laws and customs and would not become subject to the laws of the colony. The 
general provisions regarding the administration of justice in this territory were similar 
to those for the Transkeian territories. 29 
Southern Bechuanaland which was constituted Crown Colony of Britain in 1885, was 
annexed to the Cape in 1895. Northern Bechuanaland was declared a British 
protectorate. The only interest Britain had in that desert country was its . strategic 
position as buffer between the Cape and the expanding Transvaal. Administration of 
justice was left in the hands of the traditional Tswana rulers. It was provided in 
Proclamation 2 of 1885 that the Tswana chiefs would have exclusive civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over their people. The criminal jurisdiction was only restricted in respect of 
some serious crimes. The Cape policy of non-recognition of indigenous laws and 
institutions never applied in that territory. Until 1924 there was no connection between 
the indigenous and Western courts in Bechuanaland, not even a system of appeal. 
2.b Natal30 
After the battle of Blood River, the approximately 6 000 European settlers were faced 
with the administration of approximately 25 000 blacks. Their policy was one of 
territorial segregation31 and to rule the indigenes who remained in the white area 
28 In terms of the Basutoland Annexation Act 12 of 1871 (C). 
29 Cape laws & Customs Commission (1881) xiv-xix; see xiv-xviii for a discussion of specific 
changes brought about by proclamation and how the position in Basutoland differed from that 
in the Transkeian territories. 
30 See the following sources on the position of indigenous law in Natal: Brookes 22-32 41-87 
191-193, Brand 188-195, Bennett Application 43-44, Olivier /nheemse Reg 33-35, Matthews 
341-249 . 
. 31 lndigenes were retained in the whites-only territory in as far as they were needed for agricultural 
labour. 
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paternally, justly and kindly, but retaining them in a position of social, religious, political 
and economic subordination. 32 
Natal was annexed by Britain in 1843. In the transitional period between the annexation 
and the actual coming into office of the new government in 1845, the territory 
experienced an influx of more than 100 000 Zulu returning to the land of their birth. In 
1845 Shepstone was appointed as Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes. In the same 
year Roman-Dutch law was recognised as the common law of Natal and made 
applicable to the exclusion of any other law prevailing in the territory. 33 In giving effect 
to the recommendations of the Natal Native Commission of 1946-4 7, a location system 
was introduced in Natal whereby the Zulu were settled on land set aside for that 
purpose. Administratfon of the province was solely in the hands of Shepstone. When 
the colonial government refused to finance the office of superintendent to administer 
these locations, Shepstone placed the burden on the former tribal rulers, and where 
these could not be traced, chiefs were appointed for the purpose. 
Shepstone, who kept the peace amongst the indigenes, who controlled them but failed 
to civilise them, 34 had a thorough knowledge of, and respect for indigenous tradition, 
language, laws and custom. He was very popular and well respected by the Zulu 
community. Conflict arose between Cloete, Special Commissioner for the province of 
Natal, and Shepstone. Cloete was of the opinion that the indigenous population of 
Natal should be subject to Roman-Dutch law, while Shepstone felt that indigenous law 
as a whole should be recognised and applied by all courts. In 1849, 35 indigenous 
criminal and civil law were recognised and made applicable to the indigenous 
32 Brookes 23. 
33 Ordinance 12 of 1845. 
34 Brookes 43. He was criticised for this attitude by Merriman before the Inter-colonial Commission 
of 1903-1905: "You have not elevated the Natives in Natal; you have not raised them; you have 
not educated them; they are barbarians and you have designedly left them in a state of 
barbarism· (Quoted by Brookes 47). 
35 In terms of Ordinance 3 of 23 June 1849. 
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population, in as far as it was not opposed to the principles of humanity observed 
throughout the civilised world. The adjudication of indigenous crimes which could be 
regarded as being opposed to the principles of humanity was later restricted to 
colonial courts only. Roman-Dutch law was abrogated in as far as the indigenous 
population was concerned. Indigenous chiefs were appointed as government officials; 
white government officials were appointed to control the administration of justice in 
accordance with indigenous law; and appeals were instituted to the Lieutenant-
General, Shepstone, who officially replaced the Zulu monarch as paramount chief of 
the Zulu nation in 1850. 
Already at that stage the Natal administration started changing the indigenous legal 
system, not only through the repugnancy clause but through memoranda to the chiefs 
instructing them to bring about certain changes in the indigenous-law position. The aim 
with these instructions was ultimately to civilise the indigenous population by bringing 
their law into line with the Western standards of justice and civilisation. Ironically, the 
compulsory death penalty for murder was introduced in this manner: "He who 
intentionally kills another . . . shall die himself . . . he shall follow his murdered brother; 
his children shall be fatherless and his wives widows, and his cattle and all other 
property shall become forfeited". 36 This policy was endorsed by public executions 
which were ordered to serve as example to the indigenous population. The Exemption 
from Native Law Acf1 provided for the exemption of indigenous law in certain cases, 
but did not apply to persons married to more than one wife. In 1869 regulations 
regarding customary unions were published. These regulations dealt with the forms 
and registration of such unions; consent of the bride; the amount of lobolo payable; 
grounds for dissolution; and the· role of the chief in the conclusion of unions. 
The codification of Zulu law never formed part of Shepstone's policy. He supported 
the Transkeian idea that indigenous law differed from tribe to tribe and that it had to 
36 Brookes 52-53. 
37 Law 11 of 1864 as amended. 
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be determined from case to case. In 1878 a Code of Zulu law was drawn up as guide 
for all courts (colonial and indigenous) to the unwritten indigenous law. Unfortunately, 
magistrates regarded it as a binding Code of traditional law and rarely deviated from 
it. This Code made serious inroads into the traditional law position, amongst others 
divesting the chiefs of their power. A Board of Native Administration was to revise this 
Code from time to time so that it could keep up with the· natural development of the 
indigenous Zulu law. However, changes and amendments suggested by the Board 
were never implemented. 
Law 19of1891 officially codified Zulu law, made it applicable to all blacks residing (not 
necessarily domiciled) in Natal, and repealed the Code of 1878. Included in the new 
Law were rules and regulations of an administrative nature which were foreign to 
indigenous law. These were, amongst others, regulations regarding the registration of 
customary unions, limitation of the amount of lobolo payable and prescription periods 
for lobolo debts. This Law has been described as a conglomeration of traditional Zulu 
law, martial law and colonial law.38 It is unfortunate that no provision was made for 
the amendment of this Law other than by parliament. The result was that the Law was 
never brought into line with new developments in Zulu law. This Code was for the first 
time amended in 1932. 
The Native High Court, instituted in 1898, was fortunately enabled to apply indigenous 
law other than that contained in the Code. In the densely populated black areas 
special courts for the administration of indigenous law, subordinate to the Magistrates' 
Courts, were instituted and again abolished in 1896. In 1897 Zululand formally became 
part of Natal. In 1898 magistrates were officially empowered to hear civil cases 
between blacks in accordance with the indigenous law. Appeals lay to the Native High 
Court. Chiefs' Courts retained their civil jurisdiction, except in all matrimonial cases, but 
their criminal jurisdiction was limited to members of their tribes and limited to less 
serious crimes. Appeals lay to the Magistrates' Courts. 
38 Brand 194; Bennett Application 44 points out that this codification was seen as an ideal 
opportunity to amend the traditional law and that the traditional law was distorted in the process. 
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Customary unions, which had to be registered, enjoyed full recognition in Natal and 
no court was entitled to declare such a union immoral. The Natal Commission of 1906, 
which presented a comprehensive report on the administration of the indigenous Zulu 
population, proposed many innovative ideas towards the so-called native policy, but 
the administration of justice was conspicuously omitted from the report, leaving it in 
the· hands of the Magistrates' Courts. 
2.c The Transvaal39 
The first presidential election in the South African Republic took place in 1872. At that 
stage the Republic was ill-organised, poor and in dire need of trained administrators. 
The territoriality principle applied and all persons residing in the territory were subject 
to Roman-Dutch law. The black population was seen as a threat to the well-being of 
the territory and their integration into the community was low on the administrators' list 
of priorities. Legislation which saw the light during this period was rarely implemented. 
The first legislation of consequence for indigenous law in the Transvaal, was Act 3 of 
1876. In terms of this Act indigenous marriages were denied the status of lawful 
marriages and separate locations were set aside for black occupation. o40 
The Transvaal was annexed by Britain in 1877. One of the reasons for the annexation 
was the failure of the Republic's Native Policy.41 Shepstone's son who became 
Secretary of Native Affairs of the territory, was of the opinion that it was unjust to 
subject the black population to a law that was quite foreign to them. During the British 
rule, which ended in 1881, most of the old legislation was abolished and the position 
of indigenous law regulated by Ordinance 11 of 1881. This Act gave recognition to 
indigenous civil law. On regaining independence, the Transvaal re-enacted this 
39 The materials consulted on the position in the Transvaal were: Brookes 119-138 193-194, 
Matthews 249-260, Brand 196-200, Bennett Application 44-45, Olivier /nheemse Reg 35-37. 
40 This land remained the property of the republic because blacks were not allowed ownership of 
land. 
41 Brand 250. 
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Ordinance in Law 4 of 1885. In terms of this Act indigenous civil law seemingly 
received wide recognition, but it was subject to a repugnancy clause. Unfortunately the 
courts interpreted the repugnancy clause so widely that it severely curtailed the 
application of the Act. Consequently, indigenous marriages were regarded as being 
against the principles of civilisation and were not recognised as lawful marriages. The 
ordinary courts' consistent refusal to recognise customary unions was confirmed by 
Law 3 of 1897, which declared civil or Christian marriages the only lawful marriages. 
Although lobolo was not expressly forbidden, the courts regarded the institution as 
repugnant to the general principles of civilisation. Further, because Law 3 of 1897 did 
not mention the payment of lobolo in the conclusion of marriages, this institution too 
was regarded by the courts as against the Republic's statutory law. Indigenous law 
was never codified in the Transvaal. 
The position of the ordinary courts with regard to the administration of indigenous law 
was as follows: The president of the Republic was recognised as supreme chief, 
adopting the powers vested in the paramount chief. Under the president followed a 
hierarchy of white officials who also served as courts of appeal. Commissioners' 
Courts were instituted in densely populated areas. Civil disputes in these courts were 
adjudicated upon under indigenous law, subject to a repugnancy clause. Chiefs' 
Courts were recognised and had concurrent jurisdiction with the Commissioners' 
Courts. Indigenous law had to be proved in the same way all customs had to be 
proved. Indigenous criminal law was not recognised and all people were subject to the 
existing Western criminal law. Magistrates' Courts had no jurisdiction with respect to 
indigenous-law disputes and could not apply that law. In contrast the Supreme Court 
did have such jurisdiction and served as court of appeal for the Commissioners' 
Courts. This had a detrimental effect on the position of indigenous law which was very 
often held to be inapplicable because it was considered being against the general 
principles of civilisation. 
The war of 1899 - 1902 resulted in the occupation of the South African Republic by 
Britain but no real changes in the policy towards or the position of indigenous law 
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were brought into effect. 
2.d The Orange Free State42 
It is interesting to note that the position regarding the recognition of indigenous law in 
the Orange Free State and the Cape were rather similar. Indigenous law and 
institutions were only accorded recognition in the locations or reserves set aside for 
the occupation by blacks. However, their reasons behind this policy differed. Brookes 
explains: 
"Under the impression that Natives were so barbarous that their laws must be worthless, the 
Orange Free State has failed, with one or two minor exceptions, to recognise Native law at all. 
Under the equally mistaken impression that any differentiation between Europeans and Natives 
in the Law Courts meant oppression for the Natives and an infringement of the principle of equal 
justice for all the Cape Province has similarly withheld all recognition of Native Law.1143 
It seems that while the Free State supported the idea of permanent inequality between 
the races in all spheres of life, in theory'4 the Cape promoted equal rights for all 
civilised men. 45 
Considering how small the black population of the Free State was, 48 it is not 
surprising that the administrators did not pay much attention to the formulation of a 
policy for the recognition of indigenous laws and institutions and the administration of 
42 The following sources provided information on the Orange Free State: Matthews 260-265, 
Brookes 119-120 194-195, Brand 200-201, Bennett Application 45-46, Olivier lnheemse Reg 
37-38. 
43 Brookes 181. 
44 One has to consider the fact that the Cape always looked upon the indigenous population as 
being in need of civilisation. 
45 See Matthews 260. 
46 The indigenous population of the Free State consisted largely of an overflow from the other 
areas surrounding this province. 
68 Part 1.111.3 Colonial South Africa 
the indigenous communities under their control. There were two reserves for the 
indigenous people in this area. In the Thaba 'Nchu reservation, which was annexed 
Barolong territory, indigenous marriages were fully recognised. When the Witsies-
hoek41 reserve came under control of the Free State, the chief of the tribe inhabiting 
the area was given limited civil jurisdiction in respect of members of his tribe. His 
jurisdiction was not limited to indigenous law cases, but to ten pounds sterling, 
whether the dispute arose in indigenous or Western law. Appeals lay to the 
Commandant's Court of equity and from there to the ordinary courts who could only 
apply Western law unless expressly otherwise indicated by legislation. Indigenous 
criminal law was not recognised and Western criminal law applied to all persons. 
Elsewhere in the Free State indigenous law was not recognised. Law 26 of 1899 made 
an exception and recognised customary unions where succession and inheritance by 
the offspring of such a union came to bear and where parental control and custody 
of the children were concerned. The proviso was that the father and mother had 
accepted each other as spouse and lived accordingly. However, the position of the 
children in such cases was determined as if the parents had contracted a civil 
marriage. Their position therefore differed radically from the position in indigenous law. 
Contrary to indigenous law the party without fault was awarded guardianship of the 
children on the dissolution of the marriage. 
3 SUMMARY 
This period in the history of South Africa illustrates the use of law as an instrument of 
change and development, an instrument in the civilising mission of the colonialists. 48 
Law, which is central to conflicting interpretations of morality and culture, has been 
47 See Quinlan 79-91 for a survey of the history of Witsieshoek and the formation of indigenous 
tribes by the settlers residing in the area. 
48 PospisR ·culture Change• 128 observes that because law uses rewards and punishments as Its 
sanction and because It applies to the whole of society, law can be very effective and the major 
instrument for effecting culture change. 
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described as the battleground in the scramble for access to resources and labour, and 
for power and authority.48 Under colonial rule the law which was imposed upon the 
indigenous population was authoritarian in nature. This law remained true to its 
constitutive history as imperial power and dominated lesser legal orders. 50 The 
indigenes did not support the imposed law. They either ignored it and unofficially 
maintained their indigenous laws and institutions, or, in some instances, obeyed the 
colonial laws for fear of punishment by colonial officials.~, Colonial policies laid the 1 
foundation for the official policy towards indigenous law and the judicial administration 
of the indigenous population in South Africa in later years. Major political transitions, 
such as when South Africa became a Union and then a Republic brought about little 
real adjustment to the indigenes' position and in consequence newly formulated Union 
and Republican policies that seemed outwardly different, in fact varied little from those 
that went before. Likewise the indigenous population's attitude towards these policies 
did not change over the years. Official law was largely ignored and unofficial law and 
institutions grew in importance. 
49 Roberts & Mann 3 6. 
50 Fitzpatrick "Imperialism" 99 comments that a "[l]aw could fulfill the imperatives of Enlightenment 
and relate to an essential humanity, yet treat parts of that humanity in radically different ways 
because of their radically different position in the scale of civilisation or in evolutionary 
development"; see also generally Fitzpatrick "Imperialism" 100-104. 
51 Brookes 202 renounced this imposition of law that did not "reproduce the ideas and customs 
of those to whom it applie[d]" and the "manipulation of Codes and judicial decisions in order 
to bring about changes in Native life" as "reprehensible, impolitic and unscientific". 
i 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
By 1919 iodige.oQ!.J~ IC1wwas regognised to s9me extent in ~II ~the areas which,werElJP 
.. _ .... -- --·· . ., '"-,,~·· 
constitute the provinces;. of the Union of South Africa. This law differed from the true 
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pre-colonial traditional indigenous law. 1 It reflected the historic interaction between !tie 
original pre-colonial la~ _a:r1g_JbeJaw ... oL the .. colooisers, and often exposed the 
,._._ ,, "'" - -- - . ---" ---~~ 
colonisers' disda.in for indigenoµs laws and.systems of sociaLordering. It has been 
referred to as a European invention which fitted into the European model of colonial 
rule and which found expression in the concept of indirect rule. 2 On their ,parttb~ 
indigenous communitie.s abided by the .. trflnsforrnationsJn!beirJaws..and institutions so 
that they J~OLllQ g(lin a~9ess to resources and .labOL!f, and they often made 
representations about their law and institutions to give them greater validity in the eyes 
of both the Westerners and the indigenOljS populatiqn.,3 
In South Africa this process of adapting indigenous law. to suit the .purposes of the 
white administration as well as those of certain sections of the indigenous pqpulation 
is an on,goingone. It challenges the very survival of indigenous law in this country. The 
unjust indigenous leg_cil system, which is fc;ir removed from both the pre-colonial l~g?I 
system and its. institutions •. c;ind the true indigenous law adapt.e.dJrLaccordance with . 
its underlying postulates, is often presented as authentic indigenous lavv,. It will be 
- ' ' ~ •·' 
argued that this distorted indigenous law is no longer in step with its jural postulates 
and that it is perceived as inherently discriminatory by those who struggle for equality 
between male and female and old and young. But it is also this law which is perceived, 
1 Roberts & Mann 21-22 refer to it as "precontact native law". 
2 Roberts & Mann 6-9 19-23 24; on 9-23 they discuss the "making of colonial legal systems". They 
view the legal systems which are observed in Africa as a "single interactive colonial legal system 
... [which] was forged over time by Africans and Europeans pursuing interests and beliefs of 
their own• (8-9). 
3 For example, Quinlan 80-91 describes the colonial formation of various tribes in the Witsieshoek 
area. The early settlers in that area concluded a treaty with the leader of a refugee group, 
Mokhachane, in which the group was identified as a tribe and the leader elevated to the status 
of chief. This identification and elevation was based on certain false assumptions of the social 
ordering of the indigenous population inhabiting the area. The indigenous population acceded 
to the formation of this tribe, as well as to that of other tribes in the area, for economic reasons. 
On 111-112 Quinlan describes the concepts of iribe" and "chier as ideological resources which 
"served the colonial governments of the mid 19th century to categorise groups of African 
refugees from the settler wars .... The content of these concepts was shaped by the African 
need for land, the colonialists' control of the highveld and their propensity to allocate territories 
to recognisable African groups". 
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together with the official Western law, to be illegitimate" and which gave rise to the 
emergence of an alternative people's law and alternative dispute-resolution institutions. 
OFFICIAL RECOGNITION AND APPLICATION OF INDIGENOUS LAW 
The Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 
By the time of Union, there was no conformity in the mass of diverse laws which 
regulated indigenous law. It was only natural that this disparity in the colonial 
legislation caused grave injustice in the administration of justice for the black 
population. 11 Tbe 11eed J9~ Jhe homogeneeus recognition and adminis!rat!qrL of 
indigenou~ .law. had become. a. necessity. A legislative pr9j_e~J9r _!~~- unific~tion of 
colonial legislation which was launched in 1912 and culminated in a .uniform Najive 
D.isputes Bill. lbis-BilLPJmtided foe the ... abligatocy application. af Jp919_~nc.>.1:1_~ __ 1a~ 
certain specified civil cases between blacks ... The Bill never becarne leg[§JJili9.tl< 
The colonial legislation was eventually consolidated in the Black Administration Act of 
1927. 8 This Act provided for a separate court system for blacks anct for the lif"T)itf3d 
recognition of indigenous law throughout the Union of South Africa. The promulgation 
of this Act was not only effected with the interest of the black population at heart, but 
it was also done for reasons of practical efficacy (shortage of manpower) and politi~I 
utility (indirect rule).1 It was not only a desire for uniformity which prompted the 
promulgation of this Act, but another, less overt need to promote tribalism and chiefly 
4 See generally Hoexter, HSRC 129-136 155-156 142-144, Corder & Davis 2; see also Part 11.1.1 
and Part 11.1.4 below where the concept of legitimacy is discussed in more detail. 
5 See also Garthorne 258-259. 
6 Act 38 of 1927. 
7 During the colonial period and after Union there were both a shortage of funds and a lack of 
officials available to perform judicial functions amongst the indigenous population. In later years 
the use of traditional leaders to perform judicial and administrative functions under control of 
State management developed into a convenient policy of indirect rule. 
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authority. It was believed that a return to indigenous institutions would deflect the 
challenge posed by the growing urbanised community.8 
The entrenchment of traditional institutions in legislation and their incorpora~ion in State 
administration have been criticised for its stultify.ing effect on progr~ss "'@P 
development. Roberts and Mann9 point out that indigenous law and institutions are 
not unchangeable pillars of indigenous society. They regard the concept of an 
unchanging tradition in any society, whether Western or African, as a fallacy. 
Institutions, such as chieftancy and dispute-resolution processes, should merely be 
seen as stages in a process of social development. Laws and institutions are 
reflections of economic, political and social imperatives. 
It is indeed true that the incorporation of indigenous law in legislation may have had 
a stultifying effect on the development of indigenous law, simply because the 
legislation did not make provision for the natural development of that law in 
accordance with changing values. But it should be borne in mind that the indigenous 
population in South Africa has largely ignored State manipulation of its law and has 
continued to apply it unofficially and without any restriction - in the rural areas in a very 
pure form, and in the urban areas in an adapted form. 
'{) ~· · T~~ official re~Qg_r:~l!!i.C?r:i of ir:i.Qig~r,:ipus law was made subject to a repugnancy c1aus.e:.0 
<"'""'--~-~" ----,_~-. ----~""____ . -~-....... ,, -
Section 11 (1) of the Black Administration Act determined that indigenous law w?uld~ 
only be applicable in as far s.o it w~s not ~gains~ the principles of public po~ic_~~ 
~~[91.lu§!is;:e.. In practice the principles of public policy and natural justice were as a 
matter of course interpreted within a Western frame of reference. This repugnancy 
8 See Bennett Sourcebook 62. It should be borne in mind that the Chiefs' Courts that most 
resembled traditional institutions, functioned only successfully in rural areas and the 
Commissioners' Courts which also operated in urban areas had little resemblance to the 
traditional institutions. 
9 Roberts & Mann 4 6 7. 
1 O See generally Van Niekerk Comparative Study 61-64. 
'/ 
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clause still applies today, although it is now embodied in different legislation. 11 In the 
process criteria such as justice, morality, equity, good conscience, order, humar:ii!Y' 
public policy and natural justice are used to restrict the application of indigenous law 
rules, whether of a procedural or substantive nature. 
Indigenous Courts of Chiefs and Headmen were instituted and granted limited civil and 
criminal jurisdiction. These Courts, still in operation today, were under thejljdicial and 
administrative control of the State. Chiefs' Courts functioned separately from the 
ordinary courts of the l~-~9' 2 Respect for chiefs as traditional leaders declined as they 
were increasingly regarded as State officials and as their people were increasingly 
unable to exercise control over them. 13 The incorporation of chiefs into the State 
administration also had the effect of transforming the traditional role of such 
institutions. 1" Indigenous chiefs were at the same time empowered and subordinated 
- their chiefly authority reinforced (by their incorporation into the State system) and 
diminished by State control (by the application of the repugnancy clause and the 
limitations placed upon the application of indigenous law). 
Criticism levelled against chiefs, the duality of their functions as administrative and 
judicial officers, the fact that they adjudicate cases which fall outside their official 
criminal jurisdiction, the fact that many are illiterate, and the fact that their decisions are 
11 Sees 1 (1) Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. Constitutional Principle XIII contained 
in Schedule 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 as amended 
determines that indigenous law shall be recognised and applied subject to the fundamental 
rights contained in the Constitution and subject to specific legislation dealing with it. 
12 Although they were theoretically linked to the ordinary ,courts through a system of appeal to 
Magistrates' Courts, such appeals resembled trials de novo, because Chiefs' Courts are not 
courts of record. 
13 In indigenous law a ruler's powers are checked by the people. He always acts in councH (the 
council consisting of representatives of the people), he has to be adequately trained and old 
enough before he may assume office and he may be publicly criticised with impunity under 
certain circumstances: see Myburgh Papers 55-57. This traditional system was undermined by 
the State control of chiefs and the appointment of persons other than hereditary chiefs to these 
positions. 
14 See Roberts & Mann 32-36. 
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not reported15 often stems from a misunderstanding of the principles underlying 
indigenous law and institutions and from the fact that indigenous and imposed 
Western value systems are sometimes difficult to reconcile. 18 But despite such 
criticisms Chiefs' Courts have proved surprisingly resilient to Western influence and 
State intervention. All over Southern Africa Chiefs' Courts have proved their ability to 
adapt to new circumstances and to overcome the stigma of colonisation, indirect rule 
and apartheid. 11 
Commissioners' Courts 18 were instituted as an inexpensive and simple means to 
resolve civil disputes between blacks. These Courts were presided over by officials of 
the then Department of Native Affairs who had a discretion to apply either indigenous 
law or the general law of the land. Judicial notice of indigenous law could be taken by 
the commissioners and legal representation was allowed. 19 Magistrates lost their civil 
jurisdiction over blacks in those areas where Commissioners' Courts were instituted. 
Appeals lay to courts specially instituted for that purpose20 and only in exceptional 
circumstances were further appeals allowed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court. Although the supreme Court had concurrent jurisdiction with the 
Commissioners' Courts, high costs and unfamiliar procedures practically placed it out 
15 See eg Bekker's report on the role of the judiciary in a plural society. 
16 An example is the fact that the appointment of uncles to assist chiefs in court cases has been 
regarded as nepotism by some who criticise the institution of Chiefs' Courts. However, in 
traditional society elderly family members with their superior experience and knowledge not only 
of the law, but also of the social circumstances of the group, often assist the chief. They are 
regarded as built-in checks of political and judicial power. 
17 For instance, in Zimbabwe, Chiefs' Courts, which were abolished at independence, were 
reinstituted in 1990: see generally Bennett Sourcebook 59-60 63-64, Van Niekerk Comparative 
Study 131-133. 
18 Bennett Sourcebook 80-82; Van Niekerk Comparative Study 66-70; Olivier lnheemse Reg 
40-44. 
19 S 16 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. 
20 Magistrates presided over these Appeal Courts for Commissioners' Courts. But they had a 
limited knowledge of indigenous law and for that very reason often rejected the commissioners' 
judgments. 
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of reach of black litigants. The racial segregation in the administration of justice 
created by these developments seemed but a logical extension of the territorial and 
cultural segregation maintained in the colonial period. 21 
In 1957 criminal jurisdiction in respect of crimes committed by blacks were conferred 
upon Commissioners' Courts. They were not empowered to apply indigenous criminal 
law as courts of first instance. However, they could apply indigenous criminal law when 
functioning as a court of appeal for the Courts of Chiefs' and Headmen. Over the 
years Commissioners' Courts lost all credibility, especially when their criminal 
jurisdiction later included the enforcement of the notorious pass laws. Much criticism 
was levelled against them for t~eir lack of judicial independence, specifically in criminal 
cases, and against the judicial officers' insignificant knowledge of indigenous law.22 
In 1983 the Hoexter Commission found in its fifth report into the structure and 
functioning of the courts that it was unrealistic and unreasonable to restrict urban 
blacks to Commissioners' Courts for civil litigation. It was also found that separate 
criminal courts for separate people was unnecessary, humiliating and repugnant. 23 
As a result Commissioners' Courts and the Appeal Courts for Commissioners' Courts 
were abolished in 1987. 24 
Black Divorce Courts were instituted by the Black Administration Amendment Act of 
192s25 and are today still in operation. These Courts were instituted for the 
adjudication of nullity, divorce and separation suits between blacks, as well as related 
questions. The Courts may not deal with lobolo or bogadi claims, but often decide on 
questions of custody, maintenance and property. They apply Western law only. 
21 See generally Part I.Ill. 
22 It should be kept in mind that judicial officials were allowed to take judicial notice of indigenous 
law on the false premise that they had a specialised, expert knowledge of that law. · 
23 Hoexter 409; see generally Bennett Sourcebook 81-82. 
24 By the Special Courts for Blacks Abolition Act 34 of 1986. 
25 S 10 Black Administration Amendment Act 9of1929. See generally Bennett Sourcebook 85-87. 
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Procedures are more flexible and costs lower than in the ordinary courts. Yet, in 
proportion to the average income of litigants, costs are still high. These Courts will 
stop functioning when the Magistrates' Court Amendment Act of 199226 comes into 
operation at a date yet to be determined. The function of those Courts will then be 
taken over by so-called Family Courts. 
2.b Indigenous Law in Official Courts 
Today •. indigen()US law is. accorded limited official recognition in South Afrtca. It is 
applied by the Courts of Chiefs and Headmen, Magistrates' Courts, the supreme 
Court, Appellate Division, Small Claims Courts, Short Process Courts and Family 
Courts. 21 The indigenous law applied by these official courts often bears little 
resemblance to the living indigenous law. It consists mostly of law established by 
judicial precedent or codified in the Natal Code, and is applied by judicial officers who 
are not versed in indigenous law. Until 1988, if not established by judicial precedent 
or in the Natal Code, indigenous law had to be proved in the same way that custom, 
had to be proved in that it differed from the general law of the land. After the 
introduction of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, 28 all courts were given a general 
discretion to take judicial notice of indigenous law. The introduction of this new 
measure made no substantial difference in the actual application of indigenous law and 
today its ascertainment is still through judicial precedent, the Natal Code or text 
books. 29 The result is a typical black letter law, far removed from the reality of the 
living indigenous law and applied in a judicial system little trusted by the largest section 
26 Act 120 of 1993. 
27 Act 120 of 1993 which makes provision for the institution of Family Courts has not yet come into 
operation. 
28 Act 45 of 1988. 
29 There is no statutory provision for a presiding officer to call to her assistance assessors to give 
advice on matters of indigenous law. However, expert witnesses may be called to give evidence 
on the existence of a rule of indigenous law: see Bennett Sourcebook 140-141. 
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of the community it is supposed to serve. 30 
The abolition of the Commissioners' Courts and Appeal Courts for Commissioners' 
Courts was favourably accepted in light of the injustice caused by their continued 
existence. Unfortunately, their abolition caused a hiatus in the accessibility of justice 
which has not yet been remedied. The Magistrates' Courts which have taken over their 
functions are often unaffordably expensive to black litigants and they function with 
typical Western style formality. Moreover, the recent Magistrates' Courts Amendment 
Act31 which affects very extensive amendments to the Magistrates' Courts Act, missed 
the opportunity of. rectifying the intolerable situation where magistrates, who are 
authorised to apply indigenous law, are not obliged to receive any training in that law. 
Although the State has tried to facilitate access to justice, the reforms were undertaken 
without any reference to the special needs of the indigenous community. The 
institution of Small Claims, Short Process and Family Courts as well as the provision 
for mediation in certain civil cases bear witness to this. Although the introduction of 
these Courts and special procedures seems to be a movement in the direction of a 
simplified, non-technical, inquisitorial procedure, in substance it is nothing more than 
reform imposed from above. 32 The Short Process Courts and Mediation in Certain 
Civil Cases Act33 makes provision for mediation in certain civil cases, before or after 
summons but before judgment. A mediator has to take an oath to "administer justice 
to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice and, as the circumstances of a 
particular case may require, in accordance with the law and customs of the Republic 
30 See Part I.Ill and Part l.IV.4. 
31 Act 120 of 1993 which will come into force at a date to be determined. 
32 The simplified, informal procedure of these courts may be regarded as an indication that 
reference could have been had to existing indigenous dispute-resolution structures. However. 
there are those who hold the view that pre-capitalist dispute resolution structures cannot serve 
as model for the informal courts in modern capitalist societies: see Bennett Sourcebook 89. 
33 Act 103 of 1991. 
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of South Africa applying to the case concerned". 34 Apparently one may assume that 
"law and customs" here also include indigenous law.35 The process of mediation 
before trial reminds one strongly of indigenous procedural law. Persons bringing a 
matter before an indigenous court are as a rule asked whether they have tried to solve 
the problem through the mediation of their family councils. If this is not the case, they 
are referred back for mediation. Only where the family councils are unable to settle the 
matter is it adjudicated by the indigenous court. 
Unfortunately, mediators too are not required to have any knowledge of indigenous 
law and are appointed from the ranks of advocates, attorneys and magistrates with at 
least five years training. They are subject to the administrative control of the magistrate 
of the district in which they function. It is a pity that there is no provision in this Act that 
where the circumstances require, the mediator be knowledgeable in indigenous law 
and that the mediation proceedings be conducted in a language with which the parties 
are conversant. This would have been expedient especially in light of the fact that a 
mediator's order in respect of issues such as any settlement reached by the parties, 
any amendments of pleadings, and any agreements concluded between the parties, 
forms part of the records before the court in the subsequent trial. A settlement reached 
during mediation is deemed to be an order of the Court. 
The Act further makes provision for simpler, less technical procedures in Short 
Process Courts. Presiding officers, or adjudicators of these courts, who are required 
to have the same qualifications as the mediators described above, have the same 
jurisdiction and powers as magistrates. They take the same oath that mediators have 
to take on coming into office. The procedure in these Courts is simplified. Although 
legal representation is permitted, any rule of evidence may be abandoned for the 
expeditious and cost-saving disposal of the case. Evidence is given under oath. The 
34 S 2(3) Act 103 of 1991. 
35 Although indigenous law does not form part of the general law of South Africa, it is recognised 
and applied as secondary legal system. See also Prinsloo "Nuut Ge"integreerde Hofstelsel" 78-79. 
J 
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plaintiff may withdraw his claim at any stage of the proceedings and reinstitute it at a 
later date with the consent of the Court. 36 There is no appeal from a judgment of a 
Short Process Court but mediation proceedings as well as proceedings of Short 
Process Courts are subject to review by the Supreme Court in certain 
circumstances. 31 Again, it is a pity that no provision was made for the inclusion of 
persons trained in indigenous law, or even of chiefs, to act as adjudicators where the 
circumstances require. Again a golden opportunity was lost to integrate the indigenous 
courts and their officials into the existing system of official courts. 
The Small Claims Courts were instituted on the recommendation of the Hoexter 
Commission of Inquiry into the Structure and Functioning of the Courts. 38 They were 
introduced to facilitate access to justice for lower-income litigants, and to deal with the 
psychological barriers caused by the formality of the Western court structure, the 
poverty of litigants and feelings of alienation.39 The fact that no legal representation 
is permitted, that costs are low, that no records are kept (but for the verdict, judgment 
or order)40 and that procedure and evidence are simplified and informal, again show 
marked similarity to indigenous dispute-resolution procedures. Section 14 (3) of the 
Act empowers the Courts to hear civil actions arising in indigenous law and to apply 
indigenous law "as may be proved". 41 Their jurisdiction is very limited and dissolution 
of indigenous marriages, and actions for damages for seduction are amongst the 
matters excluded from their jurisdiction. 
36 See generally Chapter IV s 10 of Act 103 of 1991 for the rules concerning procedure and 
evidence in these Courts. 
37 s 11 and s 12. 
38 By the Small Claims Courts Act 61 of 1984. 
39 Bennett Sourcebook 87; see generally 87-90. 
40 s 4. 
41 S 14. Although s 14 (3) has not been expressly repealed by the Law of Evidence Amendment 
Act 45 of 1988, the wording of s 1 (1) of that Act, namely "any court may take judicial notice of 
... indigenous law• would seem to include the Small Claims Courts; see also Kerr "All Courts" 
167 168. 
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Yet again, there are features typical of reform effected from above. The needs of the 
black community, which has had the worst possible experience of the justice system 
and its inaccessibility, were clearly not considered. Academic requirements for 
commissioners of these courts include proficiency in Western law only. 42 This is also 
the case with regard to language requirements. Proceedings may be conducted in 
"either of the official languages" - which at the promulgation of the Act meant Afrikaans 
or English.43 The fact that the Small Claims Court Act gives the Court the discretion 
to conduct proceedings in either of the official languages (now probably any one of 
the eleven);44 that provision is made for the use of interpreters where evidence (not 
all the proceedings) is given in a language with which a party is not sufficiently 
conversant; and the fact that the new Interim Constitution45 determines that where 
"practicable, a person shall have the right to use and to be addressed in his or her 
dealings with any public administration at the national level of government in any 
official South African language of his or her choice" (my emphasis), all have the effect 
that court proceedings will most likely still be conducted in either English or Afrikaans. 
Judgment in these Courts is final and there is no possibility of any appeal, but only of 
review by the Supreme Court under certain circumstances. 46 Kerr47 is of the view that 
a presiding officer's lack of knowledge of the applicable law (including indigenous law) 
should constitute a gross irregularity with regard to proceedings which could warrant 
such review. 48 
42 S 9 Act 61 of 1984. 
43 s 5. 
44 See s 3 of Act 200 of 1993. 
45 S 3 (3) of Act 200 of 1993. 
46 S 45 ands 46. 
47 Kerr "Small Claims Courts" 729-730. 
48 In terms of s 46(c). 
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A separate civil-court structure for the adjudication of civil cases by magistrates was 
created by the Magistrates' Courts Amendment Act. 49 In terms of section 2(d) of this 
Act the minister may establish family divisions of the Civil Court (formerly the 
Magistrates' Court)50 and in terms of subsection 2(k) she may establish Family Courts 
for such divisions. Black Divorce Courts are abolished by the Magistrates' Courts 
Amendment Act. 51 In the transitional period, Black Divorce Courts will be regarded as 
Family Courts and the areas of their jurisdiction as a family division. 52 The rules 
applicable to Family Courts will be applicable to such Divorce Courts and the 
presidents of the Divorce Courts will be regarded as family magistrates. Family 
magistrates are required to have a knowledge of Western law only and no mention is 
made of indigenous law. 
3 THE INTERNAL CONFLICT OF LAWS 
3.a Introduction 
The official recognition of indigenous laW3 gave a different dimension to legal 
pluralism and the interaction between that law and Western law in South Africa. It thus 
created the need for rules to regulate conflicts in situations where different official legal 
systems were potentially applicable. Over the years internal conflict-of:-laws rules have 
developed to determine which legal system is the most closely connected to the facts 
of a given case. 
49 Act 120 of 1993. 
50 In terms of s 73 the short title of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 is substituted by the 
"Lower Courts Act, 1944". 
51 Section 10 of the Black Administration Amendment Act 9 of 1929 which established Black 
Divorce Courts will be repealed bys 74 of Act 120 of 1993 which, as already mentioned, is not 
yet in operation. 
52 S 71 Act 120 of 1993. 
53 See Part I for the development of legal pluralism in South Africa. 
\)/1 
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One question which arises is to what extent private international law overlaps with the 
norms which regulate the internal conflict of laws and to what extent it could be used 
to develop these norms. Private international law basically encompasses the rules 
related to external conflict of laws. It concerns the conflict between the laws of different 
States, whereas internal conflicts are conflicts between the different laws applicable in 
the same State. This distinction is important in that private international law focuses on 
territory, whilst the internal conflict-of-laws rules focus on legal culture. 54 Yet, the 
disparity in emphasis is not all-important. The principles and techniques of private 
international law have in the past, consciously or unconsciously, to a limited degree 
directed the development of internal conflicts and may still usefully be employed, if this 
is done with caution. 
3.b Theoretical Overview of the Internal Conflict of Laws 
~\/ Rules to regulate ·the conflict of laws in situations of internal legal pluralism are 
\ .. \·11;lportant for indigenous law because conflict may arise, on the one hand, betwee~ 
i 
the general law of the land and indigenous law,55 and, on the other hand, betweer:r 
,t\NQ different indigenous law systems.:) 
Visser51 refers to the rules applicable where there is a conflict between different 
systems of indigenous law as C-type norms; and to the rules pertaining to situations 
where common law and secondary systems of law are involved as D-type norms. He 
54 See generally Sanders "Internal Conflict of Laws" 57-58. 
55 Also referred to as rules pertaining to the situation where both primary and secondary systems 
are applicable or where the domestic common law and indigenous law are potentially 
applicable. 
56 These are conflicts between different systems of law applicable to particular population groups. 
The law regulating such conflict situations may also be referred to as inter-gentile law or 
conflicts between domestic systems of indigenous laws. 
57 See Visser lnterne Aanwysingsreg 49-58. A-type norms (norms of private international law) are 
involved in situations where there is a foreign element, and B-type norms (inter regional law) in 
situations where legal systems are territorially applicable. 
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uses the notions of ethnicity and status-stratification to make this distinction. 
Three additional conflict situations which involve indigenous law may be identified: 
Conflict between a foreign system of indigenous law and domestic system of 
indigenous law58; domestic common law and foreign indigenous law;59 foreign 
common law and domestic indigenous law.60 These three situations do not fall within 
the realm of internal conflicts of law because they involve foreign law and will thus not 
be discussed. In this thesis the emphasis is on the interaction and thus also the 
conflict between domestic indigenous law and domestic Western law. 
(i) Section 1 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Acr1 
The application of indigenous law is currently regulated by the Black Administration 
Act, 62 The Law of Evidence Amendment Act and the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa Act.63 Section 1 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act determines: 
"(1) Any court may take judicial notice of the law of a foreign state and of indigenous law 
in so far as such law can be ascertained readily and with sufficient certainty: Provided 
that indigenous law shall not be opposed to the principles of public policy or natural 
justice: Provided further that it shall not be lawful for any court to declare that the 
custom of lobolo or bogadi or any other similar custom is repugnant to such principles. 
{2) The provisions of subsection {1) shall not preclude any party from adducing evidence 
of the substance of a legal rule contemplated in that subsection which is in issue at the 
58 That is for instance a conflict between the indigenous law of Lesotho and that of South Africa. 
59 That is for instance a conflict between the South African common law and the indigenous law 
of Lesotho. 
60 That is for instance a conflict between English common law and South African indigenous law. 
61 Act 45 of 1988. 
62 Act 38 of 1927. 
63 Act 200 of 1993. 
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proceedings concerned. 
{3) In any suit or proceedings between blacks who do not belong to the same tribe, the 
court shall not in the absence of any agreement between them with regard to the 
particular system of indigenous law to be applied in such suit or proceedings, apply any 
system of indigenous law other than that which is in operation at the place where the 
defendant or respondent resides or has a business or is employed, or if two or more 
different systems are in operation in that place (not being within a tribal area), the court 
shall not apply any such system unless it is the law of the tribe (if any)to which the 
defendant or respondent belongs. 
(4) For the purposes of this section 'indigenous law' means the Black law or customs as 
applied by the Black tribes in the Republic or in territories which formerly formed part 
of the Republic." 
It seems surprising that the legislature grouped indigenous law together with foreign 
law, thus creating the impression that it should be treated as foreign law. However, 
from the words of the Law Commission's Working Paper64 on the review of the law 
of evidence, the intention seemed quite the contrary: 
"[C]ustomary law is not foreign law in the same sense as, for example, French law is 
foreign law vis-a-vis South African law. To the Blacks it is incomprehensible and even 
humiliating that their law is regarded as foreign law in the Republic". 
The rationale behind this grouping of indigenous law and foreign law in the same 
proposition is possibly merely the fact that for both certain guidelines are laid down for 
the choice of law in a situation of conflict of laws - albeit that these guidelines, as 
contained in section 1, do not have the same consequences for internal and external 
conflict rules. 
Section 1 (4) which defines indigenous law, inptuc;t~s in~'"!!§...9~~ni!ion..tbeJ?~~ 
for:rner b~ntu~tans. For purposes of this Act then, the incorporation of these territories 
into the Republic will make no difference to the position of the internal conflict of laws. 
64 SA Law Commission Evidence Working Paper 11. 
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This section did away with racial restrictions regarding the application of indigenous 
law. Kerr65 discusses some interesting cases in the law of contract and succession 
where racial restrictions would have had an effect on the application of indigenous law 
and points out the vast improvement the omission of such restrictions has brought 
with regard to the application of indigenous law and legal certainty. 
Furthermore, section 1 omitted the proviso that indigenous law may be applied only 
in so far as it has not been repealed or modified by legislation. Whilst this omission 
has been generally welcomed in light of the fact that all law should in any case be read 
subject to prevailing legislation,66 it has also been criticised as an incomprehensible 
oversight which may cause problems in the application of the Natal Code of Zulu Law 
of 1987. It would now theoretically be possible to allege the validity of an indigenous 
law norm which contradicts the Code. 61 However, Constitutional Principle Xlll68 
determines that indigenous law shall be recognised and applied subject to the 
fundamental rights contained in the Constitution and subject to specific legislation 
dealing with its application. 
~§CtioQ 1 (2) i~ o.f interest in that it explicitly empowers a party to lead evidence .'.VYith. 
- -- . . 
regard..to.Jndigeflous. law norms_,Jndigenous law has to be proved if it is not readily 
ascertainable. PJooloLiridigenous law is in accordance with the rules relating to ~illL. 
pr~m'. 
Section 1 (3) is similar to previous legislation which regulated inter-gentile law.69 
65 Kerr "All Courts" 170-171. 
66 Bennett Sourcebook 119. 
67 Olivier "Customary Law" 51 points out that local norms which are contrary to the Code may now 
be alleged by a party. 
68 Contained in Schedule 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 as 
amended. 
69 S 11 (2) of the Black Administration Act and s 54A of the Magistrates' Courts Act. 
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Indigenous law is personal in scope and a person's personal law applies wherever he 
may be.10 
a discretion;toap,gJyjndigenaus. law.:1 There seems to be some difference of opinion 
_,'~ ........ ~.,,._...,_,"""''"~-
amongst writers as to whether the courts now have a discretion to take judicial notice 
of indigenous law, or whether it is obligatory to take judicial notice of that law, once 
it has been established that it should be applied. Bennetf2 and Olivier13 are of the 
opinion that judicial notice is at the discretion of the courts, whilst Kerr74 interprets this 
legislation differently. AC{~ording to him, once indigenous law is indicated or designated 
as the applicable law by the statutory or non-statutory conflict-of-law rules,. or once the 
court has exercised its discretion and decided to apply indigenous law~Ai.~:L9-Q~igJ~dJo 
take juqi_giaLnotice. of that law. if Jtis ascertainable readily and with sufficient certainty. 
"'~"·~-·-'-~--··" . ~ •"- .. " 
Kerr argues that the "may" refers to a co~rt's discr~tion whether or not to apply 
indigenous law and not to take judicial notice of iL;s 
From the Law Commission's Working Paper and their Report76 it appears that it 
intended the courts to have a discretion to take judicial notice of indigenous law. The 
discussion of judicial notice starts with an observation which seems to indicate that the 
70 Kerr "Magistrates' Courts" 530-534. 
71 Bennett Sourcebook 120. 
72 Bennett Sourcebook 119-120 
73 Olivier "Customary Law" 51; Olivier "Application" 202-203. 
74 Kerr "All Courts" 168; "Magistrates' Courts" 527-528; Kerr "Judicial Notice" 580-581. 
75 According to JS~rr:...:MA9L~trates.'. . .C.aurts" 538 the l~or should have deterrninec:Ltbat .tt. lie~ 
within a court's discretion whether to apply indig~n9u,s la.wand that all co.urts shall take. judicial 
notice of indige"!_ou_s laYLL 
76 SA Law Commission Evidence Report 13; SA Law Commission Evidence Working Paper 10. 
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word "may" was used for a specific reason: 
''There are numerous facts or matters of which a court may take notice or of which a court shall 
take notice. This area of the law of evidence does not give rise to any problems worth 
mentioning ... ". (my emphasis) 
Moreover, the Commission continues, 
"(O]nly the Commissioners' Courts could in the adjudication of civil actions between Blacks in 
which customary law is applicable take judicial notice of such law. With the abolition of 
Commissioners' Courts ... this competency has been transferred to the Magistrates' Courts". 
(my emphasis) 
Section 54A(1) of- the Magis;tr(;ltes' Courts ~.c;t11 which.conferredJhis_c.ompetency.JlO 
r:nag~~!r?~f3~J:1.lsn~g_ :r-n,ClY"~ Jn conferring a discretionary power in this .respect If the 
aim of the Commission had been to rectify the position that the Supreme Court could 
not take judicial notice of indigenous law, whilst "[c]ustomary law is in fact part of our 
law" and "few members of the judiciary ... do not have at least a basic knowledge of 
customary law [sic]", 78 it may be assumed that the same discretion which applied to 
Magistrates' Courts was conferred on the Supreme Court. The Commission further 
deals here only with judicial notice after it had been established that indigenous law 
is applicable. It should not be inferred that the "may" refers to the application of 
indigenous law. Therefore, one may conclude that the courts have a discretion to 
apply indigenous law and a discretion to take judicial notice of that law. 79 
It must to be borne in mind that in practice a court will not randomly refuse to take 
77 Act 32 of 1944. 
78 SA Law Commission Evidence Report 13 14. 
79 A court does not have to supply reasons why it takes judicial notice of rule of indigenous law. 
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judicial notice of indigenous law. The examples that Kerr8° provides to illustrate the 
extraordinary results that may be obtained should courts have a discretion to take 
judicial notice, seem somewhat forced. Should a court decide not to take judicial 
notice of an indigenous-law rule that is readily ascertainable and sufficiently certain, it 
will be obliged to provide reasons for such a decision, because the discretion the court 
exercises is a judicial discretion and not an arbitrary one. 81 Ideally it should not make 
a difference whether the courts are obliged or have a judicial discretion to take judicial 
notice, as long as the discretion is judicially exercised. However, it is only realistic to 
accept that the very proviso that indigenous law should be readily ascertainable and 
sufficiently certain provides the means to avoid the ?PPlication of that law, in the same 
way as the application of the repugnancy proviso provides those means. 
A difficult problem arises when the conflict-of-law rules designate indigenous law as 
the applicable legal system but the relevant indigenous-law rule cannot be ascertained 
readily and with sufficient certainty.82 In Harnisch"~gf#DCoq:i9ration v App~~tQQ83 the .\ 
) 
co~rt determined that in lighLotthELptesumption.th9-_UJ!e[E3 is no differenca.between · 
, s.outh African law an..dJgr~i9I! law,84 the onus lies upon any partywbo.a§s.e.rts.that··t~"·'( 
. law/of aJoreign country applies,,. to prove bow. it .. .ditters from our own If!~· $houJd ~/ 
~ '-, ·"' . ' ' - ' - . •' "~- , ___ '"'"". ~ 
, p~rson therefore fail to prove that there is a difference, South AfricanJaw vvould apply. 
',"'--' 
T~.~$ presumption developed to facilitate speedy administration of justice andtoxeli~~-
,,~~/ 
: a party of the burdenrou~inely to.pr9veJoreign.law. However, now that judicial notice 
\,,,..~~·"'"'/ 
may be taken of foreign (and indigenous) law, the rationale for the application of this 
80 Kerr "Magistrates' Courts" 527-528. 
81 If a court exercises a discretion arbitrarily, its decision could be upset on appeal; see Bennett 
Sourcebook 120, Olivier "Customary Law'' 45. See also Olivier lnheemse Reg 62 and the case 
law he refers to, on the nature of the discretion exercised by the courts. 
82 Kerr "Judicial Notice" 588-590. 
83 1993 4 SA 479 01'1) 486 C. 
84 The fact that the legislature used indigenous law and foreign law in the same proposition 
indicates that it intended the same principles to apply to both: see Kerr "Judicial Notice" 
579-580. 
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presumption has fallen away.85 In a case where the specific tribal law cannot be 
established with sufficient certainty, the general or main principles of the designated 
or chosen law, and not the South African common law, should be applied. 86 In private 
international law similar situations may arise. Where an exceptional rule of foreign law 
is .against the principles of public policy, the general principles of that law are applied 
by the courts (if they are not against public policy) and not the lex fori. 87 The same 
principle should apply in a case where the specific tribal law is found to be opposed 
to public policy and natural justice. Should it be found that the main principles of 
indigenous law are also opposed to public policy, that law should be adapted in 
accordance with the jural postulates which underlie indigenous law, and Western law 
should not be applied in its stead. 
However, with regard to indigenous law it may be difficult to determine what the 
relevant general principles are. It may be reasonably easy to determine such general 
principles in the law of succession, but there are other areas of indigenous law where 
tribal laws differ substantially and where general principles may be determined only if 
one has a thorough knowledge of indigenous law generally - which brings one back 
to the problem of insufficient indigenous-law education. This problem may be solved 
by making use of expert evidence. If the legislature had in the first place expressly 
provided that judicial notice could be taken by making use of expert witnesses, it 
would have removed not only the evidential burden of proof from the party concerned, 
85 It should be noted that in those cases in which South African common law was applied and not 
indigenous law, the courts had exercised its discretion and had not applied the presumption: 
see Kerr "Judicial Notice" 589-590. 
86 Kerr "Judicial Notice" 590 illustrates this by example of the law of succession. Where the specific 
indigenous rule cannot be established, the general principles of indigenous law of succession 
should be followed, namely those of primogeniture and universal succession, and not the South 
African law of intestate succession which would divide an intestate estate amongst all the 
children of a deceased if there is no surviving spouse. 
87 The general rule is that the lex fori applies where foreign law is the designated law but is against 
the principles of public policy: see Kahn-Freund 283. 
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but also the financial burden.88 
The fact that the application of indigenous law is still a discretionary matter makes its 
application uncertain and frustrates its uniform application throughout the country. In 
the past it was this uncertainty and the conflicting views of the courts89 that caused 
the Minister of Native Affairs to seek an interpretation of section 11 (1) of the Black 
Administration Act. 00 In Ex parte Minister of Native Affairs: In re Yako v Beyi, 91 the 
~ppellate Division did not lay down rules fotJhELchaice qf Jawrbut.only precipitate.cl 
some connecting factors to be used in establishing the appropriate .I.aw that sh9uld b_~ 
J 
applied. In {:/TTJY9VO.v. Umvovo92 the Appellate Division pronouncedJor.a secorid tlaH;~. 
QJ:l the disc;~tion to apply_ indigenous law_,_but no rules for the exercise of such ~ 
. \ 
'··dj,§cretion were specified.. it being laid down only that the courts have a jud!~ 
discrettsn_,i 
The principles and techniques of private international law are useful in the process of 
internal choice of laws. 93 The most important principle relevant for the internal conflict 
of laws is that the expectations of the parties should be realised. Techniques which 
may be usefully employed are those of the classification of the cause of action and the 
application of connecting factors to determine the appropriate law. With regard to the 
classification of the cause of action, it should be remembered that the courts are 
88 Olivier "Customary Law" 51; see also Kerr "Judicial Notice" 586-588 on the methods the court 
may employ to obtain knowledge of indigenous law. 
89 Bennett Sourcebook 120-133. The Cape courts were of the view that common law was primarily 
applicable and that indigenous law would be applicable only in exceptional circumstances. In 
Natal and the Transvaal the prevailing view was that indigenous law was primarily applicable in 
cases where blacks were involved. 
90 Act 38 of 1927. 
91 1948 1 SA 388 (A). 
92 1953 1 SA 195 (A). 
93 See generally Bennett Application 105-109. 
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allowed only to apply indigenous civil law.94 If one takes into consideration that the 
categories in indigenous law and Western law do not always overlap, the problem that 
crops up is which system of law to use to classify the cause of action. It appears that 
the courts have overcome the problem by considering the full environment of the case. 
Once the cause of action has been classified, a court will determine which law is 
applicable after consideration of all the evidence and argument of the case. 95 First 
specific legislation or choice-of-law rules should be applied. Specific statutory provision 
for the application of a certain system of law in specific circumstances has been made 
in matrimonial property law, the law of succession and land law. Specific choice-of-law 
rules exist also with regard to status, the law of things, delict and contract. 06 If there 
are no specific choice-of-law rules, general choice-of-law norms contained in legislation 
recognising indigenous law and connecting factors will be considered to aid the court 
in its discretion whether or not to apply indigenous law. Once it has been established 
that indigenous law is the appropriate law, reference must be had to the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act as explained above. 97 
In private international law indications against the application of foreign law are: fraus 
legis; conflict with public order; explicit statutory provision against its application; and 
the principle of non-application of foreign criminal and tax law. Similar considerations 
are used in relation to indigenous law. Indigenous law may not be applied where it is 
94 Also in private international law a court is not allowed to apply another country's criminal or tax 
laws. This principle may result in the parties' expectations not always being realised, especially 
as far as indigenous criminal law is concerned. The unofficial application of indigenous law by 
official Chiefs' Courts as well as by the Courts of Chiefs and Headmen and Community Courts 
bears witness to this. 
95 See also Olivier Application 202. 
96 Olivier "Customary Law" 46-47; Olivier "Application• 210-213. 
97 With regard to the application of the repugnancy proviso and considerations of public policy 
specifically, see Part 11.11.2.c.ii and Part ll.IV.6. 
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against the principles of public policy and natural justice. 98 
(iii) Connecting Factors 
Over the years certain connecting factors have emerged in our positive law which may 
serve as guidelines to the courts when determining the appropriate law to be 
applied. 99 The Law of Evidence Amendment Act omitted the statutory connecting 
factor, that indigenous law is applicable where questions of indigenous customs are 
involved. In the absence of any provision in this legislation, it is to be presumed that 
the connecting factors that applied previously are still applicable. 100 Section 11 (1) of 
the Black Administration Act and section 1 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act are 
similar in many · respects and case law with regard to the former may still have 
persuasive value or sometimes even binding authority for cases to be decided under 
the new Act. 
In making their choice, the courts' overriding goal should be to satisfy the expectations 
of the parties. It is generally assumed that, otherwise than in the case of private 
international law, all possible connecting factors should be taken into account to 
determine the applicable law. 101 However, it is suggested that the connecting factors 
which the courts have identified over the years should be seen as guidelines to 
98 The lobolo custom is expressly excluded from the scrutiny of the repugnancy proviso. See 
generally Olivier "Customary Law" 189, Olivier "Application" 41. Although s 1 (1) of the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 omitted the proviso that indigenous law is applicable only 
in so far as it has not been abolished or modified by legislation, Constitutional Principle XIII 
(contained in Schedule 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 as 
amended) determines that the application of indigenous law is subject to specific legislation 
dealing with it. 
99 Bennett Sourcebook 124-133; see also Olivier Jnheemse Reg 73-74, Olivier "Customary Law'' 
44-45. 
100 See generally Bennett Sourcebook 120, Kerr "All Courts" 170, Olivier "Application· 198. 
101 Bennett Sourcebook 124; Bennett Application 108; see also Sanders "Internal Conflict of Laws" 
59-60. 
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determine one connecting factor, namely the cultural orientation of the parties. 102 It 
is only natural that the parties would feel most at home with the legal system that is 
part of their cultural environment. Thus, by selecting the legal system which is 
connected to the facts by the cultural orientation of the parties, the expectations of the 
parties are also served. 
Some of the connecting factors, such as the nature of the transaction, use of a 
particular form and the defendant's non-objection of the plaintiff's choice of law, 
appear to be but instances of implied agreement as to the applicable law between the 
parties. 103 But then it should be remembered that agreement is only a reflection of 
the parties' expectation that the law should be applied with which they feel the most 
closely at home and which forms part of their cultural environment. 
The connecting factors which may serve as guidelines to the courts when establishing 
the appropriate law to be applied are: 
1 An agreement (express or implied) by the parties to be subject to a specific 
system of law. 
2 The nature of prior transactions or of the legal act in question .. The juristic act 
or transaction which gave rise to the claim may be an indication of the cultural 
orientation and indicate the applicable legal system, for example transactions 
associated with indigenous institutions such as lobolo or bogadi. Some courts 
have concluded that this could depose the court's discretion, but in the 
decision of Umvovo v Umvovo 104 it was held that the legal system which 
provides a remedy is not necessarily the appropriate system to apply, and that 
102 See generally Bennett Sourcebook 116-118 and Bennett Application 103-109 on the role of 
culture in the internal choice of laws. 
103 Sanders "Internal Conflict of Laws· 59-60. 
104 1953 1 SA 195 (A) 201. 
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in certain circumstances justice may best be served by applying the legal 
system which gives no remedy. 
3 Where the nature of the transaction cannot be connected to a specific 
indigenous or Western cultural orientation, the purpose and subject-matter of 
the transaction and geographical environment in which the transaction took 
place may be considered to determine the appropriate law. For example, in an 
action arising out of a loan of money it was held that the common law applied 
because cash was not traditionally known in indigenous law. 
4 Where a transaction is known in both indigenous and Western law, the form of 
the transaction, such as the conclusion of a marriage in a church, may be an 
indication of the cultural orientation. 
5 The overall lifestyle of the parties may indicate a particular cultural orientation. 
6 Exemption from indigenous law should be taken into consideration in 
conjunction with other connecting factors. A discretion to grant exemption vests 
in the State President, yet few people have made used of this. 
7 Generally a person who unsuccessfully makes use of one system of law will be 
prevented from bringing his claim under the other system at a later stage 
because the matter will be regarded as res judicata; a plaintiff will be estopped 
from objecting to a defendant making use of the same system of law that the 
plaintiff used in the first place and a defendant may not object to the plaintiff 
making use of the system which provided the defence on which he relied. In the 
same vein the same legal system must apply to the main claim and defences, 
to damages and to the cause of action, to locus standi in judicio and delictual 
or contractual capacity of parties. 
In determining the law which is the most closely connected to the facts in the case of 
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internal conflicts, the emphasis is now on culture and no longer, as in the past, on 
race. There is a parallel between race and nationality as connecting factors and 
between domicile and culture as connecting factors. 105 Nationality and race are 
imposed on an individual and determined by the State, whereas domicile and culture 
are abstract concepts which have to be ascertained from various factors and which 
may be changed by the individual himself. Domicile is inclusive. Its purpose is to 
provide the foundation for free interaction between members of different communities 
settling in each other's territories. In contrast, nationality is exclusive. 106 
Therefore, in countries which adhere to the domicile principle (domicile as general 
connecting factor), public policy does not in practice play such an important role in 
private international law, 101 whilst in countries which adhere to the nationality 
principle 108 public policy plays a more significant role because the emphasis is on the 
citizen. 109 Likewise, in the internal conflict of laws, policy considerations, as presently 
finding expression in the official courts, favour the application of the general law of the 
land to the exclusion of indigenous law, the latter being regarded as but an aspect of 
another culture. 
3.c Conclusion 
The availability of specialised, competent courts is a prerequisite to the proper 
105 Bennett Application 108. 
106 See Bennett Application 108 n 335. 
107 This would appear to be advantageous to the possible application of non-Western foreign law 
which is underscored by different fundamental jural postulates. 
108 Mancini promoted the idea that a country's laws are made for the individual and not for a 
specific territory. Therefore, the cultural qualities of a community play an important part in 
making their laws: see Kahn-Freund 284. 
109 Kahn-Freund 284; see generally 280-285. 
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application of personal laws. 110 In South Africa the very foundation for the solution 
of internal conflicts of personal laws is uncertain: the competency of our courts to 
apply and administer indigenous law. The problem lies in the lack of indigenous-law 
education of the people who administer indigenous law and the hesitancy to do 
something about this lack of knowledge. 111 The problem is further exacerbated by 
the fact that Western law has always been regarded as the superior law and that 
indigenous law does not enjoy the same status as Western law. 
The fact that there are so very few cases in the law reports on private international law 
may be an indication of the a reluctance on the part of judges to apply law other than 
that of the system with which they are most familiar. 112 The same applies to the 
internal conflict of laws. 
Whilst Bennett113 is of the opinion that indigenous law has developed its own 
choice-of-personal-law rules which fall within an indigenous jurisprudential matrix and 
thus differ from the characteristically Western rules of private international law, 
Visser114 maintains that there are no rules to regulate the conflict of laws in 
indigenous law. He regards the mechanisms to solve internal conflicts in indigenous 
law as "conflicts sensitivities" or "konfliksensitiwiteite". This emotional awareness of and 
reaction to conflicts cannot fulfill the role of the Western rules regulating conflicts 
because of the ongoing process of legal acculturation. 
110 Bennett Sourcebook 110; Olivier "Application" 197. 
111 The SA Law Commission Evidence Report 13 14 is of the erroneous opinion that most judicial 
officers have at least a basic knowledge of indigenous law. The problem of insufficient 
knowledge of indigenous law could be solved by providing a compulsory course in indigenous 
law at universities and in the mean time to provide in-service training for magistrates. Moreover, 
compulsory use of expert witnesses may bridge the gap whilst judicial officers at all levels are 
being trained in indigenous law. 
112 Visser "Legal Education" 69. 
113 Bennett Application 106, explains that an alien who was integrated into the group became a part 
of that group and was thus subject to their law. Membership of the group was determined by 
allegiance to the ruler and not by birth. 
114 Visser lnterne Aanwysingsreg 52-53. 
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Yet, although indigenous law is adaptable and is experiencing a continuing process 
of development, it is important to bear in mind that this process does not revoke the 
jural postulates underlying the system. Development and adaption occurs within the 
framework of these postulates and should not be seen as a shift in emphasis towards 
the (Western) law of the land. 115 It may be true that for practical reasons it is 
necessary to work with concrete rules and even that such vague norms could only 
lead to uncertainty and casuistry. But these indigenous mechanisms for conflict 
resolution, whether they are legal rules or mere conflict sensitivities, should not be 
ignored. They should be taken into account and even direct the development of the 
concrete rules for the solution of conflicts. Only when these underlying values are 
accommodated in the internal-conflict rules and process will they will find acceptance 
in indigenous commu.nities. 
Finally, it seems that the rules regulating the conflict of Western and indigenous law, 
and the application of indigenous law generally, have not found acceptance within the 
indigenous community. As a result alternative dispute-resolution institutions emerged 
which evidence the lack of faith in the courts' handling of internal conflicts and their 
insufficient knowledge of indigenous law. In the following sections the focus will be on 
these alternative dispute-resolution structures and the interaction of unofficial, 
alternative law and State law. 
4 UNOFFICIAL INDIGENOUS LAW 
State regulation, which often resulted in distortion, and conflict with imposed State law 
underscored by fundamentally different values, could not suppress the natural 
development of indigenous law and its institutions. The unofficial application of 
indigenous law by both official and unofficial institutions bears witness both to the 
resilience of indigenous law and to its inherent ability to adapt to changing 
circumstances without losing its indigenous character. 
115 Visser lnterne Aanwysingsreg 53 regards it as a "natuurlike verskuiwing van die Idem na die 
landsreg". 
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4.a.i Indigenous Law in the Court of the Ward Headman116 
The Courts of the Ward Headmen are traditional administrative and judicial tribunals 
which unofficially apply the living indigenous law in rural areas. These Courts are 
presently functioning successfully in rural areas and the State has up to now turned 
a blind eye to their judicial activities. 
In civil cases, parties who cannot resolve their differences through their family councils, 
may approach the headmen of their wards. Complicated or serious cases are usually 
referred to the Chiefs' Courts. Both parties and their witnesses are present at hearings. 
Presiding officers, who are always assisted by their councils, first try to resolve 
disputes through mediation and only when unsuccessful do they actually adjudicate 
upon a case. Although ward headmen are not bound to follow chiefs' decisions, their 
decisions serve as valuable guidance. The Courts also adjudicate upon petty crimes 
but accused have a choice whether to have their cases tried by ward headmen or 
chiefs. Appeals lie to Chiefs' Courts and amounts to retrials. 
4.a.ii Indigenous Law Unofficially Applied by Official Courts of Chiefs and 
Headmen 
The Courts of Chiefs' and Headmen often act as unofficial tribunals when they 
adjudicate upon cases that fall outside the jurisdiction laid down by legislation and 
apply the living indigenous law. The administration of criminal justice by these Courts 
may serve as an example. Their criminal jurisdiction is severely restricted by legislation 
and they are empowered to adjudicate upon a very limited number of common law, 
statutory and indigenous-law crimes. However, in reality and owing to the 
non-specialised nature of indigenous law, these Courts in actual fact adjudicate upon 
116 See generally Van Niekerk "Procedure" 132 133 134, Myburgh & Prinsloo 15 112-115, Prinsloo 
Publiekreg 64 113-115 240. 
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crimes which fall outside their jurisdiction. 111 Whilst crimes such as rape, robbery, 
certain forms of assault, receiving stolen property, fraud, extortion and defeating the 
ends of justice are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Chiefs' Courts, the civil 
disputes arising from these crimes fall within their jurisdiction. Chiefs often adjudicate 
upon civil and criminal cases flowing from the same set of facts simultaneously, 
notwithstanding legislative enjoinment that criminal and civil cases be separated. 118 
Their lack of jurisdiction to try these offences is in this way side-stepped. In such 
cases, what seems to be an increase in courts fees in a civil case, is then punishment 
imposed for the related crime. 
There are other interesting ex~mples where the living indigenous law is still unofficially 
applied by the chiefs. In indigenous law the effect of poison or even medicine is 
regarded as magical. Poisoning may thus lead to an accused being charged with the 
offences of assault and practicing black magic. Whilst hearing the assault charge 
which falls within their jurisdiction, chiefs seldom refrain from trying an accused also 
for practicing black magic merely because the Black Administration Act happens to 
exclude it from the their jurisdiction. The same applies to theft by false pretences 
{which is within their jurisdiction) and fraud {which is not). While these two crimes are 
technically distinguished in Western law, they are not so separated in indigenous law. 
Arson and malicious damage to property are similar examples where the chiefs 
over-step their jurisdiction and apply the living indigenous law. In D/ad/a119 it was 
found that chiefs have no jurisdiction to try a person charged with arson. However, in 
indigenous law arson is considered to be a species of malicious damage to property, 
which is not excluded from their jurisdiction. Had Dladla been charged with malicious 
damage of property instead of arson the case would in all probability not have reached 
the higher court. 
117 See generally Van Niekerk Comparative Study 57-59. 
118 S12 and s20 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. 
119 1965 1 PH R 1 (N) 
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4.b People's Law 
Fitzpatrick120 indicates that informal ordering may occur in response to "fiscal and 
legitimacy crises ... afflicting countries of advanced capitalism ... because it is cheaper 
or, ... because it is a means of engendering some popular participation and thus 
ser\.ting to make up the deficit in legitimation". State involvement in unofficial laws and 
institutions, or informal ordering, is but a means of containing "potentially disruptive 
elements". 
In South Africa people's law developed in reaction to the lack of legitimacy of the 
official legal order of the State. 121 Class contradictions, the inefficiency of the existing 
justice system, a lack of legal resources and economic factors all played a role in the 
emergence of popular justice. The State's intervention in or its sanctioning of people's 
law and institutions had a profound influence on its development. 
The application of living law by unofficial legal institutions is a world-wide 
phenomenon. 122 But all unofficial practices do not constitute unofficial law. It is only 
those practices which have the ability to influence the cultural background to the 
official law and have a direct or indirect influence on the effectiveness of the official law 
which are relevant for the development of the general legal system. Therefore, only the 
unofficial laws and institutions which have undermined, opposed, modified or 
supplemented this country's official law or which have the inherent ability to do so, will 
be considered. 123 
120 Fitzpatrick "Marxism" 47; see also Nina & Stavrou 4-5. 
121 See Part 11.1.1 and Part 11.1.4 below where the concept of legitimacy is discussed in more detail. 
122 Eg in India, Japan, Indonesia and Alaska, to name but a few. See Allott & Woodman (eds) 
People's Law and State Law. The Bellagio Papers, a collection of papers on the application 
. of living law and unofficial legal institutions. 
123 The State was eventually forced to take cognisance of the unofficial tribunals administrating 
living law and even tried to legalise them by the institution of the Short Process Courts. 
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In South African legal history roughly three eras in the development of unofficial 
dispute resolution may be distinguished, the period before the state of emergency in 
1985; the period from 1985 to 1989 and the period after 1989, the era of reform. 
4.b.i The Period Before 1985 
Unofficial dispute resolution has been the norm in black metropolitan areas for as long 
as these areas have existed. Official legal institutions have been regarded to be of 
secondary importance, seemingly because of their inability to satisfy the community's 
sense of justice. 124 This was the position not only in urban areas. In rural areas the 
very first Magistrates' Courts were widely dispersed over large areas. Because of a 
lack of policemen or troops, they were not able to enforce the foreign official law 
imposed on the indigenous people and to curb the influence of the unofficial traditional 
courts. In British Kaffraria, magistrates as well as chiefs and headmen continued to 
apply indigenous law despite the Cape government's policy of non-recognition of that 
law. At first, from the annexation of the territory in 1847, it was administered under 
martial law, but when martial law was suspended in 1859 and the territory fell under 
colonial laws, the administrators of justice continued to apply indigenous law 
unofficially. 125 
Urban communities developed a new and unique social ordering which provided fertile 
ground for the development of a system of justice rooted in traditional Africa but 
adapted to the needs of urban life. Informal structures for the administration of justice 
came in a variety of forms. The earliest known 126 unofficial urban institution with 
dispute-settlement functions, was the Uitvlugt Committee which was formed in 1901 
124 Hund & Kotu-Rammopo 205; Burman "Street Committees" 151-153; Burman & Scharf 693 706; 
Scharf "Memorandum" 2; Scharf "People's Courts" 8. 
125 Brookes 181 184; see generally Part 1.111.2.a. 
126 The only comprehensive study of the development of unofficial dispute-settlement structures in 
urban areas, which spans the 20th century, was done by Burman and Scharf on the townships 
of the Cape Town area. Examples of unofficial structures which operated in the very early period 
are thus confined to this area of the country. 
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in the first Cape Town township, Uitvlugt. 121 This unofficial court was modelled on the 
traditional courts of the Transkei and Ciskei and dealt with civil grievances and petty 
crimes with the tacit consent of the local government. In 1927, in response to the 
forced removals of residents from Uitvlugt, the Vigilance Committee120 was formed. 
In line with the non-specialised character of indigenous law, the latter (mainly 
administrative) body also conducted unofficial courts. 129 By the 1950's informal 
courts, which seem to have existed even prior to that time, 130 were reportedly run by 
the Cape African Congress 131 in most Western Cape townships. In the single-sex 
hostels for male migrant workers of the Langa township, unofficial courts came to the 
fore in the early 1950's. These dispute-settlement structures were based upon the 
strict paternalistic rule of elders. Unfortunately little is known of the procedure they 
followed and the law they applied. Nevertheless, there is evidence that their activities, 
in both dispute resolution and informal policing, were in fact tolerated by the State. 132 
(i) Civic Structures in the Western-Cape 133 
The 1960' and 1970's saw the emergence of squatter committees and street 
committees which acted as unofficial courts, but also had other functions besides 
127 Burman & Scharf 697; Scharf "People's Courts" 8. 
128 This unofficial structure was created after the Uitvlugt Committee was crushed and an attempt 
was made by the government to institute an official township Superintendent's Advisory Council 
with six members elected by the residents of the Ndabeni township. This was a powerless, 
government-controlled body with merely advisory functions: see Burman & Scharf 697- 698, 
Scharf "People's Courts" 8-9. 
129 Scharf "People's Courts" 8-9. 
130 Burman & Scharf 698. 
131 A branch of the African National Congress. 
132 Scharf "People's Courts" 15. 
133 "Civic structures" denote the informal police force and courts operating in the townships. These 
consisted of marshals, yard, block and street committees who were responsible for civic duties 
directed at the general well-being of the community, as well as informal dispute settlement. See 
generally Scharf "People's Courts" 45-50. 
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judicial functions. 134 They applied living law which could be described as an adapted, 
urbanised indigenous law. 135 This law and its procedure had features of a 
non-specialised legal system. Civil and criminal cases which originated in. the same 
facts were dealt with simultaneously, 136 procedure was simple, non-technical and 
conciliatory in nature and there was no legal representation. Serious criminal cases 
were referred to the police and family matters often referred to the family council. 131 
Field research indicates that, as a rule, very few of these institutions had connections 
with Community Councils. 136 They had a system of appeal to the executive 
committees. 139 Executive committees heard these cases ab initio as a court of first 
instance. In some instances these unofficial courts worked in close association with 
social workers. They were run by adult males who were elected by adults. 
The law applied by these courts has been described as a reflection of the "patriarchal 
gerontocracy of African culture". 140 Informants were of the opinion that traditionally 
134 It is in line with indigenous law that administrative bodies such as the street committees also had 
legal functions. There seems to be some confusion on the exact meaning of the term "street 
committees" and different authors use it to denote different institutions. See generally Burman 
"Street Committees" 151-166. In this thesis the operation of unofficial dispute-settlement 
institutions is discussed generally and these institutions are termed "people's courts". 
135 Scharf "People's Courts" 10; see also generally Burman & Scharf 706-718. 
136 Scharf "People's Courts" 10; Scharf "People's Courts in Transitions" 169 maintains that no 
distinction is drawn between civil and criminal law - a misconception, possibly flowing from the 
fact that in indigenous law criminal and civil cases are dealt with in the same set of proceedings 
due to its non-specialised character. However, this does not mean that no distinction is drawn 
in indigenous law between civil and criminal law: see Van Niekerk Comparative Study 24-29. 
137 Unfortunately there is no research available on the family councils which are often referred to 
and are obviously in operation in the urban areas. 
138 Burman "Street Committees" 161-162. Some street committees in the older, established areas 
were indeed associated with the Community Councils which were regarded as a final court of 
appeal. However, all connections were finally severed when the political conflict intensified and 
a state of emergency was declared in 1985; see Burman & Scharf 716-719. 
139 Eg, serious sentences such as eviction, had to be reviewed by the civics before execution. 
Executive committees had the same functions as the street committees and also tended to the 
daily affairs of the township. The executive committees were sometimes also confusingly referred 
to as "civics". 
140 Scharf "People's Courts" 11; see also Burman & Scharf 711. 
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women were regarded as having an inferior position in the community and were 
accordingly excluded from court proceedings. Their opinion or position was of no 
relevance, even in custody cases. 141 However, this is a distorted reflection of 
pre-colonial indigenous law. The husband's right of moderate chastisement and the 
fact that "the husband's word is the word in the family"142 are indeed in line with 
indigenous ethics. 143 But, whilst moderate chastisement is regarded as a lawful and 
commendable means of maintaining discipline in the indigenous family, excessive 
corporal punishment constitutes criminal behaviour, analogous to assault in Western 
law. In indigenous law women are certainly forbidden to enter the kraal area where 
court sessions are held, not because of their inferior position in the community but 
because of their monthly ritual impurity. However, they have an honoured position 
within the group and an important role to play in certain preliminary extra-judicial 
proceedings. For instance, amongst many tribes, the women of a seduced girl's group 
immediately seize a beast of the culprit's group. This beast is slaughtered to provide 
satisfaction for the violation of their honour. The same proceedings are followed in 
case of bodily injury. 144 Any patrimonial claim for damages 145 follows by way of 
ordinary court proceedings at a later stage. 146 Further, a woman has an important 
share in the property of her house and has to be consulted before it is dealt with in 
any way, also by the male head of the household. She even has the right to demand 
protection from the group against her husband should his conduct amount to 
squandering of the family property. Esteem for women in indigenous law is also 
141 Burman "Street Committees" 156-157; Scharf "People's Courts" 11. It seems that there were 
so-called women's committees in operation. Although some of their functions were similar to 
those of the street committees, they were more involved in extra-judicial mediation. 
Unfortunately there is very little information available on them: see Burman & Scharf 709 
711-712. 
142 Scharf "People's Courts" 11. 
143 Myburgh Papers 81; see also Myburgh "Discipline" 32-34. 
144 Myburgh Papers 18-23. 
145 This claim is based on the violation of guardianship which, in indigenous law, is regarded as a 
patrimonial right. 
146 Myburgh Papers 33. 
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evidenced by the fact that the great wife of the group is often consulted by the male 
head of the group where the interests of the group are at stake. 141 
The indigenous-law position regarding the custody of children may explain the street 
committees' attitude of excluding the mother from any proceedings in this regard. In 
indigenous law plenary guardianship is regarded as a patrimonial right which is shared 
by the group. The right of guardianship vests in the group which has guardianship 
over the mother, unless the child is transferred to another group for other reasons. 
Thus, a child is a member of the group to which it is born. An unmarried mother and 
her children belong to the mother's group by virtue of that group's plenary 
guardianship over the mother. Children born to a married woman fall under the 
guardianship of her husband's group by virtue of the marital guardianship over the 
mother. That is probably the reason why the unofficial courts excluded the mother 
from the proceedings. 148 
Another interesting example of where these courts applied substantive indigenous law, 
was where a party refused to comply with the order of the court. In such a case the 
culprit could be forced to pay double the original fine, sometimes even in instalments. 
In indigenous law compliance with a court order is obtained by threat of corporal 
punishment for non-compliance or attachment by the messengers of the court. In the 
last-mentioned instance the fine would be doubled. The extra beast(s) thus obtained 
by way of fine, would be slaughtered for the court itself, because the conduct of the 
culprit constitutes contempt of that court. Mangangatlaa is an indigenous form of 
punishment for contempt of court by the unwarranted demand on the court's attention 
and is, amongst others, imposed for repeated misconduct. 149 
Eviction was another form of securing compliance with the judgments of street 
147 Myburgh Papers 80-81 110. 
148 Myburgh Papers 54 87; see also Part 1.11.4.b. 
149 Myburgh "Punishment" 44 53 54; Myburgh "Contempt of Court• 72. 
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committees, not only in squatter areas, but also in regular townships, such as 
Guguletu and Nyanga. Eviction was regarded as a very serious punishment because 
the waiting period for housing in official black urban areas could be twelve years or 
more. In indigenous law banishment is generally a serious punishment. It is imposed, 
amongst others, for disobeying the ruler's order or for repeated theft. 
(ii) The Makgotla in Mamelodi and Soweto 
The unofficial dispute-resolution institution which gained prominence in the 
Pretoria-Witwatersrand area in the latter half of the 1970's, was generally known as 
people's courts 150 or makgotla. The first publication of a comprehensive field study 
done on the makgotla of Mamelodi, near Pretoria, appeared in 1983.151 As indicated 
by the researchers the terms "makgotla" and "people's courts" are generally very 
broadly used and designate mo're than just court-like institutions. However, only those 
informal structures which were indeed responsible for the administration of justice are 
investigated here. 
The Ward Four Lekgotla of Mamelodi was linked to the Community Council and was 
described as a "parental model of justice", dealing with both petty crimes and family 
related disputes. 152 Although the chairman of this lekgotla was a Community 
Councillor, there is no evidence that he was instituted in terms of the Black 
Administration Act. Other makgotla in Mamelodi were associated with the homeland 
representatives and were thus tribally oriented. 
Certain characteristic features of their procedure which are symbiotic with indigenous 
law may be highlighted. The makgotla had other functions besides their judicial 
150 "People's courts" generally connoted unofficial dispute-settling structures until it adopted a more 
specific and political meaning around 1985: see Hund & Kotu-Rammopo 180, Scharf "People's 
Courts" 6. 
151 See Hund & Kotu-Rammopo; see also Ndaki. 
152 Hund & Kotu-Rammopo 188. 
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functions, but they were mainly concerned with family-law matters and the enforcement 
of traditional values. An inquisitorial process was adopted to elicit evidence. They were 
run by responsible adults and emulated community justice. Thus, characteristic of 
non-specialised legal orders, the emphasis was on reconciliation and harmony of the 
collectivity rather than on the abstract, formal technicalities of Western law. Little if any 
distinction was drawn between law and morality. Justice was directed at the individual 
and was thus substantive. The goal of these unofficial courts appeared to have been 
directed towards a restoration of the equilibrium in the community rather than the 
observation of specific legal rules; the emphasis was on the individuals involved in the 
case and their relationship with each other. The presiding officers attempted to reach 
this goal by implementing a holistic view of the relationship between the litigants, a 
view that goes beyond the narrow, technical Western appraisal of legally relevant facts 
with an accompanying emphasis on rules. Although it is impossible to isolate a 
comprehensive systematic body of legal rules, it does seem that the living law applied 
by these courts resembled indigenous law more than it did Western law. 153 
The Mamelodi courts associated with the homelands and Community Councils fulfilled 
a useful role and were amongst others supported by a section of the urban community 
that still identified with tribal authority. The more established older urban community 
who supported these makgotla may by analogy with the pre-colonial indigenous 
community, be described, in the words of Comaroff and Roberts 154 as 
"a hierarchy of progressively more inclusive co[-] residential and administrative groupings .... Units 
at each level have agnatic cores - as well as other kin and unrelated members - and well-defined 
authority roles predicated on agnatic ranking principles. [T]he ward is ... the most significant unit 
of organization ... [with] a recognized dispute-settlement agency, which operates along similar 
lines to the chief's kgotla. Indeed, it is described indigenously as a lower-order homologue of 
the chiefdom as a whole, and its headmanship is regarded as a microcosm of the apical office.· 
153 Hund & Kotu-Rammopo 186-188. 
154 See Comaroff & Roberts 26-27. 
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The findings of Ndaki155 in an early case study of a lekgotla operating in Soweto, 
indicated a similar position there. He highlights the following features of the process 
followed by this court: reconciliation of feuding parties, immediate compensation, swift 
relief, the hearing of the criminal and civil case in one set of proceedings and the 
absence of time-consuming technicalities. It should be borne in mind that people of 
various ethnic groups were served by this lekgotla. Therefore, there was generally no 
question of specific substantive tribal laws applied by the court. Yet the law that was 
applied was underscored by indigenous legal postulates. In contrast, Seekings' 155 
very brief, general description of makgotla operating in Soweto during the period 
1969-197 4 presents a different picture. According to him the courts dealt mostly with 
juvenile delinquency (including crimes such as robbery, rape assault, murder and theft 
by youths under the age of 18) and family disputes and fell under the leadership of a 
woman. They became increasingly coercion-based, violent, arbitrary and barbaric and 
lost the support of the community. 
With the decline in tribalism as well as for political reasons (they were associated with 
the so-called bantustans or had a close association with the Community Councils) the 
makgotla lost credibility. 157 Community values of the youth conflicted with those of 
the more responsible adults. Growing individualism and a protest against the status 
society supporting these makgotla resulted in the emergence of a new type of 
makgotla linked to youth organisations. Information on them is incomplete and it is 
difficult to establish the type of law, if any, applied by them. Although Hund and 
Kotu-Rammopo 158 describe the form of authority of one of these organisations as 
"closer to traditional forms of chiefly or autocratic control", judging from the procedure 
elicited in their research, it seems that it was far removed from indigenous law or even 
155 Ndaki 183. 
156 Seekings "People's Courts" 121-123. 
157 Hund & Kotu-Rammopo 188-191 199-200; see also Labuschagne & Swanepoel unpublished 
report (1978). 
158 Hund & Kotu-Rammopo 200. 
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Western law and procedure. It is clear that they opposed everything that the 
gemeinschaft model of justice stands for. Yet, it is difficult to discern from the available 
information any of the features of the gesellschaft model of justice typical. They 
followed a strict inquisitorial procedure and their punishment was harsh. The law that 
evolved from them could rather be characterised as repressive law. Many of these 
courts in fact deteriorated into criminal gangs. 159 It is notable that one of the reasons 
why they lost support in the community, was that they disregarded the advice of the 
adults and sat in judgment over adults; a serious breach of indigenous community 
values. 160 
The adapted indigenous dispute-settlement structures which originated in the 
metropolitan areas may be seen as an attempt at indirect rule by the urban 
communities. This often occurred with the tacit consent of the authorities. The 
Crossroads Executive Committee, for example, claimed to have received tacit 
agreement by the police to see to the ordering of the Crossroads squatter area. They 
successfully ran unofficial courts during the period from 1979-1984. These courts were 
manned by headmen who were in control of different areas. They were also assisted 
by informal township police, a concept foreign to indigenous law. 161 Other squatter 
areas also successfully ran such informal courts. It appears that they continued in 
practice even during the state of emergency and despite the rise of the politically 
affiliated people's courts. 162 
Over the years, the State continuously tried to exercise control over indigenous 
communities and their alternative institutions through the establishment of various 
State-controlled councils. Whereas the Chiefs' Courts could, to an extent, be 
159 See Hund & Kotu-Rammopo 201-202 204 206. 
160 See generally Allison 414-415, Moses 67. This was also one of the reasons why the Nyanga East 
Youth Brigade finally lost legitimacy in the latter part of 1985. 
161 In indigenous society there is no formal police force. 
162 . Scharf "People's Courts" 19-21. 
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manipulated by the State, the unofficial administrative and legal institutions which 
originated in the urban areas from the earliest times, proved impossible to dislocate 
and the bodies which were instituted as agents of control lacked credibility. In 1902 
the first Advisory Board consisting of township residents, was instituted in the Uitvlugt 
township. In 1926 provision was made for the election of the members of Advisory 
Boards by the inhabitants of the different townships. In 1927 in terms of the Black 
Administration Act, 163 indigenous law and institutions were formally recognised. The 
Courts of Chiefs and Headmen were instituted as the lowest tier in the hierarchy of 
State courts and were administratively and judicially controlled by white officials. 
Commissioners' Courts too were controlled by white officials. 164 In 1961 Urban Bantu 
Councils were introduced as "an urban parallel to the rural chiefdom/authority 
structure". 155 In terms of the Bantu Urban Councils Act166 the minister could confer 
judicial powers of a tribal leader upon a resident of such an urban area. Both the 
Advisory Boards and the Urban Bantu Councils were abolished by the Community 
Councils Act161 which in turn established the Community Councils. These councils 
were elected by members of the relevant communities, but by a very poor poll. Their 
powers and duties, which included administrative duties as well as the maintenance 
of law and order, were conferred upon them by the minister of the then Department 
of Co-operation and Plural Development. Needless to say, the councils were seen as 
instruments in the hand of the apartheid regime and had little credibility in the eyes of 
the community. Their upgrading to Town Councils, 168 did little to improve their 
credibility. 169 In 1980110 the Black Administration Act was amended and the minister, 
163 Act 38 of 1927. 
164 See Hund & Kotu-Rammopo 182-183 . 
165 Burman & Scharf 699 7 41. 
166 S 5 Act 79 of 1961. 
167 Act 125 of 1977. 
168 In terms of the Black Local Authorities Act 102 of 1982. 
169 See generally Burman & Scharf 716-718, Motshekga "Alternative Legal Institutions" 38-39. 
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in consultation with the Community Council, could then confer upon any black urban 
resident the same judicial powers as those conferred upon a chief or headman in 
terms of the same act. 111 It is not certain whether such courts have indeed been 
instituted in terms of the Act, 112 but the decline in popularity of the people's courts 
associated with the Community Councils evidences the State's inability to create a 
court structure outside the formal court structure with lasting credibility and popular 
support. 173 The promulgation of the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982174 was yet 
another attempt to control black urban areas and neutralise the challenge posed by 
unofficial dispute-settlement institutions. This Act upgraded Community Councils to 
Town Councils and made provision for their inclusion of township and squatter leaders 
into the formal system of loc~I government as official Town Councillors of the black 
urban areas. 115 When the black communities challenged this legislation and started 
demanding their rights as full citizens, their politically neutral informal courts were 
transferred to politically orientated bodies. 
It was the gradual increase in the momentum of the struggle against the apartheid 
regime which changed the early people's courts into institutions with a political goal 
and gave the general term "people's courts" a more specific political meaning. It 
should be borne in mind that the courts discussed above were the historical ante-
170 Act 94 of 1980. 
171 These powers were similar, yet more extensive than those conferred by the Urban Bantu 
Councils Act. 
172 Motshekga "Alternative Legal Institutions" 39, Hund "Formal Justice" 205 and Seekings "People's 
Courts" 120-122 are of the opinion that officers had been officially conferred with judicial powers; 
for a contrary view see Burman & Scharf 700. 
173 See also Scharf "People's Courts" 5-6 16-21. 
174 Act 102 of 1982. 
175 See eg Zwane 1989 3 SA 253 0N) 265-270 for an exposition of the history of the Alexandra 
Town Council. This Town Council was supported by the majority of the community until 1985. 
Opposition eventually led to its dissolution in 1986 when the majority of the councillors was 
forced to leave the township, or to resign and the remaining councillors could no longer form 
a quorum. 
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cedents of the courts that came to the fore after 1985 and therefore. Accordingly, 
common features could be distinguished in all these courts. 
4.b.ii The Period After 1985 
People's courts made their appearance in early 1985 and were forced underground 
within a year of their inception. 176 By the middle of 1986 there were at least one 
people's court in operation in every black township in South Africa. 177 These courts 
originated in metropolitan areas and most of them were politically aligned. This did not 
mean that they adjudicated only upon political cases, but that their sentences were 
politically directed and that activists used the courts as a forum to spread a political 
gospel. Thus, the adherents to the Freedom Charter and the Black Consciousness 
Movement competed for control of these courts. 178 Nevertheless, some street 
committees continued in practice without political affiliation despite the 1985-1986 
conflict. 119 The proliferation of people's courts in the 1980's may be attributed both 
to the failure of the formal court structure to administer justice and to the political aim 
of a certain section of the black community to render the State institutions inoperative 
by creating alternative institutions. 180 
The popularly known "people's courts" were informal institutions for the administration 
of justice which were ideally perceived to be a prefiguration or foreshadowing of a 
post-apartheid adjudicative infrastructure. Their history, composition, procedure and 
goals varied from one area to the next. However, there were certain common reasons 
176 In terms of the Emergency Regulations Proclamation 109 of 1986. 
177 Scharf "People's Courts" 25. 
178 See Burman & Scharf 727-730 on the political conflict between these two ideological tendencies. 
179 See eg Zwane 292-296, Burman & Scharf 706-718. 
180 See generally Mayekiso 1988 4 SA 738 CN), Zwane, Grant & Schwikkard 308, Allison 410. 
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for their existence. 181 The rising crime rate and political protest during the political 
upheaval which reached a peak in the period 1985 to 1986 could not be dealt with 
satisfactorily by the State police and its judicial institutions. These institutions came to 
be regarded as illegitimate by the majority of the urban inhabitants. State courts were 
regarded as instruments in the hands of the apartheid regime, enforcing apartheid 
laws. Also access to justice became increasingly difficult and unsatisfactory. 182 
People's courts were instituted as alternative structures to substitute State institutions. 
Township dwellers who ignored consumer and rent boycotts and stay-aways from 
work had to be dealt with by unofficial institutions because the State did not regard 
such behaviour as criminal. 183 People's courts were regarded as a political arena to 
further the cause of the struggle against apartheid not only through dispute settlement 
but also by way of speeches on the morality of a new post-apartheid society. 184 
Procedure and evidence in the people's courts were similar to that in the makgotla. 185 
Cases of assault, theft, robbery, housebreaking, disrespectful behaviour, maintenance, 
conflict flowing from tribalism, witchcraft and accusation of witchcraft, fighting in the 
yards, posturing as a comrade, refusal to co-operate in the freedom struggle and 
I 
collaborating with the police were heard by the people's courts. Cases of rape and 
181 Scharf "People's Courts" 23-31; Scharf "People's Courts in Transitions" 169-170; Moses 58 59 
65 68-69 75; Grant & Schwikkard 306-309. 
182 Eg Court procedure was conducted in an unfamiliar language; interpreters who had to be relied 
on were often inaccurate and unreliable in their interpretation; legal representation became too 
costly; unfamiliar highly technical procedure was followed; foreign Western law was applied; and 
the "winner-takes-all" philosophy of that law was foreign to indigenous procedures. 
183 However, it should be noted that the cases heard by the people's courts were not politically 
related: see Scharf "People's Courts" 28. 
184 See Zwane 292-296 where the formation and goals of yard, block and street committees in 
Alexandra township are discussed. In this case the State could not prove that these committees 
were formed as organs of people's power to take over the administration of the township. It was 
concluded that they were indeed formed to "encourage unity, comradeship and co-operation 
within yards, and to solve problems arising between residents". (2950); see also the charges 
brought against the accused in Mayekiso 739A-E. 
185 See the discussion of the unofficial institutions above. 
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murder again were generally referred to the police. 186 Family matters, such as those 
relating to lobolo and in some instances witchcraft, were usually referred to the family 
council. 181 Civil and criminal cases flowing from the same set of facts were heard 
simultaneously. 188 It is interesting to note that, in conflict with the position in 
indigenous law, some of these courts were indeed courts of record. 189 
Unlike the informal structures which operated prior to 1985, the people's courts 
became increasingly controlled by youths. 190 Membership of these courts was 
restricted to males and females held an inferior position in the township society. 
Hearings generally took place in public and procedure was non-technical and simple. 
Parties were given the opportunity to state their case and call witnesses. Hearsay was 
not allowed, unless corroborated. There is no mention of legal representation in these 
courts. All those present had the right to question parties. Judgment and sentence 
were determined through a process of voting by those present. Where there was no 
system of appeal, dissatisfaction with the proceedings, judgment or sentence was 
regarded as contempt of court and resulted in an increase of the sentence. 191 
Sentences took the form of community service, corporal punishment, restitution, 
compensation and sometimes so-called modelling. Modelling meant that the culprit 
had to march through the township with a placard describing his misconduct. 
Punishment was aimed at a restoration of the equilibrium in the community and more 
importantly, at educating the person in the goals of, and winning him over for the 
struggle against apartheid. Punishment with a sjambok was summary and also 
186 However, some courts reportedly tried rape cases: see Zwane 301 302 303-304, Moses 60. 
187 Zwane 309; Moses 60; see also Nina & Stavrou 9. 
188 See Van Niekerk Comparative Study 24-29. 
189 Eg the Nyanga East Youth Brigade and the Southern Cape courts. 
190 Zwane 303 306. 
191 Scharf "People's Courts" 26; Moses 62. Such increase in sentence reminds one the punishment 
for contempt of court in indigenous law: see the discussion of mangangatlaa in 3.b.i above. 
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administered to females. 192 Corporal punishment was administered by several 
members of the court in order to stress the fact that the misconduct was an injury to 
the community as a whole and not merely to an individual. 193 Some of the people's 
courts maintained a fair level of community justice and continued in existence with the 
full support of the community until they were suppressed by the State. 
In the non-punitive phase of their existence, the police tacitly approved the operation 
of people's courts as informal dispute-settlement structures and even referred some 
cases to· them. 194 Certain courts, for instance those which were linked to civic 
organisations, retained popular support and never deteriorated into a punitive phase. 
Nevertheless, the escalation in political conflict caused an increase in violence in the 
streets, rigorous measures by the State police to contain the violence, detention of the 
more sophisticated, responsible leadership and in undisciplined youths taking over 
political structures and people's courts. 195 This led to a change in the ethics of these 
courts. The emphasis shifted from education to punishment. This was attributable also 
192 Zwane 308; Sjambokking is also a popular traditional form of punishment. It is usually executed 
without delay by members of the court and administered to any healthy person, except pregnant 
women: see Myburgh "Punishment" 50 58-59. 
193 Burman & Scharf 725. 
194 Scharf "People's Courts" 26 28. 
195 The youths are commonly referred to as marginalised youths and form part of all urban 
communities in the country. They were uneducated, had no work and no family or organisational 
structure. They often formed street gangs or acted as comrades - in conflict with one another. 
Their only frame of reference was a society characterised by violence - violence by the State 
structures and violence within their own communities. Their model of justice was the exclusively 
punitive, confrontational, state of emergency summary justice where time advocated against 
reconciliating procedures. On the one hand, the comrades viewed themselves as activists in the 
liberation struggle. They regarded themselves as untouchable in the political arena and ignored 
all forms of authority, both State and domestic. Their contemptuous attitude towards domestic 
authority brought them in conflict with the adult section of the community and seems to explain 
why they did not turn to the community model of justice of the unofficial tribunals which 
operated prior to the 1985-1987 period. On the other hand, the street gangs were not political 
gangs and operated outside the State system of justice and outside the unofficial township 
system of justice. Their only goal was to enrich themselves. Their "acquisitive opportunism 
included theft, robbery, selling illicit intoxicants, housebreaking, assault and rape". They worked 
with the police and provided information on the comrades. See generally Scharf "People's 
Courts" 35-40. 
Part l.IV.4 Post-colonial South Africa Before 1994 117 
to the fact that the responsible leadership could no longer assist in the education of 
the deviants who were supposed to be incorporated into the political organisations 
supporting the people's courts. Relationships between the people's courts and civic 
organisations degenerated and the courts entered a phase of meting out unrestricted 
and severe punishment. Procedure became persecutorial and disintegrated into a 
process of harsh interrogation where parties were not given any or sufficient 
opportunity to state their case. 106 The community did not subject itself to their 
jurisdiction voluntarily, but out of fear. These features caused the institution to become 
a "horrendous monster that is coterminous with necklacing". 191 Community support 
declined and people started taking their grievances to the State structures again. New 
people's courts, also now called "kangaroo courts" were set up by youths who acted 
without the mandate of the community. These courts should be clearly distinguished 
from the people's courts which were organs of people's power, which were run by 
disciplined, organised youth in collaboration with older people, and which operated 
with the mandate of the community and with the support of its collective strength. 198 
Death sentences have always been a sensitive issue in considering the legitimacy of 
people's courts. Over the years these courts have been widely critisised for being 
involved in necklace killings. 199 These accusations have, as widely, been disclaimed 
by supporters of the courts. 200 Violence and thus also necklace killings, contradict 
the general spirit of education, reconciliation and restoration of the equilibrium within 
196 See also Zwane 315 316. 
197 Scharf "Memorandum" 8. 
198 See Moses 55-56. 
199 Necklacing is the burning of a person by placing a tyre, filled with petrol, around his or her neck 
and setting it alight. As far as the State was concerned people's courts and other organs of 
people's power were responsible for these murders. 
200 Seekings "People's Courts" 133 relates a case where a summary necklacing was stopped by the 
intervention of community leaders who urged those involved to refer the matter to the proper 
People's Court in stead. See also Scharf "People's Courts" 29-30, Scharf & Ngcokoto 360-363, 
Van Niekerk "People's Courts" 298-299, Motshekga "Alternative Legal Institutions" 48-51, Moses 
68 81 89. 
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the community, ideally perceived to be features of the system of justice prefigured for 
a post-apartheid era. Although it is true that excessive punishments have been ordered 
and administered by these courts and although some of them have in fact come close 
to passing a death sentence, they were usually discouraged in doing so by the political 
organisations supporting them. 201 Courts that could either directly or indirectly be 
linked to such killings were shut down by the community itself. Motshekga202 
classifies the violence experienced in South Africa in three categories: structural 
violence which emanated from the implementation of the policy of apartheid; retaliatory 
violence as part of the armed struggle against apartheid; and self-help. Self-help, in 
this sense, is described as structural violence resulting from despair and need for 
self-preservation. Necklacing ~s classified under this third category. These brutal acts, 
which are usually perpetrated by an aggravated crowd, have also been described as 
a consequence of mass anger. 203 
Field research has been done on people's courts since their inception in 1985 and is 
still ongoing. 204 Interesting examples of the operation of such courts will now be 
discussed. 
201 An example is the case where a court was persuaded to change the death sentence of the 
rapist of an eight year old girl to corporal punishment of 400 lashes. 
202 Motshekga "Alternative Legal Institutions" 50-51. 
203 It is the result of aggression directed at weakness, deceit, disloyalty and disharmony within the 
oppressed community itself. It is viewed as summary action by the outraged community to 
obtain satisfaction for injustice against the community. It is a release of the structural, social 
tension created by decades of political frustration: see Van Niekerk "People's Courts" 298-299. 
It is interesting to note that traitors were also summarily executed, without trial, in indigenous 
law and that the family home of the traitor was burnt down. Such action was regarded as public 
satisfaction for the outraged community. Thieves of public resources were burnt alive. 
204 Field research has mainly been conducted by Scharf, Burman and Moses. Scharf has been 
investigating informal dispute settlement and policing since 1976. 
Part l.IV.4 Post-colonial South Africa Before 1994 119 
(i) The Eastern Cape 
The people's courts of the New Brighton and Soweto townships in the Eastern 
Cape205 were political structures. Their initial success was attributed to their close 
co-operation with the street and area committees of those townships. 206 During their 
operation a dramatic drop in the crime rate was reported. When these committees 
become dissolved through the detention of their members, the youths took over the 
leadership and the courts. Severity of sentences increased and some court officials 
were suspended because of their undisciplined behaviour. The people's courts in 
these areas disappeared by the end of 1986. 
(ii) The Western Cape 
ScharF1 broadly classifies the Western Cape courts according to the punishment 
meted out by them. Examples of the least punitive of these structures were the street 
committees and the Nyanga East youth brigade208 in their initial phase. None of these 
courts was politically affiliated and they worked in close association with each other. 
Whilst some of the judicial functions of the street committees were taken over by the 
people's courts, matters relating to the family and adults were usually referred by the 
people's courts to the street committees who were run by adult males. Unresolved 
matters were also referred to the street committees. The goal of the street committees 
and the youth brigade was to administer collective justice by a caring community. The 
jurisdiction of the Nyanga East youth brigade was limited to youths. Punishment was 
limited to occasional lashing, sometimes with and sometimes without the consent of 
the parents, and mostly with a view to restitution and incorporating the culprit into the 
205 See Moses 57-64. 
206 The extensive network of people's courts which were formed in Mamelocli also fell under the 
leadership of the Mamelocli Civic Association; Moses 57. 
207 Scharf "Memorandum· 3; Scharf & Ngcokoto generally; see also Moses 64-68; Burman "Street 
Committees· 162-164; Zwane 301 302. 
208 See generally Burman and Scharf 723-734, Scharf "People's Courts in Transitions" 171-175. 
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community. This last-mentioned goal was effected by allowing the culprit to become 
a member of the youth brigade and re-educating him. 
When the Nyanga East youth brigade entered a second and more punitive phase, it 
lost a considerable amount of community support. The reason for its new phase was 
the very fact that the brigade incorporated offenders into its ranks, while not having 
adequate facilities properly to re-educate them. The democratic voting process through 
which judgment and sentence were supposed to be reached existed only in name. 
Furthermore, during this period the conflict between the adherents to the Freedom 
Charter and the Black Consciousness Movement also increased and contributed to 
this loss of support. 
The third phase was highly punitive and was characterised by a struggle for control 
of the courts by different political factions. As a result the courts become very 
unpopular. However, the fact that they were instrumental in enforcing the 
consumer-boycott, as well as the fact that they tried so-called "bogus-comrades" for 
furthering their own criminal activities in the name of the struggle, did lead to their 
regaining some support in the community. Nevertheless, this increase in popularity 
'1Vas countered by the fact that they started hearing adult-related cases. This was 
regarded as a serious breach of traditional values. It is an interesting and surprising 
phenomenon that this assumption of authority over adults, and not the severe 
punishment meted out by the courts, led to the final legitimacy crisis experienced by 
the youth brigade courts. Field research done by Burman and Schart2°9 indicates that 
the rites of passage from boyhood to manhood are still strictly upheld by the majority 
of males in the Cape Town area. Males between the ages of eighteen and twenty five 
are still initiated and circumcised and "they are usually considered men only once they 
are married".210 Yet, authority patterns shifted during this time and the youths started 
209 Burman & Scharf 730. 
210 In indigenous law the status of males is indeed enhanced by marriage. Once a man is married, 
he represents his family in domestic affairs. He may then become the head of the agnatic group 
and represent the group in litigation or the conclusion of juristic acts. In Natal a man becomes 
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representing adult political interests in the streets. When they moved beyond their 
mandate - the streets - and tried to assume authority in the formulation of ideas and 
democratic decision making, they came in direct conflict with the community whose 
emphasis was still firmly on status. This was especially so in the squatter areas where 
a conservative and patriarchal social organisation was firmly ensconced. 
The people's court which came into existence in the KTC squatter area211 in the 
Western Cape was a youth court initially supported by the community and working in 
close association with street committees. Support for this court also started waning 
when it tried adult-related cases. A conflict between the court and the Community 
Councillor of the area led to his necklace death as well as four other killings by the 
same method. The KTC court was dissolved following these killings, although in fact 
it had never been established that the killings took place on the courts' instruction. 
The people's courts of the Bongulethu (Oudtshoorn) and Kwanoncqubu (Mossel 
Bay)212 townships were both politically aligned. They were created in response to the 
rising crime rate and the break down of government structures in the areas. There was 
a youth court as well as an adult court in Kwanoncqubu township. The former dealt 
only with juvenile offenders. Appeals lay to the adult court which dealt with all adult 
related matters and the highest body of appeal was the executive committee of their 
civic organisation. It consisted of seven members representing parents, youths and 
women. 
Bongulethu's civic organisation was headed by the Bongulethu Civic Association which 
also represented parent, women's and youth organisations. This association was 
concerned with the general social and political welfare of the township. Its executive 
a major upon marriage. See generally Myburgh Papers 81. 
211 Scharf & Ngcokoto 357 360-363; Burman & Scharf 701-703 708-709 713-715 717 720-721; 
Moses 68. 
212 Moses 68-75. 
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committee served as a court of appeal for all people's courts operating in the area. 
The court next in the hierarchy of people's courts also served as court of appeal for 
lower courts, but was instituted specifically as a dispute-settlement structure by the 
Civic Association. Four people served on this court, a chairman, vice-chairman, 
secretary and treasurer. Four other people represented parent, youth213 and women's 
organisations, but they were not court officials. In line with indigenous law, the youths 
did not participate in cases relating to adults. Street committees formed part of the 
lowest tier in the hierarchy of people's courts in this area. These courts also had other 
functions beyond settling minor disputes. They were presided over by youths, and 
women were excluded from their ranks. The reason for this seems to be the fact that 
the women's own organisations dealt with their specific problems. These courts were 
subject to the authoritY of adult courts, but adults did not supervise their proceedings. 
Their proceedings, judgment and punishment were summary and often took place on 
the spot of the crime. Marshals, drawn from the ranks of street committees, ensured 
that offenders who ignored the court's written notice appear before the court. 
Although procedure and evidence of the Bongulethu courts were similar to that 
generally followed by people's courts, there were some differences. Except for the 
youth courts, all courts were held indoors. Furthermore, court proceedings were not 
open to the public as a whole, because all sections of the community were 
represented through their organisations. These courts stopped functioning, due to 
detention of their leadership. 
(iii) The Karoo 
In the Karoo, field research was conducted on the people's courts of Beaufort West 
and Graaff Rei nett. 214 The courts in these areas were created for the same reasons 
213 The youth were represented by two, one for those under the age of 23 and one for those 
between the ages of 23 and 30 years. 
214 Moses 75-78. 
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that courts in the other areas emerged. In Beaufort West the youth courts did not 
adjudicate upon cases that were perceived to be of a sensitive nature, namely cases 
pertaining to family and adult matters. These were heard by adult courts. Adult courts 
served as courts of appeal for the youth courts. The presence of those who had to 
appear before the youth courts was secured by making use of marshals. All those 
present were considered to constitute a jury. The chairman of the court, who made the 
introductory political speech and co-ordinated the proceedings, served for a limited 
period only. The courts came to an end through a lack of support of the broader 
community and the detention of their members. 
In Graaff Reinett these courts were established when street committees started hearing 
minor disputes. Appeals from the street committees lay to the zone courts and from 
there to the civic association. Unlike the civic association, the lower courts were 
basically non-political. Punishment was initially limited to a warning or, if it was the third 
time a culprit had been found guilty, a sentence of community service or restitution 
was imposed. Again the courts entertained strong community support until its 
leadership was detained. They were dissolved in 1986. 
(iv) Gauteng 
The breakdown of State justice structures in the area, the rising crime rate, the 
increasing momentum of the struggle, and more specifically an incident in which 
several people were killed in 1985, prompted the youth of Mamelodi near Pretoria, to 
create alternative legal institutions. 215 The courts they established fell under the 
auspices of the Mamelodi Civic Association which represented youths, adults, women, 
labourers and professionals such as teachers. Initially the courts adjudicated upon 
adult-related cases, but this was soon met with the disapproval of the community. As 
a result, adults became involved in the courts. Adult and juvenile cases, general 
matters and consumer boycott cases were dealt with by different divisions of the 
215 Motshekga "Alternative Legal Institutions" 44-47; Moses 78-82. 
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people's courts. An adjudicator could be either male or female - a surprising deviation 
from the general tendency in other people's courts in the country. The prosecutor's 
function included a political introductory speech, leading evidence and facilitating 
mediation. Judgment and sentence were democratically decided upon by all present. 
Sentences were in line with those generally imposed by this type of court. As was the 
case in most urban areas, there was a strict hierarchy in the court structure and an 
opportunity for appeal from lower to higher courts. Judgment and sentence of lower 
courts could also be reviewed by the higher courts. These courts stopped functioning 
during the state of emergency. 
Alexandra is one of the few townships in Gauteng in which extensive field research has 
been done on popular justice and the development of institutions of alternative dispute 
resolution. 216 Alexandra was founded in 1912 as a freehold location for blacks and 
so-called coloureds and today has an estimated population of 350 000 residents. 
Years of apartheid have left a heritage of insufficient housing, a lack of basic hygienic, 
school, community and recreational facilities, and virtually no other infrastructure in the 
township. The resultant poverty and overcrowding have lead to social problems that 
could be overcome only by a spirit of co-operation in the community. These circum-
stances also gave rise to an active spirit of resistance and struggle, so characteristic 
of black townships created under the apartheid regime. Tribalism b.ecame a major 
problem in this township where up to fifteen families of different tribes live in one yard 
under squalid conditions. During the 1980's, civic structures in the form of yard, block, 
street and camp committees were established. They were responsible for the general 
social well-being of the community, to encourage unity, comradeship and co-operation 
in the community, and also to solve disputes between residents. 
The first People's court in Alexandra was created by a woman, Sarah Mthembu, who 
216 See generally Nina Popular Justice, Nina (Re)making Justice, Seekings "People's Courts", 
Monyela, Zwane, Mayekiso. 
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started settling minor disputes in her house. 211 Development of the people's courts 
followed the familiar pattern of such courts in other townships. Courts were set up by 
youths and fell into disrepute when they started adjudicating upon cases involving 
adults and administering corporal punishment upon them.218 Moreover, corruption 
and violation of human rights caused these courts to lose the support of the 
community. When the people's courts ceased operating either for this reason, or 
because of government intervention, a hiatus was created in policing and dispute 
resolution and a drastic rise in the crime rate was experienced. 
4.c.iii The Period of Reform 
(i) Reform from Within 
In the late 1980's a process of restructuring the people's courts emerged in many 
townships. 219 This process went hand-in-hand with the renaming of the courts in an 
attempt to rid them of the stigma of violence which attached to them through the 
abuse of the revolutionary concept of people's power by the marginalised youth, when 
the responsible leadership was detained. 220 Generally they came to be called 
"community courts". Developments in Alexandra may serve as an example. 
In the latter half of the 1980's the Alexandra Civic Organisation was formed to 
217 The circumstances which gave rise to the formation of people's courts in Alexandra in 1986 are 
discussed in Zwane and the political goals of these courts are set out in Mayekiso; see also 
generally Nina Popular Justice, Nina (Re)making Justice, Zwane 266H-293D-F, Scharf "People's 
Courts" 47-50. · 
218 In Kagiso the youth courts used adults to hear adult related cases: see Seekings "People's 
Courts" 130. 
219 Scharf "People's Courts" 31-35. 
220 However, it seems that some of the restructured community courts today still function in an 
atmosphere of intolerance and violence, a result of years of State repression: see Motshekga 
"People's Courts" 39 42. 
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reorganise civic structures as institutions of social control and support. 221 The civics 
comprise, at the lowest level, the yard which is the smallest social unit in the township. 
The yard committee is also the first tier at which community disputes may be resolved. 
Unresolved disputes may from there progress to the level of the block committee and 
thence to the street committee. 222 The traditional institution of family council still plays 
an important role in this township. It is a private council in which the community has 
no say and a family matter will be resolved by the various committees only once it is 
clearly established that it cannot be resolved by the family council. In a survey done 
by Nina and Stavrou223 in 1993 it was established that the family council also plays 
an important role in the administration of criminal justice in various other South African 
the townships. 
The new community courts associated with the civics, differ from those that operated 
during the period 1985 to 1988 in that they are not party-politically aligned and in that 
subjection to their jurisdiction is voluntary. 224 Marshals are responsible for patrolling 
the area, for general social services such as· collecting money for refuse removal, and 
for securing the presence of deviants before the yard committees. An advice office 
was established in Alexandra in 1990. A community-trained registrar assesses 
problems brought to the advice office and then refers the parties to the appropriate 
institutions for the dispute to be resolved. 
The Joe Madise Camp225 is an interesting example of success achieved in 
community dispute resolution. It is one of the fourteen areas into which Alexandra is 
divided and forms an administrative unit of the civic organisation, representing 12 000 
- 15 000 township-dwellers, living in four avenues. Although, generally speaking, 
221 Scharf "People's Courts" 47-50. 
222 See Zwane 292-296 on the formation and goals of civics in Alexandra. 
223 See generally Nina & Stavrou. 
224 Scharf "Sipati" 45-49. 
225 Nina (Re)making Justice 8-10; Monyela. 
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people have become apprehensive of getting involved in the civics in Alexandra, 
because of the escalation of violence in 1991, this is not the position in the Joe Madise 
Camp which appears to be well structured at grass-roots level and to be enjoying the 
support of the community. The activities of its courts have led to a drop in the crime 
rate in the area. This unit is also hierarchically organised from the lowest yard 
committee to the camp committee which is the highest level of dispute resolution in 
the area. Between 12 and 20 mediators are elected by the community. Mediators are 
generally untrained and rely on common sense to resolve disputes. Men only are 
elected as mediators. This is contrary to the position in other areas in Alexandra which 
seem to be gender sensitive and where females play an active role in all spheres of 
social ordering. At least three mediators are present at each hearing. Hearings take 
place in public, on Tuesday evenings and Sunday mornings. An aggrieved party may 
approach either a yard representative on the camp committee, or a mediator. The 
mediator dispose of the problem immediately, or may refer the case to a regular 
Tuesday or Sunday court session. In case of a serious problem the parties often first 
approach the advice office, where a statement is taken, a date for the hearing 
established and messengers dispatched to advise all parties involved, of that date. The 
venue is usually the yard where the dispute arose. Procedure is aimed at community 
participation and the rehabilitation of offenders. 226 
It is interesting to note that the Alexandra community interrelates with the State police 
on their own initiative when they feel this is necessary. Community police in the form 
of anti-crime committees (elected by the community) as well as unofficicial courts are 
actively and successfully functioning in many townships in South Africa, often with the 
full co-operation and blessing of the State police.221 Seekings points out that the 
State's acceptance of informal justice developed as a slow process, varying from 
region to region and that this acceptance is closely connected to individual police 
226 Offenders are often involved in dispute resolution as a form of rehabilitation. 
227 See generally Seekings "Revival" 190-193; see also Ferndale & Langa. 
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officers, magistrates, attorneys-general and judges. 228 In the port Elizabeth and Cape 
Town areas police have proved to be unusually tolerant of institutions of informal 
justice.229 The State's increasing acceptance of unofficial courts culminated in the 
promulgation of the Short Process and Mediation in certain Civil Cases Act which 
came into operation in August of 1992. 230 
(ii) Reform with the Assistance of Non-State lnstitutions231 
Various non-State organisations have initiated programs to facilitate access to justice 
and develop popular justice in black rural and urban areas. 
Under the auspices of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at the University of the 
Witwatersrand, a Community Dispute Resolution Resource Committee was brought 
into existence to pilot a project for the formation of community dispute-resolution 
centres in co-operation with existing civic structures in urban areas. At its initial stage 
the project was discussed with the then Minister of Police, and was given the blessing 
of the State.232 When the formation of community centres was first contemplated, 
certain needs for a new democratic legal dispensation were considered: a change in 
the content of the law, greater accessibility of courts, research into the effect of conflict 
228 Eg, whilst denounced by Kannemeyer J of the Eastern Cape, Kriegler J described the operation 
of people's courts as a self-help by people who have been "deserted by the law": see Seekings 
"Revival" 193. 
229 The Cape Town police tacitly support Gugulethu's People's Court and in the Eastern Cape 
police reportedly welcomed the operation of these unofficial institutions: see Seekings "Revival" 
192-193. 
230 Act 103 of 1991. See the discussion of this Act and the criticism levelled against it in Part 1.4.2.b 
above. 
231 Little has been written on the community dispute-resolution centres. I have relied on Nina 
Popular Justice and Nina (Re)making Justice, Seekings "Revival", an unpublished progress 
report of the Community Dispute Resolution Resource Committee, an editorial in 1991 (3) 
Rights LHR 43, unpublished papers read by Nina and Motsepe (Alexandra Justice Centre 
Co-ordinator) at a "Community Courts Conference - An Eastern Cape Perspective" Port Elizabeth 
13 14 May 1993, Glaeser 96-100. 
232 Seekings "Revival" 196, see generally 196-198. 
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on relations within the community, involvement of the community in establishment of 
laws and legal institutions through the political process, as well as the administration 
of justice, the establishment of institutions which deserve and command the respect 
and support of the community and which are readily available and affordable, and 
which follow procedures to satisfy conflicting parties. The goal of the Community 
Dispute Resolution Resource Committee is to assist in the development of new and 
the adaption of existing dispute-resolution institutions; in the education and training of 
personnel involved in the resolution of disputes; in the co-ordination of research 
initiatives and professional development programs in community dispute resolution; 
and in maintaining contact with State institutions assigned with the administration of 
justice. Once a justice centre is established in a community, the Committee withdraws 
and assists only if requested. The idea is thus to assist in establishing 
dispute-resolution centres within the community, manned by personnel from the 
community and not to superimpose a structure from the outside. 
The first such centre opened in Alexandra in September 1991. The Alexandra Justice 
Centre was manned by mediators and administrators from the Alexandra community 
who were trained by the Community Dispute Resolution Resource Committee. The 
Committee worked in close association with the Alexandra Civic Organisation in 
establishing this Centre. The Centre enjoys reasonable community support. Cases 
mediated related to family, neighbourhood and marketplace disputes. Former people's 
courts "judges" are among the mediators who work at the Justice Centre. 233 
Procedures followed in the Alexandra Justice Centre have features of the inquisitorial 
procedure prevalent in indigenous African law. As explained before, Western concepts 
and principles of mediation and arbitration are very similar to the general principles of 
233 Seekings "Revival" 196-197 briefly mentions similar projects for the regulation of informal justice 
in black townships in South Africa but it seems that progress is slow. In Guguletu in the Western 
Cape, the community preferred that the street committees remain the dispute-resolution 
institutions. They wanted the lawyers' associations to limit their activities to the training of 
personnel (amongst others in mediation skills) and to the evaluation of proceedings. 
Unfortunately there is little information available on the success or otherwise of this program. 
See Scharf "People's Courts" 10-11. 
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indigenous procedural law and law of evidence. And these features may well be the 
reason why the Centre has accomplished some success. However, there are certain 
points of criticism which may be levelled against it. An American model of mediation 
was basically superimposed upon an African community. This model does not provide 
for collective participatory justice, and public proceedings, both of which are features 
inherent in indigenous African dispute resolution. The Centre functions parallel to 
existing structures of community dispute resolution and is in the final analysis not 
compatible with these institutions. 234 It is difficult to explain the initial support the 
Alexandra Civic Organisation gave to this project, but it is clear that, in the two years 
of its existence, the Justice Centre has not realised its goal of working in close 
co-operation with existing civic structures towards the creation of an indigenous 
African model of dispute resolution. Nina235 suggests that some measure of political 
awareness should be retained in order to diminish the inequalities created by 
apartheid, and that the ideology-free framework maintained by the Justice Centre is 
not desirable. 
Tiruchelvam236 points out that in countries such as Tanzania, India and Burma 
popular tribunals "of indigenous inspiration" emerged in societies that were committed 
to new social and economic orders and where the existing regime was being replaced 
by a process of reform or revolution. He further describes these unofrjcial institutions 
as "post colonial reactions to an imposed British court structure". They were 
considered an extension of a new legal ideology and a rejection of the existing legal 
system. In this country the community courts (as well as their predecessors, the 
people's courts) enjoy considerable support. One reason may be the fact that they are 
indeed still politicised and "represent the extension of the new 'ideology' to the legal 
234 Cf the intake officer and the advice committee (only the last-mentioned enjoys credibility in the 
community); see generally Nina Popular Justice 21-30. 
235 Nina Popular Justice 25-28. 
236 Tiruchelvam 264, see generally 263-280. 
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and specially the judicial sphere".231 This will conceivably remain the position for the 
foreseeable future. 
Other non-government organisations which have accomplished success in facilitating 
access to justice and developing popular justice, especially in rural areas, are the 
Legal Education Action Project which was brought into existence under the auspices 
of the University of Cape Town, and the Community Law Centre affiliated with the 
University of Natal. Their activities entail, inter alia, the training of para-legals (also 
within an indigenous-law framework) who assist the community in solving legal and 
social welfare problems through referral, counselling, advice giving, education on their 
legal and human rights and networking with other organisations. Community advice 
centres have been established in rural areas, villages and townships. These centres 
are equivalent to the advice offices operating in the townships but do provide 
additional social services. The Community Law Centre has established para-legal 
committees to oversee the establishment and administration of para-legal offices in the 
various rural communities, manned by para-legals who reside in the areas. 
5 CONCLUSION 
In 1992 Nina and Stavrou conducted research into perceptions of justice and the 
interaction between State and popular justice. Although the research was carried out 
in only two areas which are clearly not representative of the whole of South Africa, 
some interesting information came to the fore on perceptions of justice, the role of the 
State judicial system and unofficial systems of judicial ordering. 
It appears from their report that certain indigenous values have been adapted to the 
needs of the urban community. This may be seen as an indication that indigenous law 
is not the rigid system of customary law which it is often perceived to be but that it is 
indeed adaptable to the prevailing circumstances. In this regard the following may be 
237 Tiruchelvam 278. 
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noted. 
The communities investigated regarded imprisonment, which is unknown in indigenous 
law, as the most appropriate punishment for the majority of the crimes about which 
they were interviewed. 238 Of particular interest are responses to questions about the 
different forms of domestic violence. Some people regarded marital rape as a crime 
and felt that it should be dealt with by the police, and that the appropriate sentence 
should be imprisonment, fines or community work; others were of the opinion that it 
should be dealt with by the family, friends, or social workers. Only 3% of interviewees 
were against any interference whatsoever. It is significant that the majority of women 
interviewed were more in favour of intervention by social workers or the police and that 
the men preferred intervention of relatives or friends. These responses may be 
interpreted as an indication that women do not find the proper support from their 
families in the townships and for that reason preferred the intervention of outsiders. It 
may further be an indication that the pre-colonial indigenous law has been distorted 
to the extent that marital rape is thought to be sanctioned by it. 239 
It appeared further that family or friends and thereafter, social workers, were regarded 
as the proper institutions to interfere in cases of wife beating. 240 Community elders, 
legal-resources centres, the church, police, civics and comrades were chosen by a 
small number of those interviewed. Only a very small percentage of the respondents 
was of the opinion that there should be no interference in cases of wife beating. It may 
be inferred that the pre-colonial indigenous-law position (moderate chastisement of 
wives and children is admissible in indigenous law) is not being exploited or distorted 
in this regard and that the family is more willing to support women than in the case of 
238 Most of which are serious crimes such as murder, rape and assault. 
239 However, in indigenous law marital rape is seen in a serious light. It is regarded by some as 
assault, and others believe that such conduct is visited by the automatic supernatural sanctions 
that follow on the violation of taboo. Myburgh "Rape" 84. 
240 About 40% of the women regarded the family or friends as the appropriate institution to deal 
with such cases while 47% preferred social workers. Only 13% regarded wife beating as a case 
for the police. 
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marital rape. 
The majority of males and females interviewed felt that child rape should be dealt with 
by the police but that child beating could be dealt with in the family. Generally, 
two-thirds of the respondents were of the opinion that the community should not 
interfere in family disputes and that either the family or unbiased outside institutions, 
such as social workers and the police, should deal with it. 
Certain indigenous values still seem to play an important role in the two urban 
communities under investigation. Whilst the majority of the informants were of the 
opinion that the police should deal with serious crimes, they felt that witchcraft should 
be dealt with by the community and that domestic violence should rather be reported 
to the family or social workers. A small percentage of the informants indicated that 
most of the listed crimes should be reported to the family. This should not necessarily 
be interpreted as an indication that the crimes were not regarded in a serious light, or 
that the respondents were of the opinion that the family should adjudicate upon the 
crimes. It may be that the family council is still considered by some to fulfill its 
traditional role and that it is considered that all injustices should first be reported to the 
family council whence it should be referred to the proper institution to be dealt with 
after consideration by that council. 
It is interesting that 72% of the informants was of the opinion that State courts 
symbolise justice and that 60% was of the opinion that the civics symbolise justice.241 
Respondents wanted the community to be involved in the administration of justice, but 
on a regulated basis as members of a jury, as community court judges, or as 
members of community mediation structures. However, they felt that community 
participation should not be unlimited and that certain matters should fall outside the 
241 Thus, more or less 90% of the informants were of the opinion that non-State structures 
symbolise justice. 
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capacity or "jurisdiction" of the community. 242 
Sachs243 attributes the success of community courts, which have been in operation 
in Mocambique for more than a decade, to the fact that they function in line with the 
African concept of participatory justice; the fact that they are democratic and have 
features of ancient, traditional and well-known principles of the administration of justice; 
but that the law they apply is not exclusively traditional and that distinct non-African 
features such as women's participation and youth participation may be observed. 
Moreover, presiding officers do not necessarily come from traditionally powerful 
families and the courts are sensitive to the practical and direct physical needs of the 
urbanised community they serve. 
Finally, the creation of a culture of community participation in dispute resolution, 
witnessed by the resolution of disputes in and by the community and by the creation 
of forums for dispute resolution in which the community may participate collectively 
and openly, should not be regarded as merely the legacy of the people's courts, but 
also as a reaffirmation and perpetuation of the spirit of communitarianism and 
collectivity underlying indigenous African law and social ordering. Whilst certain 
features of the proceedings of people's or community court proceedings point to an 
almost Western-type of mediation, rather than adjudication, 244 these features are also 
characteristic of African adjudication and underscore the importance of the indigenous 
values underlying the community dispute-resolution process. 
People's courts that resemble the pre-colonial institutions in structure and purpose and 
that are not linked to specific political movements, are today still in operation. These 
courts are witness to the fact that while for the vast majority of the urban population 
242 Nina & Stavrou 17; the detailed tables are set out on 19-44. 
243 See generally Sachs "Changing"; Sachs "Community Courts". 
244 This may be the reason why researchers generally call presiding officers "mediators" and not 
"judges". 
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the notion of tribalism is abating, the break with traditional practices is not so clear cut 
in domestic relations. Many domestic customs are not incompatible with the conditions 
of urban life and urban dwellers as a rule still regulate their domestic relations 
according to customary norms and values. 245 
In his analysis of political and social developments in the township of Luanshya in the 
1950's, Epstein246 documented that despite the movement away from tribalism, urban 
blacks continued to order their behaviour in accordance with indigenous norms and 
values, especially with regard to inter-personal and domestic relations. Due to a wage 
economy, urban administration and groupings, and interaction with Westerners, new 
sets of relations developed which cut across tribal lines and brought about new 
interests in the political sphere. Yet he concluded that 
"[a]lthough 'tribalism' is an irrelevant category in these new sets of relations, it does not thereby 
cease to operate within them ... .'[T]ribalism' tends to be carried over into, and to operate within, 
all these sets of relations in which the urban African is involved".247 
Some twenty-five years later, Hund and Kotu-Rammopo248 wrote that 
"[a]lthough for the vast majority of urban dwellers the concept of tribalism is on the decline the 
break with traditional practices is less radical in domestic relations than in the sphere of 'class' 
245 Burman & Scharf 737 emphasise the important role of the people's courts in promoting 
indigenous values by maintaining the supportive network of the extended family. 
246 See generally Epstein 224-240. 
247 Epstein 240. The influence of Christianity and its condemnation of polygyny, labour migration, 
the concomitant development towards urbanisation, and the Government's policy of 
discouraging migrant labourers to bring their families to newly developed urban areas in order 
to preserve the rural economy, are regarded as factors contributing to the disintegration of the 
extended family: see Sachs "Family" 40-42, Sachs "Changing" 105; see also Bennett Sourcebook 
144-167. The Ivory Coast, where legislation was passed with the express purpose of destroying 
the extended family and promoting individualism "because the family was believed to be 
parasites discouraging individual initiative" provides an extreme example where Western values 
were superimposed upon Africa values. 
248 Hund & Kotu-Rammopo 189; see also 190-191. 
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relations. Many residents of Mamelodi still regulate much of their social behaviour in the sphere 
of domestic relations in terms of customary norms and values. The reason for this is that many 
domestic customs, if somewhat difficult to comply with, are often not incompatible with the 
conditions of urban life." 
Nevertheless, the move away from pre-colonial indigenous-law institutions does not 
necessarily mean a radical change in the jural postulates underlying that law. Although 
political, economic and social circumstances may have forced a change in the family 
set-up, it is not necessarily true that the need for the indigenous way of family 
organisation has also disappeared. Indigenous law is indeed a most adaptable legal 
system and the need for the traditional or rather familiar organisation of the family and 
family relations is witnessed by the informal dispute-resolution institutions which are 
in operation in urban areas. Although there is a movement towards individualism, this 
is a post-communitarian individualism. It may be that Africa, after centuries of solidarity 
is passing through an individualistic stage before it reaches a new communitarian 
synthesis. 249 
249 See also Maurier 12. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The issue of the legitimacy of the South African legal system is closely connected to 
the existence and complex interaction in this country of official law and unofficial law 
or living law generally, and more specifically, of the dominant Western legal system 
and the servient indigenous legal systems which are accorded limited recognition. 1 
Jewish and Islamic personal laws, are not officially recognised or applied as legal systems. 
Indigenous and religious legal systems are often in direct conflict with the official western 
common law, especially in the field of family relations and succession where the tenacity of 
intuitive law is best observed. Fitzpatrick "Marxism" 47 observes a direct connection between 
legal plurality and a legitimacy crisis, but sees the legitimacy crisis as giving rise to legal 
plurality. Legal plurality emerges as a result of, or in response to monetary and legitimacy crises 
which often afflict countries of advanced capitalism. Informal ordering then emerges because 
it is cheaper or because it is a means to create popular participation, thus "serving to make up 
the deficit in legitimation". 
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The essence of the legitimacy crisis of the present South African legal system lies in 
the historical superimposition of a foreign legal system with its concomitant Western 
jural postulates, upon those of Africa. 2 Whilst it has shown itself to be workable in 
certain countries, 3 legal pluralism as a colonial phenomenon has been abused in 
others where the transposed law was dominant, implemented as an agent of change 
and so-called development by replacing or adapting indigenous legal systems, and 
employed as a political tool to subjugate whole communities." 
It seems that in South Africa, where the normal interaction of living law with State law 
has for many years been repressed, the issue of the legitimacy of the State legal order 
may be reduced to an investigation of the moral validity of Roman-Dutch law 
(influenced by English law) as the common law. From a positivistic point of view, any 
question pertaining to morality in law and legal orders should be rejected as 
unscientific, for legal positivism denies the viability of any form of metaphysics. Thus 
any approach which relies on moral standards in evaluating legal norms and legal 
systems should be rejected. 5 
It is an uncritical compliance with this scientific approach to our legal system which 
instilled in many jurists an inability to see legal rules in their social context and which 
2 The concept of legitimacy is discussed in more detail in paragraph 4 below. It should be borne 
in mind that legitimacy may be viewed from different angles and that apartheid, for example, had 
an important role to play in the legitimacy crisis of the South African legal system: see HSRC 
166-167. 
3 The imposition of a foreign legal system which emanated from a country with a culture wholly 
different to that of the servient community, is a world-wide phenomenon. Apart from African 
indigenous populations, those of Papua New Guinea, Africa, America, Australia, Japan, India, 
Indonesia, Turkey and Alaska are further examples of such servient communities. 
4 See generally Van Niekerk ·New Developments• 19-20. In colonial times there was a tendency 
to use law and legal rationality to order those social structures perceived by the colonialist as 
•dangerously exotic and bizarre•: see Fitzpatrick •Law Plurality" 161 who also describes it as an 
attempt by the European bourgeoisie to eliminate ihe root of diversity". 
5 Davis "Realists" 388. The epistemology of legal positivism has been dismissed by Corder & Davis 
2 in the following terms: "[l]f by 'scientific' is meant some kind of value-freedom or a separation 
of things political, then law can never attain such a status". 
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gave rise to inadequate attention being paid to the philosophical foundation of other 
legal institutions and the social reality within which they function. 8 
Over the years, the pursuit of legal positivism created a legal order primarily suited to 
the needs of that section of the community whose traditions and way of life may be 
classified as Western and capitalist.1 Moreover, analytical positivism proved 
inadequate to explain law and social ordering and to direct legal development in 
Africa.8 
In the South African context one is then confronted with the question whether this 
country's legal system has the inherent capability to qualify as a legitimate legal system 
in the eyes of the majority of the population, now that it is being purged of the unjust 
and racist legislation which has crippled it and now that it can operate independently 
of the illegitimate State authority from which such legislation originated. 
History teaches that it is, above all, the scientific framework and methodology of 
Roman law which proved decisive in its reception, not only in Western Europe where 
the practical rules of Roman law were received, but also in eastern European countries 
where a scientific reception of Roman law took place although the rules of Roman law 
were never received. 9 Is the scientific framework of Roman-Dutch law capable of 
accommodating indigenous law and institutions? While attempting to answer this 
question, it should be borne in mind that the Roman-Dutch methodology and 
conceptual framework remain foreign to indigenous Africa and, more importantly, that 
the South African legal system remains endorsed by a basically ethnocentric Western 
jurisprudence which ignores the jural postulates and value systems which form the 
6 Corder & Davis 2. 
7 Corder & Davis 3. 
8 Ogwurike 137 observes that ihere is no end which justifies law [in Africa], except a social end·. 
9 Zajtay & Hosten 181-183. 
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basis of indigenous laws. 10 The notion that the ideas of Western jurisprudence are 
universally applicable and that non-Western jurisprudential ideas and modes of thought 
are to be relegated to the field of sociology and anthropology needs to be 
reconsidered. In order to accomplish this, Western cultural axioms need to be 
transcended and an indigenous African perspective employed. 
Before one attempts to analyse the legitimacy of any legal system in a heterogeneous 
society, it is essential to distinguish between different types of law applicable in such 
societies. In this chapter a theoretical explanation will be given of how and where the 
different laws which are potentially applicable in the pluralistic South African situation 
fit into the general scheme of this country's legal order. 
The popular, Western, and typically positivistic perception of modern law is that law 
is necessarily monist, 11 that it consists of those norms that are created and sanctioned 
by official State organs in accordance with a basic rule of recognition or grundnorm. 12 
It thus negates the co-existence of a variety of unofficial legal systems (in Africa 
notably those applicable in indigenous cultures) within a single community. It accords 
10 Dhlamini "Future" 12; Chiba "Conclusion" 356; Trubek 16. 
11 Monism being the doctrine that only one ultimate principle or being exists; the theory that denies 
the existence of a duality of mind or matter. It is interesting to note that although legal monism 
prevails in modern Western societies, these societies are characterised by normative pluralism 
in that a variety of autonomous social norms exist and are to an extent recognised. In contrast, 
in primitive societies normative monism in a broad sense prevail. Initially law and positive 
morality, specifically religion, were so closely related that they formed a single coherent system 
of norms which regulated the lives of members of the community: S Ehrlich 225 226; see also 
Fitzpatrick "Marxism" 52: who notes that "[m]edieval law was integral to a moral order and 
traditional community .. .". This is also evidenced in traditional indigenous African communities 
noted for their characteristically non-specialised cultures, characterised by lack of separation, 
differentiation, classification, delimitation, definition or individualisation with regard, for instance, 
to l'ime, activity, functions, interest, duties, knowledge, conceptions: see Myburgh Papers 2ft. 
This lack of specialisation in indigenous societies has been misunderstood by some 
anthropologists and lawyers alike and interpreted as evidencing a lack of law in these societies. 
But then they either conceptualised law so narrowly that it could not be applied in these 
societies, or equated it with custom: see generally Pospisil Anthropology 11 ff, Van Niekerk 
Comparative Study 13-16. 
12 Davis "Realists• 388ff; see also S Ehrlich 226, Allott and Woodman 7, Allott "Popular Law-making" 
33, Podg6recki "Intuitive Law" 72, Hund "Formal Justice" 212. 
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It accords unofficial laws a culturally inferior status to that of the official State law, and 
often labels it as not being law, nor being civilised, sophisticated, centralised, national, 
systematised or authorised. 13 Moreover, juridical monism theoretically has the effect 
that normative systems, other than the State system, may officially be dislocated and 
even absorbed by the State system. 14 
From a sociological point of view one can distinguish different types of law. Most 
inquiries into a variety of legal or other normative systems which apply in a single 
society, commence with the Austrian jurist Eugen Ehrlich's view on living law and 
norms for decision. 15 According to him living law is the law that dominates life itself, 
even though it has not been posited in legal propositions. Living law may be 
distinguished from the law which is enforced in the courts and other tribunals. 
Authoritative sources of living law are modern legal documents; direct observation of 
life, of commerce, of customs and usages, and of all associations. 16 
13 Chiba Legal Pluralism 51. 
14 S Ehrlich 227. The current position of indigenous law and unofficial laws in South Africa bears 
witness to this phenomenon. But, It must be remembered that although systems of living law 
may be officially interfered with or even abolished, they usually continue to be applied and 
consequently develop unofficially. 
15 See inter alia S Ehrlich, Nelken, Podg6recki ·intuitive LaW-, Friedman, Chiba Legal Pluralism, 
Timasheff, Rich. Although Ehrlich's notions of living law and norms for decision are regarded 
by some as the most developed view of the school of thought which emphasises the 
prominence or even predominance of intuitive law (See Fitzpatrick "Marxism" 46, Fitzpatrick •t.aw 
Plurallty9 161), those notions have also been criticised. Rottleuthner 1 is of the opinion that it 
"appears rather arbitrary for legal sociology to begin with Ehrlich· and that one may as well go 
back another century and regard Montesquieu as the founder of legal sociology. Nevertheless, 
he indicates (at 19 23) that It is important that Ehrlich's research was stimulated by his every-day 
experience of the application of folk laws under the surface of the official Austrian law in 
Bukowina. Ehrlich's distinction of various types of law, or his incorporation of living law in his 
definition of law also elicited criticism from Hans Kelsen with his monistic view of law and thus 
resulted in a set back for legal sociology in Germany: see Rottleuthner 28 especially n 83. 
16 Associations which the law has recognised, those which it has overlooked and passed by, and 
even those of which it has disapproved: see E Ehrlich 493; see also Nelken 161, Podg6recki 
•intuitive LaW- 71, Ogwurike 10 129-131, S Ehrlich 226, Timasheff 52-53, Rich 151. People's law 
as discussed in Part l.IV.4 may be classified as social law within this definition. 
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Norms far decision are legal rules found in positive law, legal codes and statutes. 
Although the norms far decision are those norms that are enforced in the courts 
(official law), it is the living law which provides the very foundation of the legal order. 
But, the norms far decision are not invariably based an the living law. 11 Whilst 
traditional jurisprudence altogether denies the existence of living law and takes account 
only of laws and norms of judicial decisions, Ehrlich promoted a jurisprudence which 
would take cognisance of the living law in order ta bring the application of official law 
closer ta social reality. 18 
Although Eugen Ehrlich 19 regarded the legal document, such as a will or a contract, 
as the primary source of livin~ law, he determined that it is the customs, usages, and 
institutions from which the unwritten living law originate which are in conflict with the 
State legal order. 20 These are more relevant in an investigation of a specific system 
of living law.21 
Ehrlich's concepts of "living law" and "norms far decision" are often equated with 
Pound's concepts of "law in action" and "law in baaks".22 This is so because bath 
17 See generally E Ehrlich 486ff, Lloyd 522ff. 
18 Rottleuthner 6-7. 
19 E Ehrlich 495. 
20 See Kidder 42-44 on the tension between the living law (or customs) and what terms the "written 
law". 
21 The ascertainment of living law remains one of the most vexing problems facing a researcher 
in the field of legal anthropology. Judicial decisions of unofficial folk institutions are important 
sources of the living indigenous law, which must be distinguished from the black letter 
indigenous law which is applied by official courts and reduced to writing in the standard works 
on indigenous law. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that •onty a tiny bit of re81 life is 
brought before the courts and other tribunals; and much is excluded from litigation either on 
principle, or as a matter of fact. Moreover the legal relation which is being litigated shows 
distorted features which are quite different from, and foreign to, the same relation when It is in 
repose•: E Ehrlich 495. 
22 See eg Chiba Legal Pluralism 132. 
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employ the notions of a living law and a dead letter law.23 However, Ehrlich's concern 
was with the social determination or function of law, that is, the social basis of law, 
whereas Pound was more concerned with the effect of law upon society. Law is seen 
as a method of social control and is thus viewed in terms of its purpose. 2• Pound's 
law in books as well as his law in action refer to the activities of law makers and law 
enforcers. Law in books are the real rules and norms applicable to those subject to 
the law and the law in action are those obligatory norms that are in fact enforced. His 
concern was with the harmonisation of law in books and law in action, since 
discrepancies between the two are indicative of the fact that the law is not attuned to 
the needs and aspirations of society. 
Whilst Pound was committed to the unsatisfied social needs which were made evident 
by social circumstances, Ehrlich's commitment was rather to the existing normative 
orders which could not be ignored. 25 Ehrlich's norms for decision control judicial 
behaviouf8 and include both law in books and actual patterns of decision by 
legislative and judicial bodies which emerge and are applied only when a matter 
comes before a court. Official State mechanisms for social control are regarded as 
complementary to living mechanisms for social control. It is only when the latter proves 
inadequate that official mechanisms are employed. The living law consists of those 
norms that prevail under normal circumstances and which originate from the normal 
interaction between individuals in a variety of circumstances. 21 Living law is not 
necessarily in competition with norms for decision. 
However, in an investigation into the legitimacy of an official legal order and the role 
of a particular system of living law, notably in this thesis indigenous law, the ideas of 
23 See Nelken 168ff. 
24 See Uoyd 522 525, Nelken 164-167. 
25 Nelken 169. 
26 See also Rich 151. 
27 See also Rich 151 159. 
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both Ehrlich and Pound are applicable. Pound's notions about law in action remain 
particularly relevant in the field of legal-anthropological research into indigenous legal 
systems,28 with regard to the various faces of indigenous law in this country, as well 
as the application and abuse of indigenous laws by official institutions. Ehrlich's view 
on living law, in turn, is of relevance with regard to the existence and application of 
unofficial indigenous laws by unofficial institutions, its non-recognition by the State 
authorities as well as the effect living law might have on the State law. 
In drawing a distinction between living law and State law some important questions 
spring to mind. 211 What would happen if different systems of living law should be in 
conflict? What will be the outcome of the interaction of different systems of living law? 
How does one explain the original effectiveness of State law and the effect on living 
law which State law indeed sometimes seems to have? 
The first two questions have a bearing on the internal conflict of laws, and the goals 
which should be set in an internal-conflict management. 30 It should be borne in mind 
that the numerous South African publications which deal with this topic, tend to 
concentrate on the conflict between different official laws, that is the conflict between 
indigenous laws which are recognised by the State and applied in the general courts 
of the land inter se and between indigenous laws and the Western common law. 
These works are not concerned with the true living law. Unofficial, living law is being 
ignored because the State has the ultimate authority to recognise or ignore systems 
of living law. In South Africa the State legal order does not take cognisance of conflict 
between, and interaction of systems of living law, or of the effect of living law on the 
effectiveness of the official law. 
28 See generally Hund ·New Legal Anthropology-, Hund ·Roles of Theory-, Sanders ·eomparative 
LaW- on the conflict between the rule-<lirected and trouble-case method of investigation into 
indigenous laws. 
29 Fitzpatrick •Marxism• 46. 
30 See the discussion on the conflict of personal laws in Part l.IV.3 above. 
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Living law may be regarded as a sine qua non for State law.31 It forms the basis of 
State law and the effectiveness of State law depends on its being in harmony with 
living law. Official legal propositions or legal institutions divorced from their 
presuppositions (living law), have no information to convey.32 It may thus be said that 
legal normative systems cannot function in a normative vacuum. 33 And that is one of 
the most important reasons for the legitimacy crisis of the official State legal system 
in South Africa. 
The original effectiveness of official law may be explained with reference to the most 
common, diffuse unofficial jural postulate34 which underlies indigenous law in 
Japanese society and which also underlies law in South African indigenous societies. 
It is called the identity postulate or the amoeba-like way of thinking because of the 
similarity to the amoeba's capacity for flexible movement whilst retaining its 
individuality. This postulate induces people to adjust culturally to changing 
circumstances in order to preserve their own identity. 35 Consequently, one finds that 
living indigenous law is flexible and has the ability to permeate different levels of the 
structure of State law whilst retaining its own identity. It may be sanctioned by, or even 
incorporated into official law; or it may function unofficially. It is perhaps more 
appropriate to regard the resilience of indigenous law as one's point of departure, 
rather than the so-called effectiveness of official law. 
The resilience of indigenous law in South Africa is best illustrated by the living people's 
law which was applied by people's courts, even after it had been officially rejected and 
31 Fitzpatrick •Marxism" 46; Fitzpatrick "Law Plurality" 161 . 
32 E Ehrlich 4 75. 
33 S Ehrlich 232. 
34 See Part II.II and II.Ill below for a detaUed discussion of jural postulates. 
35 Chiba "Unofficial Postulates• 59 and Chiba 9Three-level Structure• 355-358. This feature should 
clearly be distinguished from legal acculturation, where the identity of one legal system is 
sacrificed in favour of another. In indigenous law this postulate is referred to as the identity 
postulate. See Part 11.11.3.b.i(iii). 
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banned by the official law, as well as the living law which is unofficially applied in the 
State Courts of Chiefs and Headmen. 38 The resilience of indigenous law in Kgatla 
society is ascribed to its centralised State organisation; its well defined body of norms; 
and in accordance with the jural postulate described above, the Kgatla chief's ability 
to adapt those norms to changing circumstances so as to keep them attractive to the 
population. 37 
In an investigation into the implementation of State law through living law, in this 
instance North Sumatran indigenous law, Slaats and Portier8 come to the conclusion 
that the apparent effectiveness of State constitutional law is dependent on and 
determined by the operation of indigenous institutions and procedures. They indicate 
that where a village chief was chosen in accordance with Western procedures, his rule 
was not acknowledged nor accepted by the community. This was because his position 
lacked the indigenous basis of authority which is "empowered and at the same time 
restricted by, the intricate fabric of multi-layered tripartite relationships". 39 
2 OFFICIAL LAW 
From a positivistic point of view, various types of law may be distinguished with 
reference to a hierarchy of power structures. "40 Law is closely related to social power, 
and every power structure has a corresponding set of legal rules which it recognises 
and supports. Accordingly a distinction may be drawn between State law, being legal 
rules of the highest and most powerful power structure, and social law, both of which 
36 See generally Part l.IV.4. 
37 Von Benda-Beckmann 167. 
38 Slaats & Portier 153-154 171. 
39 Staats & Portier 171. 
40 Timasheff 302. Timasheff s view that the purpose of law should be the maintenance of societal 
equilibrium is consonant with the indigenous idea of the purpose of law. 
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fall under official law. 41 
The Russian-Polish philosopher Petrazycki, who has been described as the father of 
the sociology of law,42 distinguishes between four appearances of law which go 
beyond the conception of law as a normative phenomenon endorsed by the State. 
These are: positive law, intuitive or living law, official law and unofficial law. Within his 
definition of law, positive law is law which is, for instance, derived from statutes, 
custom, contract and judicial practices,~ whilst intuitive law obliges without reference 
to any authority. 44 Official law is supported and sanctioned by the State, whilst 
unofficial law operates independently of the State. Official and unofficial law need not 
necessarily be in conflict with each other, although this is usually the case in 
heterogeneous societies where values are divided and explicit formal prescripts of the 
official, positive law regulate the society.45 
Positive official law may be referred to as State law. Positive law and official law almost 
always coincide. An example is the law applied by the courts and upheld by the 
State.46 
Positive unofficial law is positive law applied by an unofficial dispute-settling body.41 
41 Cf Pound's view of law in action and law in books, which both form part of official or State law. 
42 Podg6recki Law and Society 212. 
43 This would include both Pound's law in books and law in action and coincides with E Ehrlich's 
norms for decision. Petrazycki also regards the effectiveness of positive official law to be 
dependent on intuitive or living law. 
44 If authority is here interpreted as State or official authority, intuitive law coincides with living law. 
45 See Ogwurike 144ff, Podg6recki Law and Society 219-221. 
46 Cf Pound's view that official law Oaw in books) does not necessarily coincide with positive law 
Oaw in action). But then it should be kept in mind that positive law in Petrazycki's definition 
encompasses more than law laid down in judicial decisions. 
47 Positive unofficial law seems to coincide with what Timasheff classifies as autonomous law, and 
according to him autonomous law is official law. 
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In the South African context one thinks of two examples of positive unofficial law. 
Alternative institutions for dispute resolution in townships sometimes apply official or 
positive indigenous law as well as the common law. The Courts of Ward Headmen 
also apply official indigenous law in addition to the unofficial law they apply. The fact 
that unofficial institutions such as community courts sometimes apply State law does 
not have any effect on the development of that law or its validity because these 
unofficial institutions are altogether disregard by the State legal order. The inference 
that may be drawn is that State law which is applied by unofficial institutions is indeed 
living law. 
Intuitive official law is intuitive l~w applied by official institutions. An example here is the 
application of indigenous criminal law by the Courts of Chiefs and Headmen. Living 
indigenous law applied by these official institutions does not thereby acquire the status 
of official law. However, should the Appellate Division extend the application of existing 
norms of indigenous law because perceptions have changed as to the propriety of 
applying the rule, thereby bringing it in accordance with the living law, living law may 
become official law. All four instances48 in which policy considerations may be 
employed to adapt existing State law may serve as examples of intuitive official law. 
Intuitive, unofficial law is the spontaneous people's law applied by unofficial people's 
institutions. 411 
2.a State La~ 
From a positivistic point of view, State law forms the upper tier of official law and 
48 See Part 11.IV.6. 
49 See generally Part l.IV.4. 
so See generally Timasheff 302-308. 
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emanates from, or is supported and authorised by the active power centre51 of the 
highest authority or social power structure, namely the State. Law emanating from 
other, lower social structures, is termed social law and forms the lower tier of official 
law. Social law is subordinate to State law. It is applicable only in so far as it is 
recognised by the State which circumscribes and limits its application. 52 State law is 
the law directly created by the State or directly authorised or supported by it. It may 
emanate from various levels of power structures in the State, depending on the 
complexity of the form of that State. 53 This conception of State law may be contrasted 
with Ehrlich's sociology of law which endorses the salience or even the supremacy of 
social law. Thus State law is regarded as a derivative, which results from a double 
institutionalisation of norms; State law emanates from intuitive law which is 
re-institutionalised at another level. 54 
Chiba, 55 in his research on legal pluralism and indigenous law in Asia attempts to 
identify the structural position and function of the indigenous legal systems in various 
Asian countries in terms of the official or State law. The methodology of his analysis 
and observation of law as an aspect of a society's culture is based on two 
hypotheses: The three-level structure of law and the interaction of indigenous and 
received law.58 The first hypothesis is that law encompasses three structural levels 
namely official law, unofficial law and jural postulates. Official law is the law sanctioned 
51 The power centre is a small group within the larger social group which is endowed with power 
and from which patterns of conduct is imposed on the larger and passive periphery: see 
Timasheff 13-14 
52 In accordance with the Kelsenian-grundnorm or the Hartian rule of recognition. 
53 This conception of State law accords with the predominant positMstic South African perception 
of law. According to Sugarman 162 one must not lose sight of the dynamic character of legal 
pluralism and the original effectiveness of State law, as well as its ability to yield to informal 
communal ordering and extend in a supervisory way over social ordering. 
54 Bohannan "Realms" 47-48; see also Fitzpatrick "Marxism" 46. 
55 Chiba Legal Pluralism 131-140; Chiba "Introduction" 4-9; Chiba "Unofficial Postulates" 61. 
56 In this chapter the emphasis is on the three-level structure of law. 
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by a legitimate authority. 51 It usually coincides with State law, but does not necessarily 
exclude other forms of law authorised and supported by the legitimate sanctioning 
authority. The distinction between official and unofficial law seems fairly universal. 
Chiba subsequently developed his hypotheses into a scheme comprising three 
dichotomies, namely official versus unofficial law; legal rules (the formalised verbal 
expression of a particular legal regulation to designate specific patterns of behaviour) 
versus legal postulates (particular values or ideas specifically connected with a 
particular legal system which they justify and guide); and indigenous law (law which 
originates in the native culture of a people) versus transplanted law (law transplanted 
from another culture or other cultures, either by a voluntary reception or by 
imposition). 58 
The difference in jural postulates underlying the various legal systems in South Africa 
is central to the legitimacy crisis of the State law and plays a cardinal role in the 
interaction between indigenous law and the Western component of the South African 
law. Therefore, it will be discussed in a separate chapter. 59 
2.b Social Law 
Social law is law which originates from social groups or power structures other than 
the State and which is indirectly recognised and supported by the State. All official law 
other than State law is first sanctioned by a sanctioning body of its own and then 
officially recognised and sanctioned by the highest and legitimate legal order. 60 
57 It is interesting that Chiba accentuates the legitimacy of the institution which has the authority 
to sanction the legal rule. 
58 Chiba "Identity Postulate" 39-40. 
59 See Part II.II and Part II.Ill. 
60 Chiba Legal Pluralism 131-140; Chiba "Introduction· 4-9. 
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Social law may be described a quasi-legal forms of regimentation which are embedded 
in the State or the official legal systems. These are the laws of groups or communities 
operating outside the regular systems of courts and State law. 01 It is not limited to 
primitive or indigenous law and may take on different forms. It may broadly be referred 
to as non-State law.02 A distinction may be drawn between social law emanating from 
political normative systems, from the normative systems of non-political organisations 
and from the normative systems of families. 63 
2.b.i Autonomous Law64 
Autonomous law is a form of social law which is derived from various sources. First, 
it may originate ·from one-sided declarations by individuals who are regarded as an 
active power centre within a specific social group and may or may not be coupled with 
private sanctions (for example, rules for visitors laid down by the owner of a private 
gallery; or rules for employees laid down by a factory). These rules are indirectly 
supported by the State to the extent that the State may under certain circumstances 
enforce them. 
Secondly, autonomous law may emanate from agreements or conventions. This will 
be the position, for instance, where the rules created by the social interaction between 
partners are supported or authorised by the State. If such rules are not be supported 
by the State, they will not be a source of autonomous law, for then they do not truly 
reflect the collective agreement between the large social groups involved. 
Thirdly, rules of behaviour established by the collective activity of social groups, 
61 Allott & Woodman "Introduction" 1. 
62 See Podg6recki "Intuitive Law" 72. 
63 S Ehrlich 234-241. 
64 Timasheff 308-310 312; S Ehrlich 238-241. 
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enforced by the group and by the State, create autonomous law. Examples of this type 
of collective action include that of guilds, private schools, or churches.1111 
2.b.ii Customary Law 
Customary law comprises both indigenous law and other similar laws of communities 
which operate outside the formal State and court systems. It is social law which is 
created by positive morality and ethics. It originates from continuous observance of 
usages and is not imposed from above. Customary law is the normative self ·regulation 
of a semi·autonomous social field. 88 Fuller describes it, 87 by comparison with 
language, as a "language of interaction"88 which emanates from human interaction 
and finds direct expression in the conduct of men toward one another.88 Customary 
law10 is essential in understanding State law. Although customary law encompasses 
more than mere primitive law, on close scrutiny of the varying social contexts 
presented by modern society, one would find parallels of almost all phenomena that 
are thought to be exclusively characteristic of primitive law.11 
Customary law may be recognised and enforced by the State without it ever having 
been legislated. Whereas customary law which has been incorporated in legislation 
65 Sugarman 216-217 describes autonomous law as emanating from "semi-autonomous realms with 
powers that in some respects resembles [sic] those of the state". These semi-autonomous 
realms are, for example, vUlage communities, guilds, churches, corporations, local courts, trusts 
and arbitration. Fitzpatrick 158 refers to it in similar vein and stresses the mutual influence of 
legal systems and their associated social systems. 
66 See Allott & Woodman "Introduction" 2, Podg6recki "Intuitive Law" 72, Timasheff 310-314 .. 
67 Whether it is official or unofficial customary law. 
68 FUiier 2. · 
69 Fuller 1-3 5. 
70 Fuller's customary law seems to comprise not merely customary law in the narrow sense of the 
word as It Is usually understood, but virtually social law generally as set out above. Therefore, 
his ianguage of interaction" refers to primitive law, customary law and autonomous law .. 
71 Fuller 33. 
Part 11.1.2 Co-existence of Different Types of Law 153 
and applied by State courts (which rigidly follow a precedent system) validly exists 
independent of the support of the social group from which it originated; true customary 
law is adaptable and responsive to the changing values of its corresponding social 
group and will lose its validity once the loss of support by the related social group is 
proved. 
In countries which rigidly adhere to the precedent system, the development and 
adaption of customary law may be stultified through its application by the courts, even 
though it has not been taken up in legislation. 12 Indeed, this happened to indigenous 
law in South Africa. Through a lack of knowledge of indigenous law and through the 
application of the repugnancy clause, an adulterated indigenous law, not in line with 
social reality, developed through judicial precedent. This law is also not consistent with 
the jural postulates which underlie indigenous law. 
Custom plays an all-important role in indigenous societies. Popular practice in these 
societies buttress, sustain and sanction law, albeit through a complicated process in 
which that which is done becomes that which ought to be done in order to keep up 
with changing value systems. 73 
There is close connection between custom and the values that underly a community's 
normative system. Ideally custom should influence the development and creation of 
State law: 
•[l]t goes hand in hand with positive law, creeps into jurisprudence and modifies it. Then the day 
comes when the theory of modifications is formulated and positive law opens a new chaptef.74 
72 As, eg, in the Zulu Code. 
73 Allott •popular Law-making• 33; The application of adat law in the State courts of Indonesia has, 
eg, led to a different type of law, an adat law with a Western structure which can be 
distinguished from the adat law which is applied in the folk sphere and which has an indigenous 
structure: see Koesnoe 104. 
74 Excerpt taken from Timasheff 312. 
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However, in reality State law and customs are as a rule not in step with each other. 
It usually takes longer for law to be brought in step with changing societal values, than 
it takes customs. 75 Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the courts should be 
able to keep law in line with changing values by employing considerations of public 
policy and that custom and unofficial customary laws should serve as indication of 
changing societal values which form the foundation of considerations of public 
policy.78 
3 UNOFFICIAL OR LIVING LAW 
Unofficial laws are the bodies of rules and modes of settlement which are at best 
tolerated and at worst prohibited by the State. 77 These laws apply both in 
undeveloped and in highly developed or sophisticated legal orders. In terms of the 
positivistic epistemology, unofficial law should be dismissed as consisting of non-legal 
norms, it not being derived from a basic Kelsenian grundnorm, or from Hart's ultimate 
rule of recognition or Austin's sovereign. 
Chiba's18 unofficial laws, which are not sanctioned by the legitimate highest authority 
and yet sanctioned by the community which supports it, form the second tier in his 
three-level structure of law. The sanctioning of unofficial law by .the community 
concerned may be of a conventional, formal and conscious structured nature, or may 
show itself in unconscious behavioural patterns of that community. However, all social 
practices do not constitute unofficial law in the sense referred to here. Unofficial law 
comprises those laws which have the ability to influence official law and the postulates 
which underscore it.79 Unofficial law directly or indirectly influences the effectiveness 
75 See Kidder 42-43. 
76 See Part 11.IV.6. 
n Allott & Woodman "Introduction" 2. 
78 Chiba "Introduction" 6; Chiba Legal Pluralism 139. 
79 It may undermine, oppose, modify or supplement official law. 
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of official law because it reflects more closely the values of that section of the 
community which adheres to it. so 
The most important example of unofficial law in South Africa is the law administered 
by the Courts of the Ward Headmen and the people's or community courts. Other 
unofficial law in the indigenous context, is the law administered by the official Courts 
of Chiefs and Headmen which have a very limited jurisdiction and in fact apply 
unofficial indigenous law in those cases where they act outside their official 
jurisdiction. 81 
The unofficial law which forms the basis for the discussion of jural postulates is pre-
colonial indigenous law. It is also referred to as such. This law is regarded as the true 
indigenous law from which the underlying jural postulates are extricated. However, this 
does not mean that indigenous law is static. On the contrary, it is an adaptable legal 
system which has developed over the years, sometimes in accordance with its 
underlying postulates, sometimes in accordance with Western postulates. In the latter 
case the result was inevitably a distorted law, far removed from the true values which 
form the basic axioms of indigenous legal reasoning. 
4 CONCLUSION 
One should not be blind to the strengths of State law and the weakness of people's 
law. All forms of law functioning in a single community have their limitations and none 
has advantages which are so overpowering that they would be justified to grant it a 
monopoly or a position of hegemony. 82 
80 One should perhaps rather define it as the law with the inherent ability to supplement, oppose 
and influence the official law. 
81 See Part l.IV.4 for a discussion of unofficial law in South Africa. 
82 Sack 3. 
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Different laws have different functions to fulfill, functions for which they are best suited. 
"Other laws" need not of necessity be in conflict with State law; they may complement 
State law and direct the development of State law in harmony with basic values 
underlying non-State legal and social systems. It is not only the negation of the role 
of living law, but also ignorance of grass-roots values and an unwillingness to keep 
official law in step with such values, which sustains the illegitimacy of the South African 
legal system. 
Legitimacy of a legal order should not be viewed solely in terms of the legitimacy of 
the authority from which law emanates, or solely in terms of the legitimacy of the legal 
system itself. Legitimacy concerns not only the content of the legal norms, but also 
their origin and application;83 it concerns norms, process and values.84 For example, 
should the values which underpin the official legal system be consonant with the 
values to which the majority of the community subscribes, the official legal system may 
nevertheless still be regarded as illegitimate because it originated through illegitimate 
means (such as through the historical imposition of a foreign legal order upon an 
existing legal order) and because the official power structure from which the law 
emanates is illegitimate. The source of illegitimacy will probably be removed once the 
illegitimate State power which imposed the legal order and from which the law 
emanated, is replaced by a legitimate State power. 85 
The idea of value consensus is fundamental to most discussions of legitimacy: Smith 
83 Van der Westhuizen "Opmerkings" 3. 
84 Values are also reflected in norms and process. D'Entreves 698 observes that "in countries 
where there are wide ideological discrepancies, radical contrasts of interests, and little or no 
agreement on basic values, the issue of legitimacy is bound to be put, as it were, within 
brackets, or explained away by paying lip-service to the principle of popular sovereignty as a 
kind of deus ex machina·. 
85 In South Africa this source of legitimacy has now been removed, but the basic values which 
underscore indigenous law and western law remain inherently different and sometimes even in 
conflict. 
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and Weisstub88 point out that the concepts of consensus (sought through the political 
process), and rationality (embodied in the science of legal precept) are both 
fundamental to legitimacy. D'Entreves81 regards the body of accepted beliefs and 
values, which induce men to obedience and to the acceptance of the exercise of 
power as "just and proper" in a given society, as the basis of legitimacy. He regards 
legitimation as ihe appraisal of action in terms of shared or common values in the 
context of the involvement of the action in the social system". Van der Westhuizen88 
gives what he modestly regards as an over-simplified definition of a legitimate legal 
order, namely a legal order accepted as law by the majority of the population to which 
it applies; and obeyed not merely because of fear or threat of force, but because the 
nature and content of the system as a whole is consistent with the community's sense 
of morality and justice and as such accepted and trusted by the majority of the 
community, even if they do not agree with certain aspects or individual norms of the 
system. In the same vein Cotterrell88 views a legitimate legal system as a "consistent 
and comprehensive rational system of regulation" which the community believes to 
promote the most fundamental values of justice and order. And Hund and 
Kotu-Rammopo90 see the legitimacy of a legal order as being determined by the 
beliefs and perceptions of the community. 
All these definitions share an emphasis on the acceptance of certain fundamental 
values by the majority of the population. These values pertain to authority, justice, 
order and morality. As will be indicated below, there exists a conflict between the 
Western and indigenous perceptions of basic values. 91 In its essence this conflict is 
86 Smith & Weisstub 397. 
87 D'Entreves 688. 
88 Van der Westhuizen ·opmerkings" 3. 
89 Cotterrell 84-87. 
90 Hund & Kotu-Rammopo 197. 
91 See Part II.II and II.Ill for a general discussion of jural postulates. 
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a fundamental conflict between the jural postulates which underscore Western law and 
indigenous law. Moreover, the very foundations of the jural postulates underlying 
Western and indigenous law are different and give rise to an essential difference in the 
so-called invariable characteristics of the different legal systems. In a situation of legal 
pluralism, this difference in the fundamental values gives rise to a continuing legitimacy 
crisis of the official legal system, even though there may be a legitimate political order 
in power. 
In the following chapters some jural postulates which underly indigenous and Western 
law, as well as the foundations of these postulates will be discussed. The postulates 
which will be discussed do not constitute an exhaustive list, but were merely selected 
to illustrate the different value systems which underscore indigenous and Western legal 
orders. Reference will also be made to some examples to illustrate the effect those 
different values have on approaches to law and legal institutions. Attitudes towards 
witchcraft and marriage, for example, illustrate a very real disparity in perceptions of 
morality. Diverse notions of equality affect conceptions of justice. Religious orientations 
and perceptions of natural law, human rights and the rule of law also are important 
concepts which have to be assessed in this regard. Finally, the effect of the new 
political dispensation on perceptions of the official legal system, and the effect of the 
Bill of Rights, which is phrased in an exclusively Western idiom, will also be 
commented on. 




2 Jural Postulates in Western Law 
2.a General 
2.b Diffuse Postulates 
2.c Specific Postulates 
2.c.i Constitutional Law 
2.c.ii Private Law 
2.c.iii Criminal Law 
2.c.iv The Interpretation of Statutes 
2.c.v Procedural Law 
3 Jural Postulates in Indigenous Law 
3.a General 
3.b.i Diffuse Postulates 
(i) Harmony of the Collectivity 
(ii) Superhuman Forces are Superior to Man 
(iii) The Identity Postulate 
3.b.ii Specific Postulates 
(i) Status Order 
(ii) Family Idea 
(iii) The Hamlet Spirit 
(iv) Common-kin Principle 
(v) Esteem for the Ruler 
4 Summary 
1 INTRODUCTION 
According to Pound jural postulates embrace the fundamental purposes of law and 
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constitute starting points for legal reasoning. 1 In his treatise on the law of primitive 
man, HoebeF describes them as self-evident truths, based on societal values of what 
is desirable and what is undesirable. Jural postulates are the basic axioms underlying 
law. Studies of these axioms focus on values and should ultimately accord with studies 
of religion, cosmography, and morals in a particular society.3 They form an integral 
part of the structure of law and a conflict between such jural postulates are often 
reflected in a political struggle ... 
Chiba5 presents jural postulates as the third structural tier of law - the other two being 
official law and unofficial law. According to him jural postulates, or fundamental 
conditions, are the value syst~ms or value principles which are specifically connected 
to and underly both official and unofficial law, and which justify and orientate all law. 
These postulates may and should to an extent coincide in official and unofficial laws 
in a given country, but are not necessarily consonant in all cases, especially if the 
close relationship between law and culture is taken into account. Jural postulates are 
also not immutable in that they may change in order to improve their supported legal 
system. These fundamental underlying principles direct legal development. They are 
dynamic and could adjust in accordance with the changing values, needs and 
1 See Pound 112. On the one hand Uoyd 748-749 criticises his view that jural postulates are, as 
it were, pre-legal because they regard these postulates as being derived from existing law. On 
the other hand criticism has been levelled against the very expression jural postulate. According 
to Sawer 148 it suggests that these postulates are wide generalisations of legal principles from 
which the courts can deduce specific legal rules. He is of the opinion that since these postulates 
rather constitute widely held assumptions pertaining to social demands which the law should 
enforce, they should rather be termed social postulates. However, it should be borne in mind 
that law and its under1ying postulates are but an aspect of a community's culture and that as 
such they should reflect a society's value systems. 
2 Hoebel 13. 
3 Bohannan Anthropology 288; see also 287. 
4 Hoebel 17. WUle 13-19 refers to jural postulates as iaws other than national law" which 
influences the development and application of national law. 
5 Chiba introduction• 6-7; Chiba Legal Pluralism 87 138-140 178. 
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aspirations of the community.8 Although they may in fact conflict with one another,1 
they should present a compromise of the diverse values in a community, if that 
community is to be socially integrated.8 However, in South Africa, which is 
characterised by cultural diversity, it is not so easy to obtain such a value consensus 
for the very reason that values are culturally acquired. 9 
Jural postulates are fundamentally applicable, which means: 
(i) that without being incorporated in specific legal norms, they are, or should 
ideally be respected, sometimes intuitively, in all judicial and administrative 
decisions as well as in legislation; and 
(ii) that they underly specific legal norms and form the basis of interpretation of 
such norms and that their application can be suspended only where specific 
legal norms make provision for such a suspension. In South African context this 
is usually so in the case of legislation. 10 
The principles of natural law, justice and equity constitute jural postulates in Western 
jurisprudence and are as such accepted and sanctioned by the State authority. Sacred 
truths and precepts constitute jural postulates in religious laws. 11 Social and cultural 
precepts concerned with the clan unity, bilineal descent and seniority are jural 
6 Pound 112-113 116-118 133-134; see also Uoyd 528-531. 
7 One should bear in mind that whilst Pound is of the opinion that law embodies the 
consciousness of a community as a whole, he also views society as a homogeneous, static and 
cohesive entity with "shared values and traditions and a common cognition of reality": see Uoyd 
529; see also Seidman Jura/ Postulates 16. 
8 Hoebel 13-17; Pound 133-134; see also Uoyd 529ff, Ogwurike 134. It is here that Pound's view 
of the function of law as the balancing of conflicting and competing interests in a community 
is best illustrated. The importance of public policy in internal conflict management in South 
Africa also illustrates the role of jural postulates in the balancing of different interests. See Part 
l.IV.3.c. 
9 Seidman Jura/ Postulates 16. 
1 o Du Plessis Jurldiese Relevansie 797 821-822. 
11 According to Hoebel sacred truths and precepts constitute jural postulates also in primitive laws. 
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postulates in indigenous law. 
These basic axioms may be usefully employed to determine the legitimacy of a legal 
system and the role and place of unofficial laws in a situation of legal pluralism. In a 
positivistic dispensation, postulates which compete or conflict with the postulates 
accepted by the official State authority are, as a rule, rejected as being irrelevant to 
law, and are relegated to the field of anthropology. 12 But it should be borne in mind 
that at least some integration of the legal postulates underlying all laws (official and 
unofficial) is required if the people of a country are to maintain their national identity. 13 
One of the reasons why the legitimacy of the present South African legal order is 
disputed, is the fact that it completely and consistently ignores not only the operation 
and applicability of unofficial law, but also the underlying value systems attached to the 
unofficial laws in the country. Although official law may be so dominant that its 
rejection14 of unofficial law is perceived to be justified, it is usually unofficial law which 
threatens the whole structure and effectiveness of the official legal system. 15 
Generally two ideal types of jural postulates may be distinguished, namely, specific 
jural postulates and diffuse jural postulates. 18 The former are postulates with specific 
relevance to specific legal rules. The latter are general postulates which support 
specific postulates as well as law and social norms in general. 
12 See also Chiba ·eonc1usion• 387-388. 
13 See Chiba •1ntrocluction• 7, Chiba Legal Pluralism 139-140. 
14 However, rejection of unofficial laws rarely results in its "annihilation": see Chiba "Conclusion" 
388. 
15 This was practically experienced in South Africa when the people's courts kept functioning 
underground after it had been banned by the authorities. (See generally Part l.IV.4. above). It 
follows that there should be a recognition of the existence of the jural postulates of unofficial 
law. 
16 Chiba Legal Pluralism 94-95; Chiba "Three-level Structure" 351-355; Chiba ·unofficial Postulates" 
64. 
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2 JURAL POSTULATES IN WESTERN LAW 
2.a General 
The jural postulates discussed in this chapter do not form an exhaustive list, but are 
used to illustrate the difference between the values which underlie Western and 
indigenous law. These postulates form the important framework within which the 
interaction of Western and indigenous law should be seen. In the discussion of the 
Western jural postulates reference will be made to their possible application in, or their 
relevance to indigenous law. 
Du Plessis11 regards jural postulates (wesenlik gelykheidsnorme) in Western law, as 
"kanale waarlangs verdere optredes ... in 'n hele aantal ... konkrete situasies verrig kan 
word, die legale uitgangspunt synde dat hierdie grondnorme (qua kanale) eerbiedig 
sal word". These fundamental precepts are created and positivised on the strength of 
the existential equality of relations. In South Africa jural postulates are historically 
founded in the Graeco-Romano and Christian-Judaic traditions. 18 
2.b Diffuse Postulates 
To preserve order and to do justice are not only regarded as basic axioms which 
support specific jural postulates in Western law as well as law and social norms in 
17 Du Plessis Relevansie 820ff. Du Plessis' grondnorme or jural postulates described above should 
be distinguished from Kelsen's grundnorm: Du Plessis Relevansie 796. Van der Merwe 109-11 O 
describes the grundnorm as the "transcendental-logical condition" or presupposition which forms 
the reason for the objective validity of legal norms. It does not form the basis of legal reasoning, 
or the basic value system underlying law and does therefore not determine the content of legal 
norms. The grundnorm only prescribes the manner in which a legal norm should be created and 
is for its existence dependent on its effectiveness by and large. 
18 See Du Plessis Relevansie 821, Du Plessis "Geregtigheid" 546. 
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general, but are often regarded as the main objectives of law. 19 These values may be 
regarded as legitimating values which provide justification for the existence of a legal 
order.20 Demands for the consideration of particular other values do not threaten the 
legitimacy of a legal system, as long as those who demand such consideration 
recognise the fundamental superiority of the basic values of justice and order 
underlying the legal system. The legitimacy of a legal system is threatened when the 
values demanded are considered to be more important than the values underlying the 
legal system and/or where the legal system cannot accommodate the values 
demanded and the values upon which the legal system is based in a rational and 
consistent manner, to maintain the systematic character of the law on which legal 
domination depends. 
Although justice and order do not always coincide and a proper balance between 
them should be maintained, they may for purposes of a comparison between Western 
and indigenous jural postulates, be seen as an integrated whole. Likewise, fairness, 
reasonableness, generality, equality and certainty may be regarded either as separate 
specific postulates, 21 or as postulates of justice and part of this integrated system of 
values which forms the starting point for legal reasoning in Western law. Wille22 adds 
to these postulates of justice that law should be in accordance with public opinion, a 
postulate which emphasises the important role of public policy in legal development 
and reform. 
19 Hahlo & Kahn Legal System 25 26; see also Van der Westhuizen "Opmerkings" 5 on the close 
relationship between justice and the maintenance of order and stability. It seems that also Du 
Plessis regards justice as an important diffuse postulate. He (Du Plessis Relevansie 827) makes 
the following statement: Hierdie geregtigheidsvorme is tewens nie grondnorme an sich nie maar 
leidingsfunksies (of rigtende prinsipes) vir die handelinge van staatsowerheid en -burgers in hulle 
konkrete doen van geregtigheid (wedersyds teenoor mekaar) langs die weg van die instellings 
(waaronder Inter alia grondnorme). 
20 Cotterrell 87 88. Chiba Legal Pluralism 140 also remarks that a minimum integration of the 
unofficial and official jural postulates is required in order to maintain the legitimacy of the State 
law. 
21 Or, according to Hahlo & Kahn Legal System 31-35, as criteria with which law must comply in 
order to be just; see also Wille 13-16. 
22 Wille 15-16. 
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Over the years various theories on the concept of justice have been developed. The 
primacy of the individual and the concept of equality has played an important role in 
most of these theories and it is in this sense that the dichotomy between Western and 
indigenous jural postulates reveals itself most explicitly.23 
Aristotle's concept of justice is often used as a framework for examining different 
conceptions of justice.24 He emphasised the connection between justice and equality 
and distinguished between distributive and corrective justice. 25 Distributive justice is 
concerned with the fair distribution of benefits and burdens and involves the 
relationship between the society and individuals. It comprises the principle that equals 
should be treated equally and unequals unequally (which principle presupposes a 
fundamental right to equality).26 Corrective justice is directed at the restoration of the 
equilibrium by redressing unfair distribution. The former entails political or social 
justice, whilst the latter comprises justice administered by the courts. 
The pre-eminence of the individual and the concept of individual rights originated in 
the writings of Locke and Kant and in the documents and Constitutions of the 
American and French revolutions. These notions have since dominated legal 
philosophy in the west. 21 It comes as no surprise that prevailing modern liberal 
concepts of justice focus on the maximisation of individual liberty subject to the 
limitations which are necessary to protect such liberty. It is also not surprising that the 
23 It should be borne In mind that although the primacy of the individual and absolute individual 
freedom dominate modern liberal jurisprudence, Nao-Marxist and Critical-Legal-Studies theorists 
have criticised the mainstream liberal theories: see Uoyd 857-861 935-941. Within the South 
African context the conflict between liberal and communitarian approaches to human rights are 
of relevance: see Du Plessis & Corder 33-39. 
24 Uoyd 456-357. 
25 Van der Westhuizen "Opmerkings• 5; Van der Vyver "Regter" 8-11. 
26 The concept of equality in justice is also incorporated in the Ulpian concept of justice evinced 
in the Corpus luris Civilis: lustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens. 
Justice Is the constant and unceasing will to give everyone his due (D 1 1 10; see also Inst 1 
1 pr). See Genn 194-195, Oark 61~. 
27 See Uoyd 379-381. 
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specific postulates which underscore Western law (some of which are discussed 
below) are often just that: limitations on individual liberty in balancing conflicting 
interests (the principle that equal liberty should obtain) and in the protection of liberty 
itself. 
Yet it should be remembered that equality and liberty are both, separately entrenched 
in the Interim Constitution and that this may lead to practical tension and conflict 
between the two concepts. Liberal equality entails the dominance of freedom, whilst 
socialist equality allows for fewer limitations of equality by individual freedom. 28 This 
tension comes to the fore especially in the law of contract. It is solved by either limiting 
individual freedom in the inter~st of material equality (thus obtaining socialist equality), 
or by limiting material equality for the sake of liberty (thus obtaining liberal equality). 29 
For purpose of comparison with the indigenous concept of law and indigenous jural 
postulates, the theory of justice of the modern Western liberal philosopher, John Rawls 
is used as example. 
In his assessment of the role of justice in a society, Rawls30 makes a distinction 
between the concept of justice and conceptions of justice. The concept of justice is 
seen as an objective phenomenon which entails the maintenance of a balance 
between competing claims. This concept encompasses a set of principles which 
assigns rights and duties and which defines the appropriate division · of social 
advantages and distribution of burdens which is necessary for social co-operation. In 
contrast, conceptions of justice are subjective interpretations of the role of the 
principles of justice in a particular situation. 
28 See Hawthorne 3-5. 
29 See generally the discussion of Hawthorne 12-23 on the tension between equality and freedom 
of contract. 
30 See generally Rawls 3-22. 
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The principles of justice are derived from a hypothetical ideal original position of 
equality in which free and rational people agree on the principles which should 
organise society.31 The principles are:32 
"First each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with 
a similar liberty of others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices 
open to all." 
The basic liberties of the first principle are political liberty (to vote and to be eligible for 
public office), freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and thought, 
freedom of the person and the right to personal property and freedom of arbitrary 
arrest in accordance with the rule of law. These liberties are fundamental rights which 
all people have. 
Once equal liberty is attained, equal opportunities must be given to persons of similar 
skills, ability and motivation. Also contained in the second principle of justice is the 
difference principle which requires that inequalities must be arranged to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged.33 
Rawls points out that for a theory of justice to be useful, it must be general, universally 
applicable, publicly known, able to impose an ordering on competing claims, and that 
it must have finality. 34 Proceeding from the premise that his is a universally applicable 
31 It is their reason which induces Individualistic, egocentric individuals to realise the necessity of 
social control to restrain excessive greed and maintain order in a society. Agreement is the 
rational way to establish such social control. 
32 Rawls 60; see generally Rawls 60-67, Heyns Difference Principle 29-31. 
33 See Heyns Difference Principle 30-34, Uoyd 356-367. 
34 Rawls 130-136; Genn 202. 
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theory, indigenous laws would have to be assessed within the framework of justice as 
an objective set of principles which govern the assignment of rights and duties and 
regulate the distribution of social and economic disadvantages. It may indeed even 
appear that the ideals of justice as we understand them in a Western sense are to an 
extent realised in indigenous law. But in his theory, in typically Western liberal fashion 
the individual is awarded a central role and individual freedom takes priority over the 
greater good shared by the community. 35 
Rawls36 makes provision for the possibility that individuals in the same community 
may have different conceptions of justice: they may have different views on the content 
of the principles which should govern their association with each other. Yet, he is of 
the opinion that individuals or groups of individuals who have different conceptions of 
justice, should still agree on the basic need for a set of principles to assign basic rights 
and duties and should agree that "institutions are just when no arbitrary distinctions 
are made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties and when the 
rules determine a proper balance between competing claims to the advantages of 
social life" (my emphasis).37 Thus, he foresees the possibility that individuals or 
groups of individuals may differ on the basic concept of justice only to the extent to 
which their notions of "arbitrary distinctions and proper balance" may differ. 
Indigenous laws are underscored by wholly different jural postulates. Indigenous 
starting points for legal reasoning are different and this makes the conceptions of law 
and justice in an indigenous context very different to the Western conceptions. Not 
only in the general conceptions of justice put forward by Rawls, but also in the 
concept of justice does the individual take primacy over the common good and is 
35 Liberal justice asserts the primacy of the individual and his inalienable human rights and stresses 
mechanisms to check and balance State rule. 
36 Rawls 5-6. 
37 Rawls 5. 
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equality assigned a central role. 38 This is not consonant with the most important 
diffuse postulate of indigenous law, namely harmony of the collectivity in which the 
collective good takes primacy over individual claims. 39 Judged then by Western 
standards of justice (whether these are the standards exposed by Rawls or those 
posed by any other Western philosopher), many indigenous laws will be found to be 
unjust and should consequently be reformed or abolished. By the same token, if 
judged within the framework of indigenous jural postulates, Western law may be 
regarded as falling short of the standards of justice of indigenous jurisprudence. 
The postulates of justice and order determine the content of public policy in a 
community. Legal development should reflect these societal values. 40 However, these 
values do not only vary in different societies but also at different times. Consequently, 
the content of legal ideology may vary and thus burden legal institutions charged with 
the administration of justice, even in homogeneous societies which are socially 
integrated.41 
It is also interesting to take note of conceptions of justice of Pospisil, a legal 
anthropologist. He identifies three paradigms of justice of law, which he distinguishes 
from justice of facts. 42 The first is substantive justice which is concerned with the 
38 Rawls 504-512; see also Van der Westhuizen "Opmerkings" 5, Van der Vyver "Regter'' 8-12, Du 
Plessis Relevansie 820ff. 
39 But, as explained above, the collectivity cannot be seen as an entity separate from its 
component members. Therefore, it is also not quite correct to speak of the absolute primacy 
of the collectivity over the individual good. Indeed, indigenous law has other mechanisms to 
protect the dignity of the individual. 
40 See generally Part ll.IV.6 on the role of public policy in legal development. 
41 Cotterrell 87 88. Although he acknowledges the changeable nature of values or conceptions of 
justice and order, he does not discuss a heterogeneous society and consequently does not 
reflect upon the idea that there may be conflicting conceptions of the values of justice and order 
within the same society. This is the case in South Africa and this is the very reason why the 
legitimacy of the legal system as a whole is still questioned, despite the fact that a legitimate 
government is in power. See also Sasson & Viljoen 227 228 on the role of societal values in the 
formation of law. 
42 Pospisil Anthropology 240ff. 
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content of individual precepts or norms;43 the second is justice in adjudication which 
underscores impartiality in and so-called humane application of law; and the third is 
procedural justice. The last two are concerned with the processes: how legal rules are 
applied. The first one is concerned with the study of norms. Although the fundamental 
values of justice are not merely procedural elements of law but also reflect social 
values, they have generally been centered on procedural aspects of law.44 
Indeed, in a society where there is legal pluralism, it is in the practical administration 
of justice that the conflict between Western and indigenous value systems is most 
apparent. Aguda45 makes the following remark in an assessment of the judiciary in 
a developing third-world country: 
"Here the judiciary has a task, and a very difficult one, of re-thinking and adapting the concept 
of justice and fair hearing to which they have become accustomed during their learning under 
the common law so that the concept will be acceptable to the generality of the people they are 
called upon to serve.• 
The existence of unofficial legal institutions provides a fine example of the dichotomy 
that prevails in the Western and indigenous values regarding procedural justice. The 
functioning of these institutions should not merely be ascribed to political differences 
and the prevalence of unjust and racial legislation, but also to the different perceptions 
of the concept of justice. In contrast, the application of unofficial indigenous law by the 
official Chief's Courts may serve as an illustration of the difference in perceptions of 
substantive justice prevailing in actual legal norms. Marriage, and other family relations, 
the law relating to land and criminal law are but a few examples of where this conflict 
43 As Indicated above the premiss of this thesis is that the individual legal norms of Roman-Dutch 
law, stripped of inequitable legislation, are basically just. Therefore, the content of individual 
precepts will not be considered in this thesis and no further attention will be paid to substantive 
justice. 
44 Cotterrell 85-87 equates order with the subjection of all social and natural phenomena to rational 
control and justice with fairness, which does not necessarily imply equality. 
45 Aguda 162. 
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of value systems comes to the fore. 
The introduction of the repugnancy clauses throughout Africa during the colonial 
period in particular illustrates this conflict in Western and indigenous values. 46 Justice 
has acquired a very specific meaning in colonial Africa with the introduction of 
repugnancy clauses in legislation. The criteria which were (and are) used to determine 
the repugnancy of indigenous law reflect the Western jural postulates that underlie that 
law. These criteria are justice, morality, equity, good conscience, order, humanity, 
public policy or natural justice. Whilst the use of a repugnancy clause today has been 
abandoned by most African countries, 47 it still forms part of the legislation of South 
Africa and of other countries belonging to the South African Law Association. 48 In fact, 
the repugnancy clause has been entrenched in the new Interim Constitution. 49 
2.c Specific Postulates 
There are various specific postulates which underscore Western law. Some examples 
may be referred to to illustrate the differences (and sometimes apparent similarities) 
between the specific jural postulates in Western and those in indigenous law. It should 
be borne in mind that all the specific postulates in Western law are supported by the 
principles of justice embodied in the concept of individual freedom elucidated above. 
This is the very reason why specific postulates are often referred to as postulates of 
justice. 
46 See also Part l.IV.2.a. 
47 See Bennett Sourcebook 130-131. 
48 These are Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. The term was developed by Schreiner J in Annah 
Lokudzinga Mathenjwa 1970-1976 SLR 25 29H. 
49 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. See Part ll.IV.1a. 
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2.c.i Constitutional Law 
Specific jural postulates are often embodied in a written code. An example is the 
American Constitution in which certain, mostly public-law, postulates are entrenched. 50 
These postulates have been regarded as expressions of human rights. 51 
The new South African Constitution entrenches many jural postulates as basic human 
rights in its Bill of Rights and in the Constitutional Principles. 52 Other postulates of the 
Western component of South African Constitutional law are embodied in and underlie 
the common law principles. 53 The jural postulates underlying the common-law 
principles of constitutional law are, inter alia, the rule of law and the liberty of 
subjects. 54 
The rule of law55 encompasses the principle that the law is above the government of 
the day. Dicey was the first jurist to establish a coherent doctrine of rule of law in the 
nineteenth century. This doctrine includes three basic principles, namely the absolute 
supremacy of law as opposed to arbitrary power; equality before the law; and the 
principle that a constitution should be the result of the ordinary law of the land and that 
effective legal remedies for the protection of human rights should be provided by the 
courts. This implies that laws must be clear, pre-pronounced, general in application 
and impartially enforced by independent courts according to fair procedures. 56 
50 Du Plessis Relevansie 820-821. 
51 See Part II.IV, Bennett "Equality Clause" 130. 
52 The Interim Constitution is discussed in Part II.IV above. 
53 Du Plessis Relevansie 822. 
54 Hahlo & Kahn Constitution 133-146. 
55 See generally Sanders "Natural Law", Sanders "Rule of Law", Sasson & Viljoen 231-235, Boulle 
38-41. 
56 Wille 14-15 regards these qualities that a rule of law must possess as postulates of justice, thus 
illustrating the working of justice as a diffuse postulate which underscores the specific postulate 
of the rule of law. 
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The International Commission of Jurists perceives the rule of law as a dynamic 
supra-national concept which comprises the following principles: 51 respect by the 
government for basic human rights; equality before the law; legal certainty; a minimum 
standard of justice in the exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial functions; the limitation 
of governmental powers democratic form of government and separation of powers; 
and an independent and properly qualified judiciary and an independent and properly 
qualified legal profession. This particular perception of the rule of law has also been 
referred to as the principle of legality. 58 
There are various and controversial interpretations of the rule of law, but the overriding 
view seems to be that its purpose is the protection of basic human rights. Indeed, 
Sanders59 describes it as a 
"politico-legal code for governmental conduct which is best suited to securing to the individual 
the highest possible enjoyment of those public claims of which - due regard being had to 
competing individual interests the necessities of government, and available national resources 
- may be regarded as fundamental". 
Despite the criticism leveled against it, the notion of the rule of law still forms an 
integral part of modern constitutionalism. 60 
This very cryptic description of the rule of law will suffice for a comparison with 
indigenous or African legality. According to Sanders, 61 African legality comprises the 
politico-legal precept that behaviour of governors and the governed should be in 
57 See Sanders "Natural Law" 73, Sanders "Rule of Law" 303. 
58 Boulle 40. 
59 Sanders "Natural Law" 73. 
60 See Boulle 40-41, Sasson & Viljoen 231-235. 
61 See generally Sanders "Natural Law" 72-75. 
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accordance with the values of African social solidarity. 62 He points out that the 
principle of African legality is reconcilable with Western legality as embodied in the rule 
of law. Although some of the principles of the rule of law as expounded by the 
International Commission of Jurists or Dicey seem foreign to traditional indigenous 
law,63 the value of human dignity which the rule of law aims to protect is not foreign 
to African legality which is as conscientiously committed to the dignity of man. The rule 
of law gives primacy to the individual and the protection of individual rights, but 
emphasis is on humanism and care for "the person in society"; and indigenous legality 
concerns communalism, but is underscored by humanism. 
It is true that whilst indigenous law accentuates communalism, it does not ignore the 
individual, the person. Julius Nyerere64 once said that in African society 
"[n]obody starved, either of food or of human dignity" and, elsewhere, 65 that "[i]n our traditional 
African society we were individuals within a community. We took care of the community, and 
the community took care of us." 
Kenneth Kaunda66 too emphasised the importance of the individual in indigenous 
society: 
62 This is consistent with the diffuse postulate of indigenous law, harmony of the collectivity. 
Sanders "Natural Law" 73 points out that although present-day situations in Africa show a radical 
digression from the principle of African legality this does not detract from the basic value of the 
principle which should still be regarded as a mission in itself. 
63 The concepts which seem foreign to indigenous law are: individual human rights (see Part II.IV); 
separation of powers (in indigenous law the ruler has the highest judicial powers, legislative and 
executive functions: see Part 1.11.4.a and Part II.IV); and a separate legal profession (formal legal 
representation is foreign to indigenous law: see Part 1.11.4.a). Also some of Dicey's principles 
seem foreign to indigenous law: The ruler in indigenous law falls outside the realm of private 
law: see Part l.IV.4.a; conceptions of equality in indigenous law and Western law differ: see Part 
II.IV.; the very basis of Western and indigenous constitutional law differ: see Part 1.11.4.a. 
64 Nyerere 163. 
65 Nyerere 166. 
66 Kaunda 25. 
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"I am deeply concerned that this high valuation of Man and respect for human dignity which is 
a legacy of our tradition should not be lost in the new Africa". 
It may be that African legality and the rule of law are both aimed at the protection of 
human dignity. But the concept of humanism in indigenous communities, underscored 
as it is by the postulate of harmony of the collectivity, cannot be likened to the Western 
concept in which the individual is never really regarded as a person in society.67 In 
indigenous law the concept has to be assessed with reference to traditional social 
structures in which the individual is in the first instance regarded as a component of 
a larger whole and in which the community or group cannot be separated form its 
individual components. 68 
The fact remains that although the individual is given primacy in Western 
jurisprudence, protection of individual interests is in the final analysis devoid of 
humanism - even humanism in the Western sense. Protection is through a 
dispassionate legal system and indifferent legal procedures which stand detached from 
the individual whose interests they endeavour to safeguard. And in this sense African 
legality and the rule of law are not reconcilable. 
Diamond69 has observed that, 
"[p]rocedure is the individual's last line of defense in contemporary civilization, wherein all other 
associations to which he may belong have become subordinate to the state. The elaboration 
of procedure then, is a unique, if fragile, feature of more fully evolved states, in compensation, 
so to speak, for the radical isolation of the individual." (my emphasis). 
Nevertheless, some principles of the rule of law (or custom) are applicable in 
indigenous society. Thus there is respect for indigenous dispute-resolution institutions; 
67 African humanism and the concept of "ubuntu" are discussed in more detail in Part 11.111.2. 
68 See also Nyerere 166. 
69 Diamond "Rule of Law" 222. 
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the making of laws is subject to public debate and concurrence of the ruler's council; 
and the ruler cannot act despotically.70 However, the reason why these principles are 
upheld is that the ruler has a sacred position in the community. This must be seen in 
conjunction with the fact that there is no separation of powers and that in indigenous 
societies the ruler is at the apex of judicial, legislative and executive power in society. 
It explains on the one hand the respect for judicial and political institutions. On the 
other hand the ruler, who is regarded as the vital link between the community on earth 
and the spiritual world cannot through his tyranny sever the ties with the people, thus 
disturbing the equilibrium in the collectivity as well as the equilibrium with the deceased 
ancestors. 71 
2.c.ii Private· Law 
The jural postulates underlying private law may broadly be described as principles of 
equity. 72 Equity, in this sense, should not be equated with institutional equity, as 
known in English law - that is, equity as a system which is distinct from and often 
opposed to common law. Equitable legal principles are principles which are wide 
enough to accommodate various situations in different circumstances and are based 
on conceptions of ideal justice. 73 Being based on conceptions of ideal justice these 
principles are directed at the balancing of competing interests by delimiting individual 
freedom. 
(i) The first principle of equity, or specific jural postulate is that nobody should be 
70 See, eg, Heyns Civil Disobedience 609-614 on the role of rebellion as a check on the tyranny 
of the ruler in indigenous society. 
71 See generally Part 11.11.3.b.i(i) and (ii) and 3.b.ii(v); see also Ayittey x:xxvi 72 179 264. 
72 See Du Plessis Relevansie 832-833, Wille 16-19. 
73 Wille 16. He explains that although the principles of equity and of natural law are both ~sed 
on the conception of ideal justice, principles of equity are formulated by man and are not, like 
the principles of natural justice, instinctively known to all mankind. 
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unduly enriched at the cost of another.14 
Myburgh15 gives some examples in which the concept of undue enrichment in 
indigenous law comes to the fore. He explains them as cases where the 
property of one group has been used for the benefit of another group. This 
happens in the case of isondlo (maintenance )76 and the management of the 
affairs of the group where the ngaka treats a patient without the consent of her 
group.n These examples provide some difficulty and may perhaps rather be 
explained by analogy with the Western concept of negotiorum gesti0. 78 
Whelpton19 too is of the opinion that the examples provided by Myburgh in fact 
do not pertain to enrichment even though, according to him, the concept does 
exist in indigenous law. In fact, amongst the Bakwena of Hebron, a person who 
pays money to another under the wrong impression that it is due has a remedy 
to reclaim it. 
It is tempting to say then, that this specific postulate of Western law also underscores 
indigenous private law. However, it remains difficult to explain indigenous institutions 
by analogy with Western institutions and concepts because indigenous law is shaped 
by postulates wholly different from those that underly Western law. Moreover, one 
always runs the risk of distorting the indigenous institution in order to force it into the 
Western compartment. 
74 In D 50 17 206 and D 12 6 14 it has been stated that iure naturae aequum est neminem cum 
alterius detrimento et iniuria fieri lucupletiorum. 
75 Myburgh Papers 92. 
76 Eg, where a child stays with, and is supported by her mother's group, whilst in fact her father's 
group has the plenary guardianship over her and has the duty to support her. It should be borne 
in mind that in indigenous law guardianship falls within the group's patrimony. 
77 Myburgh Papers 113; see also Nathan "Consent and Management" 27. 
78 For a an exposition of the difference between undue enrichment and negotiorum gestio see Van 
Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 85-110, Wille 642-643. 
79 Whelpton lnheemse Kontraktereg 78-79. 
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In indigenous law enrichment does not come to bear on individuals of the same 
constituent group. Members of a group share their rights and duties and basic 
commodities. Being subsistence communities, individuals will use only what is 
necessary for their livelihood and no more: this is congruent with African legality. What 
is produced is evenly distributed in accordance with individual needs. 80 Accordingly, 
in indigenous law the concept centers on one group's enrichment at the expense of 
another group. There is no limitation on individual liberty, but on group liberty. And 
therefore the concept of enrichment focuses on the group and not the individual as 
in Western society. 
(ii) The second postulate underlying Western private law is that nobody should 
profit from his own bad faith or unlawful actions. 81 This principle underlies the 
law relating to contract, property, delict and representation. Examples are the 
principles ex turpi causa non oritur actio or (in pari delicto)82 and contra suum 
factum venire, the latter giving rise to the doctrine of estoppel by representation. 
This postulate limits the principle of freedom of contract and the all-embracing 
importance of the subjective will of the parties in the law of contract. In fact, the 
modern contract doctrine is based on the principles of consensualism, freedom 
of contract and pacta sunt servandas. These three principles should be seen 
as an integrated whole. 83 The postulate of pacta sunt servanda implies that 
contractual promises must under all circumstances be honoured and further 
underscores the principle of consensualism. 84 Parties are free to contract and 
to determine the content of their transactions. But these values are not absolute 
80 See Nyerere 162-171 for an interesting discussion of African socialism. 
81 See also Van der Merwe Contract 230-234, Wille 431-435, Zimmermann Obligations 697-715. 
82 See Zimmermann Obligations 865-866 for a brief synopsis of the approach of the South African 
courts to this rule. 
83 Van Aswegen "Contract" 457. 
84 See generally Zimmermann Obligations 576-577. 
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values.85 As indicated above, individual freedom may be limited in the interest 
of material equality (thus obtaining socialist equality) as well as in public 
interest. Thus, the courts do not strictly adhere to this principle that nobody 
should benefit from his own bad faith and exceptions are in fact made where 
public policy demands it. 86 
It should be remembered that public policy is often used interchangeably with public 
interest. It is necessary to establish exactly what is meant by these terms. Public policy 
comprises the underlying value systems of a community. These values could entail 
that under certain circumstances the welfare of the community as a whole should take 
primacy over the individual good. But, these values are determined by the postulates 
of justice. As such public policy in Western law still reflects the primacy of individual 
freedom. Public policy determines what is in the interest of the public as a whole. 
Public interest posits a more difficult problem in that it conveys the idea that it could 
be in public interest only that the communal good be served as opposed to the 
individual good. However, it may sometimes be in public interest that the individual 
good takes primacy over the communal good of the society: that would be determined 
by public policy, by the societal value system. In the law of contract there is a definite 
movement to the limitation of individual freedom in the interest of the community as a 
whole. 81 
Thus, public policy may determine that contracts to injure the State or public service, 
or contracts to defeat or obstruct the administration of justice, or contracts that 
interfere with the free exercise of individual rights are against the interest of the public. 
Public policy may also demand that under certain circumstances an individual who is 
guilty of illegal conduct, may still make use of an enrichment action, in which case 
85 Hawthorne 12-24. 
86 Zimmermann Obligations 865-866; Wille 636. 
87 See Hawthorne 19-21. 
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individual freedom takes primacy over communal good. 88 This is also in line with the 
idea that the postulates which underlie private law are principles of equity in that they 
make the widest possible provision for the accommodation of different situations in 
different circumstances. 
In the indigenous law of contract, unlawful transactions are not allowed and parties 
may be punished for committing a crime when entering into an unlawful transaction. 89 
Whelpton90 mentions various examples of such contracts amongst the Bakwena, such 
as a contract to limit the jurisdiction of the courts or a contract to commit a crime. The 
reason advanced by the informants why a court's jurisdiction may not be limited was 
that a kraal is built around the ruler, lentswe la kgosi le agelwa lesaka. This is an 
interesting example of the special position of the ruler in indigenous law, also as vital 
link between the community and the spiritual world.91 
Another example in indigenous law of an unlawful contract is a contract which is 
against the boni mores. The panel pointed out that the reason why such contracts are 
regarded as unenforceable, is that they are detrimental to the public welfare. This 
illustrates the postulate of harmony of the collectivity. A contract not to pay bogadi 
(marriage goods) in a civil-law marriage is regarded as being against the bani mores. 
It should be stressed again that public policy determines the bani mores and that 
public policy is but a reflection of the underlying community values - in indigenous 
society underlining societal welfare and the superiority of the superhuman; in Western 
society individual freedom and equality. Transfer of marriage goods is incidental, that 
is, an inevitable accompaniment, to marriage and not a requirement for the conclusion 
88 Zimmerman Obligations 865-866. 
89 Prinsloo & Vorster "Elements" 8-9; Prinsloo "Exchange" 29-30; Whelpton lnheemse Kontraktereg 
93-100. 
90 Whelpton lnheemse Kontraktereg 93-100. 
91 See Part 11.11.3.b.ii(v). 
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of a valid marriage. 92 The transfer of marriage goods does not validate the marriage. 
It is sufficient if the family groups of the prospective husband and wife have reached 
consensus on its transfer.93 In indigenous law the delivery of marriage goods may be 
regarded as the necessary means to restore the equilibrium in the community which 
has been (or will be) disturbed by the transfer of the limited authority94 of the women 
to her husband's group.95 
Amongst most Tswana, marriage goods were formerly not returned when the wife died 
92 The obligation to pay marriage-goods does not prescribe (cp the Tswana maxim molato ga o 
bole, a debt does not decay): see Church "Betrothal" 88-89, Church "Lobolo" 28. That is the 
reason why. a claim for marriage-goods will not be taken to court. If it is taken to court the 
claimants will have to pay mangangatlaa (cheek shrinkers) for wasting the court's time by 
demanding its unwarranted attention. This is similar to the Western contempt of court: see 
Church Marriage 41-42. 
93 Church Marriage 48-51 discusses an interesting case in which a woman, who had lived as a 
man's wife for some years, but who had never been married to him because their families would 
not consent to the marriage, applied to the chief's court for a divorce. The court found that 
because the man's family had ultimately accepted the woman, and because the man regarded 
her as his wife, that she was indeed his wife. The court made an order for the division of the 
property acquired by the couple during their union. Church points out that it should not be 
concluded that mere acceptance of the woman by the man's family constituted a marriage, 
because it does not accord with the indigenous law principle that rights can only be transferred 
with the consent of both the transferor and the transferee. In this case, although the man's 
group had eventually agreed to the transfer of marital guardianship over the woman, her family 
had never consented. Although the court made no reference to the position of the children, it 
appeared from the facts that the woman's family laid claim to them, which should be seen as 
an indication that there had never been a valid marriage. If there had been a valid marriage the 
husband's group would have had plenary guardianship over the children. It seems then that in 
this instance account was taken of circumstances that were not covered by the legal rule in 
order to obtain a result that would be in accordance with the underlying jural postulate that 
harmonious relations between members of a community should be maintained. Or could this 
be an instance where the court decided that no-one should profit from his. own bad faith? 
94 The marital authority which is transferred entails her reproductive capacity, sexual privileges and 
services in caring for the household: see Church "Lobolo" 28. 
95 Church "Lobolo" 29; on 33 the author refers to the "stabilizing effect of the transfer of 
marriage-goods". She subsequently seems to change her opinion when she states that the 
delivery of bogadi before marriage must be seen as performance in terms of a real contract. 
Such performance then makes the agreement to give the woman in marriage obligatory: see 
Church Marriage 37, Church "Betrothal" 91. However, these two views are not contradictory. The 
transfer of marriage-goods has various functions in indigenous law. See for example 
Labuschagne "Lobolo" 545-550. It may be contended that the stabilising effect is indeed very 
important and in line with the postulate of harmony of the collectivity and the postulate that 
superhuman forces are superior to man. 
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without children or when she was barren. A substitute was sent to take her place, or 
bear children for her. Even in the highly unlikely case that a substitute could not be 
found, the marriage goods were not returned. This was also the position in case of 
divorce which was formerly uncommon in indigenous law. 96 Although it has 
nowadays, possibly due to Western influence, become more common to get divorced, 
marriage goods are as a rule not returnable. Church attributes the lack of a general 
rule that marriage goods should be returned to the fact that divorce was uncommon 
in traditional law.97 One may also attribute this to the fact that the underlying purpose 
with the transfer of marriage goods is to restore the disturbed equilibrium in the group 
and that it must not be seen as a quid pro quo for the transfer of the women. 
The exchange of gifts upon betrothal may likewise in terms of Western-contract 
doctrine be described as performance in terms of a real contract which renders the 
agreement between the groups binding.98 But in indigenous law it can be explained 
differently. Within the non-specialised indigenous culture abstract consensus has to be 
transformed to a concrete experience and this happens through the exchange of gifts 
reflected in the Tswana maxim "lentswe la maabane ga le thlabe kgomo" or 
"yesterday's word does not slaughter an ox". 
There is even more to the exchange of betrothal gifts and marriage goods in 
indigenous law. The purpose of such exchange is not only to restore the equilibrium, 
it also forms part of an extended marriage process in which two kin groups are linked 
together and the delicate relationship between the two groups strengthened. A 
contract not to pay marriage goods (and possibly also one not to exchange betrothal 
96 In former times divorce was not known amongst most of the Tswana and although the 
machinery for the dissolution of a marriage did exist amongst many communities, divorce was 
a rare occurrence. The importance to uphold the continuity of a marriage must also be seen in 
the context of the principle that the harmony of the collectivity must be maintained: not only the 
harmony within the group to which the woman was transferred, but also the harmony between 
the two family groups: see Preston-Whyte 193-194. 
97 Church "Betrothal" 96; Church Marriage 40-43; see also Preston-Whyte 193-194. 
98 Church Marriage 26. 
Part 11.11.2 Jural Postulates 183 
goods) is therefore unlawful because it threatens the relationships within the woman's 
group, the relationship between the two groups of the prospective husband and wife, 
and the relationship between the living and the deceased ancestors. 
Other examples of unlawful contracts in indigenous law are contracts in connection 
with land. These are for instance contracts for the exchange of a field or of a 
residential site for livestock or movable things, and contracts for the selling or letting 
of a field. Land is not regarded as a negotiable commodity in indigenous law. It 
belongs to the community as a whole and its use is controlled by tribal authorities.The 
unlawfulness of such contracts should be seen against the background of the sacred 
position of land within indigenous communities and the diffuse postulate that 
superhuman forces are superior to man. 99 
(iii) Another postulate which underscores the Western component of private law is 
that "an error in a transaction cannot prevail over the truth" which gives rise to 
the assumption that "the intention of persons override their language or 
description". Zimmermann 100 describes consensus as the "core concept of the 
modern law of contract". Consensus refers to a balance between the subjective 
attitude of the parties and their objective declarations; a balance between legal 
certainty (the giving effect to objective indications of the will of the parties) and 
equity (the giving effect to the true will of the parties). 
Indigenous law, by analogy with the Western concept (and in line with its 
non-specialised character), knows only real contracts. Liability ensues only where one 
party has in fact partially or totally fulfilled his obligation. 101 Although a mere 
agreement (nuda pacta) cannot be enforced in indigenous law, consensus, or the 
99 See part 11.11.3.b.i(ii); see also Prinsloo "Exchange" 29-30, Nyerere 166 167; Nyerere 53-58 on 
land and communal ownership. 
100 Zimmermann Obligations 563; see also generally 563-565. 
101 Prinsloo & Vorster "Elements" 6-7 10-11; Whelpton lnheemse Kontraktereg 81-83. 
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subjective meeting of the minds plays an important role in their law of contract. In 
indigenous law consensus is reached by an extended process of deliberation between 
the contracting parties and between the parties and members of their respective 
families. 102 In Tswana law this process is described as "go tshitsinya", which literally 
means "to introduce" .103 Contracting parties must actually be present physically when 
consensus is reached; it cannot be reached telephonically or by mail or even by the 
nod of a head in the presence of the other party. Further, the object of the contract 
must be physically pointed out. Because the whole process of reaching consensus 
and concluding a contract is concretised, it is much easier to determine the real will 
of the parties. In fact, a panel of experts for the Tswana was nonplussed when the 
idea was put to them that o~e contracting party could make a mistake about the 
identity of the other party or about the identity of the object of the contract. 104 
Pound also put forward some jural postulates which underscore private law. 105 
Although these postulates do not constitute an exhaustive list, being based on 
individual claims, they are useful indicators of the differences between the postulates 
intrinsic in Western law and those in indigenous law which are put forward by writers 
such as Hoebel, Chiba and Myburgh. These postulates concern possession, property, 
legal transactions and relating relations and, what he terms "wrongs" in Western 
society. The first four postulates have been referred to as generalisations pertaining 
to the concepts of right and justice presupposed by so-called civilisation. 106 The 
prevalence of individual liberty and equality in fact comes to the fore in an analysis of 
102 Traditionally parties to a contract consisted of groups. However, individual property (eg clothes, 
ornaments, animals) has become increasingly recognised and individuals are nowadays allowed 
to conclude contracts with regard to such property: see Prinsloo & Vorster "Parties" 21-22. 
103 See Whelpton Jnheemse Kontraktereg 81-83. 
104 Whelpton lnheemse Kontraktereg 85. 
105 Pound 115 points out that from time to time it becomes necessary to formulate new postulates 
for newly asserted claims in modem societies. However, for a comparison with indigenous law 
the first five postulates will be taken as examples. 
106 Rich 174. 
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these postulates. Pound's101 main specific jural postulates are the following: 
"1. In civilized society men must be able to assume that others will commit no intentional 
aggressions upon them. 
2. In civilized society men must be able to assume that they may control for beneficial 
purposes what they have discovered and appropriated to their own use, what they have 
created by their own labor, and what they have acquired under the existing social and 
economic order. 
3. In civilized society men must be able to assume that those with whom they deal in the 
general intercourse of society will act in good faith and hence 
(a) will make good reasonable expectations which their promises or other 
conduct reasonably create; 
(b) will carry out their undertakings according to the expectations which the 
moral sentiment of the community attaches thereto; 
(c) will restore specifically or by equivalent what comes to them by mistake or 
unanticipated or not fully intended situation whereby they receive at another's 
expense what they could not reasonably have expected to receive under the 
circumstances. 
4. In civilized society men must be able to assume that those who are engaged in some 
course of conduct will act with due care not to cast an unreasonable risk of injury upon 
others. 
5. In civilized society men must be able to assume that those who maintain things likely 
to get out of hand or to escape and do damage will restrain them or keep them within 
their proper bounds." 
Although the postulates put forward by Pound in some instances seem to apply in 
indigenous law, there are others which clearly do not correspond with those in 
indigenous law. 
The first two postulates may be regarded as ancient demands on security of property 
and the person. 108 These postulates focus on the Western legal notion of personal 
107 Pound 113-115. 
108 Sawer 147-148. 
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liberty and equality and the right to personal property. 109 The protection of human 
dignity in indigenous societies has been discussed at some length above. An 
interesting phenomenon of indigenous law, which conflicts with Pound's first postulate, 
is that of self-help to obtain private satisfaction for a delict or public satisfaction for a 
crime. Intentional aggression in the form of feud-action may be committed with 
impunity, against a person or against his property in order to obtain satisfaction for the 
infringement of personal injury. 110 This could be construed as a means to restore the 
unsettled equilibrium in the group and to restore relations with the ancestors. 111 
Today the phenomenon of self-help still occurs amongst many indigenous people. 
Amongst the Swazi of the former bantustan KaNgwane, adulterers caught in the act 
and witches or sorcerer may still be killed summarily. 112 An adulterer or thief caught 
red-handed may also be marked by thrashing him on his back. The idea is to leave 
109 It is assumed that Pound did not have such a narrow interpretation in mind so as to exclude 
intentional aggression in self-defence or in necessity, but that he focussed rather on a much 
broader concept of human dignity and personal freedom. 
11 O See Gluckman "African Traditional Law" 29-40, Myburgh Papers 14 18-23 113-116 and the 
examples discussed on 31-49. 
111 Indeed, in the case of violation of a female's dignity animals of the perpetrators' group may be 
seized and ritually slaughtered to heal the injury through lustration: Myburgh Papers 93 94. 
112 Today the practice of sorcery and witchcraft (and witch killings) occur commonly throughout 
South Africa and the belief in magic is still strong. Although it was originally not known to the 
Bushmen, it became known to them and became part of their culture through contact with the 
Bantuspeakers. In 1992 seven !Xu men of the Schmidtsdrift area were found guilty of the murder 
of a !Xu sorcerer. It appeared from the evidence that the killing took place with the blessing of 
the community and that it was not reported to the police. Vorster "Towery" discusses this case 
at length. The increase in witch-related killings in the former bantustan of Venda prompted the 
Human Sciences Research Council to launch a research project into these killings in 1991. The 
research report was published in 1992: Minnaar, Offringa & Payze To Live In Fear: Witchburning 
and Medicine Murder in Venda. Although it was found that political unrest contributed to the 
sudden increase in such killings, it was established also that traditional beliefs and the wor1dview 
of the Venda (the equilibrium in creation as a cosmic unity may not be disturbed) played an 
important role. In a survey it was for instance established that police sometimes refrained from 
prosecuting the perpetrators of medicine-killings (killing to use body parts in medicine) because 
they were frightened of being bewitched themselves: See Minnaar 49 50. On February 5 1995 
it was reported in The Sunday Times (19) that five alleged witches were burnt to death in the 
Northern Transvaal by a mob of youngsters. Apparently a diviner had indicated to the 
perpetrators that some magic intervention had caused the death of a young girl who had been 
struck by lightning. 
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marks which will serve as concrete evidence in a court of law. The marks have to be 
made on the back to indicate that the perpetrator was caught in the act. 113 Adultery 
is regarded as curse on the family name and of the ancestors. The defilement has to 
be removed through a lustration ceremony.114 Beasts delivered to the woman's group 
(or seized by her group) are slaughtered and eaten to cleanse the community. The 
killing of the adulterer is regarded as self-help to obtain personal satisfaction and 
satisfaction for the group.115 
The second postulate put forward by Pound, conflicts with the idea of shared rights 
and duties which is reflected in the indigenous postulate of collectivism. 116 The third 
postulate may be summarised as the assumption of good faith in making 
representations and promises111 and 3(c), more specifically, underlies the concept 
of unjust enrichment which was discussed above. 
The fourth postulate not only entails negligence in the narrow sense of the word, but 
a much wider norm of reasonableness in human conduct. In this sense one is 
presented with the question whether the different forms of fault which are 
distinguishable in Western law, are also distinguishable in indigenous law, and, once 
again, whether it is at all possible to explain indigenous law in terms of Western 
jurisprudential principles. Some authors assert that fault is of little importance in 
indigenous law because of its overriding aim of restoring the equilibrium in the 
community; the community is collectively responsible in public as well as private law; 
and because there is no distinction between culpable homicide and murder in 
113 Information obtained in a discussion with Professor LP Vorster on unpublished fieldwork 
amongst the Swazi of the former KaNgwane. 
114 A ritual purification ceremony. 
115 Myburgh Papers 45-47. 
116 See Myburgh Papers 15-16. 
117 Sawer 148; Rich 174. 
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homicide cases, all blood belonging to the king. 118 However, the fact that indigenous 
law is underscored by these postulates should not preclude one from explaining 
certain concepts and principles by analogy with the Western concepts whilst not 
exactly equating them. Research has indicated that a general concept of fault does 
exist in indigenous law, albeit not identical to that of Western law.119 Nevertheless, it 
should be borne in mind that concepts of reasonableness or unlawfulness are not the 
same in indigenous law and Western law - especially in as far as these concepts are 
determined by public policy and the bani mores of culturally different communities. 120 
The fifth postulate may be applicable in indigenous law and is evidenced in the fact 
that, as a rule, restitution is due where damage to property is caused by animals. 121 
Furthermore, a person may be held delictually or criminally liable for certain omissions, 
such as his failure to control a vicious dog. In Malawian law, a person has been held 
liable where his dilapidated house collapsed onto a neighbouring property causing 
damage.122 
118 See Van Niekerk Comparative Study 38. Kidder 160-161 is of the opinion that to apply and adapt 
the Western concept of the reasonable man in non-Western cultures, would deprive the concept 
of "most of its carefully construed and limited meanings". 
119 See Gluckman "African Traditional Law" 13 22 28, Myburgh Papers 16-17, Van Niekerk 
Comparative Study 38-39. 
120 Gluckman "African Traditional Law" 13 points out that the concept of a reasonable person is 
central to Barotse law. In indigenous societies the conception of a reasonable man is concrete 
and specific and closely related to an individual's position in the group. He explains that "[t)he 
reasonable person forms for each social position the nucleus of rights and duties which are the 
core of law, since it sets both the minimum demands on which the law insists and the maximum 
of permissible deviation". This conception of reasonableness in indigenous law is also adaptable 
to changing societal values: Gluckman "African Traditional Law" 13-14 22. 
121 See Myburgh Papers 27. 
122 See Van Niekerk Comparative Study 35. 
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2.c.iii Criminal Law 
It seems that the most fundamental postulate underlying Western criminal law is the 
doctrine nullum crimen nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali123 which is embodied 
in most Western criminal codes. 
Indigenous criminal law has largely been abolished in most African countries. In South 
Africa indigenous criminal law is applied to a very limited extent in official courts. Yet 
it is still unofficially applied, not only by the Courts of Chiefs and Headmen, but also 
by the other unofficial institutions which were discussed above. m Although 
indigenous law has to some extent been reduced to writing, its oral tradition is still 
prevailing, and this may seem to be an indication that indigenous law is uncertain. 
Nevertheless, the postulate of nullum crimen does not seem out of place in indigenous 
criminal law. Individuals are aware of what they are permitted to do and what not. The 
law becomes known to individuals through education, political organisation, economic 
oragnisation, religion, language and certain procedures characteristic of the legal 
system itself. Individuals participate in sacrifices to make amends for certain wrongs 
and they participate in ceremonies connected with marriage, death and succession. 
There are frequent discussions of the law, elders give advice and chiefs inform their 
followers of new legislation. New legislation is also proclaimed at certain religious 
ceremonies and festivals. 125 
2.c.iv The Interpretation of Statutes 
Presumptions in the interpretation of statutes may be regarded as jural postulates 
which underpin the rules of that field of law. These fundamental norms are relevant in 
both procedural and administrative law. They are: 
123 See also Hosten 706-707. 
124 See Part l.IV.4. 
125 See generally Myburgh Papers 52-53 61. 
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(i) The legislature makes laws for its subjects and not for the State, or government 
institutions. 
Oi) The legislature does not involve or concern itself with the administration of 
justice. 
(iii) The legislature covers general and not particular cases. 
(iv) Legislation is not made with retrospective force. 
(v) Legislation does not alter existing law more than is necessary. 
(vi) The legislature does not intend unjust, inequitable and unreasonable results 
with its legislation. 
(vii) Legislation does not contain invalid or useless stipulations. 
(viii) Legislation promotes public interest. 
(ix) Reference in legislation to other legislation or deeds is reference to valid 
legislation, actions or deeds. 
The presumptions listed above are often regarded as individual human rights and as 
such entrenched in a Bill of Rights. 128 
In indigenous law legislation plays a relatively minor role in law-creation, custom being 
the most important source of law. The legislative process is quite informal and lacks 
the technicalities and formalities inherent in Western law. The legislative council of the 
Ndebele of the former KwaNdebele may serve as a typical example of this process in 
126 Eg procedural rights. See Van der Westhuizen Human Rights Law 3ff. 
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indigenous law. This council consists of the chief, his private council (men of the 
reigning family) and the representative council (private council plus the headmen of the 
different wards as representatives of the people) or a general assembly of the all the 
men of the wards. Proposed legislation is freely discussed by all the members. No 
voting takes place but members of the various councils are asked what their opinion 
of the proposed legislation is. The discussions and opinions of the councillors provide 
an indication whether the proposed legislation should be accepted or rejected. 
Many of the presumptions listed above are applicable also in indigenous law. The fact 
that the people are actively involved in the legislative process ensures the primacy of 
public interest. Legislation is not made retroactively and new legislation is announced 
to the general assembly or to the people by their headmen. 121 Also, in indigenous law 
legislation is aimed at just, equitable and reasonable results - but in an indigenous 
framework. In indigenous law reference to legislation will inevitably be reference to 
valid legislation or deeds, because it is only valid legislation which is continued through 
the indigenous oral tradition. Likewise, because of their oral tradition legislation is 
characterised by a lack of the technical detail which is found in Western legislation. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that useless or invalid stipulations will crop up in indigenous 
legislation. 
In indigenous law there is no separation of powers, but this does not mean that the 
legislature will involve itself with the administration of justice. In fact, it is the 
non-specialised nature of indigenous law which ensures community participation in 
both the legislature and the administration of justice. It is community participation 
which inhibits the exercise of arbitrary State power. 
2.c.v Procedural Law 
Natural justice may on the one hand be regarded as a separate specific jural postulate 
127 See generally Myburgh & Prinsloo 15-17. 
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of Western law. On the other hand it may be regarded as a diffuse postulate which 
underscores the specific postulates of Western procedural and administrative law. 
In a narrow sense, natural justice is considered a term of art and is widely used in 
relation to the law of procedure. Whilst Wille 128 regards natural justice as a 
continuation of the ideals of natural law, Du Plessis 129 interprets it as so-called 
common-sense justice, which should be distinguished from natural law. Unlike natural 
law, natural justice should be viewed as an adaptable concept, and one which has 
indeed changed throughout the course of history. 
Du Plessis 130 describes the principles of natural justice as 
"juridiese grondnorme wat veral (synde op regsprekende en vergeldende geregtigheid betrokke) 
aan die regspraak in hoofsaaklik "common law"-georienteerde regsordes ten grondslag le". 
Natural justice comprises the judicial, normative and fundamental principles of audi 
alteram partem; nemo iudex in re sua, as well as the principle that government officials 
should not be influenced by irrelevant factors in exercising a discretionary duty. The 
latter two are directed at the elimination of prejudice. In procedural law, the principles 
of natural justice have acquired a technical meaning and yet they are almost intuitively 
observed by officers charged with the administration of justice. In administrative law 
they are regarded as the normative foundation for its development. 
The most important basic postulates underlying indigenous procedural law are the 
reconciliation of the parties (including reconciliation with the superhuman) and the 
maintenance of a balance within the community and with the superhuman. 131 
128 Wille 14. 
129 Du Plessis Relevansie 825. 
130 Du Plessis Relevansie 824. 
131 Gluckman "Natural Justice" 190-191. 
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Reconciliation is so important that the Tiv of Northern Nigeria, views "truth" in a special 
light with reference to the equilibrium in the community. Bohannan132 explains that 
to tell "yie" is to say something which disturbs the equilibrium in the community. It may 
be the truth or a lie in the Western sense of the words. It is of no relevance if the yie 
is true or false, as long as it is not detrimental to another. If it is detrimental it is judged 
worse if the yie was false. But, it is sometimes preferred that an untruth is told, if it 
would enhance the possibility of a reconciliation between the parties to a dispute. 
••rruth' in TMand is an elusive matter because smooth social relationships are deemed of higher 
cultural value than mere precision of fact. We must not judge Tiv litigants or witnesses by our 
standards. They are not liars, as they are sometimes called: their truth has other referents than 
has European truth:133 
According to Gluckman 134 the adherence to a doctrine of natural justice in Africa is 
best illustrated in indigenous procedural law where the court maintains the principles 
of law whilst at the same time restoring the disturbed relationships within the 
community and between the community and the superhuman. He further regards 
natural justice as a continuation of the concept of natural law and explains that Barotse 
judges were guided by the principles of milao yabutu, or the laws of humankind in their 
judgments. Yet, even if this is the case and even if indigenous procedural law is 
underscored by the principles of natural justice as natural law, it needs to be borne in 
mind that this higher law operates within a specific community with specific social 
structures and that it should not be likened to the concept in Western law. 135 
132 Bohannan Tiv 49 50. 
133 Bohannan Tiv 51; see also Gluckman •Natural Justice• 190 191. 
134 Gluckman ·Natural Justice• 176. 
135 See for example Part 11.11.3.b.i.(iQ; Gluckman ·Natural Justice· 183-184 points out that many of 
the principles of ethics are indeed common to all societies. 
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3 JURAL POSTULATES IN INDIGENOUS LAW 
3.a General 
The jural postulates which Chiba discusses in his study of Japanese society show an 
interesting similarity to, and often coincide with the jural postulates underpinning 
indigenous law in Southern Africa.138 The postulates of Japanese law are: 
(i) The ''family idea" which induces individuals to act for the family as a whole in 
stead of for individual members themselves. 
(ii) The "hamlet or small-village spirit"131 which prompts people to collective 
behavior, not only in traditional local communities, but also fictitiously in other 
social collectivities. 
(iii) The "common-kin principle" which underlies the hierarchy of a main family and 
its branch families and induces member families to maintain the hierarchy. 
(iv) The "status order" which demands the treatment of individual members in 
accordance with their social status within the larger group and which require 
that people behave in accordance with their status. 
(v) "Tenno adoration" which is used to denote the moral and legal influence of the 
emperor in Japanese law and underlies the special esteem for the emperor and 
his family. 
136 Chiba "Three-level Structure" 353-355 gives a detailed exposition of the application of these 
postulates in Shinto society; see also Chiba "Unofficial Postulates• 63 64 65-67, Chiba Legal 
Pluralism 93-96. 
137 Here "hamlet" denotes a traditional local community in indigenous Japanese society: see Chiba 
"Unofficial Postulates• 65. 
Part 11.11.3 Jural Postulates 195 
(vi) The "god conception" which is embodied in certain religious rituals and festivals. 
Specific postulates have a dual function. They specify the extent of the collectivity and 
they constitute a system of collective values with which members can identify. By 
staying within the boundaries of these values, these postulates preserve the collective 
ideritity and social equilibrium. 138 
From these specific postulates, Chiba formulates two diffuse postulates which support 
the specific postulates and the unofficial laws in general. These are the "amoeba-like 
way of thinking" or the identity postulate, and "harmony of the collectivity". The identity 
postulate concerns the Japanese attitude of aversion to law and legal procedure, the 
close relationship between law and morality, and an indefinite conception of right and 
contract. 
In an analysis of pre-colonial indigenous law, at least five specific postulates and three 
diffuse postulates come to the fore. The specific postulates are the "family idea", 
"hamlet spirit", "common-kin principle", "status order" and "esteem for the ruler". The 
diffuse postulates are "harmony of the collectivity", "superhuman 139 forces are 
superior to man", and the "identity postulate". In line with the non-specialised nature 
of indigenous law, diffuse and specific postulates should be regarded as an integrated 
whole. Although many of the rules of pre-colonial indigenous law have changed, or no 
longer exists, these postulates still constitute the fundamental axioms which underlie 
138 Chiba Legal Pluralism 95-96. 
139 In a discussion with Professor LP Vorster it was pointed out to me that ancestral spirits, witches, 
nature spirits, the supreme being, and so forth all form part of the cosmology of indigenous 
people. But these beings are regarded as part of their natural world and therefore it is incorrect 
to refer to them as supernatural. There is a direct and close link between these beings and living 
humans, usually through the ancestors. Mbiti Religions 83 points out that the ancestors still 
speak the language of the living with whom they have been recently (up to five generations of 
deceased ancestors according to Mbiti). However, they are bilingual and also speak the 
language of the superhuman. These forces are thus interpreted in human terms and called 
superhuman (in stead of supernatural). This is also in line with the primacy of human beings in 
Indigenous culture and the solidarity of living beings and the superhuman. It is In contrast with 
the sharp distinction between the natural and supernatural in Western thinking. In Western 
thought the supernatural is mostly relegated to the realm of superstition: see Kaunda 29. 
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indigenous legal reasoning today. 
3.b.i Diffuse Postulates 
(I) Harmony of the Collectivity 
Harmony of the collectivity and the specific postulates it supports (status order, family 
idea, common-kin principle, hamlet spirit) are widely regarded as an important basis 
of legal reasoning in indigenous law. It is reflected in all spheres of the 
characteristically non-specialised indigenous legal systems and is explained in the 
writings of Myburgh, althoug~ he never explicitly refers to it as a jural postulate. 140 It 
has been noted1• 1 that jural postulates are often regarded as social postulates, and 
in indigenous society it is certainly true that harmony of the collectivity is equally 
important in law and in social ordering and still prevails in rural areas as well as, to a 
limited extent and in an adapted form, in urban areas. 
The indigenous approach to law is permeated by the idea that the equilibrium in the 
community should be maintained. Disputes among individuals are an indication of 
disturbed relationships which threaten the coherence of the community and which may 
also disturb the relationship with the ancestors. 142 Harmony and solidarity are 
regarded as the key virtues to which everyone should aspire and as the values which 
should be sought above all else. 143 Horizontal solidarity should ideally exist between 
members of the group. But relationships do not cease with death and solidarity must 
be maintained also between the living and their deceased ancestors. Children yet to 
be born, as well as nature and the superhuman too form part of the network of 
140 See Myburgh Papers for a collection of AC Myburgh's work on indigenous law in Southern 
Africa. 
141 See Part 11.11.1. 
142 Omi & Anyanwu 141-143. 
143 Omi & Anyanwu 143. 
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persons who should live in a state of harmony. 144 
Practically, therefore, the concept of harmony of the collectivity goes beyond the 
concept of harmony and peace within the group as living individuals. Coherence of the 
group, the dead ancestors, and other superhuman beings is of great importance and 
indigenous normative systems are aimed at the maintenance of a broader harmony 
in the universe. 1411 
The fact that the law is aimed at the restoration or maintenance of an equilibrium, is 
clearly illustrated by the various processes available to settle disputes extra-judicially. 
Adjudication in indigenous law takes place only as a last resort. When a case in fact 
reaches a court, the presiding official first tries to restore peace and harmony before 
he actually adjudicates upon the case. Restoration of harmony is also reflected in the 
decisions of the courts. Decisions are aimed at the reconciliation of the parties. Even 
in criminal law it is attempted to reconcile the perpetrator and the victim. 
An interesting phenomenon which occurs widely amongst indigenous people is the 
fact that certain acts are regarded to have a polluting effect on an individual or the 
community as a whole. Certain crimes are, for example, regarded as a defilement of 
the community which can be removed only by purificatory rites. These rites are 
necessary to restore the equilibrium in the community and in the relationships with 
superhuman forces. The commission of crimes which unsettle the relationship with the 
ancestors and with the supreme being are visited by divine punishment. Incest is an 
example of a highly pollutant crime. It is regarded as violation of a taboo and originally 
perpetrators were put to death. 148 In a reported case amongst the Kwena, the 
perpetrators, who would have been killed if it had not been for the timely intervention 
144 Mbiti Religions 107. 
145 See generally Darboe 105-106. 
146 Certain crimes were for instance regarded as being inimical to rain: see generally Myburgh 
·cnme· 5-6, Oml & Anyanwu 137-138. 
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of the government, both eventually died childless. This was regarded as the 
consequence of violating the taboo of incest. 1• 1 
The concept of pollution in indigenous societies, could be explained as an attempt to 
cope with the cognitive confusions that occur when boundaries are not drawn 
clearly. 1411 This phenomenon is closely connected with the violation of taboo148 and 
with certain crimes. New-born babies, corpses, widows and initiates are persons who 
are entering into new life phases and who are in the process of reclassification. These 
persons must undergo transition ceremonies or rites of passage which are performed 
at birth, when adulthood is attained, or upon marriage or death before they can enter 
the new life phase. 1li() They cope with the uneasiness which arises from the 
uncertainty about their position, by conceptualising it in terms of heat or dirt (pollution), 
which has to be removed by cleansing rituals. 
In accordance with the lack of abstraction, and the prevailing realism in indigenous law 
and culture, the concept of chance is unknown. m Concrete explanations are sought 
to explain why certain things happen. There are basically two theoretical explanations: 
The work of superhuman beings (such as ancestral spirits) or humans using 
superhuman means (witchcraft and sorcery). 
Both these explanations entail for example that illness or misfortune is the result of a 
failure in social relations: relationships between members of the group or the 
relationship between the living and the superhuman. When misfortune is caused by 
147 Vorster ·unnatural Sexuality" 87-88. 
148 Hammond-Tooke Rituals 102. 
149 Not all violations of taboos are regarded as criminal. Eg, sexual intercourse with a menstruating 
female has a polluting effect and is visited by supernatural consequences, but will not be 
punished by a court. 
150 Pauw ·easic Concepts• 40. 
151 See generally Hammond-Tooke ·se1iets• 335-336. 
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ancestors, it is as a result of the blameworthiness of an individual. When misfortune 
is caused by witchcraft or sorcery, it has nothing to do with the blameworthiness of 
the victim(s). 
The relationship with the ancestors is similar to a parent-child relationship. Misfortune 
which is due to the interference of ancestors is regarded as an admonition. It is void 
of evil. Accordingly, it is believed that an illness sent by the ancestors is curable. In 
contrast, an illness caused by witchcraft or sorcery contains an element of evil and 
often results in death. The evil which flows from witchcraft and sorcery threatens the 
harmony of the collectivity and may be combated with drastic measures. 152 It is 
believed that witches eat human flesh and even kill their own loved ones - an 
aggression agai.nst the very fabric of the kin group - and those actions make witchcraft 
such a grievous crime. 153 Witches and sorcerers are regarded as professional and 
institutional sowers of discord, and as evil personified, because their corrosive 
influence destroys the harmony in the society. 154 
To restore the imbalance caused by disturbed relations and which is reflected in 
misfortune, recourse is had to ritual, divination and magic. Hammond-Tooke155 
describes ritual as a "stereotyped behaviour pattern, usually expressing its aim 
symbolically, that is believed to maintain or to effect a significant change in man's 
relationship with the supernatural." For example, the Kgatla believe that the crimes of 
infanticide and abortion create heat which may adversely affect rainfall. This imbalance 
between man and the superhuman has to be restored by a purificatory rite. Likewise 
contempt of court is regarded as a defilement of the community and has to be 
cleansed by a purificatory meal to be eaten by both the members of the court and the 
152 Witches and their tammes were burnt in traditional indigenous law. The killing of so-called 
witches still occurs in present day indigenous communities. 
153 Omi & Anyanwu 136. 
154 Omi & Anyanwu 136. 
155 Hammond-Tooke •Action• 344. 
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culprit. The fact that the court as well as the culprit takes part in this purificatory meal 
is an illustration of the importance of restoring the equilibrium between the living and 
the dead, as well as between the living themselves. This meal consists of an animal 
which is paid as a fine for contempt of court. 158 
The need for the preservation of solidarity in the group has been explained by the fact 
that the individual's only means of survival was through the continued support of the 
group. In his treatise on the history of Germanic private law, Huebner1111 points out 
that "[S]tate and law were too weak to protect the individual as such; only as a 'fellow' 
('Genosse'), as one belonging to a union of his equals, could he find the security 
requisite for his existence". The fact that the State provided the individual with the 
security of commerce, law, education and the like, decreased the importance and 
necessity of maintaining group solidarity. Consequently communalism waned whilst 
individualism increased in importance. Today, in an age of individualism, preservation 
of group solidarity is no more than a belated constraint upon free individual action. 158 
Whilst this explanation of the importance of the preservation of group solidarity in 
ancient communities may be true within a Western historical framework, it does not 
apply to African communities. Even in modern Africa today, social solidarity permeates 
all spheres of indigenous life 159 and forms the foundation of indigenous legality, and 
indigenous legal and political ideology. In South Africa, where Western State 
institutions were superimposed upon traditional institutions, there was never a 
spontaneous development towards individualism. Moreover, State-imposed institutions 
156 Myburgh ·crime• 6; Myburgh •Punishmenr 44; Van Blerk ·eontempr 71 72. 
157 Huebner 111. 
158 Huebner 111. 
159 Eg, stokvel, the indigenous equivalent of formal and informal mutual aid societies established 
for various social and economic reasons: see Lukhele 1-26. In his introduction Lukhele remarks: 
·since 1652 ... the black experience has been one of conquest, domination and control. Blacks 
have been sustained throughout this period by the indigenous African system of communalism, 
sharing and co-operation. The stokvel concept cannot be clearly understood unless one realises 
that It thrives on this tradition.· 
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could never substitute communalistic indigenous institutions and they thus came to be 
regarded as illegitimate. The natural inclination was to fall back upon alternative familiar 
structures. That is why alternative institutions were formed in the townships to take 
over the function of the original family structures which disposed of conflicts between 
members of the same group. One thinks here of the street committees and other 
similar institutions which, to an extent, have taken over the function of the family 
council in indigenous law. These institutions function as mediators in family 
disputes. 180 
(Ii) Superhuman Forces are Superior to Man 
In non-specialised societies religion organises individuals into a state of solidarity and 
provides a broad base for interaction between kin. 161 Hoebel162 found that the 
postulate that magico-religious forces are superior to man, was the predominant 
postulate in the law of primitive man and according to Darboe indigenous law is based 
on the supernatural. 163 Indeed, there is no doubt that superhuman forces play a 
primary role in indigenous legal thinking. 
Law is aimed at maintaining the harmonious co-existence with these superhuman 
forces. 154 There is a close connection between the metaphysical world and concrete 
experiences on earth. The visible world is interpreted in terms of superhuman forces. 
Both the physical and metaphysical are perceived to form part of reality and the 
transition from the physical world to the spiritual world is regarded as natural. All things 
in the world and beyond are connected. Consequently, as a result of mystical actions 
160 See generally Part l.IV.4. 
161 Hambrock 112. 
162 Hoebel 286. 
163 Darboe 98ff. 
164 See generally Ayittey 10-14. 
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by gods, spirits, ghosts, and other magical forces, what affects one affects all. 165 
There are various beliefs which have to be contended with, but the ancestral spirits 
play the most important role in the lives of individuals. 
The sky (the domain of the spirits of the living and unborn, and of natural phenomena 
such as lightning, rain, drought), the earth (the place where dead ancestors are buried 
and dwelling place of the living) and the world (the domain of all people) are seen as 
an integrated whole: the universe. The various components of this universe are 
represented by cosmic forces and it is important to maintain an equilibrium in the 
universe. An imbalance in the metaphysical world is experienced as natural disasters, 
barrenness of women, disea~e and death in the physical world. 188 The function of 
superhuman beings is to provide intellectually and emotionally satisfying explanations 
for certain aspects of nature and for bewildering phenomena. 181 
It is to an extent possible to generalise with regard to a supreme being and the 
ancestor cult in Southern Africa. Most indigenous people believe in an impersonal 
supreme being who created the universe. He does not take much interest in his 
subjects and there are few rituals directed at his worship. He is closely associated with 
nature and sometimes perceived to manifest himself as lightning or thunder. Belief in 
the supreme being is characterised by a lack of theology and a lack of any personal 
relationship or interaction between him and the living. Personal relationships are only 
experienced with the shades or spirits of the ancestors. 188 
Second in the hierarchical ordering of the superhuman are those forces which are 
manifested in certain natural phenomena such as hills and rivers. It is not possible to 
generalise with regard to these nature and free spirits. Most people do in fact believe 
165 Hammond-Tooke •R1tua1s· 21. 
166 Ayittey 10 173. 
167 Hammond-Tooke ·se11ets• 324; see also Ayittey 11-12. 
168 See generally Hammond-Tooke ·se1iets• 318-321, Ayittey 10-11, Omi & Anyanwu 137. 
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in such spirits but these beliefs are unique and differ from one group to the next. It 
does seem though, that the majority do in fact believe in the existence of such 
spirits. 1119 
. Ancestral spirits form the lowest tier in the hierarchy of superhuman beings. 110 The 
ancestors are the spirits of deceased members of the group. They are remembered 
for about five generations, but the chief's ancestors are recalled much longer. Certain 
rituals are performed to change the status of the deceased to that of an ancestor. 
Ancestors are believed by most to live underground. They are never referred ta in the 
singular, because they are perceived to be the collective dead of the lineage. An 
important underlying principle in the ancestor cult, and one which underlies indigenous 
social ordering generally, is the importance of paternal authority and filial respect. In 
general, ancestors are regarded as protectors 111 and mentors, but they are easily 
offended and jealous. As already mentioned, the relationship with the ancestors may 
be characterised as a parent-child relationship and ancestor worship lack the 
deference and devotion of, for example, Christian worship. Ancestor rituals strengthen 
the bond between kin. Ancestors are spiritually always present and influence the 
course of daily life. They are sometimes seen as the intermediary between the 
supreme being and the living people and as protecting the latter against witchcraft and 
sorcery. 
Ritual plays a significant role in indigenous life. Rites are symbolic actions to bring 
about a desired or expected situation or to prevent undesired situations. Rites are 
resorted to to invoke the blessing of the dead ancestors. Hambrock 112 makes a 
distinction between cyclical and occasional rites. Cyclical rites mark the beginning and 
169 See Hammond-Tooke ·se1iets• 321-324. 
170 See generally Hammond-Tooke 324-333, Hambrock 113 132-135, Ayittey 13-14 2122126127. 
171 The ancestors are believed to punish chiefs who are guilty of misrule and individuals who 
displease them. Likewise, their pleasure is shown by prosperity, good rains and the like: see 
Ayittey 126 -127. 
172 Hambrock 124. 
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end of events connected with the economy, kinship and political organisation. 
Occasional rights are occasionally held under conditions of misfortune, after the 
transgression of a taboo, or in case of illness. In contrast, Hammond-Tooke173 
distinguishes between rites of kinship and communal rituals. 
Kinship rituals are exclusively related to the ancestral cult. Kinship rituals comprise life 
cycle rites and contingent rites. Life cycle rites mark the transition to different life cycles 
and indicate the change in personal status. These rituals stress the solidarity between 
kin and if they are neglected the group will be visited by the wrath of the ancestors. 
Interestingly, Burman and Scharf174 found in their research in the Cape Town 
metropolitan areas that the majority of males still uphold the initiation ceremony from 
boyhood to manhood. 175 Contingent rituals are rituals to pacify the outraged 
ancestors. These rituals clearly illustrate the close connection between law and rituals. 
Unlawful transgression of the legal rules will be punished by the ancestors unless they 
are pacified.118 Rituals also emphasise the unity between the living and the deceased 
ancestors. Ritual sacrifices express communalism and is regarded as a communion 
meal symbolically uniting the living and the dead. 111 
Communal rites are directed at the unity of the tribe which shares a common culture 
and tradition and which occupies the same territory. Loyalty to the tribe, which is 
second only to loyalty to the kin group, must be restated in religious terms. 111 These 
173 See generally Hammond-Tooke •Action• 351-356, Mbiti ·introduction" 126-136. 
17 4 Burman & Scharf 730. 
175 Various other rites too are still upheld in indigenous rural and urban communities. In fact, 
virtually all aspects of life are ritualised. Although buildings are not erected for the ancestors, a 
certain area In the hut, and even in modem homes, is dedicated to them. Among some of the 
Ndebele of Southern Transvaal a tray with offerings for the ancestors is left on a little table in 
this area of the house: see Hammond-Tooke ·ee1iets• 333, Hambrock 139. 
176 Myburgh Papers 52. 
1n Hammond-Tooke ·Action· 353. 
178 Hammond-Tooke •Action• 354. 
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rituals involve rain making, securing of the crops, protection against lightning and hail 
and so forth. These rites are directed at the tribal ancestors, shades of deceased tribal 
chiefs, and occasionally, amongst some tribes, even at the supreme being. 
The perception of a higher law which originates in the superhuman and to which all 
laws must conform, puts the role of the superhuman in indigenous legal orders into 
perspective. The following observation of Yelpaala 179 attributes to Africa a natural 
law-like philosophy: 
•endowed with lethal powers, all the supernatural and cosmic forces exhibit and maintain an 
Intricate, delicate and mysterious balance with their normative and functional inter-relationships 
harmonized· Into a set of coherent and non-contradictory higher norms, prohibitions and 
prescriptions to human beings. Therefore all other norms, legal or social, subordinate to and 
originating from ancestors or humans cannot contradict these higher norms of supernatural 
origins." 
But all law is not derived from a superhuman authority. Indigenous law also comprises 
purely man-made law as well as penalties, even for serious offences, which have no 
religious basis. The breaking of purely human and administrative prescriptions are not 
visited by automatic divine sanctions. 180 Indigenous law also comprises law which is 
perceived to be instituted by the ancestor spirits. This is the law which originate in the 
customs and usages and which, through tradition, is accepted as law. It is only natural 
that customary laws should be seen as originating from the ancestors because of the 
belief that life after death is a mere extension of life on earth. 181 It is believed that 
ancestors uphold the law and are the guardians of tradition and that unlawful conduct 
is met by the wrath of the ancestors. 182 
179 Quoted by Ayittey 11. 
180 Oml & Anyanwu 138. 
1r.1 Schapera 7he Tswana• 59..£1. 
182 Myburgh Papers 52. 
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The importance of superhuman forces in the daily lives of indigenous people is clearly 
illustrated in the norms relating to the violation of taboos. The violation of a taboo is 
automatically visited by divine penalties. 183 In Tswana law there are, amongst others, 
seasonal taboos, taboos pertaining to critical events in human life and taboos 
pertaining to official secrecy. A seasonal taboo which is still widely observed in rural 
areas, prohibits ploughing certain times of the year and the divine punishment for the 
breaking of this taboo is spoilt crops. Violation of the seasonal taboo attached to 
castration of young bulls, turns rain into hail. Eating of the first fruits of the season, 
cutting certain trees, digging clay and cutting thatching grass near the fields between 
certain months of the year also fall in this category. Some of these taboos are still 
observed in rural areas today. Violation of these taboos are inimical to rain. Trading 
in beads and ivory when there is growing corn and the killing of certain animals such 
as elephants may also cause drought. Taboos in human crises, such as birth and 
death, for example forbid a father to enter the hut in which birth was given for at least 
three weeks, and forbid anyone to go to the fields on the day a person dies. Other 
taboos relate to unnatural sexuality such as incest184 and initiation ceremonies. 
Violation of the latter was traditionally visited by the death penalty. 
Some other examples of the role of magic in criminal law were discussed above. But, 
it is not only in criminal law that the superhuman plays a role. 185 In the law of contract 
the specific contract with a medicine man and diviner may serve as an example of the 
role of magic. A medicine man may for instance be paid with a sheep which he then 
slaughters and which is sometimes consumed by the family of the patient. The entrails 
of the slaughtered animal form part of the medicine. The medicine man may also be 
required to perform magical services such as providing protection of the home and 
fields, or protection against danger. In the law of contract a contract not to pay 
marriage goods and certain contracts with regard to land are considered to disturb the 
183 See Vorster "Violating Taboo• 94-98. 
184 Vorster "Unnatural Sexuality" 87-89. 
185 The role of the superhuman in procedural law was pointed out in Q) above. 
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equilibrium in the group and consequently also the relationship with the ancestors. 
Ancestors play an important role in the concept of land and the ownership of land. 186 
Land is regarded as an integral part of the social group. The use of land is governed 
by religious beliefs and social relationships. These relationships include relationships 
with kin as well as the relationship with ancestors. Land belongs to the ancestors and 
the living members of the group only inherit a right to use it. The ancestors keep a 
watchful eye on those who utilise it and see to it that it is fairly and properly used. 
Land may thus be seen as a bond between the living and the dead. Ancestors show 
their continued interest in the group through agricultural prosperity and the group, on 
their part, show their allegiance to the spirits by cultivating the land properly. Further, 
the ruler, who is regarded as an intermediary between the group and the spirits of the 
ancestors, is regarded as custodian of land. 
The transfer of marriage goods by the husband's group may, amongst others, be 
regarded as the necessary means to restore the equilibrium in the community which 
has been (or will be) disturbed by the transfer of the limited authority181 over the 
women to her husband's group. 188 The lobolo or bogadi institution must be seen as 
playing an important role in maintaining the equilibrium in relationships within the 
woman's group, the relationship between the two groups of the prospective husband 
and wife and the relationship between the living members of the social group and the 
deceased ancestors. 
Although these examples of the operation of magical or religious forces are not overly 
important in modern-day metropolitan indigenous societies, and although all traditional 
beliefs are no longer followed, witchcraft and sorcery are still factors which generally 
186 See generally Ayittey 243 285-287; see also M'Baye 149, Paden & Soja 39-40, Dalton 71-72. 
187 The authority is transferred in as far as it entails her reproductive capacity, sexual privUeges and 
services in caring for the household: see Church "Lobolo" 28. 
188 Church "Lobolo" 29; see also Part 11.11.2.c.li. 
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have to be taken account of188 while the belief in the omnipresence of the 
superhuman in some form or another remains an important factor in the lives of many 
indigenous people in South Africa.190 In fact, the influence of magic and ritual is even 
experienced in present-day Christian churches. 181 The Nguni Zionist movement 
provides a good example of the unmistakable influence of indigenous traditional 
beliefs. Food and other taboos play an important role in the practice of their religion 
and similarities are found between the traditional diviner and a prophet in the Zionist 
movement. Yet, all their practices, however strongly influenced by traditional belief, are 
professed to be founded on the Bible. 182 It should be kept in mind that Western 
institutions were often adopted and integrated into the existing system of beliefs, 
without ever really replacing them. This is another postulate which underlies 
indigenous law and social ordering, the ability to adapt to changing circumstances 
without losing the indigenous identity. 
(Ill) The Identity Postulate 
Chiba193 describes this postulate in indigenous Japanese law in the following terms: 
"The amoeba-like way of thinking as a diffuse legal postulate characteristic of Japanese people 
has been identified as enabling the people to choose official law or unoffic~ law alternatively 
so as to adapt themselves to changing circumstances while maintaining their individuality and 
identity In the enjoyment of Individual rights.· 
189 See Part 11.11.2.c.(ii). 
190 On 110-132, Mbitl Religions discusses the Important role rites of passage play in Indigenous 
cultures. 
191 Mbiti Introduction 184 190-194 discusses the tenacity of Indigenous religion and the fact that it 
has accommodated various other belief systems such as Christianity and Islam, but not at the 
cost of their own religion. 
192 See generally Pauw ·christianity" 415440. 
193 Chiba Legal Pluralism 153; see generally 159-169. 
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Thus, the identity postulate not only serves to maintain the identity of a legal culture, 
but also provides the framework for the development of a legal system to 
accommodate the changing needs of the community. Change may become neces-
sary from within a legal system, or change may be induced by external stimuli such 
as the imposition of a foreign legal system upon the existing legal system. This 
postulate becomes especially significant in instances of cultural pluralism. Cultural 
pluralism compels the interaction of different legal systems and the values which 
underlie such legal systems are often very different and even irreconcilable. 
In indigenous law the identity postulate is closely connected to the two diffuse 
postulates mentioned first. The identity postulate enables indigenous law to develop 
and adapt to changing circumstances whilst retaining its fundamental premiss namely, 
harmony of the collectivity and the superiority to man of superhuman forces. This 
postulate becomes apparent in the characteristically accommodating nature of 
indigenous culture which is responsive to change by integrating such change without 
displacing its existing structures. 194 Kaunda 195 explains this characteristic as follows: 
·1 think too, that the African can hold contradictory ideas in fruitful tension within his mind 
without any sense of incongruity .... Every missionary is aware of the African Christian of some 
maturity who in one situation will behave as his Faith has taught him and in another follow the 
practices of traditional religion, or even combine the two .... The African mind does not find it 
easy to think in terms of Either-Or. It is open to influences which make Both-And seem 
desirable .... This attitude comes, I think, from the sense ... of inhabiting a large world in which 
there is no partition between natural and super-natural: 
From a colonial point of view Southern Africa was easily conquered, but indigenous 
culture, and more specifically indigenous law and institutions showed a remarkable 
resilience to the imposed Western influences. It was one thing physically to conquer 
194 See Part I.I. 2. 
195 Kaunda 29-30; see also Fabian 384 on the accomodating nature of indigenous culture as 
Ulustrated In its ready acceptance of Christianity whilst retaining traditional beliefs. 
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a territory, subjugate its people and demand obedience by military force. But it was 
less easy, if not impossible, to force them to discard their traditions and to respond 
spontaneously and voluntarily to the prescripts of a foreign culture. 198 
Before the Dutch came to the Cape in 1652, missionaries and traders had already 
made some inroads on indigenous culture. But these influences were very superficial 
and had no lasting effect. Similarly, the Dutch East India Company, which was 
interested in the Cape only for its strategic position, had little concern for the interior 
and less with the administration of justice in those areas. In fact, at that stage in the 
history of the Cape, the administration of justice was quite primitive. When the British 
occupied the Cape 1795, they followed a policy of civilising the indigenes by 
attempting to dislocate their "barbarous" laws and customs. Where indigenous laws 
were recognised, such recognition was subject to a repugnancy clause. The official 
indigenous law became a reflection of the coloniser's perception of that law and was 
often far removed from true indigenous law. Moreover, the indigenous population often 
abided by the distorted and transformed law in order to gain access to resources. 
They even made representations about their law and institutions to make it more 
acceptable for the Westerners. 
Although indigenous law was uniformly recognised from 1927 onwards, its practical 
position changed little from that in the colonial period. Western laws were either 
ignored, or obeyed out of fear, but indigenous law was never displaced. Colonial and 
post-colonial policies weakened indigenous political structures and entrenched 
transformed legal structures by appointing "chiefs" and removing true traditional 
leaders. Although this process affected indigenous laws and institutions, they were not 
inherently changed by the imposed Western cultural values and they largely survived 
the adverse circumstances. 
Today the remarkable resilience of indigenous cultural institutions against Western 
196 Ayittey 383. 
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influences is especially evidenced by the fact that unofficial indigenous law is widely 
applied. The indigenous law that unofficial institutions in metropolitan areas apply in 
an adapted form is still to a large extent supported by the diffuse postulates already 
discussed. The changes that were effected, were introduced in the context of an 
indigenous value system. This is especially apparent in the administration of justice by 
the community courts of the metropolitan areas. It is also evidenced by various 
indigenous institutions which still find application in these "Westernised" areas. 
Elsewhere, in both Anglophonic and Francophonic Africa, traditional leadership and 
political structures were still in existence at the dawn of independence in the 
1960's.187 Traditional indigenous values were still reflected in the writings of early 
statesmen like · Kaunda and Nyerere. Unfortunately modern African nationalist 
leadership has rejected indigenous institutions as too backward and primitive for the 
successful development of Africa and has resorted to foreign institutions, backed by 
foreign values. Development became synonymous with change and with the 
substitution of indigenous institutions with foreign institutions. Indigenous institutions 
have been distorted to fit into foreign constructs and to suite the political purposes of 
African dictators. But, these foreign institutions collapsed because they were not 
rooted in Africa. At grass roots level indigenous law and institutions have persevered 
and have even survived their very abolition. 1118 
Having shed the yoke of another "colonialism," it is hoped that South Africa will not 
make the same mistakes and reject indigenous institutions. Neither colonial nor post-
colonial laws were able to transform indigenous law. 199 With regard to process and 
even to rules, there may have been some changes in indigenous laws and institutions, 
but these changes were not substitutionary. The fundamental postulates which underlie 
indigenous culture and law remain unchanged. It is in this cunning resilience of 
197 Ayittey 397. 
198 Ayittey 423-431, Sanders •people's Philosophy- 41. 
199 Sanders ·People's PhDosophy" 41. 
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indigenous law that the identity postulate is so clearly illustrated. 
3.b.ii Specific Postulates 
(i) Status Order 
Seidman200 regards status as the central theme of indigenous law. Although the 
status order is an important postulate, it does not fall in the same class as solidarity 
of the collectivity, the postulate that superhuman forces are superior to man and the 
identity postulate. Whilst these diffuse postulates permeate all spheres of indigenous 
law and support the specific postulates, the status-order postulate supports only 
specific areas of law. 
Status plays an important role in indigenous law.201 It determines an individual's 
position within the group and it determines the extent of the individuals rights and 
responsibilities in the group. But status does not influence the individuals dignity, nor 
his worth as a human being and as a component member of the group. An individual's 
physical and mental abilities do not influence his quality of life. As indicated above, an 
individual is not judged for what he can do for the group, but because he is there, 
because he is part of the group. The group's assets are available to fulfill the physical 
needs of every individual. 
A member of a group shares his rights and duties in the group in accordance with his 
status in the group. Factors such as physical maturity, sex, marriage and rank 
determine the status of individual members. Bohannan202 is of the opinion that one 
should not regard sex as a sole criterion for social groupings. Sex should be 
combined with other factors such as marital status, or age On indigenous law physical 
200 Seidman Jura/ Postulates 17. 
201 See generally Myburgh Papers 48 n-83 110-111. 
202 Bohannan Anthropology 154. 
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maturity) or rank. In indigenous law it is also sex, combined with another factor which 
determines a person's status. For example, if one looks at those instances where men 
have certain competencies that women do not have, there is always another factor 
which is considered in addition to sex. Men, after puberty, are allowed to marry more 
than one wife; men, who are married, can become head of the agnatic group; adult 
men can represent their groups in the law of procedure and in legal transactions. 
The fact that it is physical maturity, and not age, which, amongst others, determine a 
member's status, is in line with the non-specialised character of indigenous law which 
focuses on the sensory world and not on the abstract. Persons are for example 
allowed to get married after puberty and not at a certain age. Children's discernment 
generally determines his duties in the group. A young person who is able to make a 
good judgment and old enough to give an account of the facts, is able to testify. 203 
Babies and the insane cannot participate in representing their group in litigation, but 
they have a right to be maintained by the group. Their share in the obligatory, and 
personality rights of the group as well as their right of authority is exercised on their 
behalf by the other members of the group. 204 
A female cannot become the head of an agnatic group or represent the group in 
litigation. The reason why women cannot represent the group is because of their 
monthly ritual impurity. The court is held in a spot adjoining the cattle kraal and this 
impurity is regarded to have an adverse effect on the cattle. If a woman has to be 
present at a court hearing, the venue of the court is moved to another place. Today, 
adult males and females are in some instances allowed to attend court 
proceedings. 205 A woman's share in the right of authority over her is evidenced in the 
203 A child's evidence will be weighed carefully in accordance with her mental capacity. Children 
are further protected by the court against harsh cross-examination: see Van Niekerk "Procedure" 
135. 
204 See Part 1.11.4.b. 
205 Van Niekerk "Procedure" 133; Prinsloo Public Law 120; see also Hammond-Tooke Rituals 95 on 
the ritual impurity of menstruating women. 
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fact that she is allowed to offer herself in marriage to the group of her choice subject 
to her own group's approval. Amongst the Zulu the woman indicates her continued 
share in the property of her group of origin, by tapping the cattle that are delivered as 
marriage goods for her, on the head. Females play an active role in the taking of steps 
to obtain redress for the infringement of personality rights, thus indicating her share 
in such rights. Women's duties in the group entail grinding, sweeping plastering, 
cooking and tilling, amongst others. 
Although it is commonly assumed that the man's position in the group is completely 
different to that of the woman, in practice there are many similarities in their positions. 
The man's share in the right o.f authority is exercised when he takes a leading role in 
the transfer of the marital guardianship of females of the group. He shares ownership 
of the family's cattle and may use some of it to obtain a wife or further wives. His 
share in the rights of personality is evidenced in the active part taken in self-help to 
obtain satisfaction for the violation of such rights. The man's duties entail building, 
clearing soil, herding, milking and assisting the head when there is a claim against the 
group. 
In the following instances, men's position in the group is different to that of women. 
Unlike women, adult men can become head of agnatic groups or of several such 
groups; they may represent their groups in court; and may take up public office. It 
should be borne in mind that the fact that women are excluded from these· positions 
does not adversely affect them as members of the group. The head of the group is 
there to protect the interests of all the members of the group, not only of the men. He 
promotes the interests of the collectivity, the living, the deceased and those yet to be 
born, also in litigation and in public office. 
When people get married, their status is enhanced. A married woman has a major 
share in the right of authority over her children and this is evidenced by the fact that 
she may punish them. Her share in the property of her house is significant and the 
head of the household must consult her before her house property is used. Likewise, 
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she may take steps to prevent the head of the group (if he is her husband) or of her 
house from using more than his share of the livestock that belongs to the house. 
Moreover, he must obtain her permission to use such livestock. But, in turn, she owes 
the group her reproductive capacity and services, for example, rearing children, and 
maintaining her quarters. 
A man's status too changes when he marries. He is entitled to moderately castigate 
his wife and children as part of his right of authority over them. As a rule, only married 
men can become head of an agnatic group, qualify for a major share in the group's 
rights, and represent the group in litigation and the conclusion of juristic acts. 
Rank208 is an important factor in determining status. A man or a woman's share in 
their group's right of authority empowers them to give orders to younger brothers or 
sisters respectively. An eldest son, who is the successor apparent to the head's 
position, the head of the group and his great wife are consulted in matters concerning 
the group as a whole. This demonstrates their participation in the rights of the group. 
The head of the group, as a mentally sound, married male, has the greatest possible 
competency in the group. However, this does not mean that he is allowed to act in his 
own interest and to the detriment of the group. Everything he does must be in the 
interest of the group as a whole and with a view to maintaining the equilibrium in the 
community. He is obliged to consult the senior members of the group in exercising his 
powers. He is answerable to those members for unreasonable, inhumane and biased 
acts. Persistence with such acts may lead to administrative interference, dissolution of 
marriage, and in cases of cruelty, criminal prosecution. The head's competencies 
entail, amongst others, the allocation of land and living sites for families; the 
determination, in some instances, of the rank of the various houses; the disinheriting 
of a successor; adoption of children and giving away of children in marriage. 
206 See also Schapera "The Tswana" 36-37. 
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(ii) Family Idea 
The family idea can be described as the specific postulate that individuals do not act 
for themselves but for the family or group as a whole. 
In indigenous private law, groups and not individuals are the articulate factors201 • By 
this is meant that groups are the bearers of rights and that they share their 
liabilities. 208 For example, civil action is generally taken by the group and against the 
group; the group is liable for delictual obligations incurred by its members; the notion 
of misconduct between members of the same group for which delictual liability is 
incurred does not fall within the framework of indigenous law and such misconduct is 
dealt with rather as a breach of discipline;208 groups and not individuals are 
contracting parties;210 the inheritance of an estate is unknown because the group 
cannot in principle cease to exist and estates vest in the group, succession takes 
place to the position of head of the household;211 marriage negotiations take place 
between the groups of the couple and not between two individuals involved; in criminal 
law the group is liable to pay fines for a crime committed by a member. 
The family idea also comes to the fore in the phenomenon of feud-action. Feud-action 
is a means to obtain satisfaction by revenge for a wrong (for a personal injury, not 
compensation for patrimonial loss) committed against the group. Amongst the Nguni 
it is for example a grave insult to tell a woman that she will bear her father-in-law's 
207 Myburgh Papers 15 16. 
208 The practical application of this phenomenon was explained in detail in Part 1.11.4.b. 
209 However, in public law misconduct may be regarded as a crime or a violation of regimental or 
age-group rules. 
21 o Prinsloo & Vorster •Parties• 21 point out that individual property is increasingly recognised today 
and that persons may exchange such property. Sons who get married have the capacity to 
contract on their own and in some instances even unmarried sons over the age of twenty one 
have such capacity. 
211 Myburgh Papers 94-97. 
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child. Such a remark will not outrage the living, but also the ancestors. The females 
of the group thus insulted will take a head of cattle of the culprit's group, slaughter it, 
and pour the gall over their bodies to remove the pollution caused by the remark. 
Similarly, in case of seduction, the pollution is removed by slaughtering a beast that 
is seized from the seducer's group. In the olden days feud-action often became a 
vendetta for the homicide of one the members of the group and such vendetta usually 
resulted in many deaths in both groups. 212 Another example of feud-action is where 
women, in charge of fields which had been damaged by another's cattle, in turn drive 
those cattle into the crops of their owners. 
The indigenous concept of a family comprises more than a family of blood relations 
in the narrow, Western sense of the word. It encompasses a wide variety of living and 
deceased people. In indigenous law the smallest social unit is the household which 
consists of a man, his wife (or wives) and his own and adopted unmarried children. 
This nuclear family forms a religious, economic and jural unit. Duties in this unit are 
enforced by disciplinary action. 
The family or agnatic group comprises different nuclear families who acknowledge a 
common elder senior to all in line of descent. It consists of men who are descended 
from a common grandfather or great grandfather. It may also include other relatives 
and even unrelated families. 213 The solidarity of the collective is manifested by the 
transcendence of sociological relations over biological relations. 21 • 
It should be borne in mind that when one talks of a group or the family as a legal 
subject in indigenous law, that it may, depending on the circumstances, comprise 
either the nuclear family or the family or agnatic group as described above. 215 For 
212 Myburgh Papers 18-20. 
213 Myburgh Papers 76; Schapera .,.he Tswana• 40; Vorster "Kinship" 105-108. 
214 Darboe 105-107 110. 
215 Church Marriage 7. 
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example, in Tswana law marriage between agnates is not forbidden and marriage with 
the matrilateral cross-cousin216 is preferred. In these cases the groups that interrelate 
with regard to the marriage and contract with regard to marriage goods, are nuclear 
families belonging to the same agnatic group. 211 In contrast, amongst the Nguni 
marriage between agnates is forbidden. 218 Family groups or agnatic groups will 
therefore be the parties to marriage negotiations. 
But in light of both the non-specialised nature of indigenous law, and the important 
role of social solidarity, one should never see the nuclear family or the agnatic group 
in isolation. They form part of a bigger unity. In fact, this unity includes other agnatic 
groups as well. After her marriage, the wife's group of origin continues to play an 
important role in her iife, as well as in the lives of her children. 219 Through marriage 
a special relationship is created between the family groups of the two spouses. Visiting 
(temporary and long term) between the two groups is common and maternal relatives 
sometimes become part of the permanent residential units. 220 
Church221 explains that the reason for preferential marriages between cross-cousins 
in Tswana law lies in the fact that although a woman becomes a member of her 
husband's group upon marriage, she never loses the membership of her group of 
origin. In cross-cousin marriages special kinship relationships are established and the 
cultural bonds between the agnatic groups strengthen. 222 This is of relevance in the 
economic sphere where a relationship of mutual assistance and co-operation is 
216 Usually with the child of the malome (mother's brother). 
217 Church "Betrothal" 80. 
218 Preston-Whyte 178-179. 
219 Church Marriage 29-35. 
220 Preston-Whyte 178; Schapera "The Tswana" 45. 
221 Church Marriage 33-34. 
222 Church Marriage 34. 
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envisaged and in the legal sphere where both groups have a limited right of 
guardianship over the woman. 
Even in cases where there are no cross-cousin marriages, the malome, the mother's 
brother, plays an important role in the strengthening of cultural bonds. He plays a part 
in litigation and in marriage arrangements. Preston-Whyte223 comments that "[t]he 
'warmth' of the relationship with the mother's brother is well established ... and the 
joking relationship224 between the malume and his sister's son in Tsonga society has 
lead to much comment". In Tswana law, a woman's malome may litigate on her behalf, 
and amongst the Barolong the presence of the malome is regarded as just as 
important as the presence of the father of a person involved in litigation. In marriage 
negotiations, and the transfer of marriage goods the maternal uncles also play a 
significant role. The fathers of the couple to be married consult the maternal uncles 
and amongst the BaKwena the malome on both sides have to be consulted if the wife 
is to be the great wife. 225 If the malome is disregarded in marriage negotiations, it will 
not affect the validity of the marriage but he may later refuse to become involved in the 
resolution of domestic problems. 
It has been reported for the BaHarutse that the malome is liable to pay the same in 
marriage goods as his nephew's father, and that he is then entitled to at least one 
beast received in marriage goods for the marriage of his niece. Amongst the Tswana 
a person who contends for public office relies on his malome for support and 
advice. 226 He also plays an important role in the religious life of his nephew and 
offerings are regularly made to the gods of the mother's family on behalf of the 
223 Preston-Whyte 178. 
224 This joking relationship includes amongst others, the snatching of the meat of the beast which 
the uncle sacrificed on behalf of his nephew: see Hammond-Tooke "Action· 347. 
225 Church "Betrothal" 81-82. 
226 Preston-Whyte 207-208. 
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nephew.221 These are but a few examples of the close connection with the maternal 
kin and the important role the maternal uncle fulfills. 
However, it should be remembered that the family idea also extends beyond the 
grave. 2'28 In the nucleus of the extended family, indigenous culture distinguishes 
between the recently dead and those who have been dead for some time. The 
deceased members of the family also include younger persons and children. The 
recently deceased are those who form the closest link between the living and the 
superhuman. 228 The South Sotho may for instance pray to the "new gods" to 
intercede and to pray on their behalf to the "old gods". The lineage dead of the 
woman's family also play an. important role. 230 Amongst the Lobedu, Venda and 
Tsonga paternal as well as maternal ancestors are remembered, whilst the paternal 
ancestors are the most important shades in the life of the Nguni and Sotho. 231 
The deceased are regarded as a mere extension of the group on earth. This is 
evidenced in the offerings of food and drink which are regularly made and in the lack 
of reverence with which the indigenous people behold their ancestors. There is no 
relationship of humble worshiper and omnipotent god. People pray to ancestors as 
one human being to another, often scolding them or reminding them of their duties to 
their children. 232 The ancestors are regarded to be on the same level as humans and 
their worship is characteristically cheerful. 
227 Hammond-Tooke ·Action• 347. 
228 The importance of the superhuman in indigenous social and legal ordering was discussed in 
3.b.i. (ii) above. 
229 Mbiti Religions 106-109. 
230 Hammond-Tooke ·se1iets• 330. 
231 Hammond-Tooke ·se1iefs" 325. 
232 Hammond-Tooke "Beliefs" 332. 
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But the group also comprises those who still have to be borne. Mbiti233 says about 
the unborn: 
"They are the buds of hope and expectation, and each family makes sure that its own existence 
Is not extinguished. The family provides for its continuation, and prepares for the coming of 
those not yet born. For that reason, African parents are anxious to see that their children find 
husbands and wives, otherwise failure to do so means in effect the death of the unborn and a 
diminishing of the family as a whole: 
The importance of those still to be born is reflected in legal institutions such as the 
sororate and the levirate. Upon marriage, the marital guardianship is transferred to the 
husband's group. The marital guardianship comprises, amongst others, the right to 
the woman's child-bearing capacity which gives the husband's group the right to 
children. If a woman is unable to produce offspring, or if either of the spouses should 
die, provision is made through sororate and levirate secondary unions that the house 
is continued, the reason being that once a nuclear family is established it should not 
be allowed to become extinct. 234 
If a wife is barren or dies before she has borne any (or enough) children, her group 
of origin sends a sister to bear children for her. Rules regarding the payment of 
marriage goods for the sororate union, the return of marriage goods if no children are 
borne, whether the husband's group has a right to a substitute, and how many 
children should be borne to qualify as a fulfillment of the wife's child bearing duty vary 
from tribe to tribe. But the underlying principle, the continuation of the family through 
the procreation of children, remains the same. 
Similar to the sororate union is the levirate union, which is also regarded as a 
continuation of the original marriage. The approved relative of the deceased husband 
is not only obliged to beget children for the deceased, but takes full domestic and 
233 Mbitl Religions 105 107; see also Mbitl Introduction 109, Ayittey 10 173. 
234 Preston-Whyte 188-192. 
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marital responsibility for the widow and her children. 
The family idea is also reflected in the fact that abortion is regarded as a most serious 
crime. Amongst most tribes, the expulsion of a human foetus, irrespective of the stage 
of its development, is regarded as criminal in indigenous law. It is also regarded as a 
polluting act which disturbs the harmony in the group and with the superhuman and 
which has to be cleansed through rites of lustration. 
Today the family idea underlies social and legal ordering in urban townships. Family 
councils still play an important role in the metropolitan areas and communities are 
organised into fictitious family units (yards, blocks, streets and camps) in which social 
coherence exists. These civic structures are responsible for the general social 
well-being of the community, to encourage unity, comradeship and co-operation in the 
community, and also to resolve disputes between residents. 
(iii) The Hamlet Spirit 
Chiba uses the traditional concept of the hamlet, an autonomous local community, to 
illustrate the postulate which prompts people to collective behaviour in traditional local 
communities, and fictitiously in other social collectivities, and which underlies the 
creation of unofficial law to supplement and substitute the deficient rules of official 
laws. 2311 
The division of indigenous communities into social and administrative units or wards 
provides an example of how this postulate operates. A ward consists of a number of 
villages under control of a hereditary headman. The people living in a ward are not all 
related but they associate together, co-operate in many activities and support each 
another in case of trouble. 236 The ward is a jural community and an important 
235 Chiba Legal Pluralism 97. 
236 Schapera -rhe Tswana· 46. 
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component of the chiefdom.237 It is the smallest administrative unit. The ward 
headman represents members of his ward in the chiefdom, assists the chief in 
maintaining law and order and in allocating land to members of his ward, performs 
administrative tasks, settles and adjudicates disputes and try certain criminal offenses 
in the ward. The Court of the Ward Headman is an indigenous legal institution which 
today still has considerable influence in rural areas and which still plays an important 
part in the unofficial administration of justice and in the replacement of official law with 
unofficial law.238 The spirit of social solidarity in the ward, which comprises different 
groups organised into a single unit, may also be used to illustrate the family idea that 
individuals act for the group as a whole and not for themselves. 
Today the hamlet spirit as a specific jural postulate in indigenous law is also practically 
illustrated in the social organisation of black metropolitan areas and the creation of 
unofficial law and dispute-resolution institutions in those areas. 
(Iv) Common-kin Principle239 
This principle underlies kinship relations in indigenous communities. Despite the fact 
that there are some differences in some kinship systems there are also striking 
similarities which justify certain general assumptions. Kinship is established either 
through blood (consanguinity) or through marriage (affinity). Kinship has religious, 
moral and legal significance for the individual. It governs social relationships between 
people in a community by determining marital customs and regulations2'40 and by 
237 Traditional authorities are presently recognised in sections 181-184 of the Interim Constitution, 
Act 200 of 1993. However, this recognition is subject to the law that regulated these authorities 
before the commencement of the Act. 
238 Prinsloo & Myburgh 57-59; Prinsloo Publiekreg 63-64 113-114 241-243 267; Schapera -rhe 
Tswana• 46-47. 
239 See generally Bohannan Anthropology 54-71, Preston-Whyte 1n-210, Ayittey 1-9, Vorster 
"Kinship" 85-93, Schapera -rhe Tswana• 43-46. 
240 For example, the Nguni prohibit marriage and sexual relations between kin, while the remainder 
of the Bantuspeakers prefer marriage between kin. 
224 Part 11.11.3 Jural Postulates 
determining individuals' behaviour towards each other. Kinship affiliation may even 
determine residence. The kinship system also extends vertically to include the 
departed and those yet to be born. Children are taught the genealogies of their 
descent. Extension of the genealogical line provides a sense of depth, of historical 
belongingness and a sense of sacred obligation.241 
The kinship system provides the framework within which an individual classifies others 
and the rules to guide interaction with them. For example, children are expected to act 
in a certain way towards parents and especially towards the mother's brother. There 
are specific rules for both the husband and the wife which regulate relationships with 
affinal kin (kin through marriage).242 Zulu wives are, for example, expected to act in 
a shy and respectful manner towards their husbands' kin and there is a taboo against 
the use of certain words in the presence of a woman's in-laws. Another interesting 
phenomenon is the joking relationship which exists between certain kin. Such people 
are not only allowed, but expected to mock each other without being offended. The 
joking relationship between the mother's uncle and his nephew may serve as example 
in this regard. 
For jural purposes, descent through males forms the basis for co-operation. Agnates 
are individuals who recognise a common forefather and they are bound by a 
fundamental bond. But, as indicated above, patrilineal descent does not take away the 
importance of the mother's kin. Marriage is the other way in which kinship relations 
may be established. There are three principles regarding marriage which are common 
to all Southern African Bantuspeakers: the transfer of marriage goods; the fact that the 
woman is physically transferred to her husband's group upon marriage; and the 
principle that a woman may only have one husband whereas a man is allowed to have 
more than one wife. 
241 Mbiti Religions 105; see generally 104-106. 
242 . Vorster ·Kinship• 91-92. 
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Although polygyny is on the decline due to economic circumstances and the spread 
of Christianity, indigenous marriages are still potentially polygynous and for that reason 
not recognised by official South African law. A polygynous marriage entails certain 
duties, prerogatives and privileges for the houses created by the marriages to the 
different wives. Each marriage establishes a new house consisting of a wife and her 
children. Such a house forms a basic social, domestic and economic unit. House 
property should be allocated equally to each house and is, as a rule, used for the 
benefit of children of that house. Marriage goods generally becomes the property of 
the house, but a father who wishes to use house property for other purposes should 
first obtain the permission of the wife concerned. Houses are ranked according to 
certain rules which vary from one society to the next and which vary also depending 
on whether commoners or aristocrats are involved. Amongst the Nguni wives are both 
ranked and linked to other wives, which makes the whole system quite complex. A 
wife's rank also determines where she lives. The ranking of wives has important 
consequences for the children as it determines their social po~ition and their rights and 
order of succession. 243 
(v} Esteem for the Ruler 
This postulate is used to denote the moral and legal influence of the emperor in 
Japanese law and underlies the special esteem for the emperor and his family. In 
indigenous law, the ruler has a similar position of reverence and the royal family is also 
held in high esteem by the tribe. 
Amongst the indigenous people of Southern Africa, political organisation is structured 
around an empire which consists of a number of tribes or remnants of tribes. Authority 
vests in a ruler, the king or a paramount chief. A chiefdom or tribe is the most 
important political unit in indigenous law and comprises those who pay allegiance to 
a ruler in a specific territory over which that ruler exercises his authority. Lesser 
243 Preston-Whyte 179-182; Church Marriage 59-60; Schapera "The Tswana" 40; Vorster "Kinship" 
94-95. 
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political units are wards, sections and districts. The ruler is the legislative, judicial and 
executive head of the tribe. His position is hereditary, based on patrilineal descent. As 
a rule, he is the genealogically highest ranking male of the ruling family. In some tribes, 
such as the Lobedu, women are head of State and in others, such as the Sotho, 
women may from time to time succeed to the position of ruler. a.... 
The ruler has extensive powers245 which are exercised in-council. He is the guardian 
of fundamental values, the religious head and the direct, living representative of his 
ancestors who guard the tribe and see to its well being. He is the head of the army. 
His councils advise and assist him in the administration of the tribe and keep him in 
control by preventing any ~buse of power and by voicing dissatisfaction and 
criticism.2'48 His position and functions are also linked to other cultural aspects, such 
as law (the ruler is head of the judicature); kinship (formerly the ruler had to grant 
permission for marriage); education (the ruler is the head of the tribal school); 
·economy (the ruler controls the tribal area, agricultural activities and public labour); 
language (praise-poems and special forms of address241 are used for the ruler); art 
(insignia mark the ruler's position)248 and with religion (the ruler is the priest and the 
link with tribal ancestors). 
In Southern Africa there is no specialised office of priest. The head of the tribe usually 
acts as priest and takes charge of rites. His religious duties include the doctoring of 
244 Vorster •po11tlcal Organization· 79-84; Schapera "The Tswana· 51-53; Myburgh & Prinsloo 4 5-11; 
Ayittey 108-113. 
245 Discussed In Part 1.11.4.a. 
246 Ayittey 95-96 118-119. 
247 The Ndebele address their ruler as ·non•; ·hero, match for our enemies•; ·big, forest-like beard•; 
•jaw for which no bone is unmanageable•; -You are black and fearsome•; -war-hero, you who 
have risen above us·. Failure to address a ruler by special names may constitute the crime of 
contempt of the ruler: see Myburgh & Prinsloo 8. 
248 The Ndebele ruler's insignia are amongst others a special garment of leopard skin, a royal 
sceptre of rhinoceros horn, a sweat spoon of ivory and a needle which fits into a special sheath: 
see Myburgh & Prinsloo 9. 
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the army after his father's death; consecration of the capital when it is moved to 
another site; doctoring of tribal boundaries in times of pestilence and drought; initiation 
of boys and girls into membership of age regiments; sowing, first-fruits, and harvest 
festivals; and, above all, the making of rain. 249 
Like other people, the ruler retains his position after death. All members of the tribe 
worship the ancestors of the ruler and acknowledge them as the source of the tribe's 
prosperity and welfare, just as they had been when they were still alive. 
In the ancestor cult (the aggregate of ancestor beliefs and ritual which involves the 
worship of the dead ancestors) the ruler acts as mediator between the ancestors and 
the group. The goodwill and co-operation of the ancestors are essential to the 
existence of the tribe and the ruler pays homage to them or placate them by rituals 
and offerings. The ruler's main task is to maintain the equilibrium between the tribe 
and the superhuman. He symbolises a people at one with its moral order, at peace 
with itself and in harmony with the ancestors. 250 This close connection between the 
ruler and his chiefly ancestors, puts him in a deferential religious relationship with his 
followers. The position of ruler is regarded as sacred and as a repository of his 
ancestral spirits. 251 This position of reverence is also associated with the idea that he 
becomes a tribal god on his death. In fact, it is not unusual for rulers to claim 
superhuman powers in the exercise of their religious duties. This is done as a matter 
of expediency to inspire awe and social control. It is also believed that religious 
sanctions serve to retain a tyrannical ruler. Fear of the ancestor's wrath checks the 
ruler against becoming cruel and inhumane. It is also regarded to be in accordance 
with the norms of royal conduct as laid down by the ancestors for a ruler to be 
humble.252 
249 Schapera "The Tswana· 60. 
250 Ayittey 1n 173-181. 
251 Ayittey 126. 
252 Hambrock 130-133 135; Schapera "The Tswana· 60; Aiyttey 118-119 126. 
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The high esteem for the ruler and his family and the close connection between the 
ruler and the superhuman are further reflected in the fact that offences against them 
are regarded as more serious than those committed against other individuals and that 
such offences are often regarded to have a polluting effect on the community. 
Contempt of the ruler's court, for instance, is associated with pollution, which has to 
be removed through a purificatory meal. This purification takes place when the ruler 
and the culprit eat a meal of conciliation to restore the equilibrium both in the 
community and with the superhuman. The violation of allegiance to the ruler, disloyalty 
to the ruling family, or the rejection of the ruling dynasty constitutes treason. Treason 
is the most serious crime in indigenous law because it threatens the survival of the 
realm, which, of course, extends beyond the grave. Treason used to be punishable 
by death without trial as a form of lawful self-help to obtain public satisfaction for the 
outraged community. 253 But banishment and the confiscation of property are 
nowadays the competent sentence. The confiscated property is burnt to remove the 
pollution which the commission of the crime has generated. The punishment for 
adultery with the royal wives is also death. Amongst the Ndebele bewitching the ruler 
too is regarded as a crime punishable by death. Contempt of the ruler is a serious 
crime because it poisons the whole community. Acts such as raping of his wife, not 
addressing him by his ceremonial titles, leaving a meeting which was convened by the 
ruler without permission, and accusing him of black magic are instances of contempt 
of the ruler. 254 
4 SUMMARY 
In summary it should be mentioned that there are indeed cases where, prima facie, 
the jural postulates of Western law seem to find application in indigenous law. 
However, it should be borne in mind that indigenous conceptions of such postulates 
253 Myburgh "Satisfaction" 20-23. 
254 Schapera -rhe Tswana" 52; Van Bierl< "Contempt" 65-67; Myburgh -rreason" 62-64; Myburgh & 
Prinsloo 9 88-90. 
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usually differ from Western conceptions, and that different results would be obtained, 
depending whether an indigenous or Western approach to legal reasoning is 
employed. Many such examples have been mentioned earlier. Of relevance here are 
all the instances where, amongst others, concepts of public policy, bani mores, public 
interest, equity, reasonableness and good faith come to the fore. One has to guard 
against the distortion of indigenous law in order to conform it to the underlying 
postulates of Western law. It is important to remember that the clarification or analysis 
of indigenous laws, principles and institutions is usually done by analogy with Western 
laws, principles and institutions and that the Western terminology should merely be 
used as a device to explain or understand indigenous law. 
The most basic differences between indigenous and Western law lie in the diffuse 
postulates of these two legal cultures. These differences are so important because it 
is the diffuse postulates which determine the content of the specific postulates and 
which direct legal development. In Western law the concepts of individual freedom and 
equality are reflected in the modern, liberal perceptions of justice. In contradistinction, 
harmony of the collectivity, the superiority of the superhuman and the accommodating 
nature of indigenous law are the most important basic precepts which underscore 
indigenous law and determine the content of its specific postulates. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Jural postulates in Western law are characteristically specialised and are bedrocked 
in Judea-Christian and Romano-Germanic cultural traditions. In these legal traditions 
the emphasis is on individualism. In contrast, indigenous jural postulates are by nature 
non-specialised and are founded upon the African cultural tradition which focuses on 
social solidarity. 
1.a The Foundation of Jural Postulates in Western Law 
The Judea-Christian and Graeco-Romano traditions form the fundamental basis of 
Western law. 1 On the one hand the moral basis of that law is rooted in the biblical 
perception of law and justice;2 and on the other hand the necessary connection 
See Smith & Weisstub 195, see also Berman ·interaction· 387-391; Wieacker 6 regards the 
European ius commune which comprises Roman law (Justinian law adapted to the needs of the 
time, glossed by the glossators and commented upon by the Commentators) and canon law 
as the foundation of Western legal culture. 
2 Cf however Mayer-Maly's view that the notion of boni mores (which at 61 62 he regards as an 
extra~egal order based on everyday ethics) may be traced back to classical Roman law and that 
it is not founded in post-classical or Justinianic moralism: Mayer-Maly 76-n. 
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between law and reason is rooted in the Graeco-Romano scientific cultures.3 The jural 
postulates which underlie the Western component of the South-African legal system 
are thus also founded in these legal traditions. Although the role of the 
Romano-Germanic tradition is usually emphasised, the Judea-Christian tradition has 
also played an important role in developing the content of the basic principles which 
underlie our official South African legal system. And this is an ongoing process. The 
principles of justice, morality, order and equity are continuously influenced by the 
perceptions and beliefs of the community.4 In South Africa, religion indeed plays an 
important role in all spheres of cultural life and affects law to a large degree. With 
regard to the Western component of this community one has only to think of the 
extensive influence, whether positive or negative, that the teachings of Jean Calvin has 
had on South-African· legal thinking. 5 
1.a.i Judaism and Christianity 
The fact that Judaism and Christianity played a particular role in the development of 
Western law and jurisprudence cannot be denied. However, opinions as to the extent 
of this influence differ. 8 Studies in the history of South African law usually emphasise 
the role of the learned or scholarly Roman law which was received in Western and 
even Eastern1 Europe. Usually only scant attention is paid to canon law and it is, as 
3 Du Plessis "Geregtigheid" 546 points out that a negation of the Hebraic heritage of our legal 
culture could lead only to its impoverishment. 
4 See Denning 391-393. 
5 In South Africa, Calvinism became "the source of moral and spiritual justification for as 
oppressive a system as apartheid": Du Plessis "Calvin" 60; On 47 he points out that "Calvinism· 
is in fact a misnomer, for it refers to a much broader theological tradition and, further, that the 
reformist tradition is in fact rooted in the ideas of Calvin. 
6 Compare for instance the debate between Du Plessis and Potgieter on the Christian foundation 
of human rights. Potgieter "Gedagtes•; Potgieter "Menseregte"; Du Plessis "Opmerkings"; Du 
Plessis "Geregtigheid". 
7 Zajtay & Hosten 181-186 190-192 distinguish between the reception of norms and the reception 
of the scientific structure and framework of Roman law. This scientific reception had a wider 
influence in Europe and extended to Eastern European countries such as Hungary and the 
232 Part 11.111.1 Foundation of Jural Postulates in South Africa 
a rule, mentioned only as a vehicle for the reception of Roman law whilst its influence 
is regarded as being limited to medieval Roman law.8 Yet it is a historical fact that 
canon law infiltrated Roman law, whether through a conscious or accidental process, 
and moulded that law, formed part of the European ius commune and consequently 
impacted on the development of Western law. 
The influence of canon law is evident in various spheres of our law and jurisprudence 
and is perhaps most marked in the concept of justice, as reflected in the notions of 
reasonableness, equality, generality, good faith, conscience, honesty or integrity 
(honestas) and compassion (misericordia).11 
The fourth century saw the first real influence of Christianity in Western-Europe. 
Constantine granted religious freedom to the Christians in the years 306-337 and thus 
started the conversion of the Roman Empire to .Christianity. Although the early Church 
ordinances cannot be regarded as canon law in the true sense of the word, they did 
eventually give rise to canon law. The Christian emperors regarded it their duty to 
reform the law in the direction of greater humanity. 10 In the post-classical period, 
Roman law was reformed under the influence of Christianity. In family law, for example, 
the consent of both parties to a marriage became a requirement for a valid marriage, 
it became more difficult for a man to divorce his wife and the right of life and death (ius 
vitae necisque) of the head of the household was abolished. In the law of property the 
rights of slaves were increasingly protected; a slave was given the right to appeal to 
Soviet Union, which never received Roman legal norms into their legal systems. 
8 In a discussion of equity and Roman law in legal thought, Van Zyl "Equity" 109 points out that 
already in the post-classical period Roman law was strongly influenced by Christianity and was 
as a result characterised by a tendency to make law more ethical and more accessible. 
9 Kleyn 339; see also Berman "Interaction• 387-391. In an article on the influence of the 
Old-Testament perception of justice on modem Western law, Ou Plessis "Geregtigheid" 521-522 
546 comes to the conclusion that despite the differences, fundamental similarities exist in the 
Western and Hebraic notions of law and justice; Ou Plessis "Opmerkings" 407-409 discusses the 
Christian foundation of human rights. 
10 Berman "Interaction" 387. 
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a magistrate when his master abused his powers, or in case of cruelty, the right to 
freedom. 
The Church survived the fall of the Western-Roman Empire in the fifth century and 
grew from strength to strength. It played an important role in the survival of the 
classical tradition and the rebirth of Roman law. In the sixth and seventh centuries the 
monasteries became the channels of learning throughout Gaul, Southern Germany and 
Northern Italy and thus established the link between the Frankish Kingdom and the 
Church of Rome. In 800 the Frankish king Charlemagne was crowned emperor of the 
Holy Roman Empire by Pope Leo Ill. This event completed the process of converting 
the Franks to the Christian faith. The various compilations of Roman law by Justinian 
and his successors were partly induced by the belief that Christian humanisation of the 
law required its systematisation. 11 
The twelfth century was marked by the application of two eminent systems of law -
canon law and Roman law. The influence of the Church, as a supra-national world 
power, was gaining strength, as was the conflict between Church and State. Canon 
law and ecclesiastical courts 12 run by trained lawyers came to the fore during this 
period and personae miserabiles such as widows, orphans and slaves were allowed 
to appeal to these courts for redress. Moreover, so-called spiritual r:natters (causae 
spiritual es) fell within their jurisdiction, and they consequently dealt with matrimonial 
and succession disputes, as well as cases concerning Church property, usury and 
contracts bonae fidei. In criminal law heresy, blasphemy, bigamy, witchcraft, perjury, 
fraud and other matters affecting the conscience of its members were dealt with by the 
ecclesiastical courts. 
A renewed interest in the scientific study of Roman law and the Justinian Code, 
11 See generally Berman •interaction• 387-389; see also the discussion of intellectualism in 1.a.ii 
below. 
12 Canon law was the only law applied in these courts. 
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produced highly trained secular jurists. Canon jurists also studied this Code and jurists 
of the law schools of Bologna, Montpellier, Oxford, Orleans, Cambridge, Heidelberg, 
Louvian and Aberdeen, 13 founded from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, studied 
both the ius civile and the ius canonum and obtained the degree doctor utriusque iuris. 
Furthermore, Canonists such as Rufinus, Tornacensis and Huguccio taught canon law 
at Bologna and thus through their teaching and publications enlarged the influence of 
canon law not only in Italy but also France. It was also during this period that 
Gratianus compiled his Decretum Gratiani upon which the Corpus luris Canonici was 
founded. Yet it may perhaps be highly artificial to maintain a distinction between canon 
and secular lawyers, because the study of canon law and civil law was a reciprocal 
exercise and both disciplines .were interdependent. 14 
The Ultramontani, who were mostly Canonists, under the supervision of Revigny and 
Belleperche, were the first to lay down rules for the application of canon law in Roman 
law. These rules, known as the Bereichslehre, provided that due to the equity of canon 
law (aequitas canonica}, canon law should be applied in certain fields to temper the 
severity of Roman law. 15 
Commentators like Cinus, Bartol us and Baldus 18 developed and refined these rules 
of the Bereichslehre and determined three instances in which canon .law, which was 
characterised by equity derived from Christ, should override secular laws. The first two 
instances mainly concerned ecclesiastical matters. In the third instance canon law was 
applied when the application of secular law would amount to sin. 
13 England is regarded as part of the broad European community and its law as part of the 
European ius commune: see generally Zimmerman "Synthesis·. 
14 Hosten 41. 
15 Kleyn 335. 
16 Other Commentators who wrote important commentaries on canon law were Durantis, Andreae, 
fmola, and Tartagnus. 
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The Humanists, who were strongly influenced by Protestantism, adhered to a strict 
division between divine law and human law tried to limit the application of canon law. 
But Duarenus and Alciatus who were champions for the continued study of canon law 
extended their influence not only in France, but also elsewhere in Europe. 
The Usus Modernus Pandectarum disclaimed the theory that canon law should be 
applied when secular law amounted to sin (the ratione-peccati theory) and advanced 
a new theory based on the general preference of canon law. The reason for this was 
that canon law had applied in Germany earlier than Roman law. This theory of a 
general preference was also followed by the historical school, but for a different 
reason: according to them canon law was received with Roman law as part of the 
European common law or ius commune, but the preference for canon law was based 
on the fact that it was accepted as being of more recent origin than Roman law. The 
theory was not applied where canon law was in conflict with existing court practices, 
where statutes gave preference to Roman law or in countries where Protestant law 
prevailed. 11 The Pandectists gave the law of practice preference and according to 
them only in cases of uncertainty was canon law to prevail over Roman law. 
Canon law also had a distinct influence in the Netherlands and was applied to temper 
the severity of Roman law ratione peccati. In the period of the early reception 
(thirteenth - the middle of the fifteenth century) the officiates or ecclesiastical judges 
who were usually schooled at Bologna and Orleans, played an important role in the 
reception of Roman and canon law. They had both judicial and administrative functions 
and relied on Romano-canonical procedural law in drawing up legal documents. The 
ecclesiastical courts of this period in the Netherlands had a wide jurisdiction extending 
not only to matters affecting the conscience, but also to secular matters such as 
marriage, sexual deviance, fraud and usury. The law applied by these courts came to 
be considered part of the law of the land. The ecclesiastical courts were abolished only 
in the eighteenth century when the Reformed Church became the Dutch State Church. 
17 The conflict between Catholicism and Protestantism is of no consequence to the basic influence 
of Christianity on the development of our Western law. 
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The canonical influence upon Roman-Dutch law was readily accepted by great writers 
such as Grotius, Voet, Van Bynkershoek, Van der Keessel, and Van der Linden. 18 
It should be borne in mind that canon law also found its way into our law via English 
law. The strong canon-law influence in English law was especially pronounced in the 
Court of Chancery and in the ecclesiastical courts. '9 The evolution of the concept of 
equity in England, for example, was influenced by the principles of Roman law as 
adapted by canon law through its application in the chancery courts. 20 Zimmermann21 
explains: 
''Thus we have the interesting situation that an idea, originating in Roman Law, has been 
received in England at first via canon law by the ecclesiastical courts, then taken over by the 
Court of Chancery into Equity, developed in the course of centuries into a comprehensive 
doctrine before it has come 'home', back into the last resort of the old European ius commune". 
1.a.ii The Graeco-Romano Tradition 
Wieacker22 describes personalism or individualism, 23 together with legalism and 
intellectualism, as the three invariables which give European legal culture a specific 
18 Wessels 138-140. 
19 See generally Scrutton 208ff, Wessels 132, Lee 155ff. 
20 Wieacker 7; Lee 163-164. 
21 Zimmermann "Reception" 113. 
22 Wiecacker 20-29; Berman "Origins" 401 sees the rediscovery of legal writings from the 12th 
century onwards, the scholastic method of research and the the teaching of law at universities 
at the root of the Western legal tradition. These features are similar to the invariable 
characteristics of legalism and intellectualism, explained by Wieacker. The rediscovery of legal 
manuscripts and its study by professional jurists at universities gave rise to a scientific system 
of law which was to be separated form other social customs and norms. When the 
administration of justice was put in the hands of trained lawyers in stead of lay judges, a 
separate class of jurists came to the fore. 
23 Personalism or individualism may be described as "the primacy of the individual as subject, end, 
and intellectual point of reference in the idea of law": see Wieacker 20. 
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character. These unchanging elements in the Western legal tradition may all be 
regarded as manifestations of specialisation. Specialisation in a legal culture is 
reflected in the separation, differentiation, classification, and delimitation of, amongst 
others, knowledge, concepts, ideas, duties and interests. It is further characterised by 
individualism and abstraction. 2" 
Roman-Dutch law is the product of both a scientific and a practical reception of Roman 
law. 25 Whilst it is commonly accepted that intellectualism, which is evidenced in legal 
scholarship and the scientific study of Roman law, emerged in Europe in the twelfth 
century, 28 and that this period saw the beginning of a theoretical exposition of the 
concepts, categories and divisions of Roman law, its specialised character evolved at 
a much earlier time.' In the first century BC, a Mucius Scaevola, following the 
Aristotelian technique, employed the dialectical method in his work. He laid the 
foundation of Western jurisprudence with his classification of law into four main 
divisions, namely the law of inheritance, persons, things and obligations. 21 But the first 
traces of specialisation in Roman law could be discerned even earlier when the 
concept of a State, and the concept of individual property evolved. 
It is possible that the development of the Roman State may be the reason why the 
24 Myburgh Papers 2. 
25 A distinction should be drawn between a scientific reception of Roman law and a practical 
reception of that system which comprises a reception of the substantive rules of Roman law. 
A scientific reception encompasses a reception of the basic framework or structure of Roman 
law: Zajtay & Hosten 183; see also Berman Law and Revolution 539, Wieacker 9. According 
to Wieacker a scientific reception also comprises the reception of common values. These are 
values of justice, order and equality - the basic postulates which underlie Western law. But 
conceptions of these values differ, not only in different communities, but also in different time 
spheres. · 
26 Berman "Origins" 400-401; Wieacker 4. Berman "Origins" 400 points out that the approach to law 
changed also because of political developments. Strong central governments and a body of 
professional jurists (practicing lawyers and legally trained judges) emerged. 
27 Each category was further divided into subdivisions: see Berman "Interaction" 407. Berman 
"Origins" 405 407, points out that this system of classification was based on the Greek dialectical 
approach from which scholasticism later developed. 
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significance of group solidarity was so short lived in the early development of the 
Roman culture. The beginnings of State organisation could be discerned already in the 
city State.28 The Romans were influenced by the Etruscans, inhabitants of the 
neighbouring Etruria, as far as their political organisation was concerned. 29 The 
Roman royal dynasty of the Tarquinians was of Etruscan origin and by the end of the 
sixth century Rome was ruled by the Etruscan and Roman nobility under a constitution 
devised during the period of Etruscan predominance. 30 Some symbols of the Roman 
magisterial power originated in the Etruscan political system. In the early Roman 
monarchy three elements could be distinguished in their State organisation, namely 
the king, the council of elders (senatus) and the assembly of the people. 31 This 
division of the State into various bodies indicates the first traces of specialisation in 
their State system. 
The Etruscan influence also induced the urbanisation movement in the early Latium, 
Campania and Umbria.32 It was exactly this very early movement to urbanisation 
which served as the impetus for the development of individual ownership. The city was 
regarded as the birthplace of commerce and commerce demands free rights of 
property. 33 The Etruscans extended their influence not only to the political 
28 The Roman conceived of State not in the abstract modem meaning of the word, but related it 
to the Roman populus collectively: see Kunkel 9; see also generally Sohm 34-47. 
29 Cary 18 remarks that ·[i}n the political history of Italy the first chapter belongs, not to the 
Greeks, but to the Etruscans•; see also Van Oven 435-436, Cary 22-25, Varon 345. Although 
there is no reliable information on Etruscan institutions, an Etruscan influence on Roman law 
cannot be ruled out completely. However, it is unlikely that Etruscan institutions extended any 
influence on republican Institutions: see Varon 345. 
30 The Etrurian Empire consisted of various large cities and had a strict aristocratic political 
organisation. UntU the sixth or fifth century BC executive power was vested in their city-kings 
who were elected by the noble families. They were later replaced by annual magistrates: see 
Rostovtzeff 9 22. 
31 Jolowicz 7; Rostovtzeff 17. 
32 See generally Rostovtzeff 12-23, Kunkel 4-6. 
33 Sohm 43. 
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organisation of Rome, but also to the field of economics.34 The Etruscan influence on 
the Roman political and economic systems outlived their actual supremacy of the 
region. 315 
Another, reason why collectivity and group solidarity gave way to individualism at such 
an early stage of Roman legal development, is the fact that the position of head of the 
household and its associated patriarchal authority developed as an important 
institution. 38 
The powers of the head of the household reached a zenith in the early republic when 
the restrictions of the monarchal period had disappeared.37 The deterioration of the 
ancestral cult and the gradual decrease in the persuasive power of public opinion led 
to the increasing abuse of the patriarchal authority and a concomitant awareness that 
that power should be accompanied by a certain pietas. This decrease in importance 
of the ancestral cult and the increasing intervention by the State through legislation, 
also led to an awareness that law and morals could be separated and that the powers 
34 Etruscan cities had growing metal and textile industries and well developed trade links with 
Greece and her colonies in Phoenican Carthage and in Southern Italy: Rostovtzeff 9 1 O 11. 
Economic and social life in Rome were also Influenced by Greece and Carthage. According to 
Varon, the remnants of the Semitic influence which originated in Carthage ~ould be traced in 
early Roman law: see generally Varon; Rostovtzeff 14. 
35 Rostovtzeff 21 24. 
36 Van Warmelo 53 mentions that the association of persons under the authority of an individual 
male who had no living ascendants, originated in the primitive agrarian era of Rome when the 
family formed a close-knit union under the absolute power of the land owner. While the paternal 
authority and patriarchal joint-family organisation (consisting of various generations living 
together in the same household and united as a socio- political unit through common worship, 
work and property: see generally Westrup Vol Ill 149-150) were not exdusively Roman, it should 
nevertheless be kept in mind that It was the Roman patriarchal authority, based on the economic 
solidarity of the house community, which alone had grown in importance and influence and 
which became recognised as legal institution: see Maine 143-148. 
37 Westrup Vol Ill 147 150 151 186-187 regards the archaic family constitution as a form of 
government with the patriarch as sacral head, judex domesticus and economic manager. He 
equates the early family organisation, which was united through a common cult and common 
property with a •community of law under a patriarchal government organised through ancient 
custom• and the patriarchal authority as •a distribution of Justice founded and bound by 
ancestral legal traditions·: see Westrup Vol Ill 186. 
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of the head of the household fell under his moral duties which were not enforceable. 
Towards the close of the republic, the State started curtailing the powers of the head 
of the household and started intervening in the autonomous family organisation which 
resembled a State within a State. 38 
In primitive Roman times, the patriarchal authority as legal institution, maintaining the 
solidarity of the undivided joint family, was regarded as a social necessity to safeguard 
the economic security and material basis for the perpetuation of the family and the 
ancestral cult. 38 It was economic expediency which prompted the early development 
of individualism in this society. Di6sdi40 explains as follows: 
•A developed commodity turnover, and a lively commerce require the economic independence 
of the individual, while the basically autarchic peasant economy necessitates on the contrary 
the concentration of property. So the paterfamilias had to become very soon the sole owner of 
the family property .... Because of the increase of the family, the maintenance of family property 
would have endangered the unity of peasant economy and in consequence the basis of 
economic life in Rome." 
The period during which property rights vested in the clan was probably followed by 
a transitional period in which property rights vested in the family as a whole. However, 
it may be assumed that all traces of communal ownership had been erased by the 
time of the Twelve Tables and that by then the principle of absolute individual 
ownership had come to the fore. 41 The basis of this assumption is the fact that the 
Twelve Tables made provision for a judicial remedy for the division of the family 
, property, which suggests the recognition of each family member's right to individual 
38 See generally Westrup Va 111181-187. 
39 Westrup Va Ill 150 257-258; Westrup Va II 6. 
40 Di6sdi 49. 
41 Jaowicz 142-144 refers to the relative right of possession which preceded the absolute 
Individual ownership of the earliest republican times. It should be kept in mind that the primitive 
perception of ownership differed from the modem perception. See generally Westrup Va II 
157-172; Van Oven 113-116. 
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property and the abolition of the compulsory community of the family.42 Also, the 
head of the household's competency to dispose of the family property upon his death 
is a clear indication that the idea of family property had become a mere formality by 
the time of the Twelve Tables.43 
The Twelve Tables provided for special bequests (legacies and manumissions), but 
the institution of heirs was only introduced into Roman Law around the fourth century 
BC."" However, there was no restriction upon the legacies and the head of the 
household theoretically could dispose of the family property as a whole. '5 The Twelve 
Tables also provided for the acquisition of land by prescription. 411 Again economic 
expediency is the rationale for this new development in the direction of 
specialisaton. •1 
Some authors go further and make a distinction between familia and pecunia. This 
distinction, which is based on certain texts of the Twelve Tables, 48 may be a further 
indication of the recognition of private property in this very early phase of Roman legal 
42 The members of the family who became sul iuris upon the death of the head of the household 
automatically became co-owners of the family property and continued the family community. 
The actio familiae eriscundae was an action for the division of this common property. See 
generally Westrup Vol II 39 43 45 61-65; Van Oven 570-571; Kaser 123 -124 367-368; Di6sdi 
44-46. 
43 Van Oven 81-83; Di6sdl 43-46. Kaser 360 doubts whether the head of the household ever had 
separate property. He is of the opinion that whilst, even in classical times, the members of the 
family had no proprietary capacity, they nevertheless had a dormant interest in the family 
property during the lifetime of the head of the household. This explains why the sui heredes 
acquired their inheritance automatically, without the necessity of an act of acquisition. 
44 Kaser 332 leaves open the possibility that the institution of heirs may date back even further in 
antiquity. 
45 Kaser 331-332. 
46 Westrup Vol II 50 51; Di6sdi 85-93. 
47 Agriculture was the basis of the early Roman economy and it was in the interest of the 
community that land should be cultivated by the owners: see Di6sdi 92. 
48 The texts expressly refer to familia and pecunia. 
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development. 49 The dispute amongst the authorities regarding the question whether 
a distinction is feasible between familia and pecunia has been raging for more than a 
century and yet no unanimity has been reached. 50 It seems that there are basically 
two main streams of thought. On the one hand familia is regarded as members of the 
household, especially slaves, and pecunia is regarded as cattle. The assumption is 
then that in the Twelve Tables the exact meaning of the words had become obscured 
through the lapse of time and that they were used as synonyms, denoting property. 
On the other hand familia is regarded as family property and pecunia as the separate 
individual property belonging to the head of the household and which could be 
disposed of by legacy. 
Westrup51 too, draws a distinction between familia, being property used for the 
subsistence of the family as a whole, and pecunia, being personal property. 52 
Familia53 was hereditary property in the sense that it belonged to the family (the living 
family members, the dead ancestors and posterity) and was passed down from one 
generation to the next, whilst pecunia formed the object of individual ownership and 
passed down with the individual to the grave. 54 Di6sdi55 points out that familia and 
49 Van Oven 519-521; see also generally Van Oven 58-59 510. 
50 See Van Oven 520-521, Watson 54-59, Di6sdi 19-30. 
51 Westrup Vol II 24-42 56-58 61. 
52 This distinction is based on G 2 157 and Paulus D 28 2 11, where it is stated that the members 
of the family are, during the life time of the head of the household to some extent regarded as 
owners of the family property: see generally Westrup Vol II 32-33, Vol Ill 264-265; Kaser 360 307; 
Van Oven 519-521. 
53 The head of the household had the competency to control the family property during his lifetime 
but had no right to dispose of it by testament, because it belonged to the family as a whole. 
54 This distinction between familia and pecunia appears to have been made with reference to the 
function of the thing, rather than its nature. Thus, the house, a small allotment of land, annual 
crops, slaves and domestic animals which were used for the subsistence of the family, 
constituted communal family property. Stock-farming was the most important means of 
production and source of the acquisition of wealth and preceded tillage. Members of the family 
had the use and enjoyment of the fruits of the property which was managed by the head of the 
household but which could not be alienated. It thus seems that this was not a form of ownership 
known in the modern sense of the word: see Diosdi 50 60-61. 
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pecunia should be regarded as designating the essence of ancient property, namely 
cattle and manpower. Whereas it cannot be ruled out, that cattle, at some stage, may 
have been the common property of the clan, it appears that slaves never formed the 
object of common property and should indeed be considered as the very first objects 
of individual ownership in ancient Roman law.56 It may thus be assumed that 
movables formed the first objects of individual ownership in ancient Roman law. 
By the time of the Twelve Tables, land which formerly formed the common property 
of the clan, 57 had already become the object of private ownership. Therefore, in line 
with changed economic and social circumstances during this time, the words familia 
and pecunia had obtained a general meaning and could be regarded as signifying 
property in general, including land. 
Whichever view one adopts, it is important to bear in mind that even in ancient Roman 
times, traces of individual ownership,58 and thus specialisation, could be discerned. 
Nevertheless, the concept of individualism in Western law should not be restricted to 
the Roman tradition. The idea of individualism was also notable in the Christian-Judaic 
concept of an individual soul and a personal God as well as in the medieval Church's 
rejection of the idea of collective responsibility. The personal relationship with God 
gave rise to individual freedom of decision and personal responsibility. This personal 
relationship also had an impact on the idea of law. Law came to be viewed within the 
55 Di6sdi 30. At 22-23 he points out that the etymological origins of the words "familia" and 
"pecunia" do not support the distinction between the words, namely as designation of different 
kinds of property. Familia is derived from the word famulus which means slave and could be 
extended to include other members of the household, but cannot support the theory that it 
embraces the family property. Pecunia which is derived from pecus, clearly does not·embrace 
personal property, such as booty, clothes and weapons. 
56 Di6sdi 43. 
57 His "ownership" should rather be considered as a position of power held by the clan: see Di6sdi 
43. 
58 Although the individual ownership vested solely in one person, the head of the household. 
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framework of inter-personal relationships between individuals. This influence of 
Christianity was already apparent in Greek and early Roman law where the idea of 
magic guilt developed into the concept of personal individual accountability;59 where 
magic fides developed into an ethical principle of bona fides; and where rights came 
to be characterised as emanations of the individual will. eo Generally, the protection of 
individual rights in Roman law (of slaves and women) developed under the influence 
of Christianity and it was Christianity which introduced the concept of equity into 
Roman law. 81 
Legalism, as a characteristic feature of Western law, is based on the separation of law 
and other norms, for example, political, moral and social norms. 82 This feature 
comprises the power of a State legislator to generate and to change law. It also 
encompasses the ordering of social relationships in accordance with general rules of 
law which are not necessarily consonant with moral and social values and purposes. 
It is the separation of law from the living world. Thus, law functions independently of 
external social and economic conditions. Legalism, which separates law from social 
values and purposes, distinguishes Western law from indigenous law where, because 
59 With the establishment of the censorship in the fifth century BC, the collective popular 
disapprobation when a moral precept was violated, was expressed by literally putting a nota 
censoria against the name of the culprit in the census list: see Jolowicz 50-52; Westrup Vol II 
95. Administrative action was taken against the head of the household (deprivation of his good 
name befell him) who did not cultivate his land as was expected of him, or who squandered the 
paternal property: see Westrup Vol Ill 176-1n. Further, the head of the household who abused 
his power and jeopardised the economic well being of the family by selling his son's labour 
more than twice, forfeited his patriarchal authority. It was quite exceptional for transgression of 
a rule to be visited with punishment: see Westrup Vol II 97-102, Westrup Vol 111162-169 260-261, 
Sohm 58 482. 
60 Wieacker 20-23. 
61 Bennan ·interaction• 387-391. On 391 he makes the observation that 9the key to the renewal of 
law in the West from the sixteenth century on was the Protestant concept of the power of the 
individual, by God's grace, to change nature and to create new relations through the exercise 
of his wUI .... [T]he Protestant concept of the individual will became central to the development 
of the modem law of property and contracr. See also Van Zyl •equity" 106-109 for the 
foundation of equity in Roman law and the influence of Christianity on the development of this 
concept in post-classical Roman law. 
62 See Wieacker 23-25. 
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of its non-specialised nature, there is a close relationship between law and other 
norms. 
This feature of Western law may be traced to the development of the professional 
administration of justice in Rome which, on its part, was derived from the expert 
functions of the high priest (pontifex maximus). As indicated above, in the twelfth 
century professional jurists emerged who developed the concept of law as an 
autonomous body of rules and principles. 63 Legalism not only evidences the 
separation, classification or delimitation of legal material, but also brings individualism 
to the fore again. Legalism resulted in a conflict between individual interests and 
rationality, and also created an awareness that the interests of individuals had to be 
protected and that formalised, rule-directed justice had to be restricted. Equity of 
canon law and the discretionary powers of the praetor developed to correct this 
imbalance. The curtailment of the powers of the head of the household also illustrates 
the increasing importance of the individual and the awareness that law and morals 
should be separated. 
Another invariable characteristic of Western law is intellectualism. It may be described 
as the thematisation, conceptualisation and contradiction-free consistency of empirical 
legal materials. 64 Intellectualism also encompasses generalisation an9 abstraction in 
legal reasoning. Abstraction in legal reasoning gained greater prominence in the 
classical and post-classical Roman periods.65 By formally ordering legal science, it 
gave law creation and the application of law a systematic scientific character. 
Intellectualism was derived from Greek philosophy,66 and it induced Roman and later 
European jurists, starting in the twelfth century with the revival of Roman law in 
Bologna, to conceptualise and systematise legal phenomena. European jurists of the 
63 See also Berman "Origins" 399-400. 
64 Wieacker 25-27; see also Berman "Origins" 403ff. 
65 See also Smith & Weisstub 315-317. 
66 Smith & Weisstub 242-244. 
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time employed the dialectical method of the ancient Greeks, as well as of the classical 
Roman and post-classical Roman period as the foundation for their research. It was 
during this period too that the scholastic method of research emerged. This method 
consisted of the analysis and synthesis of sometimes conflicting doctrines and 
principles of secular and ecclesiastical law.87 Greek intellectualism shaped justice to 
an abstract concept which entrenched material equality before the law and deemed 
natural, historical and social distinctions legally irrelevant. 
2 THE FOUNDATION OF JURAL POSTULATES IN INDIGENOUS LAW: THE 
AFRICAN TRADITION 
It is often assumed that indigenous law is not only founded in the tradition of primitive 
legal cultures, but that it also stagnated at a primitive level of development that most 
legal systems went through in the earliest phases of their development. This implies 
that indigenous law did not pass through the evolutionary stages from communalism 
to individualism, from status to contract and from criminal to civil law.88 Indigenous 
law should rather be regarded as being founded in the African tradition. But, if 
67 Berman ·origins• 401 405. See also Berman •interaction· 390-391 for the influence of the Church 
in the transformation of Roman categories into abstract legal rules. 
68 Evolutionary theories of law (especially the very simplistic generalisations of Henry Maine) have 
been refuted by some legal historians. However, Elliott 38-40, argues that theories.of evolution 
of law are not limited to the nineteenth century, but that there is a strong evolutionary 
jurisprudence in America which today still underlies many assumptions about law. He divides 
these theories into four basic groups namely social, doctrinal, economic and sociobiological 
theories of legal evolution. The evolutionary tradition in law starts with the social theories which 
focus on the historical evolution of society and its culture and the corresponding changes that 
take place in law. Proponents of this theory propose an alternative to the positivist perception 
of law-creation through the wm of a sovereign. The social evolutionists laid the foundation for 
modem sociological and anthropological jurisprudence. Savigny was the first exponent of this 
school of thought. Maine continued this tradition and extended Savigny's theory in his 
well-known Ancient Law. Wigmore interpreted legal evolution as the continued adaption of law 
to changes in the environment (Elliott 40-50). The doctrinal theorists takes it a step further and 
Indicate that evolution also occurs at the level of legal doctrines (Elliott 50-62). The economic 
theorists focus on the process that causes changes in legal doctrines. They regard law as 
evolving towards rules that increase economic efficiency (Elliott 62-71). The sociobiological 
theorists emphasise not only the internal dynamics of legal systems but the evolutionary process 
through which law comes into existence and which determines the content and form of law 
(Elliott 71-90). 
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indigenous law is founded in the African tradition, why is it not called African law? 
"African law" has become a generic term for law of the African continent. It comprises 
indigenous law or those remnants of it which are still applied, those laws of religious 
and cognate origins which are recognised by African States, laws and judicial 
institutions introduced by colonial powers and the laws and decrees of independent 
African States. 1111 Indigenous law is clearly a more appropriate term to use. 10 
But is it at all possible to discuss the indigenous laws of different African communities, 
with all their cultural variation, as a single entity?11 Do these indigenous legal systems 
display a distinctive indigenous legal style or approach to law that could justify their 
classification as a legal family? Zweigert and Kotz12 use various criteria which could 
be employed to determine the style of legal systems. These are: historical background 
and development; kind of legal sources and the way they are utilised; distinctive 
institutions; predominant and characteristic mode of thought in legal matters; and 
ideology. 
First, the historical background and development of indigenous laws of Africa (at least 
of Africa South of the Saharah) are largely similar. It should be kept in mind that 
pre-colonial indigenous law forms the subject of discussion, because the legal style 
of indigenous law can best be determined by an assessment of the unadulterated 
indigenous law of that period. In colonial and post-colonial periods indigenous law was 
influenced, adapted and even distorted by external factors. Moreover, colonial 
influences varied depending on the particular colonial power which ruled. It is therefore 
not so easy to extricate the true and core indigenous law from all such external 
influences. However, this does not mean that indigenous law has lost its distinctive 
69 Kodwo Mensah-Brown 7. 
70 See General Introduction: Terminology. 
71 Zweigert & Kotz 67. 
72 Zweigert & Kotz 69-75; Van Zyl Regsverge/yking 49-54. 
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qualities. Indigenous law has proved to be rather tenacious. Sanders73 has remarked 
that 
"[p]rocess-wiseand even rule-wise, today's customary law (African law as described above] may 
not always correspond to that of the pre-colonial past, but value-wise it has retained Its 
communal/socialist nature, as distinguished from the individualistic/capitalist character of the 
superimposed European law". 
Secondly, as regards the sources of law, indigenous law is mainly derived from 
custom and to a lesser extent from legislation. However, sources of law should be 
seen in connection with the other factors and is by itself not a decisive factor. 
Thirdly, there are legal institutions which lend a distinctive style to indigenous legal 
systems. Examples of such characteristic qualities of indigenous law which come to 
mind are the following: In family law, the transfer of the bride to the husband's group 
and the obligation to pay bridewealth; in the law of succession, the concept of 
succession to the position of head of an agnatic group and the absence of any notion 
of inheritance of a deceased estate (because estates vest in agnatic groups which are 
not subject to decease); in procedural law, the lack of professional jurists; in 
constitutional law, the fact there is no separation of powers; and in private law, the 
idea of shared rights and duties. 
The fourth factor which may be taken into account is legal ideology. Diverse factors 
determine and direct legal ideology, for example politics, religion and economy, social 
structure and philosophy. 74 Indigenous cultures focus on social solidarity and from 
an ideological point of reference, indigenous law is regarded as communal or socialist. 
Traditional indigenous government is government by discussion and consent. But 
political and economic relations are closely connected and individuals participate in 
political and economic processes to create and maintain a strong and wealthy 
73 Sanders "People's Philosophy" 41. 
7 4 See also Zweigert & Katz 64. 
Part 11.111.2 Foundation of Jural Postulates in South Africa 249 
community which at the same time protects the individual. Indigenous communities are 
subsistence communities in which everything is communally owned. The kinship group 
lies at the core of the indigenous social structure. Social solidarity focuses on the 
maintenance of an equilibrium in the group, the unity between the living members, 
deceased ancestors and those who are still to be born. In a religious context the 
emphasis is on the omnipresence of the superhuman. 75 
Fifthly there is the distinctive mode of legal thinking or legal technique. By this is meant 
a particular technique in legal reasoning, in dispute resolution, in process and 
generally in the approach to law and legal institutions. Also at this level there are more 
similarities than differences between the indigenous legal systems of Africa, and 
various indigenous laws and institutions have been regarded as variations upon 
common themes,78 or as variations upon common postulates. From this point of view 
indigenous legal systems are non-specialised. An interesting stylistic feature of Western 
law noted by Zweigert and Kotzn is the "struggle for law". This feature entails that 
even though law is aimed at achieving peace, the individual must nevertheless struggle 
to achieve that peace; a duty rests on every individual to fight for his rights. This 
feature is reflected in Western procedural law where the outcome of a dispute is 
described in terms of winning and losing. In contradistinction, indigenous procedure 
is aimed at reconciliation by the employment of a practical and empirical approach. 78 
Although it is the very features of non-specialisation and communalism (as well as the 
strong reliance on custom) which usually induce people to classify indigenous law as 
75 See also Otite 147-149. 
76 Darboe 100; Sanders ·characteristic Features• 333-334. 
n Zweigert & Kotz 71-72. 
78 See also Darboe 108-109. At 109 he observes that, "instead of trying to bring about a discourse 
that would ensure the establishment of knowledge, the African approach to law aspires to give 
birth to a practice which would not only assure the continuity of social groupings, but also 
would enable the entire society to sustain conflicts which may arise to threaten social coherence 
and equUibrium·. 
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primitive law, 111 these concepts have a unique meaning in an indigenous law context, 
a meaning which is rooted in the African tradition. Indeed, there are enough similarities 
in procedure, principles, institutions, ideology and technique to regard the various 
indigenous laws as belonging to a separate family of laws which is founded in a single 
African tradition. 
The African tradition transcends extra-African influences and encapsulates the African 
spirit of ubuntu. It is this ethos of ubuntu which gives indigenous law a different 
dimension and which distinguishes it from mere primitive law, or from mere religious 
law or mere customary law or African law in its present day-meaning. Ubuntu is a 
fundamental value; an inherent belief system which underscores indigenous cultures 
and indigenous legal orders in Africa. The concept of ubuntu has been subject to 
many interpretations by different people at different times. 80 Oakley-Smith81 translates 
this Nguni word82 as "humaneness" or the "link that binds men together" thereby 
79 Ancient laws, religious and other, were basically of a non-specialised, communal character. 
Maine 134, explains that "society in primitive times was not what it assumed to be at present, 
a collection of individuals .... [l]t was an aggregation of families. The contrast may be most 
forcibly expressed by saying that the unit of an ancient society was the Family, of a modem 
society the individual." Maine's primitive society is explained from a basic Western point of view. 
His frame of reference is patriarchal Incle-European societies. Although there are similarities 
between those primitive societies and indigenous African societies, there are also certain very 
real differences. Non-specialisation and communalism were also present in ear1y Celtic clan 
associations as well as in primitive Greek and Roman cultures. Also ancient Germanic law is 
often likened to African law: see Wessels 16-22. Yet in Germanic law there are traces of 
specialisation in the individual ownership of the half-free. Originally land belonged to the group 
or tribe. But, in time the individual ownership of land developed under Roman influence. In 
Germanic law there was further a lack of abstraction or the "predominance of the sensory 
element": see Huebner 12. Thus, legal reasoning was founded in the visible and tangible or 
sensory observation and then related to an inner or intellectual basis as is the case with 
indigenous law. There was no separation of private and public law: see Huebner 15. 
80 Tambane 37 refers to it as the body of rich norms, ethics, values and cultural behaviour patterns 
of the indigenous people of Africa. At 38 he puts forward an interesting version of the 
evolutionary theory: colonisation foisted advanced capitalism on the indigenous populations of 
Africa. As they skipped the evolutionary stages of slavery and feudalism, they were enabled to 
retain the essentially tribal values of ubuntu whilst accomodating capitalism. 
81 Oakley-Smith 29. 
82 In Sotho languages it is botho. 
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emphasising the connection between the individual and the community.83 The term 
has also been described as "the art of being a human being", a description which 
focuses on tolerance, compassion and forgiveness in relation to other human 
beings.114 It has been likened to the English "person-hood", an abstract term which 
aims at community building and which manifests itself through concrete acts in 
different situations. 85 
Ubuntu has often been presented as African humanism88 and it is perhaps easier to 
explain the concept with reference to the familiar Western concept. Humanism puts the 
human being at the centre of all things. It is a belief in the centrality, the sacredness, 
the primacy of human beings in all spheres of life. It emphasises the values of human 
dignity, safety, welfare, health, beauty, love, development which should take priority 
over economic financial and political considerations. 87 
But ubuntu can be understood only within the context of the world view of indigenous 
people.88 They regard the world as an integrated whole of nature, life on earth and 
83 Cowley 3 compares ubuntu with the Japanese concept of "wa" which comprises unity, 
cohesiveness and "esprit de corps". It is "the vibe achieved by the group or 'team being in time 
with group effort and spirit". 
84 Dhlomo 49-51 ; He refers to ubuntu (for which all indigenous African languages have a term) as 
a purely African philosophy of life. 
85 Trinca & Valente 44-47. 
86 Malekane 2; Vilakazi 7. Omi & Anyanwu 139 describe African humanism as "virtues of the heart". 
These virtues are self-control and humility; faithfulness and friendship; and goodness and 
kindness. These virtues are aimed at maintaining the equilibrium in the group. Both horizontal 
social solidarity (between the living, and between the living, the deceased ancestors and those 
not yet born) and vertical solidarity (between the living and the creator god) must be maintained. 
87 Vilakazi 7. 
88 Hammond-Tooke Rituals 33 explains that wor1d view "is essentially a (cognitive) attempt to make 
sense of the world, and impose meaning on it". Besides intellectual statements to explain the 
wor1d and life, wor1d view comprises concepts and beliefs, with a strong emotional content, 
about the sense of being and as such it comprises subjective value systems. 
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the after-life. According to them, the world should exist in a state of harmony.89 
People on earth should live in harmony with each other, with nature, and with the gods 
and the ancestors. To maintain this harmonious state of affairs, the interests of the 
individual, as a component of the collectivity, should be looked after. His dignity, health 
and social welfare should be protected. But the welfare of the individual is but one side 
of the coin, the other side being the welfare of the community. And therein lies the 
essence of ubuntu: the ~elfare of the individual is inextricably linked to the welfare of 
the collectivity which is in turn inextricably linked to a harmonious relationship with the 
ancestors and with nature. Although man is at the centre of things, man can be 
defined only in relation to other men. But the community can likewise be defined only 
with reference to its individual members: 
"The relationship between 'man' and 'society' was never thought of in hierarchal terms. 
Ubuntuism teaches that 'I am because they are; and they are because I am.' The 'community' 
is the 'I' writ large - and the 'I' is the community individualised. And ... this tie-up between the 
'I' and the 'community' reaches beyond the grave . ..so 
Kaunda and others91 trace the historical roots of the concept back to small-scale 
societies in Africa. In the first place indigenous communities are characterised as 
mutual communities. They are subsistence communities in which resources are 
communally owned and administered to satisfy the needs of every person as member 
of society. The only perception of life is life-in-community. Disturbed harm9ny has to 
be restored and parties to a dispute reconciled and forgiven so that opposing parties 
are both again integrated into society.92 To this may be added that indigenous 
decision making is aimed at removing dissent through community participation. 
89 This is comparable with the Buddhist tradition which has a profound influence on the Japanese 
world view. It recognises ihe temporal, passing, impermanent and changing nature of the ego, 
and by so doing finds the true self through iclentifacation with universal oneness": see Smith 355. 
90 Trinco & Valente 45. 
91 Kaunda 22-28; see also Koopman 34, Vilakazi 9, Dhlomo 51, Malekane 2. 
92 Kaunda 34. 
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Communication in the community takes place outwardly with the emphasis on 
transparency. 93 
Further, indigenous communities are characterised as accepting communities. 
Members are "valued not for what they could achieve but because they are there". 
This feature emphasises the high regard for human dignity in indigenous culture, 
irrespective of personal "usefulness" to society. IM All persons are regarded as 
important components of the group and have a specific role to fulfill in the community. 
Thirdly, indigenous communities are inclusive, participatory96 communities. This 
means that relationships and responsibilities must be seen within the context of the 
extended family. Indigenous Africa cherishes family life. The human community is 
regarded as so important that not even death can interfere with it. Thus the ancestors 
are regarded as a mere extension of the group on earth and as an integral part of the 
extended family. This feature emphasises an acceptance of wide responsibilities and 
care for others. It rejects the idea of absolute individual freedom, also in the realisation 
of human dignity. 
In the light of what has been said about ubuntu, one could now take another look at 
legal ideology and legal technique in indigenous law. However one must remain aware 
of the fact that in indigenous law, ideology and technique are intertwined and influence 
each other. Sanders96 submits that ideology accounts for the non-specialised nature 
93 Koopman 33-36. At 35, emphasising Africa's oral tradition, he observes that Africa evolved out 
of the spoken word and thinks aurally, not through the written word. 
94 This explains the indigenous African's inability to grasp the Western attitude towards the elderly. 
With reference to old-age homes in Western societies (which have become a necessity in 
modem societies where family care for the elderly cannot be taken for granted any longer), 
Kaunda 26-27 comments that "in a society which regards person to person relationships as 
supremely important no one can be so Isolated that responsibility for his welfare cannot be 
determined and assigned". 
95 Malekane 1 2. 
96 Sanders "Characteristic Features" 335. 
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of indigenous law. By the same token it may be said, though, that in indigenous law 
the lack of specialisation determines ideology. 
From an ideological point of view indigenous law is communal or socialist. Yet social 
solidarity and harmony of the collectivity as fundamental principles of indigenous law 
must not be seen as a means to promote societal welfare or the common good to the 
exclusion of individual human needs. The common good must always be seen in 
relation to the individual as an inextricable component of that community. In the same 
way that humanism has a very specific meaning in indigenous law, so does socialism. 
Otite91 remarks that African socialism is "humanist and egalitarian, a defense of 
communalism"98 and that the qualities of brotherhood, familyhood, mutual 
dependence and benevolence, and a "cherished communocratic society" create a 
unique content for socialism in Africa. 99 
The lack of specialisation is reflected in all spheres of indigenous law. Thus, for 
example law, morality and religious expectations are not rigidly distinguished and there 
is also no rigid distinction between public and private needs. It is in these examples 
of the non-specialised nature of indigenous law that the ethos of ubuntu is best 
illustrated. Ubuntu gives the close relationship between law and morality and public 
and individual needs a fundamentally humane dimension. 100 Ghandi once said that 
the "true practice of law" and the ''true function of the lawyer was to unite parties riven 
asunder", 101 and Leopold Senghor said that "emotion is Africa, reason is Hellenic". 102 
97 Otite 141. 
98 Otite 145. He also explains that "society is not an undifferentiated mass of peoples. Man is not 
a tool for social continuity and economic development. He is human". 
99 Otite 154. 
100 Koopman 34 refers to the bias for "morals and emotions" in indigenous decision making. In 
practice it ls, eg, illustrated by the reintegration of criminals into the community and by the 
reconciliation of the parties to a dispute. 
101 Smith 346. 
102 Trinco & Valente 45. 
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Bearing the similarity of indigenous and Japanese jural postulates in mind, it comes 
as no surprise that one finds a comparable emotional foundation in Japanese law. 103 
The important link between law and compassion in both indigenous African and 
indigenous Japanese law is manifested in a reluctance to litigate and a preference to 
mediate; in an avoidance of confrontation and a distaste for adversarial procedure; 
and in the fact that dispute resolution is aimed at restoration of harmony, a harmony 
which "rests in a sense of identity within the community, which is generated mainly by 
emotional means". 104 
In an article on the ideas of the self in Japanese and Western legal consciousness, 
Smith discusses the concept of "amae" in Japanese law. There is an interesting 
similarity between this concept and the African concept of ubuntu. A cryptic exposition 
of this concept in Japanese law may shed some light on the content and role of 
ubuntu in indigenous legal ordering. Amae may be described as the spiritual 
foundation of Japan. 105 It forms the basis of the whole social and legal system and 
of the jural postulates which underscore Japanese law. In abstract terms it may be 
translated as the dependence of the individual on community acceptance. This 
dependence can in indigenous terms be likened to a mutual dependence between the 
community and the individual. 
The Japanese distinguish between a sense of having a self and a sense of having no 
self. A sense of having a self can be developed only once a strong we-consciousness 
has been developed. Total isolation from the group induces a sense of having no self. 
Therefore, an individual's acceptance and position within the group is very important. 
In indigenous law, the importance of the acceptance by the group is illustrated by the 
fact that the punishment of ostracism is regarded in a very serious light. Accordingly, 
banishment is a competent punishment for serious crimes such as black magic, 
103 Smith 346 347; Yasaki 185. 
104 Smith 347. 
105 Smith 347, see generally 347-352. 
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murder and treason. 108 
Because of the weak position of "we" as opposed to the strong position of "I" in 
Western cultures, Western legal orders are characterised by analysis, discrimination, 
differentiation, individualism, intellectualism, objectivism, inductive reasoning, scientific 
thought, generalisation, conceptualisation, legalism, organisation, self-assertion, 
impersonality. In contrast indigenous Japanese and indigenous African legal orders, 
because of a well developed we-consciousness, are characterised as synthetic, 
totalising, integrative, non-discriminative, non-systematic, dogmatic, intuitive, 
non-discursive, subjective, communalistic and spiritually individualistic. 107 
The difference between ubuntu and amae seems to be that the I-consciousness in 
Japanese law is weak and the we-consciousness is strong; whilst ubuntu is founded 
upon a strong we-consciousness as developed through a strong I-consciousness. 
Ubuntu is more in line with the ideal position in which the I-consciousness and 
we-consciousness develop in harmony. "I" and "we" are not regarded as conflicting 
opposites between which a balance should be maintained. "There can be no 'I' without 
a 'we', nor conversely, a 'we' without a set of 'l's'."108 
3 CONCLUSION 
In mainstream liberal jurisprudence the most important diffuse postulate of Western law 
is reflected in the concept of absolute individual freedom. The protection of the 
individual in Western law has become a reasoned process which is sadly devoid of 
human feeling, emotion and compassion. The Western conception of individual rights 
is regarded to be characterised by conceptual difinitude. This means that, because 
individual rights are so rigidly conceptualised, Western jurisprudence has as its main 
106 Myburgh ·Punishment" 48 49. 
107 Smith 355. 
108 Smith 354; Chiba Legal Pluralism 143. 
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objective the interpretation of a conceptual framework in which rights are 
systematically organised; it does not concern itself with possible individual variations 
and functions in practice. 108 Otite110 has written that "Western societies took their 
departure [from the process of humanisation of society] through industrialisation" and 
''the more Westernised the African societies become, particularly after the exploitation 
through colonial activities, the less of this universal humanism remains". Individuals not 
only stand in radical isolation, but human beings are objectified in Western legal 
thought. 111 The protection of individual human rights has developed into a formal 
technical weighing of individual claims without any sense of ubuntu (or amae). 
Maclntyre112 notes that rights are ascribed to individuals as individuals and without 
taking into account any relationship with other individuals or with the community. 
Rights thus become claims to protect the individual against threats presented by 
others. Rights become primarily rights against others. 
It is this conception of rights which makes it so difficult to explain indigenous legal 
phenomena with reference to Western concepts. In indigenous law there is no 
conception of rights and of the protection of rights, even fundamental human rights, 
for the sole benefit of one individual against other individuals or against the group. It 
is even difficult to translate the Western conception of rights into an indigenous context 
by saying that rights are the claims of groups for the sake or benefit of one group 
against other groups. In indigenous law there is another dimension to rights: even if 
rights are regarded as the individual claims of constituent groups, the protection of 
rights are for the benefit of society as a whole. Disturbed relationships in the 
109 Chiba Legal Pluralism 142. 
110 Otite 150. 
111 Smith 359 mentions the holocaust, slavery and the condition of industrial workers in 
nineteenth-century England as examples of such objectification of human beings. Likewise, and 
In a South African context, the whole system of apartheid with all its annexures of forced 
removals, pass laws, and the negation of the law and culture of a people are but examples of 
the objectification of human beings. 
112 Macintyre 495. 
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community unsettle relationships with the superhuman and this may cause a variety 
of detrimental consequences for all. Therefore, claims must be adhered to and rights 
protected for the sake and benefit, not of the individual group, but for society as a 
whole. Likewise individual interests must be protected to maintain the equilibrium in the 
group and in the community as a whole. 
But, faith in absolute individual freedom in Western law is faltering. The supremacy of 
this freedom is challenged and its protection countered through the application of the 
principles of public policy, public interest, boni mores and equity. Although 
individualism is still reflected in these principles, the position of the individual as part 
of a larger whole is coming to. the fore, thus limiting the absolute primacy of individual 
freedom. If the Western idea of freedom is to mean something more than the 
satisfaction of individual desires, it must comprise solidarity with others through 
participation. 113 
Apart from the important feature of individualism in Western legal reasoning, legalism 
and conceptualism also give the Western legal culture a specific specialised character 
which is not reconcilable with indigenous legal cultures. Legalism is reflected in the 
separation of law and other norms. It separates law from social values. This is in 
contradistinction with indigenous law which maintains a close relationship between law 
and other norms. Intellectualism too, which comprises thematisation, conceptualisation 
and abstraction in legal reasoning, is not compatible with the non-specialised 
indigenous legal reasoning which focuses on the visible, tangible or sensory world and 
which is characterised by lack of differentiation, classification and conceptualism. 
113 Smith 352, see also 356-365. 
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The historical events which gave rise to legal pluralism in South Africa have been 
discussed in the preceding chapters. It has been shown that the systems of law which 
are potentially applicable in this country are supported by diverse legal postulates 
which reflect different values, inherent in different cultures. Because there is no 
agreement with regard to the values which support the present official legal system, 
it is today regarded as culturally illegitimate by the majority of South Africans. Before 
the enactment of the Interim Constitution Van der Vyver remarked that1 
1 Van der Vyver •Post-apartheicr 822. Kaganas & Murray •eontest• 425 also go out from the 
premiss that the values endorsed by the Constitution has a moral legitimacy afforded by the 
democratic nature of the process by which it was adopted. However, they point out that ·cultural 
practices are themselves the product of an active process of creation and subject to continuing 
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"[s]ince all major participants in the South African constitutional initiatives agree that the new 
constitution and its Bill of Rights are to emerge as the product of a negotiated settlement of 
the political dispute and that the negotiations ought to involve representatives of all political 
persuasions with meaningful support in the country, the problem of legitimacy will not likely 
arise. It Is worth noting once again, however, that superimposed constitutional formulae, or 
constitutional arrangements that borrow too heavily from the practices of foreign jurisdictions 
and do not address the real causes of discontent and friction In the society to be served by 
those formulae and arrangements, are sure to generate their own legitimacy crisis.· 
However, even if the real causes of discontent and friction within the South African 
society have been addressed in the Interim Constitution; even if political legitimacy has 
been achieved and the Constitution, human rights declarations and legal system2 
reflect the society's political history, struggles and aspirations, it is still, to a large 
extent, underscored by Western jural postulates and does not accommodate 
indigenous values. It does not address the conflict of the values which underscore 
indigenous law and Western law respectively; it does nothing to address the cultural 
legitimacy of the legal system. 3 The only difference that the new political dispensation 
has brought about in the theoretical and practical position of indigenous law, is that 
its continued application and status are as will be indicated below, now more than ever 
before shrouded in uncertainty. 
In this chapter some practical examples will be discussed of where indigenous law and 
its jural postulates are in conflict with Western law and its jural postulates. It seems that 
the entrenchment of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution, which is framed from a distinct 
Western perspective, has given new impetus to the debate surrounding the continued 
re-evaluation and modification ... [and] cannot be considered immune from challenge". 
2 It is debatable whether the present legal order in which one legal system has the status of a 
dominant system, reflects the whole society's political history, struggles and aspirations. 
3 Van der Westhuizen 9Tiger in Africa" 11-14 points out that legitimacy may be viewed from 
different points of view. A distinction may be drawn between political legitimacy (as explained 
above), cultural legitimacy Oegitimacy appraised in its cultural context) and socio-economic 
legitimacy Oegitimacy determined with reference to access to human-rights instruments and 
legal institutions). These three should be seen as an integrated whole and overtap to some 
extent. 
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application or possible reform of indigenous law. This is not a new debate. Whereas 
the focus used to be on the compatibility of indigenous law with Western perceptions 
of public policy and natural justice, it has now moved to the compatibility of indigenous 
law with Western perceptions of human rights. 4 
; 
\ \ .E> ' n~ '-" 
The first question that arises is how compatible this Bill of Rights is with indigenous 
_..._...,,.,,.. . __......,__~~ • .., ... ~<~--~- ~,- .• ·,·-·; ··~~--- ,..,, 
law? Some jurists assume that the concept of human rights is quite foreign to 
~~.;;-
indigenous law: although regard for human dignity is predominant in that society, and 
although there is an intimate link between human rights and human dignity, these are 
not regarded as equivalent concepts. The concept of human rights as natural, 
inherent, inal!enable. rights held by virtue of the fact that one is born a human bein~) 
· remains a creation of Western civilisation and is foreign to indigenous law~Jn' 
• indigenous society rights are assigned on the basis of communal membership, family, 
.r;."> 
.··.status or achievement.j 
It seems to be the inherent conservative and collectives nature of indigenous law 
which causes the belief that human rights are foreign to that system of law. 
Collectivism or the preservation of group solidarity is often referred to as a lack of 
human rights. However, whilst there is indeed a lack of individualism, individualisation 
_____________ ,,_ 
is an important feature of indigenous law and concern for the individual and human 
4 The generally accepted substantive human rights are the right to life, liberty (freedom from 
slavery, forced labour, and freedom of movement and residence), property, education, social 
security, and freedom of belief and expression, association and assembly. Procedural rights are 
the right not to be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act not embodied in law 
and the right to a fair trial before a public court. A fair trial is characterised by a presumption 
of innocence, public trial without undue delay, the right to legal assistance, time to prepare a 
defence, the right to examine witnesses, the right not to be compelled to confess guilt or to 
testify against oneself: see Van der Westhuizen Human Rights Law 3. 
5 See Donnelly ·Human Rights• 303 305 306 308, Donnelly ·cultural RelatMsm· 410; see also 
Cobbah 309-310' Mahmud 489-491. 
6 Members of the group share their rights and duties in accordance with their status within the 
group. 
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dignity takes high priority in indigenous culture. 1 From an indigenous-law perspective, 
some basic individual human rights may in fact be distinguished, a some comparable 
to Western conceptions and others with a distinct indigenous character quite foreign 
to Western law.9 Moreover, human rights should be considered also in the context of 
the individual's protection from the State and State power. In this context too one 
should bear in mind that the very fact that in indigenous law the group share certain 
fundamental rights does not mean that such rights are not protected against the 
arbitrary execution of State power (albeit within the limited indigenous law sense). 
Thus it is accepted that human rights as the claims or demands that an individual has 
by virtue of the fact that he was born a human being indeed find application in 
indigenous law. As with other rights and principles, human rights may be explained by 
analogy with the Western concept of human rights. But a distinction should be made 
between "concept"10 and "conception". 11 Whilst the former has a settled meaning, the 
latter may vary depending on time and circumstance. Therefore, it should always be 
borne in mind that even if one assumes that the concept of human rights exists in 
indigenous law, the conception of human rights may not necessarily be the same in 
Western and indigenous societies because the jural postulates which provide the 
respective starting points for legal reasoning are so different. Likewise, the fact that 
certain human rights are as such distinguished in Western society but not in 
indigenous society does not mean that the concept of human rights does not exist in 
7 This may be observed, eg, in dispute resolution, where special care is taken that substantive 
justice is done and individuals involved are reconciled. In criminal law it is the individual's mental 
health, consciousness and sobriety which determine his responsibility for his act. In the case 
of assault the victim is allowed to inflict upon the attacker an injury similar to the one he had 
suffered. Amongst the Zulu the culprit responsible for the injury of another in a kraal encounter, 
visits the injured party frequently and offers assistance in sympathy: see generally Part 1.11.4. 
8 The expression of these rights should be seen in their indigenous cultural context where kinship 
plays a primary role. 
9 See Mahalu 3, Welch 13; Marasinghe 32-44, Reyntjens "Human Rights" 41; for a contrary view 
see Mahmud 489-491, Cobbah 309-310, Donnelly "Human Rights• 303 305 306. 
1 O What something means, the definition. 
11 A concrete specification of a concept. 
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indigenous law. 
Deng 12 pqints out that human rights, are univer~ally inherent in the very notion of 
huf"Tlanity .. Tbi$_doe!) not mean that the cultural context of its conception_ should be 
denied. On the contrary, a proper understanding of the diversity of the cultural 
""=''"'""'""''"~· ·""'~ 
contexts of human rights may only enhance prospects for cross-cultural enrichment 
in this regard. For example, if the indigenous spirit of ubuntu 13 were to influence the 
Western concept of absolute individual freedom, protection of human rights in Western 
society may move away from the formal technical weighing of individual claims and the 
objectification of human beings; and individuals may no longer find themselves in the 
situation of radical isolation th~y often experience despite the conscientious protection 
of human rights in Western society. Likewise indigenous law may be enhanced by 
Western cultural influences. For example, the Western concept of democracy can only 
have a positive influence on indigenous political thought. The one-party State is often 
perceived to be part of the indigenous political heritage. Yet indigenous political 
systems functioned in circumstances which were irrevocably changed with the 
introduction of the nation-State. 
From the outset it must be remembered that even human rights in indigenous law are 
not the exclusive claims of individuals. Individuals should always be ,seen within the 
context of the group as a whole, and groups, which are the legal subjects in 
indigenous law, should be seen as entities composed of individuals.1" The fact that 
an individual is regarded as an entity in the group does not take away that, as 
individual in the group, she has some natural, inalienable and fundamental rights by 
virtue of being a human being. And although indigenous-law rights are determined by 
12 Deng 261. 
13 See Part 11.111.2 for a discussion of this concept. 
14 Elias 85 explains that the group is made up of individuals and that it is not an independent 
self-contained unit. The group responds to its members and may even change in accordance 
with the needs of its members: see generally Elias 76-95 on the importance of the individual 
within the group. 
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a person's status and although status is in turn determined by a person's position 
within the group, all persons, irrespective of their status and irrespective of their 
position within the family group, have these inalienable rights. 
It is indeed so that the present state of the protection of human rights in Africa 
underscores the assumption that the concept of human rights is foreign to Africa and 
its indigenous cultures. However, this assumption is based on circumstances directly 
or indirectly resulting from the imposition of a foreign culture upon indigenous cultures 
through colonisation. 111 The following factors, and not indigenous African tradition and 
practices, appear to be responsible for these circumstances: 
(i) The disruption of pre-colonial indigenous social and political structures and the 
legacy of command. The nation-State was introduced and artificial boundaries 
imposed in the colonial scramble for Africa. 18 Foreign political structures were 
imposed by the colonial powers. The time of authoritarianism provided no 
encouragement for respect and protection of human rights. Indigenous 
government was "civilised", leaders were reduced to the status of puppets in 
colonial regimes, and indigenous institutions were subjugated. Existing 
indigenous rights were abridged and Western values imposed because of a 
belief in the superiority of the latter. Indigenous practices were altered and 
individual expression regarded as superior to collective expression. 11 
Eventually, after independence, nationalist leadership was urged to include 
justiciable bills of rights in their new constitutions. Yet the indigenous people 
were not permitted to play any role in drawing up these constitutions which 
15 The following sources have been consulted in this regard: Van der Westhuizen "Tiger in Africa" 
14-23, Sanders "BUI of Rights• 190-194, Welch 13-19, Reyntjens •Human Rights· 40-43, Mahalu 
4-7 14-17, Eze 9-15, Wiredu 243-260. 
16 Mahmud 489 regards the creation of the nation-State as the most important obstacle in the 
Implementation of the communitarian Ideal. 
17 This authotitaniarism was and Is not at all in accord with the spirit and practice of traditional 
political systems on the continent and may be described as "abberations facilitated by colonial 
legacies·: see Wai 115. 
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inadequately reflected indigenous communitarian values. Under the banner of 
social and economic development, the protection of human rights was soon 
curbed and appeals to traditional practices and values became a cloak for 
self-interest and arbitrary rule.18 
(ii) Economic hardship and under-development. It is quite obvious that colonial 
control over land and agriculture had far-reaching consequences for 
pre-colonial Africa. Whether it was the sole reason for the economic dilemma 
is debatable. Importantly, the protection and recognition of human rights were 
influenced by low levels of economic development, by the perception that 
economic resources had been distributed unequally, by the fact that 
post-independence leaders strove for economic upliftment, emphasising 
collective achievement through government, and by a desire for substantial 
change in international economic relations. 
Oii) The imposition of foreign law and the judiciary's lack of legal standing. Only 
indigenous civil law was recognised and then only to a limited extent. Foreign 
Western law and institutions were imposed on the indigenes and this caused 
confusion over applicable standards and values. Access to justice became 
increasingly restricted, due, amongst others, to illiteracy, the high cost of legal 
aid, and the fact that Western law, language and institutions were largely 
foreign. Moreover, courts became viewed as instruments of oppression. 
(iv) Lack of information and condonation. Authoritarian rulers restricted the role of 
the media in the disclosure of human-rights violations. Foreign media displayed 
a lack off interest in "black on black" violation of human rights. 
In order to establish the influence of the Bill of Rights on the interaction of indigenous 
law and Western law, it has to be determined to what extent the concept of human 
18 Donnelly ·cultural Relativism• 412; see generally Donnelly ·cultural Relativism• 411-414. 
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rights finds application in indigenous law and how indigenous and Western 
conceptions of human rights differ. This will be done by way of some examples where 
there would appear to be a conflict between indigenous law and Western law. But 
before this can be established, a short exposition is required of the provisions in the 
Constitution 19 which deal with indigenous law. 
1.a The Constitution and the Application of Indigenous Law 
Indigenous law is expressly dealt with in sections ~~-~~~:-~J.~~2~.~.!i~!}aj 
Principle XIII and Schedule 6 of the Constitution. 21 The terms "customary law" and 
"indigenous law" are employed interchangeably. 22 In Chapter 3 which contains the Bill 
of Fundamental Rights, section 33(2) and section 33(3) of the limitation clause, and 
section 35(3) of the interpretation clause refer to "customary law". These sections are 
general sections which refer to the common law, customary law and legislation.23 
19 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 as amended by the Constitution 
Consequential Amendment Act 201 of 1993, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Amendment Act 2 of 1994, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment 
Act 3 of 1994, herinafter referred to as "the Constitution". 
20 S 35(3) determines that customary law shall be interpreted, applied and developed within the 
spirit of the Bill of Rights. 
21 S 7(2) too, refers to indigenous law. It states that the Bill of Rights shall apply to "all law in 
force". Du Plessis & Corder 114 point out that the wording ("legislation" was first used and 
thereafter "laws") of earlier drafts of the Constitution was changed to the inclusive singular term 
"law", in order to make it clear that the term includes categories of law other than legislation. 
22 It seems that it was not the intention for these terms to denote different legal systems: see Kerr 
"Fundamental Rights" 722 n6; see also the explanation of terminology in the General 
Introduction. 
23 Section 33 determines: 
33(2) Save as provided for in subsection (1) or any other provision of this Constitution, no law, 
whether a rule of the common law, customary law or legislation, shall limit any right entrenched 
in this Chapter. 
33(3) The entrenchment of the rights of this Chapter shall not be construed as denying the 
existence of any other rights or freedoms recognised or conferred by common law, customary 
law or legislation to the extent that they are not inconsistent with this Chapter. 
Section 35{3) determines: In the interpretation of any law and the application and development 
of the common law and customary law, a court shall have due regard to the spirit, purport and 
objects of this Chapter. 
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ln~_Ghapter 11, sections 181 and 183, and in Constitutional Principle XIII, which deals 
exclusively with indigenous law and institutions, the term "indigenous law" is employed. 
Section 181 (1) determines that traditional authorities which observe indigenous law and 
which are recognised before the implementation of the Constitution, shall continue as 
such authorities and continue to exercise their powers in accordance with ''the 
applicable laws and customs [indigenous law], subject to repeal of such laws and 
customs". Section 181 (2) determines that indigenous law ·shall be subject to regulation 
by law". Section 183(2)(a) makes provision that the house of traditional leaders shall 
be entitled "to advise and make proposals to the provincial legislature or government 
in respect of matters relating to traditional authorities, indigenous law, or the traditions 
and customs of traditional communities within the province·. Schedule 6 indicates 
"indigenous law and customary law" as one of the legislative competences of the 
provinces. 
/' 
Section 14(3) states that nothing in Chapter 3 shall preclude legislation which (a) 
recognises a system of personal and family law adhered to by persons who profess 
a certain religion and (b) the validity of marriages concluded.under such a system of 
religious law.- However, even if one accepts that indigenous law is a religious legal 
system, there is no legislation which recognises indigenous marriages as valid 
marriages and this section is therefore not applicable to indigenous law. 
Kerr24 points out that there is a conflict or at least competition between Constitutional 
Principle XIII and the equality clause contained in section 8 of the Bill of Fundamental 
Rights, as well as between Constitutional Principles XIII and 111.25 On the one hand, '7 
Constitutional Principle XIII determines that the Constitution will protect the "institution, 
status and role of traditional leadership, according to indigenous law" and that 
"indigenous law, like common law, shall be recognised and applied by the courts, J 
subject to the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution and to legislation 
24 Kerr •Fundamental Rights" 723. 
25 The constitutional principles are contained in Schedule 4 of the Constitution Act. 
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specifically dealing therewith". On the other hand, section 8(2) determines that there 
shall not be any unfair discrimination on grounds of, amongst others, gender, se~ 
and age; and Constitutional Principle Ill determines that the Constitution "shall prohibit 
racial, gender and all other forms of discrimination and shall promote racial and gender 
equality and national unity". 21 
Whilst Constitutional Principle II makes provision that a new, revised Bill of Rights be 
drafted after due consideration of the existing Bill; the Constitutional Assembly is 
bound in terms of sections 71 (1) and 7 4(1) by the Constitutional Principles contained 
in schedule 4 when they draw up the final Constitution and they are not allowed to 
amend or repeal these principles. Also the preamble to the Interim Constitution 
requires that the new ·constitution shall be "in accordance with a solemn pact recorded 
as Constitutional Principles". Therefore, whereas the Constitutional Assembly is free 
to alter the existing Bill of Rights or to insert further limitations upon it should they find 
that it is in conflict with Constitutional Principle XIII, there is little they can do to remove 
any conflict which may exist between Constitutional Principles II and XIII. 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution will be used as a framework for a discussion of the areas 
in which conflict between indigenous law and Western law seem to be most likely. 
26 Kerr 723 n14 points out that there is nothing in the Constitution to indicate any difference 
between gender and sex. Thus, discrimination on the ground of sex Is equivalent to 
discrimination on grounds of gender. According to Albertyn & Kentridge 167 there is a difference 
between these two concepts in feminist literature and the inclusion of both terms indicate that 
it is not permissible to discriminate unfairly against women or men on grounds of either 
biological features (sex) or patterns of behaviour (gender); see also Du Plessis & Corder 143. 
27 Also the preamble to the Constitution states that there shall be equality between men and 
women and all races. 
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2 APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS WITH REGARD TO INDIGENOUS 
LAW 
With regard to the question whether the Bill of Rights has horizontal application, the 
following may be noted.28 Section 7(1) determines that the chapter on fundamental 
rights shall bind "legislative and executive organs of State at all levels of government". 
If section 7(1) is strictly interpreted, this means that the Bill of Rights regulates only 
vertical relationships between the State and individuals, and not also horizontal 
relationships between different individuals. 
In an interim report the Law Commission noted that the Bill of Rights "regulates the 
'vertical' relation between State and subject" and that Civil Rights Acts which will bring 
relations between individuals into line with provisions of the Bill of Rights may be 
legislated in future. The Law Commission observed further that the Bill of Rights 
"leaves the same latitude as that provided by the US bill of rights" to implement it 
horizontally, thus foreseeing indirect horizontal application. Moreover, according to the 
Commission's report, interpretation of all legislation should be in accordance with the 
Bill of Rights, as is the case in Germany.29 But in De Klerk v Du Plessis Van Dijkhorst 
J made the following observatio.n:30 
•As the people of South Africa, who are governed by the text of the Constitution, are entitled to 
order their lives on the strength of what they read therein without reference to the writings of 
contemporaries of the drafters or the drafters themselves, the drafting history of the Constitution 
should ... be regarded as irrelevant to its interpretation: 
28 The following sources were consulted on the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights: Davis 
Chaskalson De Waal 128 210-211, Du Plessis & Corder 110-114, Cachalia 19-21 121-122, Kerr 
•Fundamental Rights• 720-721, Hawthorne 5-7, SA Law Commission Group and Human Rights 
489-494, Noo 37-38, Van der Vyver ·Post-apartheid· 795-801, Carpenter ·constitutional LaW- 981, 
Rautenbach 82-87, Sasson 15-16. 
29 SA Law Commission Group and Human Rights 493. 
30 1995 2 SA 40 (T) 47F-G. 
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It is therefore important to look briefly at the text of the Constitution. 31 Section 4, 
which deals with the supremacy of the Constitution, determines that the Constitution 
shall be binding on all legislative, executive and judicial organs of the State, at all levels 
of government. Section 7(2) makes Chapter 3 applicable to "all law in force", which 
includes the common law and customary law. Section 33(2) expressly subjects the 
common law and customary law to the rights contained in Chapter 3 and renders any 
common-law limitation on such rights unconstitutional if it does not conform to the 
requirements of section 33(1 ). Common-law and customary-law rights that are not 
contained in Chapter 3, but that are not inconsistent with the Chapter, are recognised 
in section 33(3). Section 33(4) says that the Chapter does not "preclude measures 
designed to prohibit unfair discrimination by bodies and persons other than those 
bound in terms of section 7(1)". Section 35(3) determines that in the interpretation of 
any law, and in the application and development of both common law and customary 
law, a court must have regard to the spirit, purport and objects of Chapter 3. 32 This 
subsection may be seen as an express indication that the Bill of Rights is horizontally 
applicable; or it may be seen as an indication that all existing law may, by way of 
seepage, be influenced by the values entrenched in Chapter 3.33 However, it should 
be borne in mind that section 35(3) may also be interpreted as an indication against 
the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights. 34 The argument then is that section 
35(3) was drafted to ensure the generous application of the righ~s contained in 
31 In Mota/av University of Natal 1995 3 BCLR 374 (D) 381 the court determined that the expressio 
unius exclusio alterius principle is not applicable to this subsection and that in the light of 
sections 4 33(1) 33(2) 33(3) and 35, Chapter 3 is horizontally applicable. In Gardener v Whitaker 
1994 5 BCLR 19 (E) and Mandela v Falati 1995 1 SA 251 rtV) it was also determined that the 
Chapter has horizontal application. Du Plessis & Corder 112 point out that the judiciary is bound 
by section 7(1) because of Its specific role and status as one of the three components of State 
authority; see also Rautenbach 83. 
32 Thus the courts are enjoined to interpret all law, including statutory law in the spirit of Chapter 
3, and to develop and apply common law and customary law (not statutory law) in the spirit 
of this Chapter: see Davis Chaskalson De Waal 210; see also Sasson 15. 
33 See Du Plessis & Corder 112-113. The BUI of Rights will of course only be applicable to legal 
relationships which have to be enforced or confirmed by a court: see Davis Chaskalson De Waal 
210-211; see also Du Plessis & Corder 113. 
34 Davis Chaskalson & De Waal 128. 
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Chapter 3, because the Bill of Rights does not have horizontal application. Finally, 
these provisions should be seen in the context of the preamble which states that 
"there is a need to create a new order in which all South Africans will be entitled to a common 
South African citizenship in a sovereign and democratic constitutional State in which there is 
equality between men and women and people of all races so that all citizens shall be able to 
enjoy and exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms•. 
It may further be noted that various sections of the Bill of Rights make no distinction 
between laws which regulate relationships between, on the one hand, individuals and 
the legislature, or the executive government, and, on the other hand, between 
individuals inter se. These general sections seem to indicate that the Bill of Rights is 
not confined to law which regulates relations between individuals and the State. 
However, this does not mean that purely constitutional issues should be extended to 
the private-law sphere. It is preferable that Civil Rights Acts be legislated to define the 
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights. 
Moreover, many basic human rights which are recognised in Chapter 3, are in any 
event well-known and existing rights which have been regulating relationships between 
individuals even before the implementation of the Constitution and which will continue 
to do so irrespective of the Bill of Rights. It should be borne in mind that fundamental 
rights now fall within the ambit of positive law and may thus be interpreted by the 
courts to regulate relations between ind_ividuals. 35 In the meantime, until Civil Rights 
Acts have been legislated, indirect horizontal application may also be achieved by 
interpreting the open-ended norms, such as bani mores and public policy, in 
accordance with the values entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 36 It should be 
remembered that whilst these open-ended norms may extend the application of 
fundamental rights, such extensive interpretation should still be in accordance with 
"evolving moral consciousness and perceptions of the people in a developing 
35 SA Law Commission Group and Human Rights 490. 
36 Rautenbach 84-:8!;; NC>rr 37; Hawthorne 6. 
272 Part ll.IV.3 Indigenous Law and Western Law in a New Constitutional Dispensation 
societyu. 37 But the "moral consciousness and perceptions of the people" should not 
exclusively reflect Western values; it should also take close account of indigenous 
values. And indigenous values may conflict with the values entrenched in the Bill of 
Rights. 
Should the Bill of Rights have only vertical application, as the Court determined in De 
Klerk v Du P/essis, 38 its sole relevance for indigenous law would be with regard to 
Chapter 11 which deals with the powers and functions of traditional authorities. But 
should it have horizontal application, as the Court found in Gardener v Whitaker, 39 
Mota/a v University of Natat° and Mandela v Falati:' it would have far-reaching 
consequences for indigenous law.42 
3 INDIGENOUS LAW AND EQUALITY 
There are various interpretations of the right to equality. Its meaning in international 
jurisprudence differs from one country to the next, depending on the specific wording 
of the Constitution in which it has been entrenched and also, amongst others, on the 
historical, cultural and socio-political context in which it is applied. In view of the fact 
that one may regard equality as one of the basic values underlying the South African 
37 Van der Vyver "Post-apartheid" 812. 
38 1995 2 SA 40 (T) 51. 
39 1994 5 BCLR 19 (E). 
40 1995 3 BCLR 374 (D). 
41 1995 1 SA 251 CN) 257-258. 
42 Bennett "Equality Oause• 125-129 is of the opinion that horizontal application should be limited 
to instances where Indigenous law is vague, and that it should not be so employed to grant 
rights that did not previously exist. CivU Rights Acts may also solve many problems with regard 
to the application of indigenous law. 
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Constitution43 it is important to determine its meaning within the context of the South 
African situation. Much emphasis is p~aced on equality and freedom in the Constitution 
and the phrase "in ~11 Qpen_ancLdemoc:ratic society t:?ased gn freedom and equality" 
-- "~ ----•v- -~~·-~ -----~-~«~-• ""'-- ••<' 
is used in several places. Moreover, it is section 8, the equality clause which may hold 
the most far-reaching consequences for the continued existence of indigenous law as 
it is currently applied. In order to establish what effect the entrenchment of the right 
to equality would have on indigenous law, it is also necessary to ascertain to what 
ext~nt -=~~-~lity plays a role in indi~Ienous law and how conceptions of a.quality in 
indigenous and Western law differ. But then it should be remembered that the 
- ~·""'··~-·-.........------~-.. -~-~-~~----· ~ ~~ ., 
indigenous law which is officially applied in this country does not always reflect the 
jural postulates of pre-colonial indigenous law. 
Bennett« is of the opinion that by implicitly recognising indigenous law in the 
Constitution and at__!_~-~---~~'2:1~ tirrie enacting_ a gender eqtJality claus~~ 45 "the 
Constitution brought about a head-on co11front~tion between two opposed cultures", . 
" • -~"=·---~'"'~·~-·-~~~---~"'-''"~-~· _,_,_~'"" ---~-~-''«~--·«~•· -~·•'•'- "~" • • •~ ••-vO<-' -•«¥ ' '"' ""-'N'" • .~:::e.'~.,, 
and t~~!__:~~~~ncjt3E equ~lity clause threatens a thorough-going purge of customary / 
.,,,-< .. 
law",~he reason being the important role of senior men, the principle of patriarchy, thaf ,> 
/ ---- - - ------- - - - --------------- ----- -- - ------------------------ ---- ___ --...--
underlies indigenous law. 
Before attempting to analyse the indigenous conception of equality, it is perhaps 
necessary to give a brief exposition of a possible interpretation of section 8 of the 
Constitution within a Western framework. 
43 Van der Westhuizen Human Rights Law 4, describes human rights as claims or demands against 
the State which embody values, the most important of which being human dignity and equality. 
Carpenter ·Fundamental Rights• 32 too gives primacy to these two fundamental rights: "If 
pressed to nominate the one right which is the most fundamental of all in the South African 
context, I would opt for the right of equal treatment ... with the right to human dignity as a very 
strong contender". 
44 Bennett •Equality aause· 123. Kaganas & Murray "Contesr 426 too are of the opinion that if 
indigenous law is challenged on grounds of gender inequality, it will be a challenge to the very 
heart of that culture which may have serious consequences for the continued application of its 
law. But at the same time they point out that indigenous law is capable of •evolving to become 
more egalitarian• because of its inherent dynamic nature. 
45 Section 8(2). 
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Section 8 of the Constitution determines as follows: 
·a. (1) Every person shall have the right to equality before the law and to equal protection of the 
law. 
(2) No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly, and, without 
derogating from the generality of the provision, on one or more of the following grounds in 
particular: race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture or language. 
(4) Prima facie proof of discrimination on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) shall 
be presumed to be sufficient proof of unfair discrimination as contemplated in that subsection, 
until the contrary ls established.• 
I will not attempt to give a comprehensive analysis of the exact philosophical meaning 
of "equality". Neither will I discuss the subsections of section 8 which deal with the 
restitution of land rights and affirmative action. For purposes of this thesis I will 
concentrate on those provisions dealing with equality rights generally and their 
practical implication for indigenous law. 
From a Western jurisprudential point of view equality is understood to mean the 
Aristotelian concept that equals should be treated equally and unequals unequally to 
the extent that they are different. It is generally understood that absolute or formal 
equality, as a neutral norm which underscores identical treatment of all individuals, 
without taking into account factual differences, is unacceptable. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights makes provision for differentiation between individuals in 
as far as it does not lead to inequality with regard to human dignity. 48 Also within the 
South African constitutional context, equality should be interpreted as substantive 
equality and not formal equality. Formal equality may lead to more inequalities, 
whereas . substantive equality takes account of the actual social and economic 
conditions of groups and individuals to determine whether the constitutional 
46 See Du Plessis & Corder 149, Hawthorne 3. 
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commitment to equality has been upheld.47 Taking this a step further, one may say 
that substantive equality should also take account of the value systems and basic 
axioms of the legal system in question. 
Proceeding from the assumption that subjects cannot be treated identically and that 
it is necessary for effective government and social ordering to classify subjects, the 
criteria upon which such a classification may be made must be determined.48 Section 
8(2) will serve as a guideline in this regard. The factors mentioned in subsection (2) 
may be regarded as criteria upon which there should not be a differentiation between 
subjects. These criteria embrace human characteristics that are immutable or difficult 
to change or inherently part of human personality and which should not form the basis 
for legal classification. The criteria could also broadly be described as elements which 
are constitutive of human identity.49 This subsection does not provide an exhaustive 
list of all possible instances in which an unfair classification may be made, it 
enumerates only those based on human attributes. 50 Cachalia51 is of the opinion that 
the words "without derogating from the generality of this provision" indicate that it is 
not a comprehensive list, but that it should remain limited to analogous grounds which 
have to do with involuntary human attributes or inherent features of human personality. 
Another interpretation is that the grounds listed are but examples of the most prevalent 
bases for the subordination of vulnerable groups or classes of people. The general 
principle, then, is against the subordination of such groups.52 
47 Albertyn & Kentridge 152-153. 
48 See generally Davis "Equality" 208 210, Du Plessis & Corder 141-144, Cachalia 24-32. 
49 Albertyn & Kentridge 168 feel that this general description is not as forced as that of an 
immutable personal characteristic which is quite strained when it comes to religion, conscience 
and belief. 
50 See Davis "Equality" 208, Du Plessis & Corder 143-144, Sasson 22. Du Plessis & Corder 143 
point out that the courts will probably not attach the same weight to instances of discrimination 
which are not explicitly mentioned in the section. 
51 Cachalia 27 30-31; see also Davis "Equality" 208. 
52 Albertyn & Kentridge 170. 
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It should be mentioned that the use of the word "unfairly" indicates that discrimination 
must be seen against the background of specific circumstances. This keeps the door 
open for affirmative or corrective action, justifiable legal classification or differentiation. 
The use of the word "unfairly" could be seen as a limitation of the equality clause within 
the clause itself and has the effect that grounds for the limitation of rights entrenched 
in Chapter 3 is not limited to the limitations clause (section 33) only.53 
Although it is practically impossible to treat all persons identically and although legal 
classification is necessary, differentiation should not take place on an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable basis. The words "unjustifiable" and "arbitrary• inevitably make the principle 
of cultural relativism spring to mind. Therefore one should be cautious not to reject 
indigenous-law principles simply because they appear to involve, from a Western point 
of view, an arbitrary or unjustifiable differentiation between individuals. It has been 
noted that legal classification should be reasonable in relation to the legitimate 
objectives of law.54 But are the legitimate objectives of Western law the same as those 
of indigenous law? If one considers the underlying postulates of indigenous law and 
Western law, the inevitable conclusion is that they are not. The tension lies between, 
on the one hand, the maintenance of harmony of the collectivity and the preservation 
of group solidarity and on the other hand, the maintenance of absolute individual 
freedom. But then one should not lose sight of the fact that absolute individual 
freedom is increasingly being limited in Western law by the application of open-ended 
norms such as public policy and bani mores. 
The two phrases "equality before the law" and "equal protection of the law" as 
contained in section 8(1) are not identical. They should be regarded as an integrated 
53 See Davis •equality" 208-209, Albertyn & Kentridge 160-163 175-177, Cachalia 28-29, Du Plessis 
& Corder 142-143. 
54 See Du Plessis & Corder 141, Cachalia 27. 
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whole which provides a framework for the protection of the right to equality.55 This 
framework should be adaptable to new situations. 511 "Equality before the law", or 
formal equality, denotes equality in legal process and is thus a procedural guarantee 
which is applicable in the administration of justice and has no bearing upon the 
content of the law. In contrast "equal protection of the law· denotes equality in the 
substance and content of the law. "Equal protection· would include also the sphere of 
private law.57 Should a narrow interpretation of subsection (2) be accepted, cases not 
covered by it would still fall under the general provision of subsection (1). 
3.a Indigenous Law and Equality Before the Law 
Van der Westhuizen58 links procedural rights to the concept of rule of law, 59 the 
antithesis of which is arbitrary government. Procedural rights comprise a fair trial in a 
public court and the right not to be held guilty of an offence which is not embodied in 
law. A fair trial again includes a presumption of innocence, a public trial without undue 
delay, the right to legal assistance, time to prepare a defence, the right to examine 
witnesses, and the right not to be compelled to confess guilt or testify against 
oneself.80 
55 Davis "Equality" 207, Albertyn & Kentridge 157-160, Sasson 22. Cachalia 27-28 is of the opinion 
that the phrase "equal protection of the law does not add anything new to the principle of 
•equal treatment• of the first phrase. 
56 It is indeed important to regard this framework as adaptable to changing needs of society. In 
the interpretation of this clause one should always be sensitive to the underlying value systems 
of the community as a whole, including the indigenous community. 
57 Thus Albertyn & Kentridge 160 note that ihe state will foster equality by protecting vulnerable 
persons and groups from domination by more powerful individuals and groups, within the public 
or private domain". 
58 Van der Westhuizen Human Rights Law 3. 
59 The applicability of this concept was discussed in some detail in Part 11.11.2.c.i above. 
60 The rights entrenched in sections 16, 21, 23 and 24 are all in some way or another connected 
to the concept of arbitrary government and fall within the ambit of this discussion. These rights 
are: the right to assemble and demonstrate with others and to present petitions; political rights 
(to form, campaign for and participate in a political party and to vote); the right to have 
justiciable disputes settled by a court; the right of access to information which is required for 
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Although indigenous law is generally unwritten, indigenous authorities do not have 
arbitrary discretionary powers. First, the law is certain61 and becomes known to 
individuals, amongst others, through education, political organisation, economy, 
religion and language. Individuals are aware of what they are permitted to do and what 
not. Secondly, there are measures curtailing the judicial, administrative and executive 
powers of the ruler and other organs of government. 82 For example, the ruler is dealt 
with administratively when he issues unjust orders in a court of law and unreasonable 
orders issued outside a court may lawfully be ignored.83 A headman exceeding his 
criminal jurisdiction is guilty of an offence."" 
Nevertheless, one should not try to force indigenous political systems into the 
Western, liberal, democratic paradigm. Pre-colonial indigenous government fits neither 
modern democratic, nor socialist forms of government. It displays characteristics of 
both, but of a specific African hue. Yet the fact that indigenous political systems do not 
fit into these paradigms does not mean that indigenous law should be characterised 
as permitting arbitrary government. On the contrary, pre-colonial indigenous 
governance is open and participatory and decisions are mostly made on a consensual 
basis, the highest concern being societal welfare. Discussion is open and persons are 
free to dissent from the majority opinion, and express their views. 65 Political parties 
and voting are concepts quite foreign to indigenous political systems which are based 
on kinship and ancestry. But adult members of the group are free to make certain 
the exercise or protection of an individual's rights; the right to lawful administrative action where 
an individual's rights and interests are affected and procedurally fair administrative action where 
rights are threatened). 
61 See generally Myburgh Papers 52-53 61. 
62 The State in its abstract Western meaning was not known in indigenous law. See generally Part 
1.11.4.a where indigenous constitutional and administrative law are discussed in greater detail. 
63 Vorster "Disobeying Orders" 74-77; Myburgh "Responsibility" 37-40. 
64 Some regarded it as contempt of the ruler's court, whilst others regarded it as the offence of 
disobeying the ruler's order: see Myburgh "Contempt of Court" 69. 
65 Oyugi 44; Wai 116-118. 
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political choices and political grudges and dissatisfaction with the ruler can be made 
known through the private council and through petition. 
Although the ruler, whose position is hereditary, is the legislative head, the legislature 
comprises the ruler, his private council, and a people's assembly or general council66 
on which the leaders, chosen by the people, are represented. Decisions are made in 
consultation with these councils and legislation may be passed only if adopted by the 
legislature as a whole. Generally, preventative measures87 are taken against the 
incompetence, aloofness or despotism of the ruler. 
Under certain circumstances a ruler may be publicly criticised with impunity and an 
unsatisfactory ruler niay be deposed and replaced. In the exercise of all duties, the 
ruler acts in-council and is answerable to the ruling family.88 An important function of 
the private council is to protect, but also to control the position of the ruler. More 
importantly, the private council ensures that intercession is always open to an 
aggrieved individual. In certain communities disagreement within the ruling family is 
dealt with by an assembly of all available men. An important check on the powers of 
the ruler is his close connection with the ancestors. It is his duty to maintain the 
equilibrium between the living members of the group and the deceased ancestors. 
Because he is the closest link between the living and the superhuman, his position is 
regarded as sacred and a fear of the ancestors' wrath deters him from acting 
despotically and thus disturbing the equilibrium. 
The non-specialised character of indigenous culture provides that administrative justice 
is founded on the same principles which underlie constitutional law. The ruler-in-council 
is the chief administrative organ and is, in the exercise of his powers, subject to the 
66 The general councU consists of the ruler's private advisors, less immediate kin, the heads of jural 
communities and influential and able commoners. 
67 The ruler has to be old enough (he must at least have passed through the initiation school). 
68 See generally Myburgh Papers 55-58. 
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same checks and balances as described above. Although he is above the realm of 
private law, he is dealt with in terms of administrative law should he transgress the 
limits of his powers. A ruler who acts despotically has to account to his private council, 
and if he persists he may dismissed or suspended (in the olden days, even 
assassinated). He is then usually succeeded by the next in order of succession. 
Various checks on the powers of other administrative functionaries also exist. 
Mediation is an important means to settle differences with them and disciplinary action 
may be taken by age groups and regiments. 88 An important administrative function 
of the ruler, assisted by his private council, is to consider the petitions of individuals, 
irrespective of their rank. 10 
The most important fundamental principle underlying indigenous procedural law is the 
conciliation of the individuals involved, so that the harmony of the collectivity which has 
been disturbed by the conflict be restored. This postulate also underscores 
present-day informal dispute-resolution procedures in the metropolitan areas of South 
Africa. It follows naturally that harmony cannot be obtained where both formal and 
substantive equality are not upheld. 11 Social equilibrium can only be maintained where 
individuals accord each other a minimum of respect and the right to full human dignity. 
Pre-colonial indigenous procedural law and evidential law embrace procedural values 
that are to an extent comparable with the values which should ideally underscore 
Western procedural rights and equality before the law. 
Trials are held in public and in the interest of all persons involved. They are conducted 
speedily, lest important evidence of which there is no written record, be forgotten. 
Women are present only when involved in a case as complainant or witness. In such 
cases the venue of the court may have to be moved away from the cattle kraal which 
69 Eg, a chief of a neighbouring tribe may act as mediator between a chief and his people. 
Myburgh Papers 65~7. 
70 Myburgh & Prinsloo 30-32. 
71 See Part 11.11.2.c.v. 
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usually adjoins the court. This is so because women's periodic ritual impurity is 
believed to have a detrimental effect on the cattle and consequently on the agnatic 
group. Nowadays there are special court buildings and adult males as well as females 
are allowed to be present. 
Although formal legal representation as it is known in the Western sense is foreign to 
indigenous law, agnates, assisted by representatives of their jural communities, aid 
members involved in court proceedings. Tarde12 has remarked that an ideal 
procedure does not necessarily imply the existence of "barristers, attorneys, bailiffs". 
Even though indigenous procedure does not always accord with Western procedures, 
basic equality before the law may still be upheld through different mechanisms. 
Everyone present at a trial is allowed to ask questions, examine and cross-examine 
witnesses. Both sides have to be heard before a court reaches a decision. The burden 
of proof in criminal cases rests on the chiefdom. 73 It is customary and preferable that 
a criminal case first be investigated by the court of the jural community (ward 
headman)74 before it is taken to the Chief's Court and the accused is thus granted 
the time to prepare his defence. 
Extraordinary methods of obtaining proof, such as divining, ordeal and torture should 
be seen within the context of the diffuse postulates which underlie indigenous law. 
These methods are usually employed in certain cases of theft, witchcraft and 
poisoning. 75 Theft of public resources, witchcraft and poisoning have a· polluting 
effect, the last two also have a close connection with magic. The belief in the primacy 
of the superhuman and in the importance of retaining the balance between the 
superhuman and the living explains why superhuman means are allowed to solve 
these serious crimes which threaten the very fabric of the community and its peaceful 
72 Tarde 704. 
73 There Is no State in the Western sense of the word. See Part 1.11.4.a above. 
74 See Part 1.11.4.a above. 
75 Myburgh & Prinsloo 142. 
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existence. These methods to obtain proof are currently forbidden by legislation. 
The principle of equality before the law is also reflected in certain Tswana legal 
maxims:78 "do not concentrate on the person, but on the error"; "it is not the person 
that is resented, but the error"; ''the law is a blind animal and may even mulct the one 
administrating it"; "the law is a lion, it bites the great man too". 
Finally, the court plays an active role in the characteristically inquisitorial indigenous 
procedure. Evidence is judged on merit, not on technical rules. The simplicity, lack of 
technicalities and fairness of indigenous legal procedural law, and also the free system 
of evidence underline the principle of procedural equality in indigenous law. It seems 
that values which underscore Western procedural rights are not absolutely in conflict 
with those which underpin indigenous law. The entrenchment of procedural rights in 
the Bill of Rights will neither lead to serious confrontation, nor will it lead to the 
eradication of indigenous law - as long as indigenous law is not assessed from a 
purely Western perspective and as long as the jural postulates which underscore 
indigenous law are kept in consideration. 
3.b Indigenous Law and Equal Protection of the Law 
In any discussion of substantive equality in indigenous law, one has to distinguish 
between the indigenous law for indigenous people and the indigenous taw of the 
indigenous people. Indigenous law for the people is the law laid down by the State, 
it is official law as has already been explained. n l!"c:iigenous law incorporated. in 
legi?lation and ~pplied by Stat~ s:.011rts js v.alid, irrespective of the support of the 
indigenous people from which it supposedly originated. This law does not necessarily 
coincide with true indigenous law, that is with indigenous law of the indigenous 
communities of South Africa. This indigenous law is adaptable and responsive to the 
76 See Myburgh ·Punishment• 56. 
77 See Part 11.1.2.b.ii. 
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changing values of its corresponding social group and loses its validity once it loses 
the support of its related social group. It should be established whether this indigenous 
law, and not the official indigenous law, is inherently discriminatory in nature and 
whether and to what extent it is compatible with the ideals of substantive equality. 
The grounds upon which discrimination is prohibited in the Constitution,78 will be 
taken as the framework for the discussion of the effect which human attributes or 
"elements which are constitutive of human identity• have on the principle of equal 
protection of the law in indigenous law. The differences in the jural postulates 
underlying law and social ordering in indigenous and in Western communities should 
form the background to an analysis of this kind. 
(i) Ethnic Origin, Race, Colour, Culture and Language 
Indigenous social structure is such that concepts of ethnic origin, race, colour, culture 
and language do not have the same significance or meaning in indigenous 
communities that they have in a Western context. Harmony of the collectivity, the 
transcendence of sociological relations over biological relations, the importance of the 
superhuman, the family idea, the emphasis on group solidarity, collectivity, the status 
order and the kinship principle79 give these human attributes a different dimension. 
In indigenous societies language, magic.and religion have an integrated relationship.80 
The affinity between these cultural attributes influences all. facets of indigenous cultural 
e~istence. Language is the oral expression of indigenous cultural life. It is important 
in kinship terminology and the various language taboos81 illustrate the connection of 
78 See section 8(2). 
79 The kinship principle under1ies the structuring of the group, consisting of blood relations in the 
narrow sense of the word as well as non-agnates who fall under the authority of the group. 
80 See generally Myburgh ·Language• 140-144. 
81 When speech taboos are violated the spirits punish the group. 
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language with the superhuman. For example, amongst the Zulu there is a taboo on 
the use of certain words when a woman addresses her in-laws82 and amongst several 
Nguni, parents-in-law and children-in-law should avoid words phonetically resembling 
each other's names. The titles of rulers form a significant part of the institution of 
chieftainship and the manner in which a ruler is addressed and in which reference is 
made to him forms part of the indigenous political organisation. The terms employed 
to refer to cattle differ depending on whether used in legal (for instance in matters of 
marriage goods or farming out), religious (for instance where a sacrifice involve 
ancestral spirits) or kinship (when cattle are owing to an agnatic group) context. These 
are but a few examples of the role of language as an essential part of the complex 
nature of indigenous culture. It should be clear that one cannot regard language in the 
same light in indigenous and Western societies and that discrimination on the ground 
of language just does not fit the ethos of indigenous law. 
Likewise, discrimination on the ground of culture, or race, or colour or ethnicity are 
concepts foreign to indigenous law. Social ordering is underscored by the postulates 
referred to above. The unity within the group is based on obedience to a common 
elder and religion forms the basis for interaction between kin. 83 Kinship relations are 
extremely complex and have important consequences for social ordering generally. 
Although kinship relations are not absolutely identical in all indigenous communities, 
they are largely similar.84 Kinship ties in indigenous societies have moral, jural and 
religious implications. Kinship linkages provide guidelines for the interaction between 
kin and others that are not kinship related. Kin and non-kin are treated differently and 
individuals are treated in accordance with the category of kin within which they fall. 
Kinship principles have an important effect on social, economic and domestic relations. 
It should be remembered that kinship does not necessarily comprise genetic 
82 See generally Vorster •Kinship• 91-93 on the importance of terminology in kinship relationships. 
83 Hambrock 112. 
84 The most fundamental difference in kinship principles in South Africa occur between the 
Nguni-speaking people who prohibit marriage and sexual relations between kin, and the other 
groups who prefer marriage between kin. 
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relatedness. Kinship relationships broadly encompass cultural relationships which bind 
individuals by their common acceptance of the various aspects of that culture, such 
as language, religion and law,85 - irrespective of colour, race88 or ethnic origin. 
"Races" have always been viewed within a Western idiom as categories of human kind 
based on physical differences.81 As a basis for the classification of, or differentiation 
between ·people, it is foreign to indigenous social ordering. The same may be said of 
ethnic origin and colour. 
(ii) Religion, Belief and Conscience 
Religion or belief88 in the superhuman can never be regarded as a ground for 
differentiation between individuals in indigenous law. This is because of the fact that 
the superhuman is regarded as a natural extension of the group on earth. There is no 
conceptual difference between the natural and the supernatural, between the human 
and the superhuman. The close-knit unity between the living, the superhuman and 
nature makes it an unlikely criterion for differentiation between people. It would again 
just not fit the ethos of indigenous culture to distinguish between people on the ground 
of their religion. It is, after all, religion which organises members of the group into a 
state of solidarity and provides the foundation for the interaction between kin. 89 
Closely connected to the concepts of religion (a system of belief, worship of the 
supernatural) and belief (convictions, persuasion) is the concept of "conscience". 
85 That is if one accepts that culture denotes standards or norms which apply to speech, thought 
and material objects, commonly recognised among the people concerned. Components of 
culture are amongst others law, religion, political organisation, art. 
86 Bohannan Anthropology 186 describes race as •a classification of human beings ... [it] does not 
exist as anything except an ideal classification of empirical biological differences ... [race] is, in 
short, not part of the data, but it is a way of looking at data•. 
87 See Bohannan Anthropology 205 206. 
88 The SA Law Commission Group and Human Rights 283, describes ·belier as a concept broader 
than religion which encompasses non-religious convictions. Because of the primacy of the 
superhuman, belief in indigenous culture would usually be tied to the superhuman, which makes 
the distinction between these concepts of little consequence. 
89 Hambrock 112. 
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"Conscience" as "a sense of right and wrong governing persons' words and actions"90 
is likewise so intertwined with the belief in the superhuman that it is an improbable 
ground for the classification of individuals. 
(iii) Sexual Orientation 
Convictions about sexual orientation in indigenous law is again coloured by religion 
and the belief in the superiority of the superhuman and the belief in its involvement 
with life on earth. Amongst the Ndebele91 homosexuality is classified, with incest and 
bestiality, as forms of unnatural sexuality. They are known by the generic term of 
ukuhlola, signifying something ominous, and are all regarded as highly pollutant crimes 
which are punishable· and which have to be cleansed by the appropriate rites. But in 
the light of the conciliatory spirit of indigenous law, it is doubtful whether sexual 
orientation would form a ground for discriminating against a person. In contrast, 
amongst the Tswana112 homosexuality is not regarded as a crime. Tswana experts 
who were interviewed, were aware of one case of sodomy for which the culprits 
received a thrashing. Lesbian practices are common amongst older girls but are not 
regarded as reprehensible. Amongst the Northern Sotho,93 again, homosexuality is 
regarded as reprehensible but is not regarded as a crime and is dealt with within the 
family. 
(iv) Social Origin 
In indigenous communities status forms the basis for the legal classification of people. 
Although the Constitution couples "social origin" with "ethnic origin", these cannot be 
90 Collins Concise Dictionary and Thesaurus. 
91 Myburgh & Prlnsloo 102. 
92 Vorster ·unnatural Sexuality" 88-89. 
93 Prinsloo Publiekreg 223. 
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grouped together in indigenous law. Social origin includes "birth", "status" and 
"class".94 Status is determined by gender, rank, mental and physical maturity, and 
marriage. In indigenous law the individual does not stand outside the group and 
individual rights must always be considered within the framework of the group's 
interests. Every individual in traditional indigenous law is the bearer of rights in 
accordance with her or his status. Gender, sex, age and disability therefore fall under 
the status order in indigenous law. 
But status does not influence the individual's dignity, his worth as a human being and 
as component member of the group. 98 Nhlapo98 remarks in this respect that 
"true worth or excellence [is] divorced from role and associated more closely with being. Even 
in the case of traditional societies there is nothing compelling the conclusion that human worth 
divorced from social role was not highly regarded". 
An individual's physical and mental abilities, his usefulness and productiveness in a 
narrow sense, do not influence his quality of life. Indigenous communities are geared 
at the satisfaction of the basic physical and emotional human needs of every person 
in the community. Old age, youth and disability do not form grounds for discrimination. 
In line with the spirit of ubuntu, individuals are not judged on what they can do for the 
group; they are valued because they are part of the group. Their dignity is as 
conscientiously protected as the dignity of an able person. Their physical a~d mental 
well being is just as important to the maintenance of an equilibrium in the group (and 
with the superhuman) as that of any other person in the group. Those who are 
physically able accept responsibility for the physical tasks that the young, the old and 
94 See Albertyn & Kentriclge 168 n91. 
95 See generally the discussion of status in Part 11.11.3.b.ii(i); Kaunda 24-28; Nhlapo "Future" 19-20. 
For a contrary view, see Sindair 561 who is of the opinion that whilst human rights stress the 
Importance of the individual, Indigenous law focuses on the group, and group interests •are 
framed In favour of men·. Consequently, according to Sindair, women are not seen as valuable 
in themselves but merely as "adjuncts to the group•. 
96 Nhlapo "Future• 19. 
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disabled cannot perform. The old are, in fact, held in an honoured position and play 
an important role in the education of children. They are "embodied wisdom; living 
symbols of our continuity with the past". 97 They are about to become the ancestors. 
Interestingly enough, Nhlapo98 is of the opinion that the very value of respect for 
elders is inherently discriminatory against the young. He argues that there is a link 
between institutionalised inequality and the security of the elderly in that the elderly 
make demands on the young (in terms of labour and property) as security for their old 
age,99 for example, the marriage to a young second wife (often with the approval of 
the first wife). He nevertheless points out that it should be possible to remove the 
negative aspects of this cherished value of respect for the elderly and yet retain the 
positive aspects, of which there are many. 100 With regard to children, he notes the 
following. 101 Whilst sons ensure the survival of the group, daughters increase the 
group's wealth through the bridewealth paid for them. Children are important in 
establishing relationships with other groups and are participants in the household 
economy. The family, in its extended sense, has an interest in the upbringing, 
socialisation and marriage of its children. According to Nhlapo communal values are 
positive and only the discriminatory expression of these values should be adjusted. 
The importance of the group finds expression in the fact that children's relationship 
with their father and his group is emphasised. Yet, the role of the mother in the 
relationship between parents and children should be enhanced and rules with regard 
97 Kaunda 26. 
98 Nhlapo "African FamUy" 141 142. 
99 The elderly likewise cannot afford to loose the goodwill of the younger members of the group 
because they have to rely on them for support in their old age. 
100 Respect for the elderty is a way of teaching habits of humUity, courtesy, consideration and 
decency. It also ensures care for the aged. 
101 Nhlapo "African FamHy" 143. 
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to custody should be changed. 102 Nhlapo103 nevertheless expresses himself strongly 
in favour of the retention of the institution of the extended family: "It would be perverse 
to argue for the abolition in Africa of the role of the wider family and the community 
in marriage". 
The group provides emotional, economic and political support for all its members, also 
its children. However, the duty of parents to support their children should be 
considered very carefully. 104 Children share in the patrimony of the group and have 
a right to use it for their maintenance and the group has a duty to maintain its children. 
Although this right to be supported within the group is not enforceable in the sense 
that children may claim maintenance from their group or parents in a court of law. It 
should be remembered that groups, and not individuals are legal subjects in 
indigenous law. Therefore, where another group becomes involved in the maintenance 
of children, that group has an enforceable right against the children's group of origin. 
Should a mother then take her children with her upon divorce, her group of origin has 
an enforceable claim against her husband's group for the maintenance of those 
children. 105 
In a recent case 108 the Transkei Appellate Division decided that a son who has been 
adopted by a woman according to indigenous law, has an action against the estate 
(in the Western sense of the word) of his deceased adoptive parent. The Court 
102 However, one should bear in mind that a mother and her group of origin have anything but an 
inferior role to play in her children's lives. The important role of the mother's brother and her 
group of origin in various cultural spheres was explained above in Part 11.11.3.b.ii(ii). It should also 
be remembered that upon marriage a women does not loose membership of her group of origin 
which has a continued interest in her well being and that of her children. 
103 Nhlapo ·African Family 143. 
104 Labuschagne ·Menseregte• 345 is of the opinion that parents have a legal duty to support their 
children. 
105 Van Niekerk "Maintenance• 99-100. 
106 Kewana v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1993 4 SA n1 (Tk). 
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found107 that adoption in indigenous law108 received express recognition in the 
(now-repealed) Republic of Transkei Constitution Act 15 of 1976 (Tk). Because the 
deceased had lawfully adopted the child, there was a legally enforceable duty upon 
her to maintain him. This duty accorded with indigenous law and was thus legally 
enforceable in terms of this Act which recognised the application of indigenous law, 
subject to a repugnancy clause. The Court noted that •[t]he existence of an 
enforceable duty of support is derived from customary law, but the right for 
compensation is governed by that [the Constitution] Act•. 108 Seeing that it was not 
contrary to the repugnancy clause, or modified or repealed, the son's right to support 
was regarded as enforceable. 
However, as indicated above, the notion of an enforceable right to maintenance within 
the same agnatic group is foreign to indigenous law. Nevertheless the underlying jural 
postulate is that the extended family should be continued through its members. The 
family idea dictates that members of the family should physically and emotionally be 
supported by the group. Therefore, while this decision is not in line with the 
indigenous-law rule, it is still consonant with the underlying jural postulate. Although 
it was in all possibility not the intention of the court in this particular case, indigenous 
law was adapted in line with its underlying postulates. 110 
Generally the following may be noted with regard to the position of children in 
indigenous law. Physical maturity and not age determines a child's competencies in 
107 At 774H 775H-J. 
108 For purposes of this discussion it is not necessary to persue the question whether the concept 
of adoption is known in indigenous law. 
109 At 771 775. 
110 Du Plessis •Aanneming• 842 comments: ·oie Kewan[a]-saak het getoon dat die gewoontereg 
en die gernenereg nie net naas mekaar bestaan nie, rnaar dat dit deel van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
regstelsel vorm. lndien 'n regsreel volgens die een stelsel bestaan, behoort dit nie as 'n rede 
beskou te word om 'n eis kragtens die ancler regstelsel te laat vaar nie. Die gewoontereg is 
Inherent deel van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg en daarom moet die twee stelsels eerder met rnekaar 
versoen word as om in konflik tot mekaar beskou te word - dit is een van die groot pluspunte 
van die Kewan[a]-saak. • 
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indigenous law. 111 The sexual integrity of children, physically immature persons, is 
protected in both criminal law and the law of detict. 112 But a child's physical integrity 
is not protected to the same extent. A father has a right to moderate chastisement of 
his children, but excessive disciplinary action constitutes assault and is punishable. 113 
Child marriages are unknown in indigenous law. Betrothal of infants which were 
formerly known in indigenous law, have been declared unlawful by Western courts. 114 
Under pre-colonial law, two groups may agree on the marriage of infants once they 
have reached a marriageable age. Gifts are transferred to the girl's family in part 
performance. Nevertheless the consent of the parties involved is required before they 
can actually get married. Should a girl refuse to marry, the betrothal gifts are 
returned. 115 Although some authors 116 are of the opinion that consent is not 
required for marriage, the better view seems to be that consent of both parties is 
indeed a requirement, even where marriages are arranged. Lack of consent is 
considered as jeopardising the stability of the marriage111 and this in turn disturbs the 
equilibrium in the group and with the ancestors. 
The tasks which children fulfill in the group are sometimes referred to as child labour. 
But child labour is really a misnomer in this context, for these tasks are regarded as 
a learning process for children. Girls help to fetch water and wood, stamp corn, cook 
111 See Part 11.11.3.b.ii(i). 
112 labuschagne "Menseregte" 343. 
113 Myburgh & Prinsloo 81. Labuschagne "Menseregte" 343 is of the opinion that physical 
chastisement of children is against the Western principles of criminal law, as well as the law of 
delict. He points out that it has lost support world-wide, also in Africa. 
114 labuschagne "Menseregte" 344. 
115 Church Marriage 27-28. 
116 Bennett "Equality Clause" 125; Labuschagne "Menseregte" 344. Kaganas & Murray "Law" 116 
observe that the consent of marriage partners is not necessarily central to marriage 
arrangements and that the interests of the prospective marriage partner are "incidental to family 
interests which are secured by institutions such as bridewealth". 
117 Myburgh Papers 85 86; Church Marriage 25; Church "Betrothal" 80. 
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and clean and act as nursemaids to babies. Boys have other tasks such as herding 
and milking, running errands and hunting. These tasks are as a rule not physically 
exerting and are regarded as children's duty to their group. It also prepares them for 
their Mure role in the social structure of the group. 118 
Finally it should be remembered that although the protection of the physical and 
emotional welfare and the dignity of children are consonant with the aims of 
pre-colonial indigenous law and the jural postulates which underlie that law, 
urbanisation and changed economic and social circumstances may now demand that 
indigenous law be adapted to bring it once again abreast of its underlying postulates. 
(v) Gender and Sex 
What remains to be considered, then, are gender and sex. Gender and sex are 
perceiv~~ t~_tl,~-1h.e_rnost_c20J.~Dt~ grounds of d~~!imination in indigenous law. 
··----·---·-·-··-· -----
Polygyny and bridewealth are often used to illustrate the subordination of women in 
~------~-----"'~~-~--·--,_, .... -~~--~k-~--~ "-·-'"~···-"-----'~" ---·-~, __ ,,,_,~-------·-.. ~-·' __ .....---,,.,,.,,_..~--....._,_,~.-~.~---
indi~:~~~~~· And women's proprietary capacity, and succession are also subject 
to much criticism. 
Bennett119 is of the opinion that it cannot be proved that polygyny and bridewealth 
.,~, «,,- ' -, •' ·--~- ,,_.__, ~"""-'-·-- ... ~---·-
are responsible for the subordinate position of ~QrnEm in indig~f'IC>.l::!§Ja,~ and that 
""---~-----
these are such sensitive issues that the l~Qislature, and not the courts, should address 
" -- ~-,~-
the problef!l .... ~~~---~~rnm~ -~.ution. Kaganas and Murray120 too come to the 
conclusion that it is patriarchy, a characteristic feature of indigenous culture, and not 
polygyny which causes the oppression of indigenous women. According to them it is 
not only in polygynous unions that women are treated as property, that sexual 
118 Labuschagne ·Menseregte• 34 7-348. 
119 Bennett ·equality Clause• 124. 
120 Kaganas & Murray ·Law- 125. 
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stereotyping takes place and that males dominate. 121 
But because polygyny has become symbolically associated with the oppression of 
women, it is deemed to be incompatible with a social order in which the liberation of 
women is recognised as a goal. 122 Sinclair observes that polygyny has been 
condemned on religious and moral grounds in most civilised societies and that it is not 
compatible with the notion of sex equality in a democratic South Africa. She is of the 
opinion that the abolition of polygyny would be a first step in the destruction of 
patriarchy. Still, where polygyny is firmly entrenched, communities will continue to 
practice it irrespective of legislative indication against it. 123 
If one analyses pre-colonial law and its underlying jural postulates, it is often found that 
gender inequality exists not in the pre-colonial law, but in the distorted version of that 
law. 124 Nhlapo125 observes that 
"rules that appeared designed tor the subjection of women often operated to ensure their 
security. The economic priorities underlying the pre-eminence of marriage and large families 
produced practices which worked in part to ensure that no woman was left without someone 
121 However, it is difficult to envisage a polygynous relationship in which the man does not 
dominate. Kaganas & Murray "Law" 127 rightly point out that structural inequality occurs and 
should be addressed also in monogamous indigenous unions. 
122 Kaganas & Murray "Law" 129. 
123 Sinclair 563-565. She notes that even if it is found that polygyny falls within the jurisdiction of 
the Constitutional Court and in terms of s 98(5) an order is made by the Court that legislation 
be passed which prohibits polygyny prospectively (whilst preserving existing rights of women 
and children in polygynous unions and fully recognising indigenous-law marriages), those 
practices which are perceived to be oppressive would persist despite such prohibition because 
they are in fact rather connected to patriarchy. 
124 Kaganas & Murray "Law" 129 observe that it is the version of indigenous law as evolved by the 
State courts, which disadvantage indigenous women. Nhlapo •African Family" 136 points out that 
traditional leaders exploited the institutions of marriage goods and guardianship in an effort to 
regain their diminishing power, and that the colonial administration misunderstood the nature 
of indigenous institutions and regarded indigenous women as rightless entities under the 
authority of men. 
125 Nhlapo "African Family" 144. 
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directly responsible for her maintenance". 
In this distorted indigenous law women are considered to be unequal in indigenous 
marriages, whether they are de facto polygynous or monogamous. In this regard the 
following criticism has been levelled against indigenous law: 
First, women bear children and have the responsibility for them but they have no rights 
over their children, because all rights with regard to children are vested in men. 126 
It is indeed true that children born of a lawful marriage become members of their 
fathers' group. However, this is not because they are paid for by the transfer of 
marriage goods, 121 or because all rights are vested in men. The reason is that the 
woman's capacity to bear children forms part of the marital guardianship which is 
transferred to her husband's group upon marriage. All rights are shared within that 
group. The mother, as well as other female members of the group in accordance with 
their status and as members of that group, also has a share in rights regarding her 
children. This is for example evidenced in the important role played by females in case 
of seduction or rape. It is also evidenced by the important role played by the mother's 
brother in the marriage negotiations of her children, or, where daughters are 
concerned, in litigation. Further, marriage goods should not be seen. as payment for 
children or solely as a quid pro quo for the transfer of the limited authority over the 
women. As explained above, it is a means to restore the equilibrium which is disturbed 
by the transfer of the marital guardianship and it does not affect the legitimacy of 
children. 128 
126 Kaganas & Murray "Law" 127. 
127 Bennett "Equality Clause" 128 says that in theory the transfer of bridewealth determines the 
guardianship of children, but that the rule is not strictly applied and may be altered in 
accordance with any agreement between the families concerned. 
128 See Part 11.11.2.c.ii. 
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It should also be noted129 that divorce was for various reasons uncommon in 
pre-colonial indigenous law but that it has become more frequent in recent years. It 
is incorrect to say that custody of children is awarded to the husband in the event of 
divorce. The fact that parents divorce makes no difference to their children's 
membership of the group to which they belong. They remain members of their group 
of origin, which is also their father's group of origin. Even where a mother physically 
takes her young with her to her group of origin, the children remain members of their 
father's group. 130 It is only upon marriage that a daughter becomes a member of her 
husband's group too, and even then she still retains membership of her group of 
origin. Labuschagne131 points out that State courts have in the past awarded custody 
to the mother because it is in the best interest of the child, a universally applicable 
principle. In indigenous law the emphasis is on the best interest of the group, but this 
can only be maintained where the physical and emotional well-being of its members 
(in this instance, the children) are protected. Thus, the best interest of the child is in 
fact maintained in indigenous law, but through different mechanisms, or for different 
reasons. 
If one analyses the principles underlying rights over children within an indigenous law 
perspective, it is clear that it is not the inherent superior position of the husband (who 
only shares in the rights that his group of origin has over his children), or the inferior 
position of the wife which in indigenous law determines the rights over children. The 
whole issue of custody should not be narrowed down to a conflict of interests between 
a husband and wife. It is kinship which determines social structures in indigenous 
culture and which determines a child's membership of a group. And membership of 
a group holds both rights and privileges for children. 
The second point of criticism against indigenous law is that women carry the burden 
129 See Part 11.11.2.c.ii. 
130 Van Niekerk •Maintenance• 99-1 oo. 
131 Labuschagne •Menseregte• 346-347; see also Bennett "Equality aause· 128. 
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of labour within and outside the home so that their husbands prosper materially and 
enhance their status. Polygyny serves the purpose of increasing the man's labour 
force for expanding his agricultural holding and thus adds to his wealth and prestige. 
Numerous children not only extend his labour force, but ensure a male heir to 
perpetuate his father's spirit. Agnatic heads control the family's wealth and the wives 
have few proprietary rights. The male head represents the household in all dealings 
with the outside world. He has extensive powers within the household. 132 
As explained above, 133 women's position in the group is in many ways similar to that 
of men. They all share in the right of authority, ownership and rights of personality. 
Whilst men's duties entail building, clearing soil, herding, milking and assisting the 
head of the group when there is a claim against the group, women's duties in the 
group entail, amongst others, grinding, sweeping, plastering, cooking and tilling. 
Wealth is shared in the group and applied in the interest of the group. The fact that 
the head of the group represents the group does not mean that he acts in his own 
interest. As explained, the family idea dictates that all individuals act for the family as 
a whole and not in individual interests. It may be noted further that whilst women are 
indeed dependent on their husbands for access to resources, their positions are not 
necessarily prejudiced by the fact that there may be more than one wife. On the 
contrary, more wives may mean an increase in wealth for the household rather than 
a decrease. 134 One of the diffuse postulates of indigenous law is, after all, the 
maintenance of the equilibrium in the group, and this cannot be accomplished if the 
family head disregards the needs of the family. It should also be remembered that a 
male heir does not perpetuate the spirit of his father (in the interest of the father as an 
individual), but that he ensures the survival of his group, which is in the interest of the 
group as a whole. The designation of the man as the family head is also regarded as 
an expression of women's inequality. Although this is the rule, female heads of agnatic 
132 Kaganas and Murray •Law" 129-130. 
133 The division of labour in the extended family was discussed in Part 11.11.3.b.ii(il). 
134 Kaganas & Murray •Law" 128. 
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groups are known amongst some people. Whilst it is indeed discriminatory to exclude 
women from this position, it still does not affect her position of dignity and honour 
within the group. The head of the family acts in the interest of the group as a whole 
and acquires no personal gain or wealth. Females have an important role to play in 
the group. For example, they represent the group when they take steps to obtain 
redress for the infringement of personality rights. They also have a substantial share 
in the house property and the agnatic head must consult a woman before her house 
property is used. 135 
The third point of criticism levelled against indigenous law is that the levirate and 
-· ---~-~·<--""·-~,·-~~~ .; .. ~---~" .. ·--~ ~· ~"'·~·'-"' .. ~ 
sororate are indications against the equality of men and women~-·--"--·········· 
These institutions should also be regarded in light of the family idea as expounded 
above. 137 If a woman is unable to produce offspring, or if either one of the partners 
in marriage should die before children have been born, provision is made through 
sororate and levirate secondary unions for the house to be continued. The reason is 
not because women are regarded to be inferior, or because the man should directly 
benefit from it at the cost of the woman. The aim of these institutions is that once a 
nuclear family has been established, it should not be allowed to die out. 138 These 
institutions also secure the position of the women and her children when her husband 
dies, because she can continue her life within her husband's group with all the 
resources available to her. In any case, these institutions have similar social 
consequences for both men and women. In case of the sororate, a barren or 
deceased wife's sister is placed in her house to bear children in her place, and in case 
of the levirate an approved relative of the husband is put in the house to beget 
135 Part 11.11.3.b.ii(i). 
136 Nhlapo •African Family" 138; Sinclair 561 ; Kaganas & Murray "Law" 117; Bennett Sourcebook 
413-416. 
137 Part 11.11.3.b.ii(li). 
138 Preston-Whyte 188-192. 
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children in his place. In addition, this relative also takes other responsibilities for the 
widow and her children and provides security for them. Moreover, woman-to-woman 
marriages are also known in indigenous law and are common amongst the Lobedu, 
Venda and Pedi. Thus a woman marries another woman to bear children for her. The 
"spouse" (the former) either appoints a lover, or the woman who bears the children 
chooses a suitor. The idea is again to secure the continued existence of the family. 
This phenomenon may for example occur where a widow is childless, or where a 
widow does not have a son. 139 
The fourth point of criticism is that in indigenous law polygynous men may renounce 
their marriage unilaterally, and introduce new wives without the consent of the existing 
wife or wives. Moreover, it is more difficult for a wife to obtain a divorce; the husband 
may recover the bridewealth if he can show that his wife could not fulfill her obligations 
(for example could not bear children); and women cannot initiate divorce proceedings 
because it must be done by the "bridewealth holder" who may be reluctant to 
co-operate lest he loses some of the bridewealth. 1"° 
Dissolution of marriage in indigenous law may happen at the instance of either the 
husband or the wife. It is in fact the husband's group or the wife's group of origin who 
repudiates the marriage. This usually happens on good grounds such as misconduct, 
impotence, or sterility. The institutions of levirate and sororate may remedy the 
last-mentioned reasons. Incapability to bear children are sometimes just condoned by 
the husband's group. 1• 1 Myburgh142 is of the opinion that the return of marriage 
goods upon divorce is dependent on the extent to which the wife has fulfilled her 
139 Preston-Whyte 191-192. 
140 Kaganas & Murray •Law" 129-130; Sinclair 568. 
141 Myburgh Papers 86-87; Preston-Whyte 194. 
142 Myburgh Papers 87. 
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duties. However, Church,143 basing her view on extensive field research amongst the 
Tswana, comes to the conclusion, that marriage goods are not returnable, whether the 
wife has children or not and whether a substitute has been provided or not. This 
seems to be the better view in light of the fact that marriage goods should not solely 
be regarded as a quid pro quo for the transfer of marital guardianship to the 
husband's group but also, importantly, as a means to restore the disturbed 
equilibrium. 
The fifth criticism is that the institution of marriage goods has the effect that women 
are treated as property. It objectifies and commercialises women. 144 
It is clear that the transfer of marriage goods is important in many spheres of 
indigenous culture and that it was not originally devised to subjugate women in any 
way. The transfer of marriage goods in pre-colonial law has various functions. It is part 
performance in terms of a real contract (the woman's group transfers the limited right 
of authority to the man's group); it is a form of thanksgiving for the fact that the 
woman's group raised her; it softens the "blow and tries to obtain the friendship of the 
girl's family"; it ensures that the ancestors make the wife fertile; and it stabilises the 
marriage. Moreover, it should be seen as a social and spiritual symbol of the bond 
between the two families and is closely connected to the ancestors. 1.45 
Bennett146 observes, that "even a superficial knowledge of customary marriage would 
143 Church Marriage 40-42; She also indicates that there are various contradictory statements in the 
literature in this regard. 
144 See Bennett Sourcebook 196-217, Sinclair 565-566, Labuschagne ·Lobolo• 545-553, Nhlapo 
·African Family" 138 142. Chinyenze 229-252 argues forcefully for the abolition of the institution. 
145 See Labuschagne ·Lobolo• 545-550, Bennett Sourcebook 200, Part 11.11.2.c.ii for a discussion of 
this Institution. Labuschagne Is of the opinion that it validates the marriage and determines the 
legal status of children. However, for a contrary view see Part 11.11.2.c.ii. It is contended that 
consensus with regard to marriage goods is sufficient and that the actual transfer does not 
validate the marriage. 
146 Bennett Sourcebook 196. 
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show that the wife is neither a slave nor a chattel". However, the institution has 
changed and is now far removed from its pre-colonial antecedent. It has taken on a 
commercialised character which contributes to the subordination of women and 
jeopardises her financial security upon divorce. In order for the institution to survive, 
it will have to be adapted. 147 If it is reformed, the aim should be to bring it back in line 
with the underlying indigenous law principles. In short, there should be a movement 
away from the idea that marriage goods should satisfy the immediate economic needs 
of the woman's group, and that it justifies the husbands refusal to support his wife and 
children upon divorce, that it is no more than a purchase price for the woman. The 
emphasis should once again be on the pre-colonial principles which focus on the 
establishment and maintenance of good relations between the groups, between the 
marriage partners and with the ancestors. If this is the aim, the amount to be paid 
would again take on reasonable proportions and the woman would not so readily be 
regarded as economic commodity. 
It should also be remembered that in pre-colonial law the husband, or rather his family, 
is responsible to maintain his wife and her children while she is still living with him. 
When the wife leaves her husband and takes the children with her, his family remains 
responsible for the maintenance of the children. The wife then becomes the 
responsibility of her family. This being the indigenous-law position, the husband in an 
indigenous law marriage, or his family, should have the legal responsibility to support 
the children upon divorce. All this would of course be possible only once indigenous 
law marriages are accorded full recognition. However, Burman 148 is of the opinion 
that it is in any event futile to try and obtain maintenance for children from their fathers. 
By updating the institution of marriage goods and constituting a "Bridewealth Fund" 
which may serve as a source of funds in the event of the marriage ending, or a which 
may be a lump sum saving to help in old age if the marriage survived, the problem of 
maintenance for children upon divorce may be ameliorated. 
147 See Bennett Sourcebook 201-202. 
148 Burman "Women, Welfare and the Law" 217 219-221. 
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Sixthly, it is said that women are regarded as perpetual minors who fall under the 
authority of their fathers or their husbands and that their locus standi and contractual 
capacity are limited. They are also discriminated against in the law of succession. 149 
It is indeed true that indigenous law as it is applied by the State courts and as it has 
been distorted by the legislature, is generally discriminatory, but this indigenous law 
is not always a true reflection of pre-colonial law and is more often than not 
inconsistent with the fundamental postulates which underscore indigenous law. 
Widows and children cannot inherit in pre-colonial indigenous law. Universal 
succession takes place through the oldest male. However, because he does not inherit 
any property in his personal capacity but succeeds to the position of the deceased 
head of the household, everything that is inherited, is applied for the benefit of the 
family as a whole. The fact that everything is owned communally and inherited 
communally provides security for widows and children. They are taken care of within 
the circle of the extended family, or by the wife's own family should she decide to 
leave her deceased husband's group. The notion that a woman and her children 
should suffer at the death of her husband is foreign to indigenous law. 
Bennett150 asks whether the equality clause should be so interpreted that it generates 
rights that did not previously exist, namely by granting widows the right to inherit. He . 
concludes that such cases, which are neither vague nor contradictory, should rather 
be left to reform by the legislature. However, one should not regard indigenous law as 
an immutable legal system; it is adaptable. The courts should be able to adapt 
149 Sinclair 566-568; Bennett •Equality aause• 125-129; Kerr ·Fundamental Rights" 725-729; Nhlapo 
•African Family" 138 144; Kaganas & Murray •Law- 122-123 129. 
150 Bennett •Equality Oause• 128-129. Kerr •Fundamental Rights• 726 is also of the opinion that it 
is not for the courts to change the indigenous law of succession. The principle that the equality 
clause should not be interpreted to generate rights that did not previously exist, applies to all 
aspects of indigenous law which are in conflict with the Bill of Rights. He comments on 735: 
·un1ess It can be shown that it was explained to the traditional leaders ... that 'Indigenous law' 
meant a fundamentally changed indigenous law ... the only way to acknowledge the good faith 
of those who negotiated the present Constitution is to recognize that it contains direct conflicts". 
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indigenous law to changing social needs, as long as such adaption is in line with the 
postulates which underlie that law. The premise should not be to adapt the law to 
bring it in line with the Bill of Rights, but to bring it in line once more with its 
fundamental principles. 
If it is therefore found that a widow and her children are destitute due to the particular 
circumstances of a given case, the court should intercede on their behalf. But there 
are some factors which need to be borne in mind. It should be determined who is in 
fact regarded as part of the extended family of which the deceased husband was the 
head. In terms of indigenous law, not only the widow and children but a variety of 
others may be dependent upon the family's assets. It may have far-reaching 
repercussions to impose the Western concept of inheritance of an estate by an 
individual, on indigenous law. Should a court determine that a widow be allowed to 
inherit from her husband, a specific amount should be indicated, taking into account 
other dependants in the family concerned. Alternatively, the court may determine that 
the widow and other dependants have a claim for maintenance against the estate. 
Again one should be very cautious to apply the Western principle to indigenous law. 
The whole concept of an estate which belongs to and individual is foreign to 
pre-colonial indigenous law. Over the years the idea of individual ownership by men 
has evolved. However, where the man is regarded as the owner of the family property, 
it should be determined whether indigenous law or Western law is applicable. One 
should guard against applying Western law merely because individual property is at 
stake. It may cause hardship for many people if the Western law is applied without 
having regard for the specific circumstances of the case. For this reason it may be 
dangerous to leave it to the legislature to introduce general reform which may not 
cater for individual needs and specific circumstances. 
In pre-colonial law every household has a right to house property which is applied for 
the benefit of that house. Being subsistence communities, property is closely linked 
to the security, survival and maintenance of the family. A woman may add to her 
house property by for example practising divining and making craft articles. Once 
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house property is allocated, the property is regarded to be inviolable. Not even the 
head of the family can use such property without the consent of the wife; but this does 
not mean that she may use it in her own interest. 151 Generally, both men and women ' 
have a very limited proprietary capacity and individual ownership extends only to 
personal property such as weapons, clothes and ornaments which have ritual value. 
However, in line with the new market economy indigenous law has been adapted to 
encompass the idea of individual ownership. This is especially the case in urban areas. 
If the idea had been developed in line with the underlying principles of indigenous law, 
where there is no substantial difference between men and women with regard to 
proprietary capacity, both men and women would now have been able to own 
property. Unfortunately indigenous law has been distorted. The fact that the head of 
the family represents the group in all legal spheres, has lead to the erroneous 
assumption that the husband is the owner of individual property and, therefore, that 
the wife has no proprietary capacity. 
Furthermore, the legislature has interceded and declared women to be perpetual 
minors. 152 Again this position does not accord with the underlying principles of 
pre-colonial law in which all members of the group are represented by the family head 
in legal and social matters. The fact that he represents them does not mean that he 
acts in his own interest. It is not in line with the postulates which underlie indigenous 
law, for women to be regarded as minors and for men to have full legal capacity. If 
indigenous postulates had directed the development of its law in this regard, there 
would have been no distinction between men and women with regard to proprietary 
capacity and the capacity to litigate. 
151 Preston-Whyte 179-180. 
152 S 11(3) of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 determines that all women (except those 
living In Natal) are deemed to be minors and are subject to the guardianship of their husbands. 
S 11A makes an exception and exempts women from the application of indigenous law with 
regard to matters relating to leasehold, sectional title and the ownership of immovable property. 
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(vi) Summary 
It should be clear that the grounds upon which discrimination is forbidden in section 
8(2) of the Constitution have different meanings and a different impact on human 
dignity and equality if interpreted in the indigenous cultural context. Some of these 
grounds (amongst others culture, race, colour, ethnicity) have no significant influence 
on equality in indigenolJs law. Others, (ethnic and social origin) have such diverse 
meanings in indigenous law that it seems illogical to group them together, as they 
presently are. And others, if taken 9ut of their cultural context, may have disastrous 
consequences for the continued application of indigenous law. Nevertheless, this does 
not mean that they should not be regarded as elements which are constitutive of 
human identity, or that they do not have an important role to play in indigenous law. 
Moreover, from a Western perspective there has obviously been a need to include 
explicitly at least these grounds, because they have, in the past, played a significant 
role in the unfair discrimination against individuals. Therefore, it is important that 
section 8(2) be retained, but where circumstances demand, that the equality clause 
should be interpreted in its indigenous cultural context. If this is done, it may be found 
that although the indigenous and Western153 conceptions of equality differ, they are 
not completely irreconcilable. 
4 INDIGENOUS LAW AND THE SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE 
Certain rights in indigenous law may indeed be characterised as individual rights. 
These are the right to life and amongst the Lobedu apparently the right to privacy. It 
must always be borne in mind that the degree of individualism differs from tribe to tribe 
and there may well be other instances where individuals have individual rights that the 
group has no say in. However, and more importantly, in indigenous law the 
predominance of the group interest generally prevails. 
153 The Western conception as expressed ins 8. 
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The constitutional protection of life has far-reaching implications, especially for 
social-policy issues such as the death penalty, mercy-killing and abortion. Protection 
of the right to life may also be interpreted to affect broader issues than merely life and 
death. 154 Whether the protection of the right to life will have any significant influence 
on indigenous law depends on the value indigenous law attaches to life. On close 
observation of the indigenous attitude towards life (within the narrow interpretation of 
life versus death), it seems that this right is indeed treated as an individual right. 
Suicide, mercy-killing and abortion may serve as examples. 
In indig~!l_Q~§J~~ _$1,.1ici-9_~J~r1d attempted suicide are not regarded as offences: every 
--,---·~·-,--~- ·- ~, ___ ·-- ___ ,., - ''" " 
p~~rson has the right to take his own IJfe. However, this right to die is limited.~rson 
is only allowed to take h!!?~c:>~DJj!~- Should a person ask another to assist him because 
------·-· -- ·- -----· -··----- -·----·----~---~- ----- - ~--~ .. ----.-..,.~---~---~-~"------µ- ----· ~-·- .. ,,, ___ .,_~~~~--·-----"~---------
he is unable to kill himself, the assistant will be guilty of murder. Mercy-killing is 
regarded as an offence. 155 Terminal illness and serious mental and or physical 
disability are not regarded as a justified limitation on the right to life. 156 However, a 
person found guilty of mercy-killing would receive a reduced sentence. 
It seems that the indigenous-law perceptions with regard to suicide and mercy-killing 
are similar to Western perceptions. However, it should be remembered that in 
indigenous law killing is seen to have a pollutionary effect on the comrnunity which has 
to be removed through certain rites. Therefore, although these acts are not always 
regarded as crimes, they have religious and magical consequences which have to be 
dealt with. 
The conce!pt of abortion must be seenwithin the context of the world view of 
154 Du Plessis & De Ville 214-215 point out that the following issues may also be included: threats 
to and loss of life resulting from either armed conflict or environmental hazards; failure to meet 
survival needs; violation of human rights in situations of armed conflict and disregard for due 
process of law by law-enforcement, security and military personnel. 
155 See generally Church "Murder" 78-80, Church "Necessity" 17-18, Myburgh & Prinsloo 98, 
Prinsloo Publiekreg 206-208. 
156 This is also the position in the South African law: see Du Plessis & De Ville 323. 
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indigenous people. As explained above, the universe is regarded as one integrated 
whole. Not only the deceased but also those yet to be born form a natural part of the 
group. The question whether the fetus is "a constitutional subject"151 is not really 
relevant in indigenous law. It seems then only natural that abortion 158 is, with some 
exceptions, regarded as a crime in indigenous law. 159 Amongst most people, neither 
the mother nor the group may consent to abortion. Some groups regard the expulsion 
of the fetus at any stage of the pregnancy as the crime of abortion. 180 Others 
regarded it as the crime of abortion when the fetus is not viable and murder when the 
fetus is aborted at a stage where the child is already viable. 161 The fact that different 
Western crimes are used to describe the expulsion of the fetus at separate stages of 
gestation, does not make any difference to the fact that the unborn, and even those 
who have not yet been conceived form part of the group and are regarded to be an 
important component of it. 
In the case of abortion, indigenous law presumably protects the group's interest in its 
continuation through children and not necessarily, or only the sanctity of human 
life.162 A woman certainly has no right to procreative autonomy in indigenous law, 
seeing that it is her procreative capacity which is amongst others transferred to her 
husband's group upon marriage. The group's interest may outweigh certain of the 
mother's rights, but not her right to life. Where the mother's life is in danger, an 
abortion may be procured with impunity. It is also the relationship between the living 
157 Du Plessis & De Ville 229 point out that one of the most vexing problems regarding abortion in 
Western jurisprudence is whether the fetus is a constitutional subject. 
158 Go ntsha mpa: to empty the stomach, to extract the belly, to take out the womb. 
159 See generally Nathan •Abortion" 85-86. 
160 Nathan ·Abortion• 85-86. 
161 Myburgh & Prinsloo 98-99. 
162 In indigenous law human life may be sacrificed in the interest of the continued peaceful 
existence of the group. A witch or a thief of public resources has a polluting effect on the 
community and may be punished by death. Not only is the culprit killed, but lustration 
ceremonies are performed to purify the community and to restore the equilibrium. 
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and the superhuman which is protected. Abortion is regarded as a polluting act which 
disturbs the harmony in the group and with the superhuman. It creates heat which 
adversely affects rainfall. The pollution has to be cleansed through rites of lustration. 
One has to agree with Sinclair's183 warning that the purpose of indigenous marriage 
goes beyond the individual interests of the husband and wife and that it would 
consequently be dangerous to equate the position of the Anglo-American feminist with 
that of the African woman. To this one may add that the jural postulates which 
determine the indigenous-law attitude to life are so different from western law, that a 
conflict between Western and indigenous perceptions in this regard is inevitable. 
It is interesting that the Lobedu regard an abortion performed by anybody other than 
the mother as a crime. The group has no say in this matter and the mother may 
lawfully cause the fetus to abort. It seems that the mother has an individual right 
analogous to the right to privacy or the right to security of the person. One may 
speculate that the mother's procreative autonomy is but a reflection of wider rights for 
women in Lobedu society. The right to procreative autonomy in any event influences 
many related issues. 184 Also among the Kgaga and the Pedi, abortion is not regarded 
as a crime. The Kgaga regard it as an incident that must be dealt with within the 
family, whilst the Pedi regard it as a natural termination of the pregnancy. Other tribes 
regard it to be lawful as long as the father also consents. 165 
The group has no right of life and death over the members of that group unless the 
individual threatens the survival of the group. It is usually religious and magical factors 
which may induce the killing of an individual without due process. Examples are the 
163 Sinclair 529. 
164 In American jurisprudence a mother's right to terminate a pregnancy is regarded as a right to 
privacy whilst in Canada it is regarded as a right to security of the person: see Cachalia 32 
42-44. Lobedu women's procreative autonomy may be explained by the fact that they have a 
most famous regentess, Modjaji. The sacred position of the ruler and her ancestors in 
indigenous law may well be the reason why Lobedu women have this exceptional right. 
165 Prinsloo Publiekreg 213-214. 
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killing of deformed infants, one of twins, babies born from uninitiated parents and 
witches. Such occurrences within a group also have to be purified by rites of lustration. 
Capital punishment is a permissible punishment in indigenous law. 
Finally, it should be borne in mind that the death of an individual may have detrimental 
consequences for the group. It causes patrimonial loss for the group which loses the 
reproductive capacity and labour potential of a female or a male's capacity to earn 
wages. The group is therefore entitled to compensation for patrimonial loss flowing 
from the death of one of its members. It may also obtain satisfaction for the sorrow 
caused by the death of one of the members, the dismay being regarded as bodily 
injury. Finally, the fact that the death of a member pollutes the group, affects the 
dignity of the group for which satisfaction could be awarded. 11111 
5 INDIGENOUS LAW AND FREEDOM 
Ayittey1111 lists twenty "Fundamental Rights of the African People" which he condenses 
into five basic freedoms which "shall be enjoyed within the boundaries defined by the 
community as a whole, not by the chief or king". These basic freedoms are: freedom 
of choice, to live anywhere, to engage in any occupation, to trade goods at whatever 
prices; freedom of expression, to debate, criticize policies and participate in 
decision-making processes; freedom of association in social economic and political 
spheres; freedom of worship; and freedom of movement. 
It should be remembered that not only the interests of the collectivity, but also the 
interests of superhuman forces give a very specific content to these freedoms. Here 
the difference in the jural postulates which underlie indigenous law and Western law 
makes it not only difficult but sometimes inappropriate to apply the Western concepts 
166 See generally Myburgh Papers 34-39. See also Part 1.11.4.b. for an exposition of the concept of 
rights in indigenous law. 
167 Ayittey 264-266. 
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in an indigenous law context.168 In indigenous law individuals may sometimes be 
prohibited from expressing themselves in a certain way, from associating freely, from 
moving freely or from having access to information, because the exercise of such 
freedoms is regarded to disturb the relationship with the superhuman and because it 
may be visited by superhuman sanctions. The rules delimiting such freedoms are often 
associated with taboo. 
Freedom of movement, for instance is curtailed by rules relating to taboo. A father is 
prohibited from entering the birth hut for a certain period and from taking part in the 
hunt for two moons after his child's birth. It is also forbidden to go into the field when 
a person dies. Women are fo~bidden to enter the kraal area or appear in court (which 
is adjacent to the kraal) when they are menstruating. However, individual freedom is 
so highly valued in indigenous law that it is rarely taken away from anyone, not even 
from a criminal. Imprisonment is regarded as a degrading punishment. 169 
Rules regarding a taboo may also affect a person's freedom of expression and 
association, and right of access to certain information. It is a violation of a taboo to 
enquire about men's initiation lodges, to discuss these in public, and to disclose 
initiation secrets to people who have not been initiated. Because of the close 
relationship between language, religion and magic, and the concomitant language 
taboos, there are various restrictions upon the freedom of expression. Banishment is 
regarded as second in severity only to the death penalty and is ordered for crimes 
which bear superhuman. consequences and threaten the co-existence of the 
group. 110 
168 See for example sections 15, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 23 of the Constitution Act. 
169 The fact that imprisonment is a competent (and popular) sentence in Western law may perhaps 
be one of the reasons why the indigenous population has so little trust in the Western system 
of justice. 
170 For example treason, murder and the practicing of black magic: see generally Vorster "Violating 
Taboo• 96-97 and Myburgh ·Punishment" 48 49 52. 
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Land too has a sacred position in indigenous law and should be seen within the 
context of the postulate that superhuman forces are superior to man. The concept of 
ownership of land in the Western sense is indeed unknown in indigenous law. Land 
is not regarded as a negotiable -commodity. It belongs to the community as a whole, 
the living, those yet to be born, and to the superhuman, and its use is controlled by 
tribal authorities. Yet all persons have the right to use land for various purposes. This 
individual right cannot arbitrarily be taken away by the authorities. Where a ruler orders 
an individual to move from the land without consulting the proper council and where 
the public's interest is not at stake, the order may lawfully be disobeyed. An order to 
vacate agricultural land for public use as a tribute field, without a suitable substitute 
being offered, may be disregarded lawfully. 111 Contracts for the exchange of a field 
or of residential site for livestock or movable things and the selling or letting of a field 
are, for example, regarded to be unlawful. 112 
6 CONCLUSION 
Over the years, the State and State institutions have failed to eradicate indigenous law. 
State courts and State law are to a great extent ignored in the townships where an 
adapted indigenous law is applied by unofficial institutions. In rural areas indigenous 
courts apply indigenous law in a much purer form. 113 
On the one hand it may be assumed that the new Interim Constitution, like all other 
legislation, will largely be ignored by unofficial dispute-resolution institutions, and that 
it will not affect the application of unofficial indigenous law by official institutions such 
as the Chiefs' Courts. Moreover, because the Constitution is framed in a Western 
perspective, it may be assumed that it will not have any effect on the indigenous 
171 Vorster ·oisobeying Orders• 74. 
172 See Part 11.11.2.c.il, Prinsloo ·exchange• 29-30, Nyerere 166 167 and 53-58 on land and 
communal ownership. 
173 See generally Part l.IV.4.a above. 
Part ll.IV.6 Indigenous Law and Western Law in a New Constitutional Dispensation 311 
community's perception of State law and institutions, which will continue to be 
regarded at least as culturally illegitimate. 
On the other hand, however, the Bill of Rights will have an effect on the application of 
indigenous law by the State courts. If horizontally applicable, it will provide a new 
dimension to the old debate surrounding the continued application or reform of 
indigenous law, and to the problems regarding internal-conflicts management. It is the 
equality clause which draws the attention once again to the conflict that exists between 
indigenous values and Western values as the latter are entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
Indigenous law is an adaptable legal system. Yet its adaptation should not be in 
-
accordance with the Bill of Rights as an instrument entrenching Western values. It 
should be adapted in harmony with its underlying postulates. This may be in 
--
accordance with the Bill of Rights, if, where circumstances demand, the Bill of Rights 
is interpreted in an indigenous cultural context. It has been pointed out above that the 
jural postulates of pre-colonial indigenous law are as a rule not inherently 
discriminatory. The conflict that exists is more often than not between a distorted 
indigenous law, as modified and applied by the State courts today, and Western law. 
Thus the overt forms of gender discrimination may, for example, be removed from 
indigenous law by adapting it in accordance with those fundamental postulates which 
underlie indigenous law and which are still accepted by the indigenous community. In 
the process of adapting indigenous law, the courts have the most important role to 
play. The courts should be aware of their law-making function which is performed by 
changing and extending the application of legal rules. This can be accomplished only 
if the courts engage in a program of indigenous legal education. In the meantime 
judges should be assisted by expert witnesses on the values that underlie indigenous 
legal orders in the same way they rely on the assistance of expert witnesses in other 
fields of expertise. 
However, section 35(3) of the Constitution instructs the courts to interpret, apply and 
develop all law in the spirit of the Bill of Rights. The underlying ideals of equality and 
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freedom, aimed at the protection of a certain core of human nature and human dignity, 
and entrenched in the Bill of Rights, are not altogether unfamiliar to indigenous law. 
But the expression of these ideals in terms of exclusive individual human rights is, to 
some extent, foreign to that law. Presently the Constitution does not make provision 
that where indigenous law is concerned, equality, freedom and human dignity must be 
seen in the context of the communitarian ideals of indigenous society. 114 
With regard to the application of indigenous law by the State courts and the possible 
resolution of conflicts (in cases where there are two legal systems which may possibly 
apply to the facts, and in cases where indigenous law is in conflict with Western values 
as entrenched in the Constitution) the following should then noted. In terms of th~---
, 
Constitution the courts are directed to interpret the Constitution and to apply its 
provisions in accordance with the standards and values .it entrenches. 115 The 
Constitution does not give clear guidelines whether indigenous law or the Bill of Rights 
should prevail. It is usually assumed that should the Bill of Rights prevail, indigenous 
law would be eliminated and Western law would be applied in its stead. On the one 
hand guidelines for the resolution of conflicts between Western and indigenous values 
could be sought outside the Constitution.118 On the other hand, if the Constitution 
accommodates indigenous values, it should provide those very guidelines to the courts 
to resolve conflicts. Moreover, it could direct the courts to take cognisance of 
indigenous-law values. 
This may be accomplished by extending the interpretation clause, section 35, and by 
conferring upon indigenous law the same status as State law. In view of the fact that 
the Constitutional Principles cannot be changed, and because Constitutional Principle 
XIII recognises the application of indigenous law subject to existing legislation, the 
174 Bennett •Equality aause· 123 points out that ·existing institutions can cater for individual needs, 
in the short term at least, more effectively than a bill of rights can•; see also Whelpton •1nheemse 
Reg• 3-7. 
175 See Du Plessis & Corder 70. 
176 Bennett •Equality Oause• 123-124. 
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Constitution should revoke such legislation, or those parts of legislation which limit the 
application of indigenous law or affects its status in the South African legal order. 111 
It should further revoke such legislation or those parts of legislation which entrench 
distorted indigenous law. 118 As in the case of State law, the application of indigenous 
law should be subject only to the Constitution. L-
Section 35(1) instructs the courts, where applicable, to have regard to public 
international law in as far as it is applicable to the protection of the human rights 
entrenched in Chapter 3 and allows the courts to have regard to comparable foreign 
case law. With regard to indigenous law, the interpretation clause should not only 
allow the courts to have regard to the values which underlie indigenous law, it should 
in fact direct the courts to do so. But how should this section be extended? In the 
introductory statement of the preliminary draft to the African Charter on Human and 
People's Rights, 179 it was pointed out that the committee of experts for the 
preparation of the draft, was guided by the principle that the Charter should reflect the 
African conception of human rights. Thus, amongst others, it was decided that 
people's rights should be included because the concept of absolute individual freedom 
is opposed to the welfare of the society and not consonant with African values; it was 
decided to include duties towards the community in which the individual lives, but 
more specifically towards the family and the State; and it was decided to emphasise 
the importance of African values and morals. 180 
177 For example the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 54 of 1988 which gives the courts a 
discretion to apply indigenous law and which makes its application subject to the repugnancy 
proviso. 
178 For example section 11 (3) of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 which determines that 
indigenous women are minors and subject to the guardianship of their husbands. 
179 The memorandum of the "Meeting of Experts for the Preparation of the Draft African Charter of 
Human and Peoples' Rights" of 1979 was reprinted in Kunig Benedek & Mahalu 107ff. 
180 Reprinted in Kunig Benedek & Mahalu 95-119. In the preamble of the African Charter on Human 
and People's Rights (Banjul Charter) it is stated that the concept of human and people's rights 
should reflect the virtues of their historical tradition and the values of African civilisation: see 
Mahalu 25; Benedek 60-62. 
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One should be careful that the measures included in the Constitution to accommodate 
indigenous values are not so phrased that they appear to be consonant with those 
values, whilst they are in fact hiding or repressing the ways in which the Constitution 
is in actual fact dissonant with them. In indigenous societies, duties which focus on 
the group are the expressions of social responsibility. Whereas the entrenchment of 
duties may be one way of establishing indigenous values and the concept of social 
solidarity in the Constitution, it may be dangerous to include the notion of duties, 
which, if not properly defined, and if misused, may in fact lead to the implicit 
neutralisation of those very rights the Constitution seeks to protect. The concept of 
duties is still a very vague one in international human-rights law and there is still 
speculation on its exact meaning in the African Charter.181 Likewise the concept of 
people's rights is still ill-defined and its meaning as contained in the Banjul Charter has 
been subject to varied interpretations. 182 With regard to the South African 
Constitution, the concepts of social responsibility and group solidarity, and with them 
the communitarian ideals of indigenous society, may all be encapsulated in the 
interpretation clause if it so amended that it instructs the courts to take cognisance of 
the values inherent in indigenous law. Such an extension of the interpretation clause 
would not only accommodate the cultural diversity, it would strengthen the protection 
of human rights, at the same time enhancing the legitimacy of the Bill of Rights and 
the Constitution. 
If the interpretation clause is so amended, there would be less danger to the continued 
existence of indigenous law. However, a question which does arise is whether an 
indigenous-law rule which seems to be discriminatory will be found to be 
constitutionally invalid and struck down (that would be the case if section 35 were 
181 See generally Benedek 85-94; Van der Westhuizen "Tiger in Africa· 27 37; D'Sa 77-78. 
182 See, eg, Van der Westhuizen 'Tiger in Africa· 26-27, Benedek 66-94, D'Sa 77-78, Kiwanuka 
80-101. 
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interpreted to mean that the Bill of Rights had unrestricted horizontal application), 183 
or whether the courts would still be able to adapt that rule by applying considerations 
of public policy. If section 35(2) were extended to apply to all law, and not only to 
statutory law, it would increase the opportunity of ensuring the continued existence of 
indigenous law whilst developing it in consonance with the values (which are 
interpreted in a cultural context) entrenched in the Constitution. 
The Constitution will not eliminate the need for properly worked out rules for the 
resolution of internal conflicts of laws. The role of public policy could be expanded in 
internal conflict management, but then the conception of public policy as a colonial 
relic contained in the repugnancy clause should change to a conception of public 
policy underscored by communitarian ideals. 184 Here, too, section 35 plays an 
important role. 
Kahn-Freund 185 emphasises that a court should decide whether the outcome of the 
application of a foreign rule is against the principles of public policy, not whether the 
rule itself is desirable or moral. This would mean that in the sphere of private 
international law, public policy should be limited to desirable goals of collective societal 
welfare and that values of ethics and morality that are valuable in themselves, should 
183 According to Bennett "Equality Clause" 130 the problems relating to the horizontal application 
of the equality clause may be avoided by the application of Western law instead of indigenous 
law in accordance with "revitalised" conflict-of-laws rules. This would ensure that indigenous law 
is not eliminated through the application of the equality clause, but merely avoided when its 
application would result in a discriminatory result. Relief would be afforded on an ad-hoc basis 
by making use of the equality clause and other constitutional norms as "standards to direct the 
choice-of-law process". On the other hand, according to him, the horizontal application of the 
equality clause and the possible elimination of indigenous law could also be sidestepped by 
making use of the repugnancy proviso. The courts' hesitance to invoke the repugnancy clause 
thus far may be ascribed either to a general reluctance to keep indigenous law in step with 
changing social norms, or a general reluctance to apply unfamiliar laws. "Public policy" and 
"natural justice" as contained in the repugnancy proviso are but expressions of fundamental 
human rights and could as such be used as independent and subsidiary criteria to determine 
the possible application of indigenous law. 
184 Sanders "Internal Conflict of Laws" 59-60. 
185 Kahn-Freund 282 283. 
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not be considered. With regard to the internal conflict of laws, and in light of the Bill 
of Rights, it seems desirable that the actual rules be tested against policy 
considerations, as long as reference is had to their cultural context. 
The rule that a foreign norm must be tested against the principles of public policy is 
universally applicable. In the internal conflict of laws, it may have a salutary effect on 
indigenous law if public policy were to play a more important role. This is not to say 
that indigenous law should be treated as foreign law. Policy considerations are 
important in judicial legal development. If indigenous law is accorded full recognition 
in this country and if it receives the same status as Western common law, public policy 
and section 35 may be used to adapt and reform indigenous law and not as a means 
to avoid its application in favour of Western law. 
Public policy as it is presently employed in private international law and as it has been 
applied by the State courts as a criterion to determine the repugnancy of indigenous 
law, will have a detrimental effect on the application of indigenous law. One has to 
agree with Sanders that if public policy is to be used in internal conflicts management, 
conceptions of policy considerations should move away from a strict Western 
interpretation and incorporate indigenous values. In the State courts in South Africa, 
policy considerations (and the repugnancy clause) are as a rule determined and 
interpreted within a Western frame of reference. It must be remembered that the study 
of the structures inherent in Western legal discourse may follow a system of logic 
which differs from the system of logic of indigenous legal discourse. Therefore, the 
conceptions of public policy and natural justice should, as is the case with the Bill of 
Rights, be interpreted within the cultural framework of the specific community whose 
law is applied. 188 
Policy considerations play an important role in legal development generally and as a 
186 See generally Part 1.11.2. 
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mechanism in judicial law-making specifically. Van Aswegen 187 defines policy 
considerations as "substantive reasons for judgments reflecting values accepted by 
society". These values comprise moral or ethical values which are valuable in 
themselves, or they comprise desirable goals of collective societal welfare, or both. 
Presently, the most fundamental of these values are entrenched in the Constitution and 
the courts are directed to have regard to them in applying all law. 
Four instances have been highlighted in which the courts make use of policy 
considerations to adapt existing legal norms. These are: (i) where a legal rule is so 
formulated that it expressly or by implication incorporates considerations of policy in 
its application (open-ended standards are incorporated in the rule); (ii) where the area 
of application of existing rules is extended to cover new situations; (iii) where legal 
rules are altered to accommodate new situations; and (iv) where contradictory legal 
rules have diverse consequences. 188 It seems that the courts are as a rule not 
unwilling to make use of this mechanism to develop our legal system. 
With regard to (i), if one considers the fact that the repugnancy proviso is statutorily 
entrenched, it follows naturally that the norms which regulate the application of 
indigenous law are open-ended standards which incorporate considerations of public 
policy in their application. Thus, within an indigenous-law context, public policy is used 
to determine whether indigenous law is valid. The repugnancy proviso is used also as 
a limitation on the application of indigenous law where there is a conflict between 
indigenous law and Western law. However, there is no direct indication in section 1 of 
the Law of Evidence Amendment Act189 that Western law should be applied in a 
case where there is no conflict in hand, but where indigenous law is found to be 




Van Aswege~i·~oelict" 174; see also Payen Components CC v Bovie Gaskets CC 1994 2 SA 464 
fYV) 474 -476l which the Court refers to Van Aswegan with approval. 
Van Aswegan "Delict" 180-188. 
Act 54 of 1988; see Part l.IV.3. 
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such a case indigenous law should be adapted to bring it line with indigenous 
principles of public policy and that it should not serve as an indication that Western law 
should be applied. 
In Argus Printing and Publishing Do Ltd v lnkatha Freedom Party190 the Appellate 
Division observed that policy considerations differ from one community to the next, 
and that in South Africa the courts should heed "juridical convictions in this country 
and not elsewhere". Grosskopf JA further pointed out that "[a]s Judges we are 
expected to know and understand our own society and its institutions, particularly its 
legal ones". Indeed, it is expected that our judges would know or take note of 
indigenous legal institutions and juridical convictions and be alive to the fact that 
different policy considerations apply in the different communities in this country. 
With regard to (ii), the application of existing norms of both indigenous law and 
Western law may be extended to cover new situations. There are two possibilities of 
importance here. A rule may either be extended because changed circumstances 
created new situations which demand its extension, or because perceptions have 
changed as to the propriety of applying the rule. 191 
The polygynous marriage 192 and the consequences of such marriages may serve as 
an example of a case where changed perceptions may influence the continued 
existence of the institution. There are different views with regard to polygyny. 193 On 
190 1992 3 SA 579 (A) 593. 
191 See Van Aswegen "Delict" 182-186. 
192 Polygyny is declining due to economic and religious factors. 
193 Kaganas & Murray "Law" 130 point out that polygyny may afford wives some autonomy in that 
they have more freedom to engage in economic activities because the burden is shared by 
do-wives. It provides women with companionship, often in the form of a sister, it reduces sexual 
demands and allows a woman to space her children. Nevertheless the majority of women 
interviewed in surveys favour its abolition. Even men do not favour it anymore because it entails 
additional financial burdens, made impractical by changed economic and social conditions, and 
because they find it emotionally too demanding. 
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the one hand it is has become too expensive to maintain a multiple household, and 
on the other hand Christianity dictates against its practice. Even in former times, large 
polygynous households were confined to the wealthy and the ruling class. 194 
Nevertheless, indigenous moral and ethical values still do not dictate against the 
institution, and it should therefore be considered against the principles of public policy 
to deny the indigenous union the full status of marriage. The consequences of 
polygynous or potentially polygynous unions which are not in line with indigenous jural 
postulates should, however, be adapted to bring them once again in line with the 
values which underlie that law. 
An example of a case in which a court may extend the application of a legal rule to 
bring it in line with changed circumstances is that of women's proprietary capacity. In 
pre-colonial indigenous law, both men and women have a limited proprietary capacity. 
The head of the family195 represents the family and administers its property for the 
family as a whole. The fact that an adult man, other than the family head, represents 
the family, still does not affect his proprietary capacity which remains as limited as that 
of a woman. However, what happened in practice was that the courts extended the 
indigenous-law rule with regard to men, granting them full proprietary capacity. Yet 
they did not grant women the same capacity. The rules regulating proprietary capacity 
in indigenous law are currently therefore no longer in line with the indigenous 
postulates. The courts should extend women's proprietary capacity to bring it on a par 
with that of men. This would bring the indigenous-law rule which is applied in an 
adapted form in line with the prevailing market-economy and changed circumstances 
and with the jural postulates which underlie that law. 
The extension of the proprietary rights of women may also serve as an example of (iii), 
namely the alteration of a legal norm to accommodate new situations. 196 The 
194 Church Marriage 59-60. 
195 Granted, it must be a man. 
196 Van Aswegen "Delict" 186. 
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extension of proprietary rights may be interpreted as an alteration of the rule that the 
family head has reasonable control over the assets of family members. This will occur 
when it is found that a family head's control over salaries and wages, for example, falls 
outside the conception of "reasonable management of family assets", in other words, 
that with reference to prevailing circumstances such control is not in line with public 
policy .197 Again it should be borne in mind that an open-ended legal rule, where a 
judge has to make a value judgment, 198 is regarded as express justification for the 
use of public policy and thus for judicial legal development by the extension or 
alteration of an existing rule. A further example of the alteration of an indigenous law 
rule in accordance with indigenous policy considerations and at the same time in 
accordance with indigenous jural postulates, is the granting of an enforceable right for 
maintenance to a child against her father or his estate. 
The fourth instance in which a court may base its decision on policy considerations 
is where contradictory legal rules which have conflicting consequences are potentially 
applicable. 199 Contradictory legal norms and diverse consequences for different rules 
are of course inherent in cases where Western and indigenous law are both potentially 
applicable in the same set of facts. 
In an internal conflict situation, two legal systems, underscored by different values, are 
197 Bennett "Equality Clause" 126-127 approaches the problem from another angle. According to 
him the application of section 28(1) of the Constitution (which provides that all persons should 
have the right to acquire and hold proprietary rights in property and to dispose of it) read in 
conjunction with the equality clause (which provides for gender equality) may be employed to 
protect existing proprietary rights. However, it is not certain whether the courts may extend 
women's existing capacity to the acquisition and control of wages. But, by making use of the 
German principle of the indirect horizontal application of human rights, the courts could use the 
principles of constitutional law to determine whether wages and salaries fall within a family 
head's power to manage family assets reasonably. The same result could probably be obtained 
by simply treating this rule of customary law as an open-ended norm which demands the use 
of policy considerations to extend or even to alter its application in line with changed 
circumstances. 
198 In this example the court will have to determine whether the family head's control over family 
assets is reasonable. 
199 See generally Van Aswegan "Deticr 186-188. 
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potentially applicable. The problem in such a case is that different results may be 
obtained depending on the cultural context in which policy considerations are applied. 
Considerations of the principles of public policy in an indigenous-cultural context may 
induce the court to apply indigenous law, whilst the principles of public policy in a 
Western context may induce the court to make a finding in favour of Western law. 
Therefore, considerations of public policy should not be regarded as a guideline in 
determining which legal system should be applied. It should not be applied to 
determine the validity of indigenous law. At present Western principles are regarded 
as universally applicable and are thus used to limit the application of indigenous law. 
Once a court has decided, in terms of conflict-of-law rules, which system of law is 
most closely connected to ~he facts, it should have regard to section 35 of the 
Constitution and to the principles of public policy (in the cultural context of the chosen 
or designated legal system) to determine whether it should be applied as it is, or 
' 
whether it should be adapted or whether it should be altered. It may well be found that 
when indigenous law is again brought in line with its underlying postulates, the original 
source of conflict has been eliminated at the same time. 
The fact that a claim for maintenance within the same agnatic group is unknown in 
indigenous law may serve as an illustration. The principle which underlies this specific 
rule is that everything the group owns belongs to all its members communally and that 
the group should provide for the needs of everyone in the group. The principle is not 
inherently discriminatory against children and the rule was not designed so that 
children would be destitute when their father died. Other mechanisms existed to 
protect the interests of the children. But in light of changed circumstances and the 
development of individual ownership (at least for men), a strict application of the rule 
would indeed be discriminatory against children. The rule should therefore be changed 
to give a child an enforceable claim against his father's estate. That would bring the 
rule once more in line with the underlying indigenous-law principles, at the same time 
removing the source of conflict between Western and indigenous norms. In this 
instance the court should therefore not determine that the indigenous-law rule is 
against public policy and that Western law should therefore be applied. 
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Fifteen years ago Vissef<'° wrote: 
"Hierbo is daarop gewys dat alhoewel talle kenmerke van die outochtone reg selfs as voorbeeld 
vir die landsreg kan dien, sommige kenmerke weer onaanvaarbaar is in 'n Westerse 
gemeenskap. As gevolg van laasgenoemde is dit dan nodig dat die toepassing van die 
outochtone reg ingevolge die interne aanwysingsreg, onderhewig gemaak word aan 'n 
beperking wat sal verseker dat hierdie onaanvaarbare kenmerke uitgeweer word. Die 
regverdiging vir hierdie voorkeurverlening aan die landsreg is gelee in die natuurlike 
akkulturasieproses (waarby ingesluit is die regsakkulturasieproses). Vanwee die felt dat die 
landsreg die grootste stukrag in hierdie proses vertoon, neig die outochtone reg in die rigting 
van die landsregmodel." 
History has shown that the process of acculturation did not have such a drastic effect 
on indigenous law and culture as anticipated. The continued application of unofficial 
indigenous law bears witness to the fact that in stead of a movement towards, there 
was a reaction against Western legal ideas, principles and institutions. The indigenous 
law which is upheld in unofficial institutions is not a Westernised indigenous law. The 
entrenchment of traditional leadership in the Constitution is an indication that great 
score is still set by traditional institutions. However, this does not mean that indigenous 
law is static. Nor does it mean that it has not changed over the years or that it has not 
been influenced by Western ideas and values. Its development at grass roots level has 
taken place within the framework of the basic axioms which underlie indigenous legal 
orders. It is where development lost track of these basic axioms that indigenous law 
became discriminatory. 
Indeed, an attitude of eurocentricism is a sure recipe for failure in the resolution of 
internal conflicts of laws. The underlying values and basic axioms of both legal 
systems should be taken into account in a conflict situation. What should the ultimate 
goal of internal conflicts management be? Is it possible to attain legal unity where the 
two applicable systems are so different with regard to norms, values and process? 
200 Visser lnterne Aanwysingsreg 418. 
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Should the goal be to integrate the Western law and indigenous law, or should these 
systems be harmonised? 
Integration has the effect that a new legal system is created which replaces the 
pre-existing systems. In the case of integration the new unified law may still draw its 
rules from one of the component systems which it replaced. Should there be an 
integrated system, policy considerations should reflect the integrated values of all. 
Then again, the aim may be to harmonise the Western law and indigenous law. 
Harmonisation is the removal of discord and the reconciliation of the contradictory 
elements, in the rules, postulates and effects of the two legal systems which will 
nevertheless continue in force as self-sufficient bodies of law.201 Both systems will 
continue as independent systems, underscored, as they presently are, by their own 
jural postulates. Certain and well worked-out rules to regulate the internal conflict of 
Western and indigenous law should then regulate the legal pluralism in this country 
and these rules should be applied by legal personnel who also have a thorough 
knowledge of indigenous law. 
201 See Church Marriage 191. 
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
"Are you civilised? 
Have you been civilised recently?"1 
A plurality of laws is the result of cultural differences and often reflects a largely 
irreconcilable plurality of legal values. In South Africa dissatisfaction with the 
administration of justice and the crisis of legitimacy of State law are the result not only 
of the existing legal pluralism in this country. They have in part been caused by the 
fact that from the time that Western law was first introduced at the Cape of Good 
Hope, an attitude of superiority or cultural chauvinism has prevailed. According to this 
attitude, all Western cultural aspects were characterised as progressive and civilised, 
and those of Africa as primitive and uncivilised. The monopolistic control of the legal 
order by the Western or European component of the population resulted in the 
creation of a legal order primarily suited to the needs of that section of the community 
whose traditions and way of life my be classified as Western, capitalist. This perceived 
superiority of the State law, "which is called in orthodox jurisprudence simply 'law' 
without any adjective attached because of its believed-in nature as the only genuine 
law in human society", 2 today still directs the practical relationship between that law 
and indigenous law. This perception is reflected also in the Interim Constitution and 
Bill of Rights which were drafted within a typical Western conceptual framework. 
Judicial application of indigenous law by State courts and State legislation regulating 
the application of indigenous law, forced that law to move away from the jural 
postulates which underlie it. An unjust indigenous legal system has evolved, far 
removed from the pre-colonial system and its institutions, and far removed from the 
true indigenous law adapted in accordance with its underlying postulates. This 
distorted system is the indigenous law which is often presented as authentic 
1 Monty Python 98. 
2 Chiba Legal Pluralism 1. 
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indigenous law; it is this distorted indigenous law which is perceived as inherently 
discriminatory by those who struggle for equality between male and female and old 
and young; and it is also this law, together with the official Western law, which are 
perceived to be illegitimate and which gave rise to the emergence of an alternative 
people's law and alternative dispute-resolution institutions. If this law is brought in step 
with its underlying postulates and interpreted in its cultural context, it may be found to 
be just and non-discriminatory, even in Western terms. 
Against all odds indigenous law has proved to be resilient. Despite the State regulation 
of its application, and despite the fact that internal conflicts are unfairly resolved in 
favour of Western law, indigenous law has survived. In the rural areas, where State 
legislation has been largely ignored, it is still applied in a reasonably pure form. 
Indigenous law is also an adaptable legal system. In the metropolitan areas it has 
grown to meet the needs of the urban community. And even in the rural areas it has 
not remained static. But where legal development was relatively free from Western 
influence, indigenous law developed naturally in accordance with its underlying 
postulates, and is in fact still undergoing a continuing process of development. This 
process should nevertheless not be regarded as a shift in emphasis towards Western 
values. 
Also in the urban areas, where there is a much stronger Western influence, adaption 
of indigenous law seems to have taken place within the framework of indigenous jural 
postulates, although there has been some movement away from traditional indigenous 
legal institutions. But this does not imply that there has necessarily been a radical 
change in the jural postulates that underpin the law and social ordering. People's 
courts, resembling pre-colonial indigenous institutions in structure, are today still in 
operation. These courts are witness to the fact that although, for the vast majority of 
the urban population, the notion of tribalism is abating, indigenous practices in 
domestic relations are still of importance. Moreover, although political, economic and 
social circumstances may have forced a change in familial structures, it is not 
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necessarily true that the need for the indigenous way of family organisation has also 
disappeared. The need for a familiar, traditional organisation of the family and family 
relations is witnessed by the informal dispute-resolution institutions which have been 
established in urban areas. Many domestic customs are not incompatible with the 
conditions of urban life and urban dwellers as a rule still regulate their domestic 
relations according to indigenous norms and values. 
The difference in the values of Western and indigenous legal cultures is reflected in a 
fundamental conflict between the jural postulates which underscore Western and 
indigenous law. Also, the foundations of the jural postulates underlying Western and 
indigenous law are different. Accordingly the so-called invariable characteristics of the 
legal systems are different. Where there is legal pluralism but the legal systems which 
are observed do not enjoy the same status, disparity in the fundamental values gives 
rise to a crisis of, at least, cultural legitimacy in the dominant legal system. More 
importantly~ it may threaten the very existence and continued application of the 
indigenous system of law. 
The question arises how legal pluralism should be accommodated in this country? 
There is no doubt that the interaction of indigenous law and Western law is in dire 
need of proper regulation, but how should this be accomplished? The following may 
be noted: 
Unofficial dispute-resolution institutions, people's law and unofficial indigenous law 
have proved that where the postulates that underscore indigenous law are ignored and 
where indigenous law is distorted, the newly developed system is, like the official law, 
disregarded; true indigenous law is applied and the legitimacy of the official law is 
called into question. 
South African law is at present dominated by Western law, and requires the imput of 
Africa to create a truly South African legal system. However, it is just too idealistic to 
expect that an integrated legal system can be created without surrendering some of 
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the values which buttress the just and equitable Western legal system, or without 
sacrificing some of the communitarian ideals which sustain the humanistic indigenous 
legal system. It is also too idealistic to expect that the law could be South Africanised 
by taking the best of both systems and creating a single unified system which is 
neither Eurocentric nor Afrocentric. The jural postulates of Western law and of 
indigenous law bear out the fact that these systems of law can be unified only with the 
greatest of difficulty and only by sacrificing values which are inherent in the two 
different cultures involved. 
The only way in which the law can be South Africanised is by accepting that two 
disparate legal systems are ~bserved in this country, by recognising their parallel 
application, and by appreciating the different values which underscore both systems 
of law. Indigenous law should receive full recognition and enjoy the same status as 
Western law. This system of law should exist alongside the Western component of 
South African law. If the South African legal system is to be legitimised it should be 
brought closer to reality and closer to the needs of the community. In short, effect 
should be given to the norms, the processes and the values of both systems of law. 
Individuals should have the freedom to choose which system of law they prefer to 
follow. The system of law chosen will naturally reflect the values to which the individual 
adheres. The choice should not be influenced by the fact that one system of law is 
treated as inferior, or by the fact that its application is limited to the extent that it is 
regarded as being or has become unjust, or by the fact that it has been distorted to 
the extent that it does not reflect the basic axioms which underscore its tradition. 
It cannot be denied that the co-existence of legal systems as different as the imposed 
Western and the indigenous system, creates a certain measure of tension and even 
conflict - if not where both systems are potentially applicable, then at least in the 
precepts which underscore them and to which effect is given through application. 
Therefore, certain and detailed rules for the internal conflict between indigenous law 
and Western law should be legislated. These rules should take cognisance of 
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indigenous mechanisms to resolve internal conflicts. These mechanisms should not 
be ignored, regardless of whether they are legal rules or mere conflict sensitivities. 
Only when these indigenous premises are accommodated in the internal-conflict rules 
and conflict-resolution process, will internal conflicts management find general 
acceptance. 
Courts should be denied a discretion not to apply indigenous law where it is the 
designated or chosen legal system. Judicial officers should be thoroughly trained in 
indigenous law and should be sensitive to the basic axioms of that law. They should 
be able to develop indigenous law in accordance with thesa basic precepts wbeJ:e" __ __,J 
public policy so demands and. they should be directed by the Constitution to d~_sd:_) 
An integrated court system should exist. The fundamentally Western court system 
should be reformed to allow a culture of community participation in dispute resolution. 
Forums for dispute resolution in which the community may participate collectively and 
openly should be established: this is the legacy of pre-colonial institutions and is a 
reaffirmation and perpetuation of the spirit of communitarianism and collectivity 
underlying indigenous African law and social ordering. The hiatus between "ours" and 
"theirs" should be eliminated. Both indigenous law and Western law should be ours, 
both should form part of the South African legal system. The present court structure 
which reflects first-class Western justice as opposed to second-class community 
justice should be eliminated. In legal process there should not be different principles 
for different people. Indigenous courts and community courts should operate within 
a formal structure which reveals a delicate balance between formal and informal 
justice. The key issues which should be addressed are access to justice and equal 
justice. Legislation should provide for due process and the protection of human rights, 
provided that human rights are perceived in a South African framework which also 
gives effect to African conceptions of fundamental rights. 
Finally, a study Western and indigenous law and their jural postulates reveals that 
although they are incongruent, the application of their legal norms surprisingly often 
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leads to the same results. Even in a multicultural society such as that of South Africa, 
there is a common nucleus of core values that are shared by the whole society. The 
existence of these values is often overlooked in indigenous law. These values are, for 
example, values of life, human dignity and equal protection of the law. But different 
cultures have different conceptions of these basic values and their role in legal, political 
and social ordering. The Bill of Rights should give due recognition to the postulates 
which underscore both Western and indigenous law, by providing that the values it 
entrenches are interpreted in their proper cultural perspective where circumstances 
demand. It is ignorance of indigenous law and its basic axioms which spawned a spirit 
of intolerance towards that law. If that law is again brought in step with its fundamental 
precepts, and if it is interpreted within the context of these precepts, it will be in 
harmony with the core values shared by indigenous and Western communities. But 
this will be possible only if the level of knowledge of indigenous law and its 
fundamental precepts is drastically improved. 
The following was once said with regard to American society, 
"Ours is a late-twentieth-century world profoundly fissured by nationality, ethnicity, race, class, 
and gender. And the only way to transcend those divisions ... is through education that seeks 
to comprehend the diversity of human culture. Beyond the hype and the high-flown rhetoric is 
a pretty homely truth: There is no tolerance without respect - and no respect without 
knowledge." (my emphasis)3 
This fundamental truth applies no less to South African society. 
The new South African legal system should be inclusive, rather than exclusionary. It 
should reflect respect for the South African cultural heritage which includes the 
traditions, laws, values, language, and beliefs of the Western as well as the indigenous 
African component of this society. 
3 Ong Hing 910. 
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